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Raising Beef during the 1890s

The first real blizzard of the season struck Kansas on January 23, 1894, forcing
temperatures down to fifteen degrees below zero in some parts of the state.
One can imagine an old cowboy the morning after the big snow, urging his
reluctant team into the small corral where the hay had been stacked the
previous summer. It was still cold, and the breath of the horses mixed with
his own before disappearing over his shoulder and settling along the fresh
track that his hayrack had just made as he went about feeding the cow herd
for another day. Winter feeding was an increasingly popular practice now
that there were more ranchers, fewer cattle, fenced pastures, and white-faced
bulls. The old cowboy knew that there was no longer any profit in raising
cattle unless they were fed during the winter months when snow covered the
grass.
Many cowboys could remember when, only a few years before, they had
not spent winters feeding cattle, but rather huddling next to a pot-bellied stove
in a drafty bunkhouse, endlessly playing cards, or thumbing through a dogeared Sears, Roebuck catalogue, or drinking in a saloon when they could get to
town. They waited for spring work to begin, when they would drive cattle
north from Texas, work on a roundup crew, or simply herd a large bunch
of cattle from one stand of grass to another, always making sure that a creek
or river was close by. Now, windmills provided water almost any place on
the range, and the quiet summers were disrupted, more often than not, by
clanging mowing machines.
Although some of the older cowmen may have longed for the "good old
days," beef production in Kansas by the 1890s was well along in its transition
from the open range to the ranch of the twentieth century. The original cattle-
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men had spread across the West during the last half of the nineteenth century,
their number multiplying as the rai lroads extended lines into the new territory.
During the early 1880s, they enjoyed a degree of prosperity. Their scrub cattle
grazed the free or cheap grass, often with little attention except for branding
and the selection of aged steers destined for slaughter. Hundreds of unattended cattle died each year from extremes in the weather, and some overgrazing occurred in the rush to beat the other fellow to the grass. Little fencing
was done, nor were the cattle upbred. The relatively few owners of cattle in
this open-range situation employed mostly a transient labor force, often men
who were unmarried and, some said, unchurched. Although many have found
the early cattle industry colorful and romantic, it was in fact wasteful of grass,
livestock, and manpower.
The open range disappeared and serious ranching began as larger numbers
of cattlemen and farmers took over the land. They paid taxes and developed
communities. Having built fences, they cared for their cattle the year around,
and arranged for aggressive Hereford bulls to march in from the Midwest
to take over the cow herds. Fences and better herd management reduced
cattle thefts. Mowing machines and hay stackers came into common use to
provide winter feed. Consequently, most cattle survived the winter and cows
produced a much larger calf crop. Specialization into calf production, the
maturing of stockers, and the fattening of feeder cattle became more pronounced. Ranch work was well organized, purposeful, and more profitable
for a larger number of people, although it did become routine and rather
prosaic. Cowhands more often now were married and even attended church,
acquiring domestic and social concerns along with their greater attention to
the cattle. These ranchers of the late nineteenth century and after, who transformed beef raising into the important national industry that it is today, are
the real heroes of the cattle business. The greater credit is due to them rather
than to their forefathers, who in fact helped themselves to the public's grass,
paid few if any taxes, and wasted the lives of cows and men, all in the process
of producing rather poor beef.
While much changed when the expansive method of producing beef gave
way to modern ranching, some things stayed the same. Grass and cows were
still basic. John J. Ingalls, a senator from Kansas from 1873 to 1891, once
said, "Grass is the forgiveness of nature-her constant benediction. Fields
trampled with battle, saturated with blood, torn with the ruts of cannon, grow
green again with grass, and carnage is forgotten . . . . Forests decay, harvests
perish, flowers vanish, but grass is immortal." Cattlemen agree with Ingalls'
2
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high opm10n of grass, realizing that good grazing is the foundation of the
range cattle industry and the basic reason it has remained permanent in the
West rather than transient, as it had been in much of the East. The cow, not
particularly intelligent or prolific as animals go, is a hardy specimen, whose
unique, four-compartmented stomach can convert relatively low-grade natural
vegetation into highly desirable protein food. "She is," one observer noted,
"a mobile, selfpowered processing plant that needs no other raw material
except water" to produce one of our most popular foods. As in ages past,
then, there can be no beef industry without grass and cows. 1

Kansas is in the transitional zone between East and West as far as environmental factors such as flatness, timber, aridity, and native vegetation are concerned. Even a casual observer is struck with the contrasts that appear within
the state. The eastern third has trees, rolling hills, and long grasses, while
many of the trees disappear and the flatter land produces short grasses in the
western third except, of course, where the native vegetation has been replaced
with wheat and other grains. The central third, roughly the area between
the 95th and 100th meridians, has environmental features characteristic of
both the eastern and western sections.
Environmental traits, along with human adaptation to them, accounted
in large part for the variations that were found in the Kansas beef industry
during the late nineteenth century. A more detailed examination of different ·
sections of the state, first the Flint Hills, then the areas to the east and west
of these famous hills, demonstrates the importance of environment as well as
the variety of techniques that were used to produce beef in Kansas.
The Flint Hills, central to the Kansas beef industry during the late nineteenth century and for many years thereafter, encompassed some of the most
extensive ranches in the state engaged in beef production. James C. Malin, a
highly regarded Kansas historian, outlines the region "as a somewhat elongated oval-shaped area about 200 miles from tip to tip, with Pottawatomie
County, Kansas, at the northern end and Osage County, Oklahoma, at the
southern end, the intervening country being some fifty miles, or somewhat
more than two counties, in width." There have been other attempts to define
an exterior boundary, but essentially the Flint Halls are the "Central third of
the eastern half of the State." They include the whole or some part of about
fifteen Kansas counties.~
The beautiful bluestem pastures of the Flint Hills, covered with both long
3

The Kansas Beef Industry

and short grasses, supported thousands of transient cattle each summer, shipped
in from Texas, the Southwest, or western Kansas for a few months of growth
and fattening before moving on to a slaughtering plant or to a specialized
feedlot in the Midwest. The Flint Hills also helped stabilize the beef industry,
not only of Kansas but of the Southwest as well, by grazing breeding herds
during summers of extreme drought. And a few permanent cow herds existed,
especially those dedicated to producing breeding stock for use in upgrading
herds in Kansas and westward, while a few cattle were fed grain. Nevertheless, the most distinctive operation in the area remained the pasturing of
transient cattle.
Many of the first settlers to reach the Flint Hills after the Civil War
passed through the region's tall grass, preferring the rich, deep-soiled plow
lands farther west. Only a few stopped to take up land in the fertile valleys
along the several streams that permeate the region. This is surprising, as the
thirty to thirty-five inches of annual rainfall is adequate for farming, and most
of the upland area has adequate soil fertility and depth for extensive cropping.
Nor are all of the bluestem pastures in hills. Many are on terrain that is
remarkably flat, free of chert or flint outcroppings, and quite suitable for the
plow. But for a number of reasons farming was never extended to all the
areas it might have been. During the 1870s the slow experimental process of
specializing in the grazing of transient cattle began and helped differentiate
the Flint Hills from the wheat country to the west and the mixed farming
area to the east. In the end, this disproved early boom literature promising
immigrants that livestock interests would dominate only until the demands for
a more intensive land-use necessitated crop farming-a sequence that had happened repeatedly in areas to the east.3
The cattle boom of the early 1880s and the drought at the end of the
decade also discouraged plowing. The former made the practice of producing
breeding stock for areas farther west more profitable, while the dry years,
combined with the increased numbers of cattle in the Southwest, placed a
premium on Kansas grazing lands. More ties with out-of-state ranching interests were thus encouraged, and many large pasture areas were created by
purchasing railroad lands or by taking land already assembled into large acreages by some organization.
In 1882, for instance, a Scottish syndicate purchased 75,000 acres of Flint
Hills land from the Santa Fe Railroad and an additional 20,000 acres from the
Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad. This large tract of land became famous
first as the Diamond Ranch and then as the 101 Ranch, when it "was used in
4
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Loading cattle for the Swenson Land and Cattle Company, Stanford, Texas.
Thousands of cattle such as these were shipped into the Flint Hills each year
for summer grazing. Courtesy of the Southwest Collection, Texas Tech
University, Lubbock, Texas.

part for pasture-fattening steers from its 160,000-acre sister operation in Hartley
County, Texas."-1 Other links with out-of-state interests were developed, and
cattlemen like the Roglers, Crackers, Saubles, and Tads soon spread throughout the West the virtues of Flint Hills' grazing.
Many Kansans also brought cattle into the region from other parts of the
state to graze on either rented land or ranch land that they owned. Frank
Arnold, Lyon County banker and cattleman, for instance, synchronized stocker
production in western Kansas with maturing cattle on Flint Hills grass.
Arnold had purchased a ranch of 20,000 acres near Ashland, which he and
his son, Francis, operated for many years. He had been attracted to the small
town by a real-estate boom during the early 1880s, when a stream of settlers
poured into the Southwest to take up government land. When drought appeared ten years later and many of these farmers and small cattlemen were
forced from the land, Arnold began to purchase their property, much of it for
only the taxes due. Despite the rustlers, who operated out of what is today
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the Oklahoma Panhandle, the Arnolds and many others across the state
shipped thousands of cattle into the Flint Hills each year. 5
The movement of western Kansas cattle to eastern parts of the state,
notably the Flint Hills, continued throughout the eighties and nineties and
then increased during the early years of the twentieth century. Some indication
of the movement can be gained from the reports of a single shipping point
on the Santa Fe branch line to Ashland. A 1906 issue of the local newspaper,
for example, noted that over 160 cars of cattle had been shipped to the eastern
part of the state for summer grazing in 1905 and nearly 200 cars in 1906. A
year later, the paper reported over 500 cars of aged steers headed east. 6
The railroads helped to establish the Flint Halls as a distinct area during
the eighties and nineties by facilitating the inshipment of cattle. The Santa Fe,
with its main line running through the Flint Hills, western Kansas, Colorado,
and the Southwest, and many of its branch lines linking southern points, provided cattlemen with the means of transporting cattle into the Flint Hills
without disturbing any of the intervening farmers or ranchers. The Missouri,
Kansas, and Texas Railroad as well as a few other lines participated in the
same business. Cheaper feed-in-transit rates also contributed to the quantity of
inshipped cattle. These special tariffs allowed owners of cattle to pay the
rates for a single long haul from the point of origin to the final destination
at a slaughtering plant rather than the higher charges that would have resulted
from the short hauls that actually occurred.
State legislation in the area of di sease control encouraged the grazing of
transient cattle by ensuring the health of inshipped cattle. By the nineties the
Kansas Legislature had been passing and amending the state's quarantine
laws for over three decades. To keep the ravages of Texas fever out of Kansas,
for instance, the legislature generally restricted cattle that had not spent a
winter north of the tick-infested area of Texas from moving into some parts
of the state except during the winter months from December to March. By
1867 all of Kansas except that part south and west of present McPherson was
protected. The unprotected section was gradually reduced until the whole
state was placed under quarantine in 1884 and 1885. The laws, however, were
more often violated than honored, and it was not until the 1890s when more
knowledge was gained of Texas fever and how it was transmitted that the
federal and state sanitary agencies were able to provide a degree of security
to those cattlemen engaged in the business of grazing transient cattle. Improvement came largely through closer inspection of cattle and dipping procedures.
Although attaining widespread protection from the fever was a gradual process
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not fully accomplished until the near demise of the tick well into the twentieth
century, cattlemen felt there was less risk in importing cattle once inspections
and quarantines were established. 7
The unique grazing of transient cattle, then, was by the 1890s a major
business in the Flint Hills and was to a large degree based on environmental
factors. The Emporia Gazette reported in 1894 that over 200,000 cattle were
already being shipped into Kansas each year, many arriving in the Flint Hills
during April and May. Four to six months of grazing followed before the
stock was shipped to slaughter or to cornbelt feedlots. Shipping out occurred
principally during August and September. The length of the grazing period
was determined by the protein levels of the native grasses, which "run from
ten to fifteen percent from April to June ... and then break rather sharply
in July to seven to ten percent." The decline continues through August and
September and may dip as low as four percent. 8 The levels of declining protein
of the long grasses in the Flint Hills differ sharply from those of the buffalo
and gramas of the short-grass region, which retain a higher level of protein
well into the winter months. In a larger sense, the protein factor helped
determine whether a producer specialized in calf production or in the maturing
of stockers.
The managerial practices necessary for handling these transient cattle in ·
the Flint Hills took several forms. Sometimes the owner of stock leased
bluestem pasture, then cared for his cattle himself or hired others to do so. At
other times the owner of the grass bought cattle for grazing, or had ranch
land in other parts of the country that produced the stockers he needed. The
operation of the 101 Ranch, with land in Texas and the Flint Hills, illustrated
the latter method. Speculators sometimes got involved, buying both the
cattle and the right to use the grass. The anticipated market levels at the end
of the grazing season often determined which course the owner of the land
or cattle took. 9 Most often in the 1890s, and for many years thereafter, the
transient cattle belonged to one person, the grass to another, and in between
the two was a unique individual known as the professional pastureman. Two·
or three of these professionals developed in each community, representing the
landowner to those who owned the four-, five-, and even six-year-old steers that
needed final grass fattening before slaughter. The Rogler family exemplifies
professional pasturemen as well as any in the Flint Hills, using at different
times several of the different techniques.
Charles Rogler migrated from Germany to Kansas before the Civil War,
settling north of Matfield Green on land that is still in the family. His son,
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Cattle pens at Eskridge, Kansas, used for holding cattle that were moving into or
out of the Flint Hills. Courtesy of the Kansas Department of Economic Development.

Henry, and then later his grandson, Wayne, became pasturemen. The Roglers
initiated their dealings with transient cattle soon after the Santa Fe Railroad
pushed through the area during the 1880s. Working for a percent of the
pasture rent, the Roglers and other pasturemen took care of the thousands
of cattle that they had contracted for in the name of the landowner. The
contracts were written rather than oral, specifying a certain acreage to graze,
and guaranteeing water, salt, and protection against straying and theft.
Spring arrivals of cattle from the Southwest and early fall departures of
the same stock after a gain of two hundred or three hundred pounds each
were occasions for enjoyable social events for the people of nearby communities
not unlike the gatherings that occurred at threshing time in farming areas.
Pasturemen, cattle owners, cowboys, and a miscellaneous assortment of other
folk clustered around the railroad stations waiting for the arrival of stock cars.
Some pitched horseshoes or played cards, others told each other tall tales, and
8
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all talked intently about cattle prices or the condition of the grass. A small but
usually good cafe was central to the pageant, providing roast beef and strong
coffee to speed the hours spent waiting for the train. 10
Besides grazing transient cattle, a few stockmen in the Flint Hills kept
breeding herds the year around and supplemented their winter feed with
grain and cottonseed products or roughage feeds such as alfalfa. Breeding
herds were most adaptable to those parts of the Flint Hills where a higher
percentage of short grass was mixed with the long bluestem. Several of these
herds were purebred cattle used for the production of improved breeding
stock for the range.
In addition, some local or inshipped cattle were partially or fully fed on
grain before being marketed. The Emporia Gazette reported the extent of
feeding in a single county of the Flint Hills, noting that more than 20,000
cattle would be on full- or half-feed in Lyon County during the winter of
1895. Sixteen feeders were listed as each having 300 or more cattle, with the
partnership of Tom Price and William Martindale topping the list with 3,000
head.11
Finally, the Flint Hills helped stabilize the beef industry in Kansas and
the Southwest during times of severe drought. According to J. J. Moxley, a
long-time rancher in the Council Grove area, the "Flint Rock pastures absorb
the rainfall in the spring and then give it back in the heat of the summer."
This enabled quite a number of breeding herds to survive the dry years of
the late eighties and early nineties as well as several droughts in the twentieth
century. 12
Kansans took great pride in the Flint Hills. In singing its praises they
referred to it as the best cattle region in the state, if not the Untied States or
even the world. It was most often compared to the Sand Hills of western
Nebraska, with the Nebraska region always coming out second best. The
Emporia Gazette reported in 1905 that a circle with a radius of fifty miles
around the town would include eight of the greatest cattle counties in Kansas.
It further noted that the area within the circle had the "best natural grass in
the world," that it was the "garden spot" of the state, and that 40 percent of
the "top cattle" sold on the Kansas City market came from the area. Emporia
itself was labeled the "capital of steerdom." 13
Some of the paper's claims needed modification, however, as other parts
of Kansas were also raising good cattle and engaging in the transient stock
business. Not all of the rural residents of the Flint Hills were cattlemen; nor
9
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was all the land used to graze stock. Crop farmers also lived in the region,
many of whom were not at all or only slightly interested in grazing cattle.

Stockmen in the mixed farming area to the east of the Flint Hills, roughly a
sixth of the state, engaged in several phases of beef production, but the geography and the methods of production were not as distinctive as those in the
Flint Hills. A few transient cattle spilled over from the Flint Hills and were
matured on grass. Herds of purebred breeding stock also dotted this section,
complementing the feeder cattle and commercial cow herds that grazed the
unplowed long grasses or ate much of the grain that was produced.
The eastern section was usually referred to as the cornbelt of Kansas.
An overall emphasis on a corn-hog economy, much like that of the Midwest
from whence most of the settlers had come, was evident there by the 1890s.
The good corn, which grew in a section that received more than thirty inches of
annual rainfall, was sometimes used to feed cattle. A few farmers had relatively
large feeder operations, but most feeders full- or half-fed less than a hundred
head of their own or inshipped cattle. After a winter of feeding, the stock
was marketed for slaughter in the spring or, if still young, sent to summer
grazing for more growth and maturity. Hog and cattle production was often
complementary, with the hogs following the cattle in the same feedlot and
fattening on the corn that passed through the bovine's digestive system.
The drought and depression of the 1890s hurt this section as well as the
rest of Kansas and the whole grassland region. The low market price for corn
encouraged some farmers to increase cattle feeding in an attempt to reap
greater profits from their grain crop; but the drought and the drop in beef
prices, especially up to 1895, brought about a decline in the number of the
state's beef cattle. The middle nineties was the low point of Kansas beef
production for the decade. One newspaper suggested that there was profit in
cattle only through the by-product of hog fattening, while another said that
many cattle were being shipped to Texas and the Southwest because the
Kansas City market was glutted with cattle "too thin to butcher, and [too]
light to feed corn." 14
Beef production in the section immediately west of the Flint Hills, approximately the central third of the state, was determined largely by the sizable
influx of farmers during the 1870s. Its agriculture was similar to that in the
eastern section except for a greater emphasis on wheat, although the northern
tier of counties specialized in the corn-hog economy. Cattle, usually small cow
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Branding calves on the Salt Fork, Barber County, in the 1890s. Courtesy of
the Kansas State Historical Society.
herds, and hogs were most often the livestock raised on the diversified farms.
But there were also some large ranch operations along the western border of
the Flint Hills and in the southern counties to the west. Feeder cattle were
sometimes a part of the farm operation, as were herds of purebred cattle. In
fact, some of the state's first purebred Herefords were raised 111 this central
reg10n.
Much of the full feeding of cattle 111 the 1890s occurring 111 this section
as well as the other areas of Kansas took advantage of several new feeds and
combinations of feeds that were developed at Kansas State Agricultural College. The results of experiments with stock diets were reported to feeders
requesting help from the college. Corn, which was sometimes soaked in water
or mixed with various types of roughage, was still the basic ration; but with
an abundant supply and the drastic decline in prices in 1894, wheat was becoming increasingly popular.
The Kansas Farmer reported, "Never before in the history of Kansas was
such vast quantities of wheat fed to growing and fattening stock as at the
present time, and the practice is general throughout the West. ... " Several
writers for the Farmer felt compelled to advise feeders that it was not wicked
to feed wheat to cattle when there were people in the country who were
hungry for the bread the grain might produce. Evidently, in a folk-culture
where wheat was thought of as a food for humans, people had to be persuaded
to use it as livestock feed. The agricultural college joined the Farmer in
advising the use of wheat, pointing out that it was especially good for bone
and muscle development before the final layers of fat were put on with corn.
11
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Because of a significant increase during the 1890s in the amount of cottonseed that was crushed for livestock feed , it became a popular diet for cattle.
The seed, sometimes crushed into a meal and mixed with roughages such as
cob meal, ensilage, hay, or straw, was considered a high-powered diet. Some
feeders believed that a judicious use of cottonseed in a balanced ration would
"lay on flesh faster than any known food." In addition to its use with feeder
cattle, cottonseed cake became important in the diet of range stock. Made
from the pulp of the seed-meat after the oil had been extracted, cotton cake
was especially important as a supplement to the roughage fed to cattle during
the winter months. Besides cottonseed, the expanded use of alfalfa, several
varieties of sorghum, and the Russian-developed crested wheat grass produced
more forage for cattle. The sorghums were especially significant for their
drought-resisting qualities.
The revolution in the methods of full-feeding stock that resulted from
the use of new feeds and the scientific research into diet combinations decreased
the amount of time required to finish cattle for market approximately by onehalf, depending on their condition when entering the feedlot and on the degree
of finish desired at the end. This, of course, represented a considerable saving
for the cattleman. Despite several new feeds, however, corn remained a popular basic diet for fattening stock. 15
Merritt M. Sherman's business operations typified some of the activities
of other stockmen in this section in the beef industry during the 1890s and into
the twentieth century. Sherman, a short, stocky man who usually sported a
neatly trimmed beard, was a colorful and innovative cattleman. Born in New
York and educated in philosophy and mathematics in an eastern university, he
moved to Arizona for reasons of health and began a short teaching career.
During the 1880s and the big cattle boom, Sherman was engaged by an uncle,
Lewis H. Lapham, and his partners to purchase and manage ranching property
for their New York firm. This he did by purchasing well over 100,000 acres
south of Bisbee, Arizona, in Mexico, for ten cents an acre. This Mexican
ranch, the San Rafael de La Nora, produced stocker and feeder cattle, many
of which Sherman matured and fattened on whatever Kansas grass he could
lease.
Importing cattle from Old Mexico, however, was not as simple as bringing
stock from Texas and the Southwest because tariffs were involved. During
the last decade of the nineteenth century, Congress pushed through three
major tariff bills, all with varying effects on the Mexican trade. The McKinley
Tariff of 1890 had relatively high rates, but these were lowered four years later
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by the Wilson-Gorman plan. Rates were raised again, however, when the
Republicans were instrumental in passing the Dingley Act in 1897. Because
they wanted to avoid the severe competition afforded by the Mexican producer, most cattlemen favored restrictive rates on imported cattle. 16
Sherman, however, was out-of-step with the majority of his fellow cattlemen, arguing that low rates were needed to encourage Mexican cattle to utilize
the Kansas grass crop. His position might have been expected, as his beef
operations continued to grow. In 1896, 25,000 acres of grass were purchased
by the New York firm near Crawford in Ellsworth County, while additional
grassland was leased in the area. Thus began what came to be known throughout the West as the Sherman Ranch.
Soon after acquiring the Kansas ranch, Sherman turned it into a fullfeeding station for Mexican cattle en route to market. As many as 7,000 cattle
were fed some years, even after the Dingley Tariff raised rates to 20 percent
ad valorem. The Sherman Ranch also produced Shorthorn bulls that were
later shipped to the Mexican ranges, and served, too, as a hog-fattening center.
During some years more than 10,000 hogs were fattened in conjunction with
the large cattle-feeding operation. Sherman, who chain-smoked factory-made
cigarettes, which he wrapped again in paper that he imported especially for
that purpose, continued the feeder cattle and hog operation until just before
World War I. Then an epidemic of cholera killed thousands of his hogs, and
the interests of the firm turned to producing grain to fill the inflated demands
of the war.
About half of the Kansas property was plowed and planted to wheat,
corn, oats, and a few other crops. Sherman mechanized this large farmwhich some claimed was the largest in the world under fence-by purchasing
tractors, binders, and other machinery. Nearly two hundred hired hands were
engaged during busy seasons, all of whom, according to Sherman, were not to
drink, join a labor union, or believe in the principles of the Democratic party .
The farming operation fell on hard times after the war, and was eventually
broken up and rented to small farmers in the area.
Cattle continued to play a role in the Sherman operation, even though
half the original ranch was farmed, and connections with the Mexican property were maintained. The large cow herd Sherman kept in the Flint Hills
illustrated the fact that the area was not exclusively the domain of transient
cattle. Sherman's operation successfully integrated cattle raising and highly
mechanized farming, but nevertheless the mighty empire died during the
Great Depression. In 1937 the Mexican government confiscated the San Rafael
13
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de La Nora, while grain and cattle prices in this country had recovered only
slightly from their lows during the early 1930s. By this time Sherman was
more than eighty years old. After disagreeing with Lapham heirs over the
sale of land to the Kanopolis Dam project, he retired in disgust and moved to
California. There he died the following year. Cattlemen in the area bought
the famous headquarters of the ranch, but some of the land is today flooded
by water impounded by the dam. 17

The western third of the state, where the short grass grows, was more
distinctly a beef-producing area during the 1890s than the central third, especially in the northwest and in the area along the Arkansas River. Irrigated
farming was developing in the Arkansas valley, with sugar beets and alfalfa
two of the principal crops. In most of the area where irrigation was impossible
wheat was becoming an important crop.
The area around the Arkansas River was more exclusively devoted to
cattle production during the 1890s than any other area of western Kansas, and
it illustrated two problems frequently encountered in the West beyond the
100th meridian: first, the failure of the federal government to provide legislation that was adequate for the legal acquisition of the large land parcels
necessary for ranching operations; and second, the reluctance of immigrants
from more humid environments to adapt their agricultural pursuits to the
scarcity of rainfall.
Before the 1880s most of the southwestern and south-central grasslands
of Kansas were grazed by large herds on open range, a practice that was to a
large extent a natural outgrowth from the times when herds were trailed to
northern railroads from the south. The herds frequently ranged back and
forth across the Kansas-Oklahoma border. Grazing associations and pools were
established to facilitate the cooperative use of the grassland, and portions
of the public domain were sometimes illegally fenced after barbed wire became readily available in the late 1880s.
The relatively unrestricted use of the land by cattlemen, however, did not
continue without competition. During the early and middle eighties a wave
of farmers poured into the area, took over parcels of government land, and
attempted to diversify agricultural pursuits. This influx of thousands of settlers
forced the cattlemen to adjust their operations, an adjustment that was lauded
and encouraged by several local newspapers. One noted that during the early
eighties the only occupation of the few inhabitants was raising cattle, with at
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Branding in Scott County during the early 1900s. Like threshing in farming
areas, branding was sometimes a festive occasion attended by women. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.

least one man having 25,000 head. But with the "advancement of civilization
and cultivation and increased rainfall," which the editor believed the influx
of settlers had caused, the large herds were being broken up. The writer
concluded that the settlers "by taking up the land, force range cattle to more
limited pasture, until at last every foot of the land will be taken by actual
settlers. Then and not until then, will all the resources of this country be
developed, and all utilities economized." 18
Despite the distinct prejudices of some local editors, the farming boom
was over by the late 1880s. Depression, drought, increased amounts of debt,
and a general disillusionment with homesteading brought a common fate to
small farmers and stockmen. Many of them left the area, returning to the
East whence they had come. Less rainfall than they were accustomed to and
their failure to adapt to the relatively dry conditions were responsible for
many failures. Rather than adjust their endeavors to the environment, many
fell victim to the theory that the coming of civilization, as it was embodied
in the plow, and the extension of a timber culture would cure the heavens
of their forgetfulness. "It has been rationally demonstrated," noted one local
newspaper, "that this progress of timber culture and growth will work beneficent climatic changes, in which the annual rainfall will be more equally
distributed . . . . " But several seasons during the late eighties and early nineties
disproved the theories when neither the plow nor the newly planted trees
produced moisture. In 1893, 1894, and 1897, for instance, Ashland received
less than thirteen inches of rain annually, while over twenty inches was normal
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for the area. The theory that rain followed the plow was buried, along with
the plow, in Kansas dust. 19
Cattlemen repossessed much of south western Kansas as the settlers gradually thinned out, but the process of adjusting their unrestricted operations
had begun and would continue well into the twentieth century. The size of
individual holdings became smaller, more of the land was owned by the
operator, upbreeding was more pronounced, and fencing was evident.
The days of cooperative grazing of large tracts were not completely past,
however-only modified. Thousands of cattle sometimes grazed across "big
pastures," with the cooperative roundup still in use on occasion. The large
pastures, enclosed with barbed wire, confronted many cattlemen of the southwestern part of the state with a land ownership problem. The Wichita Beacon
remarked in 1897 that many of the ranchers in the southwest were enclosing
land "largely held by non-resident owners, many of whom no doubt think it
a great hardship to pay taxes on land producing no income." The use of land
without remunerating the owner and the continued use of the public domain
were also alluded to by another writer, who promised that ranching in western
Kansas required ownership of only a quarter section or at most a whole
section. "The land you hold," he said, "will control grass on several sections
adjoining, or [it] can be leased at very low figures." 2 Fencing and using
these large pastures turned out to be an effective middle step in the evolution
from open range to smaller, enclosed ranches.
Keeping cow herds to produce young cattle for eastern feeders was the
dominate type of cattle operation in this area of the state during the 1890s
and for many years thereafter. Stocker and feeder production allowed the
western cattleman to pass on most of the risk to the eastern feeder, some said,
and there was money in it toward the end of the decade. A few cattlemen
claimed that the stockman had weathered the depression better than anyone
else in agriculture, that in the 1890s "there never was a better outlook in
western Kansas," and that by comparison "the stock breeder of the 'short
grass' country is reaping far better returns for his capital and labor than the
stock breeder dwelling within the cornbelt portion of the state." Some of the
advantages enjoyed by the western cattleman were attributed to the better
managed, smaller ranch. 21
There was also some grazing of transient cattle in southwestern Kansas,
much like that described earlier for the Flint Hills. There were numerous
instances of Colorado cattle, unhampered by the quarantine laws, grazing
Kansas pastures, as well as large numbers from Texas and other areas of the

°
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Southwest, and even Old Mexico. It was estimated in 1897 that as many as
80,000 head from the Texas Panhandle alone would be in western Kansas
"before snow flies."~~ Grazing inshipped cattle developed because many of
the first cattlemen in western Kansas were Texans who retained cattle interests
in their original state, many of the southern ranges produced more cattle than
they could mature, and the building of cow herds sufficiently large to utilize
the abundant grass was a slow process. Professional pasturemen, however,
were not as common in the southwestern section as in the Flint Hills.
The return of much of western Kansas to the cattlemen after the unsuccessful farming boom was temporary. As the decade of the 1890s expired, other
developments began to threaten the cattle empire. A few large spreads were
poorly managed, and several local editors were again prompted to hurl insults
at the large producers. There were "too many would-be cattle barons,"
one reported with Populist-like fervor, "who think they have capacity to run
thousands ... when in fact they can't handle 100 successfully." These barons,
it was charged, tried to "fence in the bigger portion of the country" and spent
their money in Kansas City, or at least outside the immediate area. Some of
the cattlemen refused to pay for the use of other people's property, the editor
scolded, but rather they had begun "a few years ago with nothing. They
have grazed off much grass with many cattle; have paid all the profits out to
thieving commission companies and are today not worth a dam." The bulwark of the country, the editor believed, was the man who owned a limited
herd, paid his taxes, and bought his supplies from local dealers. 23
The prevalence of a disease variously known as scabies, mange, or cattle
itch and a severe winter in 1899 that had caused heavy stock losses contributed
to the editor's dissatisfaction with the large cattlemen. He found it difficult
to be completely objective when the stench from the rotting corpses of hundreds
of dead cattle filled his office while he worked at publishing the weekly news
sheet.
Earlier the same paper had castigated the barons for their fencing practices. While Kansas never had the controversy over fencing that other states
experienced, there was a bit of fence cutting and some unhappiness over gates
on public roads. Although the editor of the paper could overlook cutting
wire on land that was not owned by the large operator, he threatened that
"there will be a quietus put on unprovoked wire cutting sometime." Later he
announced that "people building fences across public roads seems to have
occasioned some inconvenience, some hard feelings and not a few 'cuss' words."
The editor believed that a traveler compelled to open and close the rickety
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wire gates m the community "loses his patients [sic] , slits his raiment, and
knocks more or less skin off his hands." He advised abolishing the wire gate
in favor of a wooden one "that can be opened without profanity, or loss of
skin." 24
The operations of C. D. Perry, rancher and farmer for over twenty years
along the southern border of the state in Clark County, exemplified many of
these developments in the southwest around the turn of the century. He was
a large rancher but not really one of the irresponsible barons objected to by
local newspapers. Perry had immigrated to Kansas in 1885 along with thousands of others interested in farming. He was fresh from real-estate developments in Chicago and differed from most of the other immigrants in two
important considerations: he had no previous experience in agriculture, and
he had considerable money in his pocket.
Perry purchased 10,000 acres of short-grass prairie and immediately began
ranching and farming on what he called the Claremont Ranch. Imported
Shorthorn cattle and later Herefords were used to upbreed the native stock
that he purchased in the area. He was always experimenting-with crops,
farming methods, and different breeds of livestock-or promoting somethinga bank, a town, railroads, experimental farms, or sugar mills. By digging a
shallow seven-mile canal from the Cimarron River in Oklahoma to his ranch
in Kansas, Perry was able to irrigate several thousand acres of small grains,
alfalfa, and tame grasses. All this was accomplished before 1900.
By the time Perry sold his holdings during the early years of the twentieth
century, he had accumulated over 20,000 acres, 1,000 of which were irrigated,
and over 2,000 head of well-bred cattle. He sold out in 1907 in order to retire
to a California alfalfa farm, but, unfortunately, he died in an auto accident
the following year. 25 Before his move, Perry had not only witnessed but encouraged several changes in western Kansas. He had engaged in both dry
land and irrigated farming, encouraged more restricted ranching, fenced all
or most of the land he used, and upbred his stock. Finally, he helped stimulate
another threat to cattlemen that developed during the early years of the new
century in the form of a wheat boom.
The Medicine Lodge Cresset was one of the first papers to note the
second wave of immigrant farmers moving into the southwest in less than a
generation. It reported in 1905, "Western Kansas is going to be the great
wheat field of the world. Lands that have been thought only fit for short grass
is proving that it can produce wheat, and the western counties are attracting
immigrants from all over the country .... Fine farms can be seen where
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only a few years ago was a broad expanse of nothing but grass . . . . Land
values are on the increase and there is a disposition of the owners to cut up the
large ranches into farms." 26
Two years later the Wichita Eagle observed that "one by one the big
ranches of southwestern Kansas are disappearing and in their places are appearing farms .... Free range is almost unknown." 27 One factor that contributed
to renewed interest in farming this area was the belief that the Campbell
method of dry farming-essentially a method for summer-fallowing croplandwould solve the climatic deficiencies. C. D. Perry was one of the first in the
area to experiment with and advertise the method. Parts of his Claremont
Ranch that had farming potential were divided and sold to some of the new
immigrants. But even with the influx of wheat growers the southwest remained largely cow country. Much of the short-grass prairie was already
owned by cattlemen before the new immigrants arrived, some of the land was
not adaptable to the plow, and the Campbell method was not a complete
answer to the variance in annual rainfall. Wheat cultivation too was destined
for many poor years.
Specialization, then, was evident in the different sections of the state
engaged in raising beef, although a single area often practiced several phases
of growing and maturing cattle for slaughter. During the nineteenth century,
cattle were often born in one section of the country and matured over a period
of several years in another, before being marketed as either grass-fat slaughter
beef or feeder stock that needed additional fattening. If the latter was the
case, a different owner often performed the task in a feedlot. Frequently it
was undertaken by stockmen in another region, notably the Midwest.
Specialization into several stages occurred for a number of reasons, but
basic to its development was the fact that the grassland production of cattle
exceeded available grain supply, while the midwestern states chose to market
much of their grain by feeding it to stock. This way more profit was expected
from the grain. Also, midwestem land values were much too high by this
time for profitable grazing of stock. Intensive production of corn for the
fattening of cattle born and matured in the grasslands was more suitable, and,
as a result, the regions complemented each other quite well.
Producers also expected to save money on transportation by putting as
much weight on the animals as close to the large marketing centers as was
possible. Not only were shipping rates on cattle usually cheaper than those
on grain, but transporting midwestern feed to the source of stocker-feeder
production would have necessitated shipping it back again a few years later
19
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in the form of beef. The necessity of a yearly income without a delay of
several years while awaiting full maturation of the cattle, as well as the cost
of separate pens and other equipment necessary for full-feeding operations,
also contributed to specialization.
The practice of using several stages in the production of slaughter beef
became increasingly popular during the twentieth century. Rarely did a single
grassland operator retain ownership of cattle from birth to slaughter until the
development of large commercial feedlots after World War II. Even then few
producers retained ownership throughout the whole process of converting a
little calf into a large critter ready for the packer.

By the 1890s Kansans had acquired relatively large numbers of cattle, and the
production of beef was making a significant contribution to the state's agricultural economy. As a result of consistent growth since the 1860s, the state
had over 2.2 million beef cattle and calves by 1890. After a decline during
the middle nineties, the number had grown to almost 2.9 million by 1900,
which represented the largest number for the nineteenth century ( see Figure 1).
Figure 1 also reveals the relative balance that existed between the state's
hog and cattle populations from 1890 to the early 1930s, even though fluctuations in numbers did not always coincide. After 1930 beef cattle became the
dominant species of livestock in Kansas, largely as a result of the demands of
World War II, the postwar consumer preference for beef, and the growth of
large commercial feedlots. The state's hog industry, meanwhile, never regained its former stature after the depression, drought, and government controls of the 1930s combined to reduce swine numbers, although increases did
occur as a result of World War II and the expanded demand for meat in the
1960s. Decreased amounts of corn harvested for grain paralleled the declining
hog industry.
By the 1890s the pattern of distribution for Kansas beef cattle had already
been set, with the heaviest concentrations in the Flint Hills ( see Map 1, p.
70). This pattern did not vary greatly throughout the next fifty years,
although prolonged droughts caused greater concentrations in the Flint Hills.
The availability of grass and water, corn for feeding, and the total number of
stock were important factors in determining the location of the state's cattle.
The contribution of livestock to the agricultural economy of Kansas increased along with the numbers of cattle. Livestock and its products consti-
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Figure 1. Numbers of Livestock m Kansas, 1890-1970 (in million of head)
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Figure 2. Average Percentage of Farm Value of Selected Kansas Products,

1891-1895
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tuted a higher percentage of the economy during the 1890s than at any other
time during the next two decades (see Figures 2 and 3), accounting for over
35 percent of the total value of farm commodities. Actually, the contribution
to farm income from livestock was probably larger than this figure indicates.
The value of grain fed to stock, for instance, was apparently included in the
crop sector, when in fact its cash value was attained only through livestock.
Cash receipt figures from the marketing of farm and ranch products would
have been a better indication of livestock's real value to the agricultural economy of Kansas, but these figures did not become available until 1925. Nor
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Figure 3. Average Percentage of Farm Value of Selected Kansas Products,
1896-1900

LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTERED
OR SOLD FOR SLAUGHTER

30

CORN

/

25

/
/
/

/

/

19

/

Source: "State Summaries,'" in Repts., KSBA (18 96-1900) .

was it possible to differentiate the contribution of beef cattle from that of
livestock as a whole until after 1925, but that of cattle was the largest single
contributor during most years.
The Kansas beef industry was an important local industry by the 1890s,
but its significance went beyond the local area. In addition to the millions
of beef cattle produced exclusively within the state thousands more were
shipped in from Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas, and other states of the Southwest for maturing and fattening before going to market as grass-fattened or
as partially fed animals. Some of these transient cattle were slaughtered immediately after leaving the grass, but large numbers were also shipped to
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feedlots in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and other cornbelt states. The intersectional
link eventually proved far more important to Kansas and to the nation's beef
industry than the earlier role of the state as the terminal point for the Texas
drives.
As a whole, cattle raising in Kansas at the end of the nineteenth century
had largely completed its transition from a frontier institution to a modern
ranching industry. This necessitated a number of modifications. Ownership
of land, for example, was requried as the public domain disappeared, and
greater managerial skill was necessary as the spread between market prices
and production costs narrowed. Finally, the upbreeding of stock, which was
also begun during the nineteenth century, gained new importance in the modern industry's drive to improve management practices and increase profits.
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2
Purebreds Move West: The 1890s

One of the most interesting and important single contributions that Kansas
cattlemen of the late nineteenth century made to the western beef business
was in the area of upbreeding. Before the century ended, thousands of wellbred cattle were sired and matured in the state and then shipped to the western
range country. Prior to the 1890s most of the well-bred cattle had originated
in England and Scotland or in the midwestern states of the Mississippi River
valley. Kansas, initially a transfer point for these bovine aristocrats, gradually
began to add its own improved stock to the growing flow westward. 1
The westward path of improved stock was counter to the traditional
movement of cattle. To the flood of stocker and feeder cattle that moved
out of the West toward the midwestern markets was added a stream of
upgraded stock moving in the opposite direction. This movement continued
well into the twentieth century-until western producers had established their
own purebred herds-and a shadow of it remains even today.
In a larger sense, upgrading of range cattle was an integral part of the
transition from open range to ranch. It was both cause and effect. Because
improved stock was dependent upon close herd management, cattlemen recorded few successes in improving their herds until after fences were built.
A little barbed wire enabled stockmen to improve their herds and, most
importantly, to harvest the products of good sires. Upbred stock, since they
were more valuable, deserved more winter feeding and water close at hand,
and required supervision during the calving period to minimize the risk of
calf losses, all of which were possible only on a well-managed ranch.
Small and large farms that specialized in purebred production supplied
much of the upgraded stock that moved West. The owners of these farms
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worked seriously at improving the breed and spent a good deal of money in
the effort. Range producers then bought the bulls for use with commercial
cattle or to start their own purebred herds for bull production. Frequently,
these purebred establishments were owned by men who had considerable
money, made not in agriculture but rather in some urban business. Some
men made money and gained fame in the business, while others accomplished
neither, but most contributed some impetus to transforming the long-legged
scrubs into modern beef-producing machines.
Almost from the beginning there were attempts to upgrade the nondescript cattle that stocked the grasslands, but not until the 1870s and 1880s
did the movement reach full force. Reasons abounded for upbreeding, but
pride and profit were the prime movers. Most cattlemen had always desired
to produce the best stock that their particular circumstances allowed. Improved
cattle were more pleasing to the eye, a source of pride for the owner, and,
most importantly, more profitable. During the last half of the nineteenth
century, when the country was becoming increasingly urbanized and industrialized, there were demands for increased quantity and quality in the beef
trade. A growing export trade, especially to England, also contributed to these
demands. Many cornbelt feeders had stopped feeding Longhorns by the 1870s
and were in the market for upbred feeder stock that fattened better and did
not bring the dreaded Texas fever into the Midwest. Upgrading stock and
the turn away from Longhorns, then, helped ensure profits for those who
fed cattle.2
An Ohio correspondent to the Kansas Farmer, who was typical of those
who fattened stock, wrote that cornbelt feeders wanted animals that gained
weight rapidly and thus reduced feed costs. Further, he said, feeders desired
"compact, medium-sized, thick-fleshed, easy keepers, that will mature at 3
years old and make a 1,500 to 1,700 pound steer." A quiet disposition, no
horns, broad backs, deep loins, and massive quarters were highly desirable
qualities too, because, he noted, "it costs no more to produce a pound of steak
than a pound of neck or tripe." 3 Another correspondent suggested that an
improved digestive and circulatory system that utilized feed to the best advantage was the most desirable quality in the upgraded stock. Only blooded
animals could fill the requirement of increased quantity and quality. The
upbred steer often weighed 500 to 600 pounds more at three years of age than
his poorly bred counterpart. Reports of experiments at Kansas State Agricultural College that were published in the Kansas Farmer and other agricul-
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tural publications supported the gainability qualities of blooded stock when
compared with scrubs. 4
The premium paid by me~t packers for quality stock obviously helped
stimulate the feedlot demand for upgraded cattle. The packing industry
played no small part in the upbreeding process. Not only did packers help
create the demand, but several engaged directly in purebred production themselves. Kirk B. Armour of the famous packing family, for example, bought
the herd of C. M. Culbertson, when in the 1890s depression forced the latter
to liquidate his famous herd. Armour placed this herd on his farm near
Excelsior Springs, Missouri, expanded it through additional purchases, and
sent most of the increase to the range country. George A. Fowler, a Kansas
City meat packer, was associated with William J. Tod, long-time rancher of
Maple Hill, Kansas, in the production of purebred cattle, many of which were
used in the Flint Hills or were sent to upgrade the commercial herd on their
Crosselle Ranch in New Mexico."
As a result of observing these improved animals, many range producers
by the late nineteenth century agreed that not only did blooded stock adapt
well to range conditions but they were also better money-makers. Only the
specific breed-Shorthorn, Aberdeen-Angus, or Hereford-remained a matter
of dispute.

As early as the eighties some improvement was noticed in the cattle being
trailed from Texas. This improvement was largely the result of cattle moved
south from Kansas shipping points to the Texas ranges. A. M. Lord of
Dodge City, for example, assembled 1,300 yearling bulls from Missouri, Iowa,
and Illinois and trailed them south from Dodge City in 1882. Lord's cattle
must have passed several herds of Longhorns moving in the opposite direction
on the first leg of their journey to urban markets. Also during the 1880s,
the Burlingame, Kansas, firm of Finch, Lord, & Nelson estimated that they
had sent around 10,000 Hereford bulls to Texas between 1881 and 1888, and
Lucien Scott shipped breeding stock from his Ridgewood Farm near Leavenworth. Scott, a banker by trade, used his upbred Kansas cattle to improve
the quality of the stock on his LS Ranch in the Texas Panhandle, a spread
that became famous throughout the West. Other Kansans followed the
example of the large exporters of fine cattle, much to the advantage of beef
producers in Texas and throughout the Great Plains.6
Shorthorns were the first breed to be used extensively in upbreeding
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programs. The first were imported into the United States during the late
eighteenth century, with hundreds more following during the next century.
By the 1860s Shorthorns had migrated as far west as Kansas, where a few
farms were being devoted to upgraded stock. Samuel S. Tipton, a cattleman
in eastern Kansas, brought about fifty Shorthorns into Kansas Territory from
Ohio after a brief stay in Iowa. As early as 1859 he recorded fifteen of these
purebreds in the breed's herd book, the first purebred Shorthorns known to
have existed in the state.
Additional Shorthorn cattle appeared soon after the Civil War. Albert
Crane early in the 1870s kept a famous herd at his Durham Park farm north
of Wichita. Crane had graduated from Harvard Law School before making a
fortune in Chicago real estate and investing in Kansas land and cattle. He
soon bought Shorthorn bulls to use on 3,000 Longhorn cows, while building
a small purebred herd of his own with cattle brought from the Midwest or
imported from England. For a while during the seventies, cows that Crane
had purchased for more than $20,000 apiece, as well as a bull from England
at $25,000, grazed the bluegrass that he had sown after plowing under the
native grass. It is doubtful that Crane's heavy investment in fine cattle ever
paid for itself, but he did sprinkle some fine Shorthorn blood throughout
central Kansas. 7
George Washington Glick, first Democrat to govern Kansas, also bred
Shorthorns. A threshing machine accident that severely injured both feet
had forced young Glick from his father's Ohio farm and into the law office
of Rutherford B. Hayes. After some experience with Hayes, Glick practiced
law in Ohio, then moved to Atchison, Kansas, where he prospered in both
business and politics. But practicing law did not satisfy Glick's longing to
improve the agriculture of his adopted state. Thus, during the 1870s he
bought what was called the Shannon Hill stock farm west of Atchison, and
there built a herd of more than a hundred purebred Shorthorns. Glick claimed
that he chose the breed because of its large, well-marbled carcass, its earlymaturing qualities, its mild disposition, and its superior milk production.
Murdo Mackenzie, manager of the Matador Land and Cattle Company,
bought many of Glick's bulls for use with range cows, paying $80 to $120
per head during the 1890s. The herd was finally dispersed in 1900, when Glick
went to Florida to spend his twilight years on a citrus farm. 8
The master Shorthorn breeder during this early period was W. A. Harris
of Linwood. According to C. W. McCampbell, beef cattle specialist at Kansas
State Agricultural College for many years, Harris had the "most famous herd
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in America during the '80s and '90s." Harris made his specific contribution by
following the lead of the great Scottish Shorthorn breeder, Amos Cruickshank.
Both men devised matings and made herd selections based on individual merit
rather than on ancestry, as the Bates Shorthorn people had tended to do.
Using many animals of Cruickshank breeding, which he obtained from
Canada, as well as a few superior Bates cattle, Harris revolutionized the type
of Shorthorns raised in the United States. His cattle, when compared to the
older Bates Shorthorns, improved markedly the size and fleshing ability of
the breed. His fame spread even to the British Isles, where some of his cattle
were exported during the late eighties and early nineties.
The depression of the 1890s and a growing interest in politics forced
Harris to sell his prized herd. He was first elected a United States congressman, then a United States senator in 1896. His famous herd was dispersed the
same year, but his Shorthorns had already made their mark in American
breeding circles, not least of which was the effect they had on the Tomson
cattle, probably the most enduring herd of Shorthorns in Kansas.9
T. K. Tomson, who had migrated to Kansas during the Civil War, established a farm near Dover and another south of Topeka, around Wakarusa.
It was 1886, however, before he got into the Shorthorn business with a small
herd of common grade cows. To this he added a famous bull named Phyllis
Duke, which he purchased at a sheriff's sale in Kentucky for the paltry sum
of $25.50, as the bull was in poor flesh. Thistletop, a bull bred by Cruickshank,
was also placed in the herd. Then during the 1890s John and James G. Tomson
became their father's associates, and the purebred business was expanded.
Young Jim Tomson displayed early the shrewdness and determination that
was essential in making their herd famous. Jim, the genius who built the
herd, became known as one of the best judges of cattle in the country. Kansans tell the story that W. A. Harris mistakenly listed for sale one of his
coveted herd sires, Gallant Knight, in a letter to young James Tomson, who
insisted that the letter constituted a bona fide offer, and Harris was persuaded
to sell this excellent bull that he had intended to keep for his own herd.
Gallant Knight and several good cows purchased later at the Harris
dispersion sale were added to the growing herd of Shorthorns, aiding in the
development of what came to be known as the Tomson Type, cattle that were
of "scale and substance, thickly and evenly fleshed, combined with quality and
breediness." During the twentieth century the Tomson name became almost
synonymous with Shorthorn, especially in Kansas. The contributions of the
Tomson Shorthorns to their home state can be judged from the fact that
29

The Kansas Beef Industry

over half of their production was sold to Kansas breeders. A few were sent
west, and the remainder were sold in states to the east of Kansas. 10
The black Galloway and Aberdeen-Angus, nature's dehorners, were not
far behind the Shorthorns in arriving on the western scene. George Grant is
usually given credit for importing the first Aberdeen-Angus into the United
States. Grant had made a fortune as a London cloth merchant, part of which,
it was said, came as a result of his cornering the supply of black crepe at the
time of Prince Albert's death . Be that as it may, he did have money. After
visiting Kansas he decided to plant a colony on the state's western grassland.
Thus, in 1873 he brought a group of immigrants and four black bulls through
the port of New Orleans and on to a site a few miles east of Hays, which he
called Victoria. The colony soon failed, but the bulls sired hundreds of calves
from Texas Longhorn cows.
At the time of Grant's death in 1878, over 800 crossbred calves had been
dispersed from his herd. These mixed-blood calves "created a sensation" when
their rapid gainability became evident to eastern feeders. McCampbell, who
may have been a bit too laudatory, noted in his study of upbreeding that
Grant's importation "more than any other single factor stimulated a desire
for better sires." It was an odd turn of fate, McCampbell continued, "that
Angus cattle which furnished the inspiration that really started the work of
improving K ansas cattle, were not used extensively in this work." The greater
availability of other breeds accounted for the smaller role of Angus cattle,
but one might also question McCampbell's evaluation of the blacks as the
inspiration. Shorthorns were already established to some degree by 1873, and
the great Hereford boom was not far off. But Grant's work did help stimulate
interest in the Aberdeen-Angus and contributed to the founding in Kansas
of several herds of purebreds.
Probably none of the other purebred herds descended from Grant's importations, although no one knows for sure what became of the original four
bulls. T. J. McCreary of Highland had one of the first purebred Angus herds
in the state, and he was joined shortly by J. S. and W. R. Goodwin of Beloit.
A representative of the Goodwin herd won a major prize at a Kansas City
stock show as early as 1885. Many of the finest Angus herds in the state,
however, were begun around the turn of the century, or several years after. 11

Shorthorn and Angus cattle certainly helped upgrade stock, but it was the
white-faced Herefords that played the most significant role both in Kansas
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and throughout the West. The Herefords' popularity was based on their
availability, their attractive appearance, and, most heavily, upon the belief
that they were the best winter and summer grazers, especially on scanty
pastures. Ironically, the poor milking ability of Herefords when compared
with Shorthorns enhanced their popularity, because udder and nursing problems were reduced and the cow's strength was not spent producing milk.
Rather, Hereford cows had excellent records of breeding back quickly and
producing calves the following year, even though drought might have ravaged
their pastures. Hereford bulls were even more popular than the female stock.
They were virile and aggressive breeders during the hot summer months, and
even came through long winters in good physical condition when feed was
short. It was the Hereford bull, more than any other single factor, that increased the size and quality of range cattle, enabling any producer to increase
his beef production without necessarily enlarging his land holdings.
Herefords fattened well, too. Their quiet dispositions in feedlots and their
ability to manufacture grain into a highly desirable meat were cited repeatedly
by those who championed the breed. The fattening ability of the breed was
indicated by the prices paid at marketing centers. During the first forty years
of the twentieth century, for instance, the highest price paid each year for fat
steers at Chicago went to Herefords more than half the time.12
The Hereford first came to America after being developed in England
during the eighteenth century in response to the increased demands for meat
in the growing urban centers. Breeders in western England were responsible
for Hereford development, especially the elder and younger Benjamin Tomkins of Herefordshire, a county in England adjacent to Wales. Henry Clay,
United States senator and frequent presidential hopeful, as well as an agriculturalist, from Lexington, Kentucky, imported the first Herefords into the
United States in 1817. But to avoid continuous inbreeding, Clay soon mixed
the breed with Shorthorns and their identity was lost. A few whitefaces were
brought over after Clay's initial importation and were used sparingly from
New England to Ohio. Although there is an authentic record of Clay's import,
the first importation of Herefords to the United States that resulted in the
founding of a breeding herd of a substantial basis, a shipment from England in
1840 consisting of twenty-two head, was made by William H. Sotham of
New York.
Importations of purebred Herefords before the mid-1870s, however, were
not great and probably did not exceed 250 head. This changed rapidly during
the next decade. New imports, along with the cattle already here, helped
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establish several Hereford farms in midwestern states during the 1870s.
Thomas Clark, for example, produced excellent Herefords, first in Ohio, then
Illinois. About the same time, T. L. Miller, whose industrious promotional
work was equally as important as the quality of his cattle, and C. M. Culbertson helped move the center for Hereford production from Ohio to Illinois.
Culbertson, a wealthy Chicago packer, imported the first Anxiety blood, a
line destined to have great influence on American Herefords. He also persuaded other men of wealth to enter the purebred business, among the most
significant of whom were Moses Fowler and W . S. Van Natta. These men,
along with many others, worked not only to improve the breed but also to
spread it into the WestP
Hiram Woodward and Walter M. Morgan, both of Marshall County
near Blue Rapids, share the honor of introducing Herefords into Kansas.
Both had connections with Thomas Aston of Elyria, Ohio, who had brought
some of the original Tomkins blood to the United States when he migrated
from Herefordshire. Woodward brought the first Herefords into the state in
1872 and showed them at a Leavenworth fair a couple of years later. But
Woodward died in 1877, before the cattle were fully developed, and the herd
was sold to T. L. Miller.
Walter Morgan did more to popularize Herefords in the state than did
Woodward, as his herd advertised the breed from the 1870s until a year
before his death in 1916. Morgan had migrated from England to Ohio in
1852 and there became associated with Thomas Aston. Several years after
beginning this position, he married Aston's daughter, and they moved to
Kansas in 1876. With them the Morgans brought Aston cattle that had been
crossed with blood from T. L. Miller's herd. They attempted to show their
cattle almost as soon as they arrived, but getting the Hereford accepted by fair
judges as a legitimate beef breed was no small task. Morgan's son reported
many years later that it would have been as easy for "Governor Al E. Smith
to get justice in a K.K.K. lodge in 1928 as for Herefords to win over Shorthorns at that time." Despite prejudice, however, Morgan's herd eventually
won many prizes at top shows, and soon established Marshall County as the
"Herefordshire of Kansas." 14
Other Hereford herds were established in widely scattered areas of the
state soon after the pioneering work of Morgan and Woodward. Shockey &
Gibb near Lawrence, J. S. Hawes of Colony, T. J. Higgins around Council
Grove, and W. E. Campbell, whose headquarters were near Kiowa, all had
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Herefords during the early period. Campbell was especially significant in
introducing the breed to range herds.
W. E. Campbell had been one of the first to trail Texas cattle into the
state after the Civil War, and he eventually bought grazing land of his own
southwest of Wichita. To his herd of native cattle he introduced blooded
Shorthorn bulls and championed their value throughout the Southwest. Neighbors called him "Shorthorn" Campbell, but this sobriquet soon gave way to
"Whiteface" Campbell when he began using that breed in 1879. His enthusiasm for Herefords grew to more than double that which he had expressed
for the former breed. Campbell even established a purebred herd, which produced bulls for his range cattle and won top prizes at the best stock shows
in the area.
Campbell's greatest contribution was in demonstrating the Hereford bull's
ability to transmit his desirable qualities to scrub cattle. In 1881 six of his
small south Texas cows strayed into the pasture of his purebred herd and
were serviced by Hereford bulls. Three of the calves from this chance mating
were carefully fed before becoming Campbell's demonstration exhibit at the
Kansas City Fat Stock Show in 1883. His favorite, a heifer called Texas Jane,
weighed 1,260 pounds as a yearling, some 500 pounds more than the Texas
cow that had mothered her. Texas Jane was kept for three years in a special
pen at the Kansas City market where she demonstrated before hundreds of
range producers the results from good Hereford bulls.JG
With men like Campbell showing that added weight on upbred cattle
resulted in increased profits, and with many of the agricultural journals
urging stockmen to eliminate the plug, scrub, and runt, it is not surprising
that the upbreeding of range herds became an important concern towards the
end of the century. The Hereford was in a prime position to facilitate the
change, especially after breeders had eliminated some of the deficiencies in
the breed.
The Herefords' thin, cat-hammed hindquarters were their principal fault
and the source of much criticism during the early years of their development
in the United States. This deficiency was especially significant because many
of the more expensive beef cuts come from the hindquarters. When improvement of this trait occurred, not only was the Herefords' meat-producing
abilities enhanced but also their popularity. The Hereford boom in the 1880s
followed closely the first successful steps to solve this hind-end problem.
Charles and James Gudgell and Thomas A. Simpson were most responsible for taking the first step that led to enlarging the hindquarters. These
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transplanted Kentuckians did much of their early breeding work around
Pleasant Hill, Missouri, where they founded in 1876 a purebred herd that was
to become easily the most famous and influential of its time. Later, they moved
their headquarters to Independence, Missouri . Donald R. Ornduff, in his
history of the Hereford breed, judged that "in ultimate influence upon the
Hereford breed in America, no contemporary herd came close to matching
the contributions of Gudgell & Simpson and no bull that of Anxiety 4th 9904."
Regarding this bloodline, Ornduff had written earlier that there was little
doubt that Anxiety had "supplied the foundation upon which the improvement
wrought in the United States in the old English-type Herefords was primarily
based." 16 Even today most purebred Herefords trace their ancestry to
Anxiety 4th.
Thomas A. "Governor" Simpson, a quiet man with an endearing dry wit,
was a distant cousin of the father of the Gudgell brothers, and had been a
partner from time to time in some of the elder Gudgell's farming activities.
Perhaps as a mark of his willingness to make decisions, he was nicknamed
"Governor" early in life, and the Gudgell sons, who were some twenty-five
years younger, naturally picked up the term, as did his friends in the Hereford
field. Upon their father's death before they attained their majority, the
"Governor," who never held political office, became their legal guardian.
The Gudgell brothers became engaged in the range-cattle business at Las
Animas, Colorado, more by circumstance than by deliberate design. When
they first came to Missouri they entered the employ of a bank in Kansas City.
When hard times struck in the early 1870s they acquired a financial interest
in a cattle operation through a transaction which had to do with a loan the
bank had made. Their partners in this venture, which eventually reached into
Oklahoma and Kansas and gave them an insight into the need for high-grade
range bulls, were Major W. A. Towers and John R. Towers, the firm operating
as Towers & Gudgell. Simpson never had a financial interest in this venture.
Following the death of his wife, Simpson made his home for the remainder of his life in Charles Gudgell's large home in Independence. This
house also served as the first office of what was to become the American
Hereford Association, and became a renowned meeting place for important
cattlemen from throughout the country. Simpson always kept on hand a
barrel of excellent Scotch whisky, which was always available to guests, he
himself professing to indulge a bit only when struck by "a cold." Gudgell &
Simpson also made notable importations of Aberdeen-Angus cattle from
Scotland, but sold them out within a few years. They were, however, charter
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members of both the Angus and Hereford breed associations, and Charles
Gudgell served as the secretary of both organizations from the office in a large
room in his home in Independence.
Charles Gudgell, whose brother James had died in 1897, continued the
purebred business alone after Simpson's death in 1904 until the entire herd was
dispersed in 1916. The Gudgell sons had no desire to continue the purebred
business, although ranching interests, including land in northwest Kansas,
were retained. The elder Gudgell retired to California soon after the dispersal
of the purebred cattle and began construction of a beautiful new home. Death,
unfortunately, claimed him barely three months after the herd was sold.
Observers of the Gudgell & Simpson enterprise have given both men equal
credit for its accomplishments. Gudgell received praise for his keen business
sense and willingness to provide capital, while Simpson was lauded for his
remarkable ability to judge cattle and plan breeding programs.17
An often-repeated story concerns Simpson's journey to England in 1881
to find a bull with a "hind-end on him," as he had been admonished by
Charles Gudgell. This was the trip that produced the famous Anxiety 4th,
a son of the original Anxiety that had died shortly after arriving in 1879 in
Illinois. Through a judicious and skilled use of linebreeding-a practice of
mating animals that have as close a relationship to the foundation as possible
and the least amount of relationship to each other except through the foundation-Gudgell & Simpson were able to concentrate Anxiety 4th's blood in his
numerous progeny. Much criticism and many predictions of failure were
leveled at the firm by those who failed to understand that linebreeding was
a useful form of closebreeding when accompanied by a rigid culling of the
herd. The bull Don Carlos, which in turn produced Beau Brummel and
Lamplighter, was the most famous son of Anxiety 4th; but another son,
Beau Real, the sire of such famous sons as Kansas Lad and Wild Tom, should
not be overlooked. These six bulls and many other bulls and heifers represented the high concentration of Anxiety 4th's blood that was destined to make
major improvements throughout the nation.
It has been estimated that Anxiety 4th had more effect on Kansas upbreeding than any other animal, by improving such influential purebred herds
as those of Shockey & Gibb, Scott & Whitman, C. S. Cross, and Robert H.
Hazlett. But the effect that Gudgell & Simpson had on purebred herds was
only part of their magnificent story, as they also directly influenced many
commercial range herds. The Horace G. Adams family and the Tod-Fowler
interests, all of Maple Hill, along the northern edge of the Flint Hills, were
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only two examples of the many who used Anxiety 4th breeding on large
range herds. Likewise, the Gudgell brothers, as previously noted, had ranching
interests where Anxiety 4th's blood was used on commercial herds . The firm
of Gudgell & Simpson also eventually raised purebreds in Kansas, first on a
ranch near Richmond, then on a ranch of nearly 10,000 acres in northwestern
Kansas, near Edmond. In fact, the entire breeding herd was sent to the
Edmond ranch after 1909, with only small holdings retained in the Independence area for show or sale. This latter location near Kansas City, where hundreds of prospective customers patronized the stockyards, was helpful in
spreading Gudgell & Simpson's blooded cattle.
It is not surprising that the Gudgell & Simpson influence was so widely
felt when one considers that their purebred herd sometimes approached 800
head and that it "shelled-out" bulls by the carload. Fully two-thirds of Anxiety
4th's own sons and literally thousands of bulls with Anxiety 4th 's blood went
into commercial range herds, most of which grazed the plains of Kansas and
the Southwest. Gudgell & Simpson enlarged the hindquarters of the Herefords, improved their "mellowness of flesh" and easy feeding characteristics,
and helped decrease the age at which they matured. Even more important,
they had demonstrated to American breeders that the blood of a superior animal could be sucessfully concentrated through linebreeding. 18 It was this
practice that the Kansan Robert H. Hazlett employed in becoming one of
the greatest Hereford breeders of the twentieth century.
One of the largest purebred H ereford herds in Kansas during the 1890s,
if not the largest, was that of Charles S. Cross, who had built a herd of 300
cows by the end of the decade. In addition to fine breeding on his model
Sunny Slope farm, a few miles northwest of Emporia, Cross illustrated again
that purebred breeders frequently had large financial resources, money that
was often made in nonagricultural pursuits. The literature abounds with
examples of men who had made fortunes in oil, real estate, banking, or other
urban-centered businesses before going into the purebred trade. The Cross
experience illustrated several other characteristics of purebred production during the 1890s as well, especially the widening influence of Anxiety 4th, the
continued ties American breeders retained with England, the large amount of
capital that was required, and the precarious nature of the investment. Finally,
Cross exemplified a certain mystique that developed around this class of
breeder and his livestock .
C. S. Cross had come to Emporia with his parents just after the Civil War.
His father invested in the First National Bank in Emporia a couple of years
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before the financial panic in 1873, but neither the panic nor the depression
permanently harmed the Cross banking interests. At his death in 1891 the
elder Cross passed to his son his interest in the bank, which must have
exceeded 50 percent. C. S. Cross first diversified his economic interests during
the middle 1880s when he began to fatten stock for slaughter. Then, with the
depression in the 1890s and the low prices for purebreds that resulted, Cross
was encouraged to enter the purebred business. He bought foundation stock
from Shockey & Gibb, who were forced to liquidate, Gudgell & Simpson,
Fowler & Tod, and several other well-known breeders. Among the cattle
purchased from Fowler was the bull Wild Tom, a grandson of Anxiety 4th,
which became not only the most important sire for the young herd but also
a nationally famous bull. All of the stock was kept at Sunny Slope farm,
which consisted of a large residence, a bunkhouse, several large barns-all
scrupulously kept in the finest condition-and over 2,000 acres of land. Some
760 acres of this land belonged to Cross, and the balance was leased. The
day-to-day work was performed by a manager and a score of other hired
hands, while Cross divided his time between the farm and the Emporia bank.
A practice not uncommon for fine cattle breeders was that of keeping
purebred hogs. Cross kept quality Poland China hogs until he disposed of
them in 1896 to make room for more cattle. The hog sale was reported as
one of the biggest social events of the year for the community. It needed,
according to the local newspaper, "only a red lamp shade and a head prize
to get into the Gazette's society column."
Moreover, there were a number of other sales prominent in the Cross
story. The yearly progeny of the large cow herd were sold at special auctions
or by private contract to those who visited the farm. The Gazette proudly
announced in 1898 that Sunny Slope was the one famous thing in Lyon
County and that "buyers from all over the country come here to buy fine
stock." The largest and most publicized sale at Sunny Slope was one that
was held in March, 1898. Billed as the highlight Hereford auction of the
decade, it included in the listing forty head of highly blooded animals that
Cross had recently imported from England at a cost of over $150 a head. The
Breeder's Gazette, Harpers Wee!(!y, and dozens of newspapers covered the
two-day sale, which was attended by over 3,000 people. Gross receipts totaled
over $61,300 for an average of $407 per animal. 19
Almost four decades later, one of the auctioneers remembered the sale
in 1898 as one of the greatest he had ever attended. Advertised in many national stock journals and by an elaborate catalogue bound in red, velvet-like
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cloth, it attracted the leading breeders of the nation. Bidding was moderate
to begin with, but when a gentleman from Virginia finally bid $3,000 for the
bull Salisbury pandemonium broke loose at ringside. The enthusiasm carried
through the remainder of the sale. Some have said that the national attention
that surrounded the event, as well as the nationwide attendance, did more
for the breed during the difficult 1890s than anything else. "It was without
doubt," one observer said, "the greatest sale of Herefords ever made in
America up to that time." 20
With the assets of "unlimited capital, energy, and brains," according to
the local newspaper, Cross built one of the largest herds of blooded cattle
in America. The herd was the source of much pride in the community, as
the Cross cattle not only attracted many distinguished visitors to the Emporia
area but advertised the small town by winning top prizes at most of the shows
on the western circuit.
All the transactions of the Cross enterprises were not apparent, however,
and when the financial crash came the community was shocked. The crisis
became visible several months after the large sale in March, 1898, which was
a last desperate attempt by Cross to regain financial stability. The effort
failed, however, and a bank examiner closed the First National Bank in
November, 1898. The Cross bank had lent so much money that less than
16 percent of the deposits were on hand, while other local banks, by comparison, maintained close to 40 percent. Cross and his partner had been heavy
borrowers, mostly without adequate collateral. Cross alone was estimated to
have borrowed as much as $150,000, with Sunny Slope as collateral ; but only
a month after the bank was closed the model farm and remaining stock were
sold for only $40,000. On the day that the bank's activities were officially
suspended, Cross paid a final visit to his beloved Sunny Slope and there, in
an upstairs bedroom of the large house, shot himself. He had lived just
forty years. 21
Cross had built what many breeders could only dream of, but he had
done so at great expense. His own small fortune was lost, as well as the
deposits of many members of the community, although the bank did eventually pay much of its debt after several years of litigation.
The Cross experience related directly to some of the larger problems of
financing purebred as well as other cattle herds toward the end of the century.
Long-term, low-interest loans to cattlemen were almost nonexistent, unless of
course one owned a bank, as Cross did. Short-term loans that were rediscounted by commission firms or smaller banks and passed to the larger
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sources of capital in the East were more common and even quite adequate
in the view of some, but the long-term needs of cattlemen were seldom satisfied. Interest rates were also high, sometimes approaching 10 percent, and
the availability of capital did not correspond well with the need. During
depressions, when there was an increased need for credit, as in the early 1890s,
cattlemen had more difficulty in finding capital, while the reverse was true
when there was a great deal of optimism about the beef industry. In fact,
the greater availability of money towards the end of the decade and the lack
of precaution exercised by some bankers led to several situations in Kansas
similar to that of C. S. Cross.
An eager, swashbuckling young man named Grant G. Gillett, for instance,
was able to parlay his self-imposed reputation as the largest cattle feeder in
Kansas into a sma ll fortune of borrowed money without ever having adequate
collateral. Gillett had a small cattle-feeding operation near Abilene during
the last part of the nineteenth century that was moderately successful, but he
was impatient for fortune and began to expand rapidly. Soon, hundreds of
cattle began arriving at the Gillett farm and departing with such rapidity that
the bank examiners did not bother to keep adequate count of the cattle or
the dollars that were involved. A score of banks in a half-dozen states were
involved in loans to Gillett, some on the same cattle and some on stock that
did not exist. Gillett, meanwhile, traveled around in a private railroad car
with his own cowboy band and hosted lavish parties for his friends and
creditors in Kansas City and other large cities. But someone became suspicious
in 1898, counted the cattle and dollars, and found some $200,000 to $600,000
in loans-other estimates ranged up to a million dollars-while only a few
cattle could be found.
Before the audit was completed, Gillett beat a hasty retreat with a relay
of fast horses to Chihuahua, Mexico. "It was reported that he took with him
$100,000 in gold," but not his young wife, one newspaper reported. She and
their small son joined him later, followed, it was said, by a mysterious stranger,
dressed in black, and wearing a heavy, sandy mustache. Legend has it that
the stranger intended to steal the gold, or kidnap Gillett and bring him back to
the United States. In fact, there probably was not much gold, although the
cattle king did eventually make enough money in mining and real estate to
repay part of his debt. Accusations of stock frauds, and even some arrests,
dogged Gillett's footsteps for the rest of his life. He died in the 1920s, living
as if he were wealthy even if he was not, after crashing a "fast car" into a
telephone pole in California. 22
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After another disaster in western Kansas similar to the Gillett affair, a
local editor lamented philosophically that the big busts experienced by some
cattlemen have a "redeeming feature, for they hasten the time when any
kind of a little 2 X 4 cow-boy with only a six-shooter and a stinking cigarette
can't buy a thousand head of cattle for his individual note and mortgage." 23
And the editor was right. Procedures for loaning money on cattle needed
revision. The dishonest hustler only increased the prejudice that some lending
institutions already had against cattle paper. But most of all, those cattlemen
who had collateral needed more long-term, reasonable credit. This situation,
some feel, has not been entirely corrected even today, although there has been
notable improvement during the twentieth century.
Financial shenanigans and subsequent disasters were not confined to these
two men. Others besides Cross and Gillett also exploited the loosely organized
system of financing the cattle industry. Yet in the case of Sunny Slope, the
demise of Cross caused only a temporary setback in the farm's increasing
importance to the purebred trade. In 1898 C. A. Stannard, who already had a
large Hereford interest as well as extensive oil properties, purchased the farm
and combined his purebred stock with what remained of the Cross herd,
doubling the number to almost 600 head. Stannard also reinstituted the practice of raising hogs at Sunny Slope, with a herd of 300 registered Berkshires.
The farm grew in fame, and probably fortune, under the astute management of Stannard. He spent much time on the show circuit and dispersed
purebred breeding stock to many sections of the United States at almost double
the rate that Cross had. Sunny Slope stock was included in auctions held in
widely scattered towns and cities, including Fort Worth, Denver, and Kansas
City. Many sales also continued to be made at Sunny Slope itself. One, in
1903, included on its list of large purchasers the name of Frank Rockefeller,
a younger brother of the famed industrialist John D. Rockefeller. This is
another example of nonagricultural money being brought into the purebred
business. Led by young Frank, the Rockefellers had become interested in
Kansas ranching as early as 1876, buying several thousand acres in Kiowa
County and engaging in general ranching and the production of purebred
Shorthorns. A herd of 400 registered Shorthorns had been accumulated by
the middle 1880s. When C. S. Cross staged his large sale in 1898, Rockefeller
added Herefords to his line of stock and continued to increase the number
until by the early twentieth century it equaled the size of his Shorthorn herd.
The Rockefeller interest was important to upbreeding in Kansas and surrounding states for several decades, for it provided an outlet for stock bred at Sunny
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Slope and also helped to distribute registered stock among many range herds. 24
A disastrous fire in "barn #3" during the winter of 1904 was about the
only setback in the growth of Sunny Slope under Stannard ownership. Almost
a hundred head valued at over $20,000 perished in the flames. Judging by the
local newspapers, the farm remained a source of much pride in the community
even after the fire. "Best" and "largest" in Kansas, "larger than the Gudgell
& Simpson's herd," and "largest thoroughbred Hereford herd in the World"
were only a few of the superlatives aimed at Sunny Slope. A degree of the
community's pride, as well as the mystique that often surrounded purebred
cattle operations, might well be judged from an unusual obituary written by
the editor of the Gazette. He wrote:
Several days ago one of the most distinguished inhabitants of Lyon
County died and no telegraphic reports were sent out of town, and
the Gazette wouldn't have heard of it but for the fact that a friend of
the Gazette went out to Sunny Slope farm Thursday and asked to see
Wild Tom and was told by one of the men that Tom had been "laid
away" .... He has won blue ribbons from cattle shows all over the
United States and Canada, and his picture hangs in the rooms of all
lovers of white face cattle in this country and England. At one time,
while Wild Tom was the property of C. S. Cross, an offer of $25,000
was made for him and refused.2 5
Stannard continued to operate Sunny Slope until 1910, when political
obligations and an increased preoccupation with his oil interests forced him
to sell. The luster of purebred breeding had also declined for Stannard by
this time because of personal misfortune. His only son had contracted typhoid
fever while showing Sunny Slope cattle at a county fair and died in 1907,
and his wife succumbed to the same disease the following year. In 1910 the
entire herd, down from over 800 head to less than 250, was sold at public
auction. Sunny Slope was sold privately to a local resident and then resold
the following year. Both buyers were described as "successful businessmen"
who were seeking rural investments. The sum of $60,000, or more than
double what Stannard had paid for the land only twelve years earlier, was
cited as the sale price in each transaction. 26

Any picture of upbreeding in Kansas during the 1890s or in any other part
of the country, for that matter, is apt to overemphasize the importance of
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the colorful producers of purebreds because they were the men who caught
the fancy of the press. The owners of range herds who patronized the purebred breeders were often relegated to obscurity, even though these were the
folk who used the purebred animal for the basic purpose for which it was
bred. But the producers of purebreds were important because their herds were
the fountainheads of improved blood . Several herds in Kansas had acquired
national stature by the 1890s, and these were often owned by men of financial
means who seemed to engage in the purebred business as something of an
avocation. The depression in the early part of the decade eliminated a few
herds, but the business had recovered well by the end of the decade.
By 1900 the Hereford was well on its way to becoming the most popular
of the several breeds of beef cattle. Most important for the twentieth century,
however, was the fact that this blooded stock had begun to work its magic
on the range as more and better beef was being produced in a shorter period
of time from fewer cattle and on fewer acres of land. The "blue jeans roasts
and corduroy steaks" that had formerly stood for Kansas meat were fast
becoming a thing of the past. Finally, there was much optimism toward the
end of the nineteenth century about the present and future condition of the
industry. One enthusiast went so far as to predict that the whole country
would soon recognize Kansas as the "hub of the cattle industry of the United
States, and consequently the world." The northwestern section of the United
States, the article noted, had too much winter weather and not enough grain
for major cattle production, while the South had less grain and more "greenhead " flies, and the East had land and grain that were too high-priced. Only
in Kansas, he said, were the conditions and resources ideal for large-scale beef
production. 27
Production, however, was only the first step in putting steaks and roasts
on the American table, and in many ways it may have been the least complicated. After growing and fattening the stock, cattlemen were forced to confront the several large businesses that were in charge of the marketing and
processing phase of the industry. As a result, many disputes between producers
and big businesses arose, and cattlemen were compelled to spend increasing
amounts of time and energy in attempting to resolve these disagreements. The
box score of the cattlemen-big-business confrontations revealed both their
successes and failures.
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Between the range or feedlot and the consumer's dinner table was the marketing phase of the beef industry. Here the cattleman came into contact with
big business in the form of railroads, stockyards, and packing plants. As
independent-minded stockmen individually confronted the greater power and
organization of big business, the first result was conflict; but before long the
cattlemen saw the need to organize and thus to speak with a stronger, united
voice. In due time this produced the Kansas Livestock Association (KLA),
a weak and ineffective organization for several years, except in dealings with
railways, but also the foundation upon which stockmen later built a strong
association. Ultimately, KLA became an organizational response to industrialization, not unlike that taken by farmers, laborers, and big businesses.
After 1871 the stockyards and packing houses in Kansas City were the
destination of most livestock produced in Kansas and much of the Southwest.
These two industries were tremendously important in the development of the
Kansas and Southwestern beef industry throughout the last quarter of the
nineteenth century and much of the twentieth.
Kansas City, like other large central markets in the West, developed
simultaneously with improvement in transportation, increased livestock production, and the migration of eastern packers toward the primary sources of
supply. These central markets served to concentrate supply and demand and
to provide the facilities and coordination necessary for the transfer of ownership. Skilled employees of the stockyards, as well as the commission men who
operated under the rules of a livestock exchange, supplied the coordination.
Feeders or graziers bought the younger stock for additional maturing, while
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packers took the older cattle and transformed this beef on the hoof into
products ready for consumption.
During the nineteenth century a typical group of cattle arrived at the
Kansas City stockyards by railroad car. The unloading and recording of the
stock's origin, number of head, and location within the yards were accomplished by stockyard employees. Then a commission company, selected by
the shipper, assumed responsibility for the animals and saw to their feeding,
watering, and eventual sale. After the sale was completed the animals were
weighed under the supervision of the commission company and then delivered
to the buyer by stockyards personnel. The commission company deducted
various charges and paid the shipper the balance, usually on the same day.
Besides facilities and coordination, central markets provided auxiliary
functions. During the nineteenth century prices paid for livestock sold in as
well as outside the central markets were set by the markets themselves. Supply
and demand supposedly determined prices, and few questioned the practice.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, producers
increasingly accused the large packers of arbitrarily setting price levels. Central markets also developed banking and credit facilities for buyer and seller,
provided market news services, and performed some sanitary control. From
the buyer's point of view the large volume of transactions handled, the regularity of receipts, the facilities for handling and weighing cattle, and the guaranteeing of titles were the principal advantages. The seller appreciated the
standardization of price and classification at the central markets and the
market information that eventually became available. The seller often felt
that higher prices were received when there were larger numbers of specialized
buyers, that his poor stock sold better when there was more off-grade stuff
available, and that the weighing and grading were more satisfactory in the
central market. 1
Railway companies were responsible for the origin and development of
the Kansas City yards. As early as 1867 the Kansas Pacific Railroad established a small area in the town as a rest and feeding station for southwestern
cattle that were en route to Chicago or midwestern feedlots. The yards were
located just south of the confluence of the Kansas and Missouri rivers on the
Kansas side of the state line. As the yards expanded eastward in subsequent
years, many of the activities covered an area in both states. Some 35,000 head
passed through the feeding station in 1867 and double that number the following year. Three years later L. V. Morse, a superintendent for the Hannibal
& St. Joseph Railroad, and James F. Joy, president of the Chicago, Burlington,
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& Quincy, had permanent pens built and scales installed. Though the presence

of scales indicates that some animals were being sold locally either to butchers
or feeders, the yards for several years remained primarily a rest and feeding
station.
In 1871 the Kansas Stock Yards Company was organized with a capitalization of $100,000. J. M. Walker of Chicago became president of the company,
although ownership was reported to be largely local until 1876. These were
the first yards west of Chicago, predating those in St. Louis by a year and
those in Omaha, Denver, and St. Paul by about fifteen years. Receipts in 1871
included over 120,000 cattle, 40,000 hogs, and 4,500 sheep, but these figures
may have included some stock that passed through only for feed and rest.
Growth was slow until the late eighties, but by 1900 the Kansas City yards
were receiving over two million cattle a year in addition to other livestock.
Cattle usually accounted for about 75 percent of all receipts. Stocker and
feeder sales, by 1900 amounting to over half of the cattle trade, became the
most significant part of cattle marketing, and Kansas City eventually became
the largest stocker-feeder market in the world.
An eastern group of financiers, headed by Charles Francis Adams, Jr.,
of Boston, became in 1876 the principal owners of the yards, which they
reorganized into the Kansas City Stock Yards Company with Adams as its
president, a post he held until 1902. These financiers also had interests in the
railroads that served Kansas City, and there were several instances of railroad
personnel filling key managerial positions in the new organization. The new
company initiated a policy of expansion and development that lasted well
into the 1890s. It was responsible for adding land on both sides of the KansasMissouri border, and for building new pens and unloading facilities, bridges
across the Kansas River, and a new and enlarged Livestock Exchange Building. Charles F. Morse, a Harvard-educated Bostonian with Burlington and
Santa Fe railroad experience who became general manager of the yards in
1870, received much of the credit for developing the Kansas City market.
After the period of expansion that temporarily ended the nineties, the stockyards company had a capitalization of over four million dollars.2
There were few local markets for livestock in Kansas in the nineties,
and a number of cattlemen no doubt shipped to the large central markets
outside the state. Chicago, for example, was usually considered the best
market for fat stock; St. Louis was active, as was St. Joseph, which for many
Kansas producers was the closest central market outside the state. The development of the St. Joseph yards was similar to that which had already occurred
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rn Kansas City. The yards, originally used for feed and rest stops by the
Hannibal & St. Joseph Railway, developed into a central market during the
late eighties. Compared to Kansas City, however, the packing industry played
an earlier and larger role in their development.3
Within the state, Wichita also had a major market but nothing comparable to that of Kansas City. It had been one of the original shipping points
for Texas cattle trailed north during the 1870s, but not until 1888 was the
Wichita Union Stock Yards Company opened for business. Initial capitalization for the stockyards company was $200,000; twenty years later it had more
than tripled. The interests of Jacob Dold, Francis Whittaker, and other small
packers were important to the development of the Wichita yards, although
Cudahy packing interests eventually became a large stockholder. 4 The proximity of the large beef-producing areas to the southwest contributed to the
growth of the Wichita yards because of lower freight rates, while the many
cow herds in these areas encouraged the stocker and feeder trade.
Railroad rates and connections were extremely important for the development of all stockyards, and a major consideration of cattle shippers in deciding
which market to patronize. The additional expense of freight charges influenced many Kansas shippers to avoid the Chicago market even though it
might have paid higher prices. Sometimes a railroad favored one stockyard
over another. The Santa Fe, for example, attempted during the early 1870s
to continue their carrying trade to Chicago by avoiding the Kansas City yards
and routing trains through Atchison. But the practice gave way after a few
years as the Kansas City yards grew and shippers insisted on using them.
The meat processing industry complemented production: the packers
were the harvesters, so to speak, of the meat crop. More important than processing, though, the industry found a market for the surplus meat produced in
the thinly populated West in the more heavily populated areas of the Midwest
and the East.
As the eastern packers were migrating west, first to Milwaukee and Chicago, then to Kansas City and a number of other cities on the fringe of the
large beef-producing area, they were also developing a system for the national
distribution of their products. This highly efficient wholesale marketing system was of prime importance to the growth and centralization of the packing
industry. Gustavus F. Swift and his brother, Edwin, are usually given credit
for leading the development.

Their nationwide system, which was built

around a network of branch houses established during the 1870s and 1880s
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in most of the major towns and cities, forced other large packers to follow
their example or remain relatively small local companies.
A number of problems had to be solved before western meat moved
smoothly into eastern markets. Railroads first discouraged the shipment of
dressed meat with freight charges that were much higher than rates for live
shipments. Even the reduction in bulk between live and dressed shipments
failed to equalize this rate disparity. Livestock shipments had been a lucrative
business, except when rate wars absorbed the profits, and the lines reluctantly
accepted dressed meat. But not until the advent of refrigerated cars, developed
and owned for the most part by the large meat processors, were the Chicago
and Kansas City packers able to force lower rates. As the number of refrigerated units owned by packers increased, it became customary for the railroads
to pay for the use of these cars by a reduction in the established hauling
charges. Eventually this refrigerated traffic became, as William Z. Ripley has
pointed out, "large in volume, very regular and highly concentrated as to
source." Volume increased even more as packers began to ship fruit and other
produce that could be successfully refrigerated. These large tonnages were
easily diverted to that railroad which best showed its appreciation through
reduced rates or secret rebates, resulting in the western packers having significant power to influence the rail lines. The influence continued until the
Hepburn Act in 1906, and resulted in fewer shipments of live cattle to the
East and the growth of midwestern packing.
In addition to the discouragement from railroads, the opposition from
retail meat shops, stockyards, and livestock dea!ers in the East, all of whom
were in line to lose profits from predressed meat, had to be overcome. And
finally, the public prejudice against cattle that were slaughtered thousands
of miles from the place of consumption had to be eliminated before western
beef became common fare on eastern tables."
The development of a national distribution system and the increased
centralization of the packing industry in a few locations were interrelated
developments. Both were dependent upon a number of technological innovations. Of utmost importance was the refrigerated railroad car, pioneered
successfully by Swift in the late 1870s. Built and owned largely by the packers,
refrigerated cars solved many of the problems of the long-distance transportation of fresh meat and ended the packers' dependence on salting, curing, and
canning for the perservation of their products. They also provided an important source of revenue and served as the packers entree into many other lines of
distribution, especially of foods that were highly perishable. Distribution of

47

The Kansas Beef Industry

California fruit, for example, was almost monopolized by Swift and Armour
by 1900. Refrigeration also was important to the packing plants because it
allowed year-round operation with little fear of spoilage.
Developments in the slaughtering process during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century were also important to the spectacular growth of the packing industry. The moving conveyor belt, or the disassembly line, as packers
called it, speeded the butchering process by allowing a more specialized utilization of space, machinery, and labor. Some plants were ingeniously arranged.
Animals were herded up to the top Boors, killed, and hung on a line. Gravity
then assisted the movement toward the lower Boors as different parts were
separated from the hanging carcasses. At the end of the line waste products
were converted into fertilizer.
Increased use of by-products from animal slaughter both stimulated and
resulted from this growth and centralization. Desire for larger profits and
the difficulties of disposing of waste also contributed to more frequent use of
by-products. The Armour interests pioneered the large-scale practice of utilizing every part of the animals they butchered, and by the 1890s all the large
packers were doing so. The by-products were manufactured into marketable
commodities by the packing plant itself or in separate plants located close to
the slaughter point. By the nineties most of the by-product manufacturing
that had originally been started by small businessmen was owned by the
major packers. 6
The development of Kansas City as a national packing center, like its
development as a central market, was dependent upon the railroads. There
were a couple of antebellum packers supplying the local market with meat
during the 1850s, but it was not until the late 1860s, after railroads had
reached Kansas City, that today's packing industry originated. Most of the
initial plants were owned by local citizens. The first outside money for the
industry came in around 1870 with the Armour brothers and their partner,
John Plankinton. These early plants provided Kansas City with what one
historian has called a "thriving packing business" a year before the Kansas
Stock Yards Company was chartered. 7
Before the 1880s, when rapid transportation and refrigerated cars allowed
the fresh beef trade to develop, Kansas City's packing was heavily dependent
upon the pork and the specialty beef trade. Beef was packed in salt, then
later in cans, some of which became an item in international trade. The importance of the pork trade can be judged from the fact that in 1880 the number
of hogs slaughtered was about seventeen times greater than the number of
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cattle. In the late 1880s, however, after refrigeration had developed, cattle
slaughter as well as the whole packing business grew rapidly.
The growth of the central market and the new possibility of using Kansas
City as a slaughter point for the national fresh meat trade attracted a number
of additional packing interests during the 1880s. Fowler & Sons, for example,
moved in from Atchison a few years before moving to Wichita; Morris &
Butt initiated a plant that became Wilson & Company in 1915; and Kingan
& Company built a plant that was taken over by Cudahy in 1900. There were
others besides these, but the most significant addition to Kansas City's packing
industry during the eighties was the attraction in 1887 of Swift's large halfmillion-dollar plant. Then, with their combined strength, Swift and Armour
were able to stop much of the railraods' discrimination against dressed beef.
Success in adj us ting railroad rates contributed much to the increase in cattle
slaughter from 79,000 head in 1885 to a kill of over half a million in 1890.
The patronizing attitude of the stockyards company was also important
in attracting packers. Swift received over $62,000 in land, while Armour was
given $500,000 worth of stock in the Kansas City Stock Yards Company for
locating its new million-dollar plant in the city. At least $200,000 in land or
cash was paid to four other packers.
Given these land and cash incentives, the mechanical developments that
were occurring, and the choice location of Kansas City, it was not surprising
that the packing industry continued to expand late in the nineteenth century.
By 1900 the lion's share of Kansas City's meat processing was in the hands of
the large national packers, and it was the largest single industry in the city,
supplying incomes to over 35,000 people. One historian has noted that "perhaps nothing was so important to Kansas City's industrial growth before
1900 as meat packing." This industry "more than any other aspect of the
livestock business," he continued, "made Kansas City a metropolitan center."
Much the same thing could be said for Kansas City's packing houses in their
effect on the Kansas and southwestern beef producers. 8

While packers, stockyards, and railroads were expanding westward during
the latter part of the nineteenth century, their relations with agricultural producers were becoming more and more strained. Rural producers, after failing
to correct through individual effort the abuse they felt, protested vehemently
through the Grange, Alliance, and Populist movements and also advertised
their grievances through a number of other regional and state groups. Cattle49
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men, for instance-who complained of high railroad rates, yardage fees, and
low prices for their stock, all of which were the result, they claimed, of the
monopolistic power of the large industries-often sought relief and security
by cooperating with their neighbors in livestock associations. They used either
the old associations, which were redirected to conform more with the increasingly complex economic conditions, or newly created organizations, which
were also directed toward meeting the new circumstances. Preeminent among
the latter was the Kansas Livestock Association. The rationale for its creation,
contrary to earlier associations in the West, yet consistent with the new
economic situation, was not related to any particular problem that cattlemen
faced in range production. Rather, the railroads and their freight-rate policies
were more responsible than any other factor in spawning this significant group.
Begun as an organized lobby against rising freight rates, however, KLA was
soon involved in many other developments that directly or indirectly affected
livestock producers. This involvement has continued to the present time.
The exact origin of the association is shrouded in mystery and conflicting
evidence. Though the earliest secondary accounts point to May, 1894, as its
beginning, no primary material can be found to support this early date. The
first accounts probably refer to a local or county association that preceded
KLA. The first statewide organization, the Kansas Livestock Association,
most likely had its origin in 1897.9
William Allen White's Emporia Daily Gazette proclaimed the new
organization in its August 30, 1897, issue. Cramped between a story of "a boy
tramp from Dodge City" who had stolen a pair of shoes and an advertisement
for two-quart hot-water bottles that sold for seventy-five cents was an inconspicuous note that said "stockmen from all parts of the state met at the courthouse this afternoon and formed a state organization. The principal object
of the organization is to get freight rates which will be just and equitable
...." In its issue for the following day the paper listed other objectives
of the new group as reducing theft, preventing the shipment of diseased
animals, and protecting "in every manner possible the interests of dealers
and shippers of livestock." For over a decade, however, the freight-rate battle
pushed other concerns out of the picture.
KLA began, then, with little fanfare. Perhaps its founders expected it to
dissolve in a few years, as other organizations had done before. But it struggled along for a decade or so and then blossomed into one of the more
prominent stock associations of the twentieth century. 10
Although the exact origin of KLA may be debatable, the names of several
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prominent Kansas stockmen can definitely be associated with it in its early
years. James W. Robison of Towanda, sometimes hailed as the proprietor of
the "biggest farm in Kansas," located in Butler and Sedgwick counties, was
the association's president from its inception until his death in 1909. This
stockman was born in Scotland in 1831 and raised in Illinois. Before migrating
to Kansas in 1882, Robison farmed in that state, beginning, as he said later,
with a "stumpy forty acres" rented from his father. By the late 1890s Robison
owned and leased over 10,000 acres in Kansas, including 4,000 acres of crop
land. He planted corn for the most part, using the remainder for grazing his
1,800 head of cattle and horses. His cattle included many feeder steers that
were marketed after grass and corn fattening. He also sold about 2,000 hogs
each year. Even though, the Topeka Daily Capital noted, "everything on
the Robison farm is as handy as a pocket in a shirt," a labor force of sixty to
seventy-five men was required to run the extensive operation. By 1901 Robison's holdings were reported to have increased to over 16,000 acres. Robison
was also active in several other promotional organizations in addition to KLA.
At various times he served as president of the Kansas Improved Stock Breeders'
Association and as vice-president of the State Horticultural Society. He was
also president of the State Bank of El Dorado and served a two-year term
on the Kansas Board of Railroad Commissioners.
Robison's fame reached beyond the borders of the state as well. His
obituary noted that he had acquired international fame as the "breeder, importer and handler of the big black handsome Percheron horses." One of his
sons continued the registered horse business on his famous Whitewater Falls
Stock Farm long after the father's death, but the efficiency of the tractor, the
depression of the 1930s, and the death of the son forced the sale of the famous
Percherons. 11
George Plumb, brother of United States Senator Preston Plumb, was
the most important early member of the KLA, serving as its secretary during
the first decade of its existence. He and his parents had migrated from Ohio
during the spring of 1857 to a Kansas prairie site that was destined to become
Emporia. The Plumb family built one of the first wooden shanties on the
town site. Plumb had served with several Kansas cavalry units during the
Civil War, spending much of his service time in the West, before he began
extensive sheep and cattle raising in the Emporia area on his 3,000-acre ranch.
Plumb was a member of the state legislature from 1905 to 1907, and the chairman of the 1911 Board of Railroad Commissioners that organized the Kansas
Public Utilities Commission.
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Plumb's principal contribution to KLA was his knowledge of freight
rates, and he early became one of the state's most vehement critics of railroad
policy. Sharing his ranching duties with a son, James R., during his later years,
Plumb continued until his death in 1933 to advance the interests of Kansas
livestock producers. 12
Though Robison and Plumb were the most active members of KLA during this early period and often seemed to be the whole organization, they were
by no means the only prominent stockmen in the ranks of the new group.
H. B. Miller of Osage City was the first vice-president, and W. P. Martin of
Cottonwood Falls the first treasurer. Thomas M. Potter, rancher and cattle
feeder from the Peabody area, was also a charter member. Before his death
in 1929 Potter had acquired a long list of accomplishments in addition to his ·
participation in KLA, including membership in the state legislature, a gubernatorial candidacy, the presidency of the Board of Agriculture, and membership on the University of Kansas Board of Regents. A small reward for the
last service was his becoming the eponym of Potter Lake on the campus of
the University. Jacob Heath, Frank Arnold, George Donaldson, W. J. Tod,
and Melville C. Campbell also helped guide the new association.
Campbell became especially well-known for his long service in KLA and
more generally as a Kansas rancher and businessman. He had begun his
cattle interests by trailing herds north from Texas during the 1880s before he
settled more permanently on a ranch in southwestern Kansas in 1891. Early
in his cattle business Campbell was associated with a younger brother, James
P., who also made a distinguished reputation for himself as a Kansas rancher.
Campbell was also an active businesman in Wichita, first as a commission
man at the stockyards, then as a banker. But the cattle business was always
his first love, and he had a good deal of experience with livestock associations
before KLA was ever conceived. During the 1880s he was a member of the
Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association, the Western Kansas Cattle Growers'
Association, and the group that eventually became the Texas and Southwestern
Cattle Raisers Association. He served on the board of directors of the last
organization for many years. The KLA executive board from its beginning
until a few years before his death in 1932 also benefited from Campbell's wide
expenence.
During the 1890s Campbell was busy buying, or blocking up, as it was called,
some of the public and private land in Clark County that he and other stockmen in the area had been using. Wisely, Campbell was making the transition
from free grass to ranch. Most other cattlemen had already done so, although
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the change was delayed a few years in the southwestern part of the state. 13
The Campbell ranch, some 20,000 acres of grazing and meadow land
along the Cimarron River, eventually became one of the best-known spreads
in the state. This was due not so much to the ranch itself, although an efficient
steer and cow herd operation developed, but to the people associated with it.
Campbell, of course, became widely known and respected for his business
interests and his long-term participation in the public affairs of stockmen. In
1918 he formed a partnership with his son-in-law, Jesse C. Harper. This young
man had only recently retired as coach and athletic director at the University
of Notre Dame, after having persuaded the university to hire Knute Rockne
as its football coach.
Though Harper's background was unusual, his common sense and willingness to work in the interest of stock producers soon won for him a respected place among ranching folk. Like his father-in-law, Jesse was honored
with the presidency of KLA, although his term of office was interrupted by
his returning to Notre Dame after the tragic death of Rockne for a stay of
two years. Harper's son, Mellvin C., also became a KLA president. The ranch
prospered under their astute management, and it continues today with the
third generation of Harpers actively involved. 14
KLA was not the first significant stock association in the state or the
West as a whole. The number of associations was legion before KLA ever
came to be. In Kansas, sectional and county associations predated KLA, as
did organizations to promote a single breed of stock. State associations in
Colorado, Wyoming, Texas, Utah, Nebraska, and South Dakota were among
those established earlier than KLA.
There were also attempts in the 1880s to form a national association,
initiated first by western stockmen who gathered in Chicago in 1883 to discuss
the possibilities of federal legislation to retard the spread of Texas fever and
pleura-pneumonia. The N ational Cattle Growers' Association and the formation of the Bureau of Animal Industry followed the Chicago meeting. But
the National Cattle Growers was not in fact a national organization, as it
tended to represent only northwestern cattlemen. Southwestern stockmen,
reluctant to accept the responsibility for Texas fever and determined to have
a national cattle trail to northern ranges, established the following year in
St. Louis a rival group known as the National Cattle Growers' and Horse
Association. The two worked at cross purposes for a while, then merged
into the Consolidated Cattle Growers' Association, and finally ceased to exist
after the disastrous winter of 1886-87. Today's National Cattlemen's Asso53
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ciation, a name adopted in 1977 after several name changes during the twentieth century, does not descend directly from any of these early attempts. It
originated early in 1898 as a result of a meeting called the year before by the
Denver Chamber of Commerce and the Colorado Cattle Growers' Association.15
KLA was thus part of the phenomenon of stock associations, local, regional, statewide, and national, that spra~g up all through the West during
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Similar movements toward consolidated action were apparent in the industrial and financial sectors of the
economy as well.
The associations in the livestock business can be divided roughly into two
groups. The ones established before the 1890s were concerned primarily with
internal problems that were related to the peculiar nature of open-range production. Regulation of round-ups, use of grass, and the control of theft were
typical issues that demanded attention. After 1890, however, the older associations that continued and the new ones that were created became more
concerned with problems that were external to range production and inherent
in the industrialization process. KLA represented the latter group .
The tendency of stock associations to emphasize new directions after
the early 1890s followed, though somewhat tardily, the larger developments
that were occurring in the nation's economy. Not only had the open-range
method of producing beef largely disappeared, but western farmers and
ranchers were at the peak of their struggles to adapt their operations to the
demands of the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Industrialization had
provided agriculture with larger domestic and international markets and the
transportation necessary to service them; it had supplied the machinery that
was necessary for expansion; and it had generated hopes that the agricultural
producers' share of profits from the nation's economy would be greatly increased. But industrialization had another face, too. The increased efficiency
of agriculture and the expanded acreages that had come into production as
a partial result of railroads, new machinery, government land policies, and
increased immigration led to a surplus of agricultural products. As a result,
farm prices were low, and a number of industries hoped to keep them that
way. Cheap raw materials from agriculture were indispensable to low production costs in industry, as were tariff policies that actually raised the expenses of farmers and ranchers.
Besides the effects of industrialization that tended to restrict profits,
farmers and ranchers had to contend with an unreliable climate, an antiquated
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tax structure that depended heavily upon real and personal property, labor
costs that could rarely be reduced by layoffs, and the fact that returns on
capital investment were often delayed for several years. In short, commercial
agriculture had come to the West, and farm and ranch producers had been
thrust into the money economy where their need to show a profit could not
be matched by their ability to effect significant economic change.
Farmers and ranchers were small-unit producers and relatively small
shippers and marketers, wholly unable to compete with the commercial giants
that had developed by the 1890s. Agricultural producers could set neither the
prices they received for their products nor those they paid for the manufactured
goods they bought. It was a continuous struggle for them to raise an effective
voice even in the relatively small area of marketing expenses. It was indeed
a troubled time. Agriculturalists had been schooled to believe that they were
the chosen people of God and the guardians of the nation's virtues, and that
their endeavors were basic to a healthy economy. They had believed that
industrialization would enhance the importance of their endeavors, but now
found that the opposite was closer to reality.
Cattlemen in Kansas responded to industrialization with KLA. But this
was only a partial response and one that followed a long line of attempts by
agricultural producers throughout the nation. Early in the period farmers
and ranchers tended to follow the lead of the Grange, which introduced
cooperative marketing and purchasing associations and stimulated renewed
interest in political activities. Then the belief that control over the political
processes would enable the oppressed to curtail the evils of industrialization
grew and blossomed into the Populist party of the 1890s. And while there
are many different views of the Populist phenomenon, there is little dispute
that it was in part a manifestation of agrarian discontent with problems that
were related largely to industrialization.
Kansans participated in the early attempts of the Grange movement to
maintain an honored place for agriculture in the developing economy, but
not until the 1890s and the advent of the Populists were any large-scale efforts
made to improve agriculture's economic position by gaining control of the
state's political processes. Kansas populism, like that for the nation as a whole,
developed from the Alliance movement, which had first come to the state
in the interest of combating monopoly. Its strength increased rapidly until its
fusion with the Democrats in 1896 and a rise in agricultural prosperity initiated
its decline. Populist success in the state included the Kansas electoral vote
for presidential candidates James B. Weaver in 1892 and William Jennings
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Bryan in 1896, the selection of William A. Peffer to replace the seasoned
United States Senator John J. Ingalls, and the election of several congressmen.
Included in the latter group were at least two cattlemen, Jerry Simpson, who
lost his accumulated wealth as a result of a Kansas blizzard, and William A.
Harris, the Lin wood Shorthorn breeder.
Populist success on the state level may have been even more striking.
With about 40 percent of the state's vote in 1890, the Populists were able to
cast the decisive votes in the legislature, and they gained control of both the
executive and legislative branches of state government by 1896. But the latter
victory was accomplished only by fusion with the Democrats, a union which
eventually led to the death of populism as a separate entity. By 1896 intraparty strife also plagued the Populists and blunted their legislative efforts.
Their direct success in mitigating the economic ills of the state's farmers and
ranchers was negligible during the 1890s, but many of their proposals gained
new life the following century. The overriding contribution of these late
nineteenth-century movements was in awakening the populace to the importance of government regulation of monopoly. 16
There is little evidence that producers in Kansas who were devoted more
or less exclusively to cattle raising ever became Populists in large numbers.
Simpson and Harris were, of course, both Populists and cattlemen, but Simpson was a cattleman and Harris a Populist for only brief periods. The leaders
in the cattle industry appear to have remained, for the most part, in one of
the old parties, primarily the Republican. 0. Gene Clanton's study of Kansas
Populists has shown that only 35 and 29 percent of the party's leaders were
farmers or stockmen in 1890 and 1896, respectively; but whether farming or
stock raising was the dominant interest remains unknown. Most were probably diversified in their interests, as many Kansas producers were, and raised
both crops and stock. The political sympathies of the rank-and-file cattlemen
are also a matter for some speculation. They were undoubtedly sympathetic
to a number of Populist demands, but, as far as party affiliation is concerned,
there is no reason to believe that they varied much from Clanton's conclusions
regarding Populist leadership. 17
Although the state's cattlemen were not in the vanguard of the Populist
party, its failure left them without an effective lobby other than the Republican
and Democratic parties. These parties were helpful at times, but cattlemen
needed something bipartisan and dedicated exclusively to their interests. KLA
picked up some of the slack and in so doing followed the trend already set
by business and labor. Ineffective individual effort gave way to an organized
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response; cooperative action in the face of common problems overcame rugged
individualism. 18
The whole association movement spoke well for the western cattlemen's
ingenuity and willingness to cooperate in the solution of problems common
to the whole industry, to a particular region, or to a single state. The twentiethcentury cooperative marketing and purchasing movement, for example, derived
much benefit from the effects that the earlier agrarian organizations-including
livestock associations-had on the thinking of producers.
On the other hand, some of the activities of these organizations were less
laudable. Cattlemen's associations were sometimes employed to forbid the
use of public lands to latecomers or sheepmen, and sometimes the associations
implemented the cattlemen's concept of justice. Indians and other claimants
to range land or cattle were often the recipients of this "justice," sometimes
when it was unjust. The despicable activities perpetrated by stock associations were not unlike those of some manufacturing associations, who fought
unionism, maintained artificially high prices, and took unfair advantage of
businesses too small to protect their own interests. Association policies were
essentially the extension of the ideas of a group of businessmen. Their activities led one historian of the cattle industry, C. L. Sonnichsen, to categorize
their basic motivation as selfishness-a selfishness, one might add, that was
often necessary in a competitive economy. Pointing his comments toward
livestock associations in general-but they would apply to manufacturing
organizations as well-Sonnichsen wrote: "(They are] out to 'protect the
interests' of their constituents-that is, get as much for them as they can. They
are dominated by rich and powerful men and they are frankly and proudly
selfish, as all organizations must be which work for the welfare of a special
group." 19 Sonnichsen's views are partly true of KLA.

Of all the complaints that agricultural producers voiced against big business during the 1890s, few if any exceeded in intensity those that were raised
against the railroads. Cattlemen were among those who became increasingly
concerned with rail lines. In Kansas, as was shown earlier, this concern led
to KLA. At times, shippers complained of poor service or some other unpopular practice of the lines, but the most frequent and concentrated attack
was upon freight rates. To complicate matters, railroad rate schedules and
the process of arriving at them were exceedingly complex and difficult for the
average shipper to comprehend. Most rural shippers understood only the cost
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of transporting their goods to market and not the complicated procedures of
arriving at various schedules. To them, the rates were simply too high, in
view of their own diminished purchasing power during the early 1890s. These
shippers knew the railroads could not operate without earning a "fair" profit,
but they believed that rates were higher than necessary, considering the increased efficiency and the expanded carrying trade of the lines and the high
freight charges they themselves paid for the goods which they bought. They
also believed there was corruption, mismanagement, and overcapitalization in
railway circles.
It is difficult to determine, however, the level of combined long- and shorthaul tariffs. Most authorities agree that rates in general had started to decline
in the decades before the 1890s and continued to do so until about 1900. It
was estimated, for example, that the average charge for transporting one ton
of freight for one mile was around 2 cents in the late 1860s but only .73 of a
cent by 1900.20 This represented a reduction of over 63 percent. The Santa
Fe system, one of the most patronized roads in Kansas and the Southwest, had
reduced its ton-mile rates from about 2.3 to 1.1 cents between 1881 and 1895.21
These declines seemed to indicate that rate increases were justified by
the 1890s in order to ensure the roads a reasonable profit, but such was not the
case. The level of rates was not the only criterion of the roads' ability to show
a profit. William Z. Ripley, in a detailed analysis of the subject, concluded
that the level of rates did not always indicate profit or the lack of it. Other
sorts of information, much of which the railway companies were reluctant to
divulge, were necessary for an accurate evaluation of profits, and it was o£ten
impossible to reach a definite conclusion. Not even the fact that a number
of railroads failed in the 1890s and went into receivership was convincing
evidence that freight rates were too low; mismanagement or a number of
other factors might have caused the failures. In the end, Ripley was unable
to reach a definite conclusion on the justice of rates during the 1890s.
John F. Stover, another student of railroads, suggested a possible answer.
He concluded that before 1900 rates did generally fall more rapidly than did
the general price structure, and that they continued to lag behind for the first
decade of the twentieth century. 22 But the relationship of tariffs to the general
price structure was not of prime importance to shippers of farm products.
Stover's study included all freight rates, some of which were relatively low,
as well as all prices throughout the economy, some of which were relatively
high. People in agriculture were interested only in the cost of transporting
manufactured goods from east to west or the expense of getting livestock to
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a central market. In addition, rates probably did not decline as rapidly as did
rural income. The justice of the railroads' position on interstate rates during
the 1890s, then, remains somewhat clouded-except in the view of most rural
shippers.
The evidence is a bit more conclusive on intrastate rates. As competition
and the railroads' inability to establish effective pools pushed long-haul rates
down, local or short-haul charges tended to become whatever the traffic would
bear. 23 Some declined, others remained constant, and some actually increased
during the last part of the nineteenth century, judging by reports made to the
Kansas Board of Railroad Commissioners. A report in 1892 showed that the
cost of shipping a carload of cattle or hogs 50 miles had declined from $22.00
per car in 1883 to $18.00 in 1892, a reduction of 18 percent. For the longer
haul of 250 miles, rates had decreased from $72.00 to $43.50, or 39 percent.
If the report was accurate, there had been a reduction in local rates; but even
so, it did not occur with the same speed that interstate rates had declined. But
the reports themselves were subject to question. The commissioners noted in
1891 that the statistical information included in their report was as full and
accurate as was possible, but also that the complicated nature of the task made
it possible for the railroads to make any showing they desired. 24 The inability
to determine exactly the rates that were charged, as well as the method of
establishing them, accounts in part for the contradictions that often permeated
the rival claims of shippers and railway companies. Cattlemen, for example,
were not cognizant of any decline in local rates during the 1890s, and in fact
claimed repeatedly that rail tariffs were going up.
There was no effective federal agency that shippers could appeal to during
the 1890s for redress of local rate grievances. The Interstate Commerce Commission was usually considered too cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive, and the practice of figuring on an extended basis whether the lines
charged more for a short than a long haul made it difficult to establish that
local rates were too high. This practice allowed railroads to charge relatively
high rates for short hauls in areas without competition, as long as cheaper
rates in areas with competition reduced the total charges for several short
hauls to equal that of the long haul.~;;
On the state level, shippers could appeal to the Kansas Board of Railroad
Commissioners-composed of three members appointed by the governorwhich had been established in 1883. According to the legislation establishing
the institution, the board had the power to supervise most activities of common
carriers, require statistical reports, conduct official hearings, and, in the view
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of shippers, issue binding orders on rates to specific c1t1es. As the century
drew to a close, however, it became evident that the board did not have the
power to determine freight tariffs; indeed, it had little power at all if a road
stubbornly refused to abide by the board's decision or had them set aside
through appeals to the courts.
The board's limited ability to determine rates was largely responsible for
Populist moves to strengthen it. And efforts to increase the board's power
soon provoked a heated debate. Most shippers were willing to strengthen the
board, but other prominent Kansans insisted that it was too powerful as it
was. William Allen White, an outspoken foe of the Populists, charged from
Emporia that the men who formed the commission were "ignorant and mercenary, with the morals of bandits and the crude intelligence of arrant demagogues. These men too often regard the railroads as their prey and the
people as their dupes." State railroad boards in general and the Kansas board
in particular, White held, stood between the shipper and justice. In contrast,
others claimed that the lines were affected little by the board, as they frequently refused to abide by its rulings, and used the courts to shield their
excessive rates. 26 By 1896 the Kansas board had heard over a thousand cases,
354 of which had been decided in favor of the rail lines, and 483 in the
shippers' favor. The railroads had disregarded twenty-two rulings of the
board. 27 A tabulation such as this, however, meant little. The key was not
how many but rather which cases the shippers won.
Several attempts were made in the Kansas legislature during the nineties
to pass a stronger railroad bill, one that would establish maximum freight
tariffs or give the board of commissioners the undisputed power to fix rates.
Most attempts engendered partisan disputes between the Populists and the
Republicans and eventually failed. Early in 1897 the legislature passed a new
railroad bill, but Governor Leedy vetoed it on the basis that it was too weak.
Then in December, 1898, this Populist governor called a special session of the
legislature to consider railroad legislation. The lame duck session-voters
had turned Leedy and several of his Populist supporters in the legislature out
of office a few months before-created a Court of Visitation to replace the
controversial railroad commission. The new bill gave a panel of three elected
judges the right to decree freight rates, and also several other powers.
The new Republican governor, William E. Stanley, gave the new law
a fair trial, but in 1900 the Kansas Supreme Court declared the Court of
Visitation unconstitutional on the basis that the law had granted legislative,
executive, and judicial powers to the same body. 28 These ill-fated attempts to
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regulate the state's railroads were to take several other forms during the
twentieth century, but for most of the nineteenth century, the Kansas Board
of Railroad Commissioners was the only body to which stockmen and other
disgruntled shippers might appeal for help. If the railroads were inclined to
follow the recommendations of the board, shippers received some relief.

The specific contest in Kansas between stockmen and railroads that led to KLA
centered on the recurring question of increased freight rates. This was far
from the first confrontation between Kansas cattlemen, or most western
stock men for that matter, and the railroads; but by the 1890s the effects of
the depression, the growing power of railroads, and the other complexities of
an increasingly industrialized economy put the dispute into a different perspective and added urgency to the search for a solution.
The question of rates also involved the contestants in issues related to
the method of charging for freight and in the quality of railroad service.
Almost a decade before the formation of KLA, shippers and railroads disagreed on the mode of charging for services. The railroads had traditionally
billed stock shippers on a carload basis, with specific charges per carload,
dependent upon the size of the car and the distance to market. Neither the
number nor the weight of the livestock in the car mattered. Then in 1888 the
lines initiated a new system based on weight shipped. The new plan stimulated
numerous complaints to the Kansas Board of Railroad Commissioners, as the
stockmen viewed it as only a ploy to raise rates. After a hearing the board
directed that the new system be abandoned. 29 The railroads unsuccessfully
attempted to change the mode of rate charges again in 1890, then they made
no serious attempts to modify the established system until 1896. Most of the
complaints to the board during the first half of the 1890s involved discrimination in the form of rebates, drawbacks, false classifications of freight, free
personal transportation, or the practice of billing at underweight. The secretive
nature of these arrangements between the railroads and their favorite shippers
made regulation by the commissioners difficult.30
On January 11, 1896, the railroads again inaugurated the system of charging shippers by weight rather than by carload.31 Stockmen immediately protested and pressured the railroad commissioners into summoning representatives of the lines to a formal hearing. Several hundred stockmen, according
to the Kansas Farmer, journeyed to Topeka on the appointed day in order to
register their complaints; but most of these were mere spectators. Forty-nine
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witnesses, including cattlemen, bankers, commission men, and freight agents,
testified on behalf of the shippers.
The railroads, "represented by a splendid array of their best legal talent,"
according to the Farmer, argued that the new rates were not higher or, if
higher, that the increase was minimal. They also argued, correctly, that the
new system of charging was more equitable to the small shipper who was not
always able to fill a car to the same capacity as large shippers, yet still had to
pay the full carload rate. In addition, they claimed that the carload rate had
encouraged overcrowding of cars, which resulted in the added expense to
both shipper and carrier of injured or unmarketable stock. 3 2 Decreased
brutality to animals and fairness for small shippers, then, appeared to be the
cornerstones that supported the railroads' argument for a new system of rate
charges. William F. Zornow, however, suggested another possible motive.
The profits from Kansas railroads, he said, had been declining steadily since
1893, so that by 1896 only two out of the twenty-six companies m Kansas
could pay dividends .33
The representatives of the shippers, among whom the cattlemen exerted
a major influence, argued convincingly that the new mode of charging had
resulted in a 15 to 50 percent increase. W. J. Tod of M aple Hill, for example,
testified that the new rates increased the charges he paid for the sixty-eight
mile haul to Kansas City by $6.00 to $7.50 per car, while James P. Campbell attested to an $8.22 increase per car for the several hundred mile trip
from western Kansas. 34 James W . Robison, who later became the president
of KLA, complained th at his rates had risen by $8.00 a car, and that he had
driven some of his stock to the Wichita market rather than pay the rate to
Kansas City.
Then Robison emphasized other major complaints of stockmen. The
necessity of weighing the stock cars in Kansas City and the practice of weighing the cars while they were still coupled and in motion left stockmen with
no foreknowledge of shipping charges and in considerable doubt as to the
accuracy of the railroads' scales. Robison argued that weighing moving cars,
considering the uneven coupling devices commonly in use at the time, resulted
in some cars recording an excessive weight. This meant that a shipper might
pay for more freight than was actually carried because he might be charged
for weight in the car either ahead or behind his. One of the three attorneys
representing the Missouri Pacific countered Robison's argument by suggesting
that "experts" had determined weighing cars while in motion actually resulted
in short weights for the shipper. This conclusion, according to the testimony,
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was based on much the same principle as that which accounted for a moving
skater being able to cross thin ice. Finally, stockmen maintained that the new
system increased the suffering of stock by causing delays in weighing and by
encouraging the practice of loading fewer cattle in the cars than was advisable
for safe travel. 35
In response to the skillful prompting of their Topeka attorney, cattlemen
emphasized their desire to lower rates and to eliminate other abuses by returning to the old carload system of charging. The value of their testimony, however, was weakened somewhat by two inconsistencies. First, the stockmen
found it difficult to justify adequately the inequities of the carload system to
the small shipper, except to say that all shippers, sooner or later, ship "light"
and "heavy cars," or that the small shipper could always cooperate with a
neighbor in order to obtain a full carload. Many of them did this. But the
railroads' contention that the large shippers favored the old carload system
so that small shippers subsidized their freight charges, in part, also had merit.
A second problem revolved around the question of why the stockmen demanded more cars to ship the same number of stock under the new system
if, as they contended, they had not been overloading under the old system.
This question was partially answered when some stockmen admitted that the
increased demand for cars was a deliberate attempt to frustrate the new
system.
The railroad commissioners recognized that the testimony had suggested
at least two major issues: the mode of charging for freight, and the question
of whether the new system had raised rates. They agreed with the railroads
that the new mode of charging was more "just and equitable," but they were
opposed to the apparent rate increase. They did, however, postpone a final
decision on the questions until time permitted them to digest several hundred
pages of conflicting testimony and numerous documents that had been introduced. In the meantime, the board ordered the railroads to return to the old
system.36
The fact that the railroads again attempted to establish rates according
to weight in 1897 indicates that the board eventually required the continuance
of the old system. The change in 1897 prompted another hearing before the
railroad commissioners, but the arguments, the witnesses, and the results were
not much different from those of the earlier hearing. The railroads did, however, change their argument from the "no increase" position of 1896 to that
of a reasonable and justifiable increase. Most important for the cattlemen of
Kansas was the relationship of this hearing to the origin of KLA. The need
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for a united front against the tariff increase, as well as the lack of organization
in previous disputes, was the major stimulus that led cattlemen to meet in
Emporia and form the new association. James M. Robison and George Plumb
both testified at the 1897 hearing, and both were referred to as officers of a
stockmen's association.
While the cattlemen won the first few rounds with the railroads-Plumb,
in fact, claimed that the success of stockmen in preventing rate increases saved
livestock shippers $300,000 to $400,000 a year for many years-the fight was
far from over. 37 A short notice in the May 16, 1898, Emporia Gazette relating
to the second meeting of the young KLA implied that the organization was in
dire need of money for the continuing struggle with the railroads. An order
that KLA officers were "instructed to look after the injunction cases now
pending" suggested that the railroads were not always following the dictates
of the railroad commissioners and that the conflict had moved into the courts.
The railroads' use of federal and state courts to protect their rate schedules was
a major stimulus to the legislature that created the Court of Visitation. While
few cattlemen recorded their view of the new court, the implication that the
court was a stronger regulatory agency than the board should have put the
stockmen squarely on the court's side.
The new Court of Visitation, however, proved to have no more success
in regulating the railroads than had the old board of commissioners. The
1899 meeting of KLA, the first in more than a year, was devoted almost exclusively to plans for raising money to continue fighting rates. The railroads
had again initiated new schedules, which were "in many localities ... from
40 to 50 percent higher than the old rates." KLA officers appointed a committee to encourage the formation of a livestock association in every county
of the state, with the expressed purpose of raising money for the renewed
fight.as

Thus began a struggle between Kansas cattlemen and railroads that continued
into the 1930s. Motor trucks were destined to figure prominently in, if not
actually to eliminate, most of the strife between stockmen and rail companies.
This earlier confrontation, however, taught many stockmen that only by cooperating with their neighbors could their voices be made audible.
In the few years of its existence during the nineteenth century, KLA had
made a notable beginning on its journey toward becoming the most effective
and cooperative stockmen's lobby in the state. Yet many of the early members
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of KLA were reluctant to give up their concept of themselves as rugged
individualists who were able to care for their interests alone.
A popular story, told and retold over the years, typifies the view that
many had of cattlemen, in general, and of the founders of KLA, in particular.
In a small town in western Kansas during the height of the 1890s depression,
the story went, folks were taking inventory to see what government aid they
would need to get through the winter. One of the poorest members of the
group refused to ask for help or to cooperate with the others. They were sure
that he would starve and urged him to reconsider, but the old man replied
that he would get along with his cow. "But you have no feed for your cow,"
the others protested. "Oh, she'll get along," said the old man, "she sucks
herself." The author of the story went on to say that the old man was a
stockman, that he was resourceful, and that all he wanted was to be left
alone. "His reply typifies the spirit always present among stockmen," the
author concluded.39 The incident, however, hardly characterized KLA or any
other livestock association. Rather, they were the antithesis of individualistic
self-help. Although cattlemen continued to think of themselves as being
individualistic and self-reliant, they sought help from others, and wisely so.
Kansas stockmen were quite willing to cooperate. They turned eventually to state and federal agencies for help in protecting and promoting the
interests of their industry. Unfortunately, advancing the interests of some
stockmen was sometimes harmful to the interests of others, at least in the
case of KLA's attempt to preserve the carload system of freight rates. Small
cattlemen suffered most from this position. The story of the early period of
KLA's existence indicates that it was not representative of all the stockmen
in the state, but rather was the organ of a few relatively large cattlemen. It
was also apparent that the driving force behind early KLA activities came
more specifically from the well-established stockmen in the Flint Hills who
were heavily involved in grass-fattening transient cattle, which meant a greater
dependence upon the railroads for in and out shipments.
Developments during the nineteenth century laid the foundation for the
beef industry of the future. Production had stabilized to some extent, and
the industry had become specialized, with some stockmen developing cow
herds, some maturing stock, and others raising purebred breeding animals.
The necessary links between grasslands in Kansas and dinner tables in the
urban East had been provided by the movement westward of railroads, stockyards, and packers. To individual producers these big-business middlemen
often seemed omnipotent, but through organizations such as KLA stockmen
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acquired the power to force acceptance of some of their demands. By the
late nineties K ansas beef producers, as well as those throughout most of the
West, were fairly well prepared for the future. Into the new century they
carried few regrets, much optimism, and the beginning of a better understanding of the increasingly complex economic system in which they were
forced to operate.
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4
The Transition Completed:
Producing Beef, 1900-19 20

Most historians view the first two decades of the twentieth century as a
period of prosperity for ranchers and farmers-the "Golden Age" of agricu lture, some have called it. While this was generally true of Kansas, there
were a number of upturns and declines within the twenty years . Cattlemen
swung from pessimism to optimism and back again. The stockman's mood
often reflected the sharp fluctuations in cattle n umbers, market prices, and
purchasing power, or his continued dissatisfaction with big business. The
prosperity usually associated with the early twentieth centur y was not always
evident at the time, becoming obvious only when the cattleman stood squarely
in the 1920s or 1930s and looked over his shoulder.
Despite the fact that cattlemen were dejected periodica lly, advances occurred in many areas. Upbreeding contin ued, and the quantity of fo rage
crops and the amount of winter feeding reached new heights. Sorghums,
for example, moved up to fourth in acreage among Kansas crops by 1910,
behind corn, wheat, and alfalfa. New methods of utilizing forage crops were
also significant. An Emporia paper, for instance, proudly announced that an
Oklahoma man h ad developed an alfalfa meal that was a perfect feed. The
meal consisted essentially of dehydrated green alfalfa and was, according to
the report, "so attractive, and has such a pleasant taste, that men, as well as
cows li ke to eat it." 1 Other crops, notably wheat, were also expa nded, so much
so that some stockmen fe lt the grassland was disappearing at an alarming
rate. This feeling, coupled with the impact of severa l drough ts, produced an
increased awareness among cattlemen that the supply of grass was shrinking.
Stockmen met the second decade of the twentieth century with about the
same misgivings and uncertainties as other sectors of the economy. The level
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Haying scene, Scott County, 1906. Courtesy of the Kansas State Histon·cal
Society.

of domestic and foreign demand, the prices received and paid for goods, and
the short labor supply were major concerns. But progress was made in adjusting to these difficulties. When the major developments in production are
considered, it is evident that the grasslands beef industry during this period
completed the transition that had begun during the closing decades of the
previous century.

The number of cattle on the western grasslands actually declined during the
first decade of the new century, by as much as a third in some parts of the
Great Plains. Numbers in Kansas reflected this trend ( see Figure 1, p. 21).
But before the decline began, Kansans reported almost 3.4 million head in
1903, a figure not reached again until World War II. Following 1903, numbers declined steadily to 1.8 million in 1914, which was one of the lowest
levels during the twentieth century. Then numbers increased to match the
demands of the war. There were 2.7 million head by 1919. These were large
fluctu ations in relatively short periods of time, amounting to declines and increases of 50 to 67 percent.
The general distribution of the state's beef cattle had been pretty well
established by 1890, and changed little during the next fifty years (see Maps
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1, 2, and 3). By the final decade of the nineteenth century, eight of the top
ten counties in number of cattle were located completely or partially in the
Flint Hills, and throughout the next four decades little change occurred. Only
the period around 1920 varied much from the norm. Increased production in
other areas rather than a decline in the Flint Hills accounted for this change.
During severe droughts cattle were always pushed back into the Flint Hills
to graze on the lush bluestem.
The preeminence of the Flint Hills rested largely on the geographic
advantages of abundant grass and water, and on the historic fact that pioneers,
and the landowners who followed them, refused to turn the sod for crops.
As a result, beef raising was firmly established in the area early in the state's
history, even in those parts that could have been plowed.
The one or two tiers of counties on each side of the Flint Hills were
secondary areas of concentration in 1890 and remain heavily populated with
cattle up to the present, reflecting the availability of grass and corn for feeding
livestock. Corn is heavily favored in the northern tier of counties as a crop,
and much of it is fed to cattle and hogs. Relatively large numbers of cattle
were also found along the southern border of the state, sometimes as far west
as Meade County. Although beef raising in these areas was more mixed
between the production of calves and the maturing of local or inshipped
stockers than was that in the Flint Hills, concentration was largely for the
same reasons: the availability of grass and water, and the reluctance of landowners to plow the grassland. In the western part of the state the relatively
scant amounts of rainfall and the difficulties this presented to crop farmers
also helped preserve much of the native grassland. Thus, while the major
cattle-producing areas remained substantially the same between 1890 and
1940, there was a slight tendency for shifts toward the west and southwest.
The movement toward the western part of the state before World War II
became a flood with the coming of the fifties and the development of irrigation and large commercial feedlots ( see Map 4).
The decline in cattle after 1903 revealed a facet of the beef industry that
became generally recognized by cattlemen only after World War I. This was
the fact that cattle numbers, prices, and purchasing power varied cyclically.
For those associated with the industry, each cycle seemed unique and unpredictable; only in retrospect did a pattern become clear, and even then the
many causes remained obscure ( see Figure 4).
Between 1903 and 1911 the cycle was in its second major downturn since
the origin of the grassland beef industry; the first had occurred between 1890
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Map 1. Distribution of Beef Cattle in Kansas, 1890 ( in thousands of head per county)
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Map 2. Distribution of Beef Cattle in Kansas, 1920 (in thousands of head per county)
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Figure 4. Purchasing Power of Cattle (in dollars) and the Number of Beef Cattle
in Kansas (in millions), 1865-1935
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and 1895. Thereafter, downturns th at varied in length and intensity occurred
in each decade between World War I and the 1960s. Complete cycles lasted
anywhere from nine to sixteen years. This variation alone made them almost
impossible for producers to anticipate, and therefore of no use in their planning. Stock prices, depression, war, drought, the availability of feed, and
consumer demand were only a few of the interrelated conditions that increased
or decreased numbers.
Between the 1880s and the middle 1950s Kansas beef cattle passed through
six fairly distinct numerical cycles. Highs were reached in 1889, 1903, 1919,
1934, and 1955 ( see Figure 1, p. 21). After 1957 the number of cattle increased,
with only slight setbacks, at an unprecedented rate. Almost 6.4 million head
were reported in 1970.2 The last figure indicated that in 1970 there were more
than three times as m any cattle in the state as there had been just prior to
World War I. Commercial feedlots and irrigation, again, explain much of
the increase.
The number of cattle in the state at any one time, however, rarely excited
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cattlemen as much as did stock prices. Here again there were several fluctuations. The average price for western range cattle in 1900 was $4.35 per hundredweight. By 1905 the price had declined to $3.80, before a gradual upswing
to $5.40 by 1910, and $7.40 just prior to World War I. Fat stock prices were
a few dollars higher at times, but only if the cattle were choice.
After 1913, prices increased steadily until 1920. According to statistics
from the Department of Agriculture, the average price for all beef cattle
marketed in the United States rose from $6.52 to $9.88 per hundredweight
during the war. The price of Kansas cattle went up even more. One historian
claimed that the average price for western range cattle advanced from $7.65 in
1914 to $14.50 in 1918. An all-time high for the period, a price of $20.50, was
paid for a native steer in December, 1918, a record not surpassed until the
1940s.3
Unfortunately for stockmen, rising production costs were often unrelated
to the rise and fall of market prices. This disparity is most evident when the
purchasing power of cattle-established by co Ila ting cattle prices to the costs
of other commodities-is considered ( see Figure 4). This was a comparison
that cattlemen were forced to make every time they bought something, and
it often led to much unrest. Statistics from the Bureau of Labor showed that
the purchasing power per head for beef was about $28.00 in 1900, but had
declined $10.00 a head by 1905. After this decline, it ranged upward again
to about $28.00 by 1913, and continued to climb throughout the early years of
the war. By 1915 it had moved to the highest point it was to reach before the
1940s, with an average of over $33.00 per head. After 1915 the increasing
costs of other commodities caused purchasing power to decline rapidly to
$16.00 by 1920. Purchasing power tended to follow a cyclic pattern similar to
that of numbers of beef cattle, but highs and lows did not necessarily occur
during the same years . There was a tendency, however, for highs in purchasing power to precede those in numbers by two to four years. 4
As a result of this unpredictability, cattlemen were forced to operate with ·
a large amount of uncertainty. Long-range production plans were often spoiled
because they could be based only on guesses as to what purchasing power and
numbers might be. In addition, the purchasing level of beef was probably
less subject to modification by producers than was the number of cattle because
they had little control over livestock prices and even less control over the prices
of commodities they had to buy. A rapid rise in the general price index, as ,
occurred during th e latter part of World War I, caused a significant slump
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m the purchasing power of beef, even though prices for the latter were also
nsmg.
Numbers and prices had a variety of reciprocal effects, but many other
factors were also important in determining the prices stockmen received or the
number of stock they produced. Domestic consumption, which was relatively
high between 1900 and 1920 compared to the 1890s and to the decade that
followed the war, affected prices and numbers. Annual per capita consumption
of beef was almost eighty pounds between 1905 and 1910, and averaged around
seventy-five pounds for the whole period. Increased consumption sometimes
coincided with decreased numbers of cattle, suggesting that more beef was
being produced from fewer animals.
Foreign demand was also a factor in domestic prices and numbers. England imported beef throughout this period, but France and Germany almost
terminated their purchases a few years prior to the war. When the war came,
exports to Europe increased; and this, in turn, was an important factor in
the growth of production after 1914, as well as in price rises. The United
States exported, primarily to England, an average of 6.2 percent of its total
production each year during the war, compared to only about 2.2 percent for
each of the previous seven years . Foreign exports declined soon after the war
ended, but the effects were not felt to any large degree until the early 1920s. 5
When prices were high, increased production was also stimulated by easy
credit from lending institutions that were available to cattlemen ( such as the
commercial banks and cattle loan companies) and by the discounting practices of the Federal Reserve Banks, to a lesser degree. As is usually the case,
much of the beef industry during this period was financed with borrowed
money, especially during periods of rapid expansion. In fact, an official of
the Federal Reserve Bank in Kansas City, M. L. McClure, said during the
war that the cattle industry was always more dependent on borrowed capital
than any other sector of the agricultural economy. Ranchers' excess capital,
he believed, tended toward land investment, which necessitated credit arrangements for additional livestock. Kansas cattlemen were reminded of this fact
during the 1915 KLA convention, when a Wichita minister opened the meeting with a prayer asserting that cattlemen held their stock only in trust. The
next speaker immediately agreed with this thought, but, differing with the
minister, pointed out that the cattle were owned by the banks rather than
some higher power.
Capital was easy to obtain as long as prices remained at war levels, usually
from local banks or those at the central markets that sometimes served as
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intermediaries for the larger banks and loan companies in the East. But, by
the time of World War I, much of the eastern money that had been such an
important part of cattle production during the nineteenth century had disappeared from the West. In its place arose local and regional banks, as well
as cattle loan companies. Packer money often found its way into the production phase through the efforts of the latter institutions. The new Federal
Reserve Banks were indirectly involved in livestock financing through their
practice of rediscounting cattle notes, which were considered quite desirable
when prices were high. McClure reported that by 1918 the reserve bank in
Kansas City had discounted over $98 million worth of livestock paper throughout the Tenth District, which included five states. He also estimated that all
lending institutions in the district combined had more than $300 million
loaned on livestock most of the time, much of it to cattlemen.6
Although there was usually adequate money available while stock prices
were high, cattlemen were troubled by the short-term nature of most loans.
Cattle paper discounted by the Federal Reserve, for instance, had a six-month
maturity-sometimes a six-month extension was granted-and this tended to
be characteristic of most loans on cattle. Some even matured in three months.
These short-term arrangements, while adequate for most feeding operations,
were wholly inadequate for foundation herd expansion, which often _required
money for as long as three to five years. Long-term loans provided by the
government would have been desirable, but not until the postwar depression
was public money directly involved and then only on a relatively short-term
basis.
Despite declining numbers and purchasing power of beef cattle, a disastrous flood in the state during the spring of 1903, and several dry seasons,
Kansas agriculture as a whole was generally prosperous during the period
1900 to 1920, especially when compared to the years of depression that had gone
before and those that followed. The years 1899 and 1900, as well as the period
from 1908 to 1910, were outstanding crop years, and the state reached its alltime high in hog numbers in 1908, with three and a half million head. Cattlemen also enjoyed some of this prosperity. They were aware of declining
numbers and prices but were not as cognizant of the significant decline in the
purchasing power of beef until several years later.
Most of the time cattlemen had confidence in the future. Because of high
prices and an abundance of feed, stockmen were expecting more prosperity
when they jot:rneyed to Wichita for the 1915 KLA convention. The Wichita
Eagle remarked that "wrinkled-faced men, young men, middle-aged men and
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Stacking second crop of alfalfa, Scott County, 1906. Courtesy of the Kansas
State Historical Society.

fat-faced men swarmed into the Peerless Princess last night all talking cattle,
horses, hogs or sheep-mostly cattle." The stockmen, according to the paper,
said that the cow country was full of feed and that "the winter has poured
gold into their pocket." When William J. Tod asked the members to help
defray a $1,000 KLA debt, over $2,000 was raised in less than thirty minutes.
"The eagerness, rapidity and spontaneity with which Kansas stockmen coughed
up money yesterday, would make Billy Sunday envious," the Eagle stated.
Nor was Tod the only one eager to separate the cattlemen from some of
their gold during this convention; many Wichita merchants were anxious to
accomplish the same end. The 4,000 stockmen from Kansas and surrounding
states who attended were expected to leave over $50,000 in town when they
departed after the two-day meeting. "The cattlemen are liberal spenders" the
paper noted, and if their spending caused them to "frisk around in the city
a little" and they were "rounded up" by police, they could expect to be "dealt
with gently by the law." The paper used the occasion to urge local promoters
to establish a stock show similar to the American Royal in Kansas City so the
city could stage a convention every year that would keep the cattlemen around
for a full week. "Think what that would mean to the merchants of Wichita!"
the Eagle cried. Two years later a stock show was actually established. 7
With the attitudes of some Wichita businessmen in mind, a few of the
state's cattlemen may have felt something like the Texans who had driven
their cattle to market in Kansas, including Wichita, several decades before.
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The cowtown merchants, some Texans claimed, were paper-collared Comanches who bought the trail herds, then waited in ambush with various
entertainments to see that the weight of the gold did not burden the cattlemen
on their trip back home.
Higher stock prices and a general feeling of prosperity during the early
war years led to significantly higher prices for cattle feed. A drought in much
of Texas and the Southwest also contributed to the high cost. By 1918 some
supplemental cattle feeds had doubled in price since the beginning of the
war. Cottonseed products rose from $30.00 to $60.00 a ton, tankage was up
from $55.00 to $100.00 a ton and corn sold for $1.50 a bushel compared to 90
cents a few years before. Joseph H. Mercer, executive secretary of KLA,
carried a strong protest to Herbert Hoover and the Food Administration.
Though Mercer was able to get the amount of cottonseed meal shipped from
droughtstriken Texas to Kansas increased, he accomplished nothing toward
the reduction of prices.
The Food Administration was one of several efforts by President Wilson
to gear the United States economy to the continuing war. Through this
agency the government attempted to exercise authority over the production
and distribution of vital food commodities. The production of wheat, for
example, was encouraged by setting the minimum price at $2.00 a bushel.
Sugar and pork received similar treatment, but no minimum price was ever
set on cattle. Hoover apparently felt that the nation's beef producers were
responding adequately to verbal encouragement to expand production, that
prices were already high enough to provide incentive, and that the administration's meatless days were adequate to meet the crisis.
As a result of the war, the cost of renting pasture in the Flint Hills more
than doubled, and much of the same rate of increase occurred for pastures
throughout the state. In 1900 cattle owners paid as little as $1.00 per head for
six months of grazing, and $5.00 to $6.00 in 1911. Three years later, $7.00 to
$7.50 was the average; and, towards the end of the war, rates increased to as
much as $20.00 per head for aged steers and cows. Average prices at this time
were probably about $17.00 a head or less. Increased pasture rates reflected
higher stock prices more than they did app reciated land values, although the
price of Kansas land also shot upward. Flint Hills pasture could be purchased
for $3.50 to $5.50 an acre in 1900; by 1911 it had advanced to $18.00 to $30.00;
and by the end of the war the 1911 prices had nearly doubled.
Despite the increased prices, pasture was in great demand. Repeated
notices in the Kansas Cattleman and the Stockman asked landowners to
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advise Mercer of available grass so that he could coordinate supply with
demand. During the spring of 1918, the Stockman reported that more than
7,000 cars of cattle detrained in the Flint Hills. Over 38 percent of these cattle
had originated in Texas, 28 percent in Kansas, and 19 percent in Oklahoma;
and the remaining 15 percent came from states like New Mexico, Arizona,
Colorado, Arkansas, and Missouri. Accurate figures on the number of transient cattle that grazed the Flint Hills during the war are not available, but
James C. Malin estimated that between 213,000 and 319,000 head were accommodated annually during the early 1900s, and that 263,000 to 278,000 were
definitely grazed there each year between 1925 and 1929. The level for the
war years probably fell somewhere between the numbers for these two periods;
and, of course, cattle in the Flint Hills represented only a portion of the inshipped stock that were grazed throughout the state.8
Some of the state's cattlemen naturally took advantage of higher wartime
prices for stock and grass to expand their operations, although few stockmen
were as fortunate as Walter S. and Evan C. Jones, who nursed a few acres
into an empire that lasted for more than half a century. And what an empire
it was. At the time of their deaths, both in 1953, the brothers left a fortune
estimated to be worth between six and eight million dollars in land, cattle,
and oil to Walter's wife, Olive.
Few cattlemen made that kind of money, nor did many local banks
encounter the predicament that dropped into the lap of an Emporia institution. Olive's will made several specific bequests to institutions and relatives,
and after her death in 1957 the Emporia bank became responsible for dispensing the remaining large income from the estate. According to the will, money
could be disbursed only for the medical needs of the poor in the several
counties around Emporia. Soon, however, dollars were coming in faster than
they could be dispersed. The court eventually broadened its interpretation of
the will so that today the fund provides medical assistance and college educations for some of the local poo r, as well as recreational facilities for people
in the Emporia area.
The Jones brothers were a notable example of cattlemen moving up the
ladder from leasing land to owning it. Raised in a poor family, Walter once
claimed that not until he was an adult did he discover that a chicken had more
than a neck. The brothers formed a partnership about the turn of the century
with 200 acres of inherited land. In 1904 they moved a few miles east of
Emporia to Lebo, the headquarters of their cattle operation. They became
pasturemen, leasing land in the Flint Hills and grazing up to 10,000 transient
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cattle each year, including many steers from Isaac L. Elwood's famous Spade
Ranch in Texas. Some of the cattle were fattened in feedyards at the south
edge of Lebo after they were taken off grass.
The brothers made good money during World War I and invested much
of it in land. Several thousand acres were acquired around Lebo; then, during the twenties, the brothers took advantage of the agricultural depression
and bought more than 40,000 acres near Higgins, Texas. Although the
presence of oil was unsuspected at the time, oil pumping machines began to
dot their Texas grassland after World War II.
Big Walter, as he was called after he grew to weigh over 300 pounds, was
known to be a shrewd cattle trader who spent much of his time traveling
several states to find the cattle the brothers' pastures demanded. Evan, the
more introverted of the two, tended the day-to-day requirements of their wide
interests.
The family was rarely ostentatious with its wealth, but all of them enjoyed a few luxuries. Evan at one time left the ranch for the prestigious
Julliard School of Music in New York, but returned when officials thought
him a bit old for voice training. Big Walter loved to chauffeur people around
hi:; pastures in the largest Chrysler he could buy, while Olive never failed to
serve visitors a huge platter of the finest steaks-a far cry from Walter's
chicken-neck days. On the other hand, Olive made her own soap.
Friends liked to tell the story of Walter's encounter with several Texas
ranchers in the lobby of the old Broadview Hotel in Emporia, a favorite watering hole for out-of-town cattlemen who were seeking grass or tending to other
interests in the Flint Hills. Walter spent many happy hours there, enjoying
the conversation as well as conducting much of his cattle business. One day,
the story went, a number of Texans were sitting around bragging about how
their wives were spending large amounts of money. One was wintering on
the Riviera, another was in Rome, while a third was in New York attending
the latest Broadway plays. Noting that Walter had not volunteered any
information regarding his wife, someone asked him directly. "She's home
making soap," he replied, totally unintimidated by his friends' braggadocio.
Although wealthy in land and cattle, the Joneses were plain folk to most
of their neighbors, and they spent little money foolishly. When they did
spend, however, a check for any amount signed "Jones & Jones" by one of
the brothers or Olive was never refused. 9
Few cattlemen were as prosperous as the Jones brothers, but many made
a good living throughout most of the period before and during the European
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conflict. Toward the end of World War I, on the other hand, higher labor
costs, government-encouraged meatless days, drought-induced feed shortages,
and the rising prices of other commodities threatened not only the cattlemen's
optimism but also their profits. Stockmen were unaccustomed to the high
prices they received during the war; yet, only a few noted that price levels
were abnormally high. This was understandable, for only when one failed to
consider purchasing power were prices actually high. As the purchasingpower figures show, beef prices failed after 1915 to keep pace with the wholesale prices of other commodities, and in the end the high levels made the
sharp decline during the postwar depression in agriculture much harder to
bear.
As a result, the feeling of prosperity early in the war gave way to doubt
and skepticism during the closing years of the conflict, and the change in
atttiude accurately reflected conditions. Increased labor costs and a shortage
of farm and ranch workers, which was related to the international conflict,
encouraged skepticism. Some workers were in the military service, but the
primary cause of the shortage was the loss as many moved to towns and cities
where higher wages were being paid. One stockman lamented to the Cattleman that the government was paying $45 to $50 a week for construction
work at Ft. Riley to laborers who had not made half or a third that much on
Kansas farms and ranches before the war. Organizations that represented the
distressed stockmen and farmers were successful in getting draft deferments
for some "real" agricultural workers, but cattlemen could do little to curtail
the migration to the cities except increase their costs by raising wages. KLA
at one time suggested strongly that military manpower needs should be filled
from middlemen groups rather than agricultural workers, and that the government should devise some means of forcing experienced young agricultural
workers back to the farms and ranches they had deserted. Nothing, however,
ever came of the proposal.
Although the general trend of cattle prices was upward until after the
armistice, the fact that market prices sometimes fluctuated a few dollars per
hundredweight was also a matter of concern. Some attributed it to a deliberate attempt by the packers to fleece the producer, while others blamed the
unsettled conditions that resulted from the conflict.
Those cattlemen who specialized in feeder stock appeared to be most
subject to the whims of the market, especially towards the end of the war when
they bought high-priced stock just before the onset of depression. But even
before the postwar decline set 1n, many feeders were complaining that the
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prices of feed and other goods that they had to buy prevented them from
making any money. In fact, some Kansas feeders claimed as early as 1918
that they were losing $10 to $30 a head on fed stock. This situation supported
the view that one large feeder, Arnold Berns, set before a meeting of the
Kansas State Board of Agriculture in 1918. Berns told the group that, with
increasing costs, fluctuating prices, and the large number of feeders who got
in and out of production, feeding had become a game of chance rather than
a solid business venture. 10
The relatively large capital investment that was required and the close
profit margin in the feeding operation did make it the most speculative phase
of the beef industry. A feeder in Marshall County, for example, reported
that he had made a gross profit of $25,952 by fattening about 300 head of
cattle each year between 1910 and 1919. Money had been made, he reported,
only six of the nine years, and prices were high throughout most of this
period. The three unprofitable years were not designated, but they probably
fell toward the end of the period.11 Many cattlemen today still feel that feeding is the most risky phase of the cattle business.
Weather also affected cattle production and profits during this period.
While the war could not be blamed for drought and cold winters, these two
factors contributed to the decline. The summer of 1916 was hot and dry
in most of Kansas, and in the western counties prairie fires caused heavy
property damage as well as the deaths of two Hutchinson area residents. It
was so hot during the summer, said the Topeka State fournal, that the jackrabbits were "sitting in large groups under shade trees." The paper no doubt
exaggerated, but these ever-present animals could be a curse or occasionally
a blessing for ranchers. They ate precious feed, yet sometimes ranchers realized
small amounts of money from the sale of their meat. There were numerous
accounts all through this period of rabbits shipped to eastern cities, apparently
for human consumption. This was especially true towards the end of the
war-possibly because of the high price of meat-when one canning company
wanted two million jackrabbits at fifteen cents each and offered twelve cents
each for cottontails. Many Kansans responded to such offers.
Another weather phenomenon, the heavy winter snows of 1912, prompted
stories about the abundant rabbits. A few tall tales, designed to relieve
ranchers' anxiety, concerned the deep snow and its threat to the cattle. A
Hutchinson paper noted, for example, that jackrabbits were knocking down
the weak, wobbly cattle and eating their oil cake. "A dozen farmers are
missing," the paper continued; "rabbits have carried them to their dens in the
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sandhills." Not to be outdone, another Kansan claimed to have killed 942
rabbits with a single shot after they had lined up to eat a trail of corn he
had put out.
Heavy snows also fell throughout the early spring of 1918 and during
the winter of 1918-19. Hundreds of thin cattle, shipped into western Kansas
earlier than usual due to drought in Texas, were victims of the 1918 snows.
Hide buyers were also busy during the following winter when heavy snows
kept the western counties blanketed for several months. Sandwiched between
these two severe winters was an extremly hot summr that ruined some grazing
land and forced a few stockmen to haul water. 12
The early war years, then, were prosperous for cattlemen. Feed was
usually abundant, once the effects of the 1913 drought wore off, and sometimes cattlemen had to struggle to find enough cattle to consume the supply
of feed. But the tide of prosperity crested around 1916. High demand for meat
and rising beef prices continued for a few more years; but production costs,
the short labor supply, and periods of severe weather affected profits. The cost
of living, up steadily since the war began, advanced markedly after 1916.
Between July, 1916, and April, 1917, the cost of food increased by 46 percent,
then advanced another 45 percent by the end of the year. Other prices reflected much the same trend. Yet, while conditions worsened toward the end
of the war, cattlemen were hardly prepared for the drastic tumble of cattle
prices that was to occur during 1920.13
Judging by farm values of selected Kansas products, the percentage of
livestock's contribution to the state's agricultural economy slipped between
1900 and 1920 ( see Figures 5-8) .14 Before the war, livestock and its products
accounted for slightly over 30 percent of farm commodity values. A slight
increase followed, then a decline to 27 percent after 1916, most of which
ocurred as a result of reductions in livestock slaughtered. But the loss in
relative value by the livestock sector after 1916, as Figures 5-8 indicate, was a
decline only when compared to increases that occurred in crops, especially
wheat. Livestock actually increased its total dollar value throughout the period
after 1900, and between 1916 and 1920 the value of livestock slaughtered alone
rose by over $100 million. This increase, however, was no match for the rise
in the value of wheat, which more than tripled during the same period, and
thus reduced the relative contribution of livestock. Corn also suffered a decline as wheat increased in importance. On the whole, the value of livestock
and its products to the Kansas agricultural economy almost doubled between
1900 and 1920, while that for crops more than tripled.
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Figure 5. Average Percentage of Farm Value of Selected Kansas Products,
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Market prices, purchasing power, and the number of beef cattle were not the
only things that concerned Kansas farmers and stockmen during the first
twenty years of the new century. Other developments were also part of the
agricultural scene, some of which were of great significance to the state's
cattlemen. There was, for instance, a continuous influx of new settlers into
the West throughout most of this period, many of whom were attracted by
the siren calls of dry farming and wheat culture, both of which were considerably oversold by railroads, chambers of commerce, and others interested in
population growth. A rainfall of as little as ten or twelve inches a year was
advertised as sufficient for successful crop farming by some of the apostles of
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Figure 6. Average Percentage of Farm Value of Selected Kansas Products,
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dry farming. In the end, thousands were forced to retrace their steps to their
point of origin, or move to towns that offered some means of livelihood.
Serious droughts and the naturally small amount of moisture hastened many
of the failures. The summer of 1913, as mentioned earlier, was dry throughout
much of the grassland, with no general rain in Kansas between June and
September. This was the most severe general drought in the state for over
a decade.
The other drought periods of these two decades, most notably in 1901
and 1916, were also hard on producers but were of much shorter duration.
These droughts were also noticed in the Flint Hills, where larger than normal
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Figure 7. Average Percentage of Farm Value of Selected Kansas Products,
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inshipments of cattle from Texas, Oklahoma, and western Kansas were received during the spring and fall if adequate feed was available. Some Kansas
stockmen also had to haul drinking water for their cattle due to the shortage.
The drought and subsequent water deficiencies at this time prompted one of
the first campaigns in the state to use tax money for building ponds. Governor
George H. Hodges spoke frequently in support of the proposal, but there was
also notable opposition. One Lyon County critic noted that ponds either
disappeared or become poisoned during dry periods. The droughts and other
impediments to successful agricu lture on the Great Plains did not force all of
the new crop farmers from the land, however; they, with the help of older
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Figure 8. Average Percentage of Farm Value of Selected Kansas Products,
1916-1920
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residents, had actually expanded crop acreage by 1920. Many of those who
stayed also diversified their operations to include some livestock, often beef
cattle.15
Expanded crop acreages often came at the expense of grassland. For
example, E. E . Frizell, who was in the hardware business in Larned, bought
and broke several thousand acres of sod during the early 1900s on what had
been the Ft. Larned military reservation in Pawnee County. Frizell broke
more sod during World War I and planted much of it to wheat. In Hodgeman and Ness counties just west of Larned, Frizell grazed cows and steers on
several thousand acres of grass that he owned and leased. After the war Frizell
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and his sons continued to expand their wheat and cattle operation. They plowed
under four thousand acres of grass and planted wheat in Hodgeman and Ness
counties to complement their military reservation land. At the same time,
the Frizells continued raising cattle on a large ranch in Colorado, as well as
grazing Texas steers in Kansas. 16
Others followed Frizell's example. Even some of the grassland in the
Flint Hills felt the plowshare during this period. One local paper stated in
1912 that Emporia was as much a center for wheat and alfalfa as for cattle.
During the first decade of the twentieth century the state's wheat acreage
approached that of corn and actually exceeded it for the first time in 1907.
It was, however, during the early twenties that many landowners increased
their acreage under cultivation because of low prices for cattle and decreased
income from grassland, and wheat became the state's major crop. 17
Corn remained an important crop in Kansas throughout this period, even
though its acreage declined from seven or eight million during the first decade
of the twentieth century to a little more than five million in 1920. The importance of corn, as well as other forage crops, was enhanced in many cattle
operations when the silo became more popular. Trench, cement, and brick
silos were constructed to preserve feed and thus increase stock production. The
"silo boom" became so evident that the Abilene Reflector reported that "if
Kansas had the Tower of London it would probably tear it down to give room
for a silo."
Expanded wheat planting and the use of gasoline tractors, however, received more press coverage than did silo development or corn production. In
1916 a dispatch from Hutchinson reported, "gas tractors are tearing the whole
country upside down in western Kansas, and at the present rate the famous
short-grass pasturage will be a thing of the past. T rainloads of tractors have
been shipped into that part of the state and are turning the sod and getting
the ground ready for cultivation ... . One ranch in Morton county is plowing up 3,000 acres. Another in Ford county has eleven outfits on the Sherman
ranch . Ten tractor outfits were unloaded at Satanta in Haskell county in two
days. Montezuma, in Gray county, received five in one day." 18
The urgency to expand food production was so great that tractors were
sometimes equipped with headlights and used twenty-four hours a day. A
Geary County farmer was reported to have "opened an old Indian mound,
hauled off the artifacts as rubbish, and put the ground to wheat." The use
of tractors rose to the point that the Board of Agriculture could boast in 1919
that more tractors were used in Kansas than in any other state. 19 Not all
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Kansans, however, were readily convinced of the advantages of the gasoline
engine. One expressed a popular objection when he pointed out that the
exhaust from the tractor was not nearly as potent a factor in maintaining soil
fertility as was the exhaust from the former source of power. Still, more and
more tractors found their way to Kansas farms and ranches.
The Food Administration's campaign to increase food production encouraged much of this expansion. Production quotas were suggested for each
state, and farmers who failed to cooperate were called "slackers." High prices
also contributed. Wheat sold for an average of $2.12 a bushel in 1917 and
as high as $3.14 at one time, while corn averaged $1.59 in 1918. This led to
large demands for land, and the Emporia Gazette reported a year after the
war began that there were far more tenants seeking farms than there was
land available. But new cropland was added, and J. C. Mohler, secretary of
the Kansas Board of Agriculture, noted that the state had eighteen million
acres in crops in 1915 and about twenty-five million three years later.
After this expansion in cultivated land, cattlemen had more forage and
grain available for feeding but they also had fewer acres for grazing. "Encroachment of tillers of the soil on cattle ranges calls for a new deal in the
livestock industry and to keep up the production of stock 'intensified ranching'
is the solution being preached in Wichita this week," was the message of
the Eagle during the 1915 KLA convention. In other words, more pounds
of beef had to be produced on fewer acres of land. Increased attention to cattle
feeding, more silos to preserve feed, and the trend toward early maturation
and fattening of cattle, all helped the stockmen augment the quantity of beef.20
Prompted by the interest of President Theodore Roosevelt on the national
level and by the loss of grass to the plow at the local level, conservation of
natural resources became a concern of cattlemen during the early years of the
twentieth century. Discussions between western cattlemen and government
officials about the use of the public domain was one result, but most concern
at this time centered on the public forests rather than grassland. Some cattlemen wished to continue the free, unrestricted use that they were accustomed
to; others favored a leasing policy; and a few agreed with the Forest Service's
plan for a permit system that would have enabled government officials to
control the number of cattle grazed.
There was little public forest land in Kansas in 1900, but over 300,000
acres were set aside in 1906 as a national forest reserve in five counties along
the Arkansas River in the far western part of the state. Still, some residents
of the state were concerned with forest policy, because cattlemen in Kansas
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Breaking sod with a Hart-Parr tractor and mo'.dboard gang plow, Finney
County. During World War I and the 1920s, rigs such as this helped transform grassland into wheat fields. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical
Society.

paid full value for grass while competing in the marketplace with cattle producers in other states who had very cheap use of public land. Justin De Witt
Bowersock, Republican from Lawrence, even introduced a bill into the 1902
Congress that would have permitted leasing of the public land for a few
cents an acre. 21 Fortunately for the public and for the conservation of resources, however, the Department of Agriculture opted for a grazing fee
system rather than the Bowersock Bill. This allowed greater control over the
number of animals grazed.
More important to Kansas than the national forest reserve, and probably
more significant than the outcome of the dispute over Forest Service grazing
requirements, was the increased concern over the availability of grass that
developed during the war years. This attitude and the conservation practices
it stimulated were, in part, a response to rising land values, to the need for
more intensive land-use, and to the periodic droughts. The droughts, disastrous as they may have been, had some redeeming value in stimulating an
interest in the conservation of native Kansas grasses. 22
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Some of the state's journalists encouraged the new concern. In 1915 the
Emporia Gazette noted that most Kansas pastures had responded well to
increased rainfall, but also questioned the future of the grass in the absence of
greater concern by graziers. Pioneers, the paper said, had talked of bluestem
as high as a horse's back, but the "record-breaking drought of 1913 proved
most disastrous for the native sod of our pastures, and now we are left with
weedy grassless pastures." Greater efforts at conservation had to be exerted,
the article warned, especially now that the war was stimulating more use, or
"finally the point will be reached where we may record the passing of our
prairie pastures. " 23
Other warnings, predictions, and tributes to Kansas grass, especially the
bluestem of the Flint Hills, were made during the period, but the most interesting comments of the time were those of John A. Edwards. This Greenwood
County cattle and hog producer was a popular toastmaster at many gatherings
of Kansans and, frequently, the master of ceremonies at the annual KLA
banquet. His wit was most appreciated, but he was also capable of more
serious thoughts. Educated at the University of Kansas-he later claimed
that he had played cards while his parents and classmates went to his graduation-Edwards had an abiding distrust of the large packers, and for the first
three decades of the twentieth century he was usually a member of any group
that investigated businesses associated with the beef industry. Spartan in his
personal habits, Edwards as a state legislator had opposed the use of alcohol,
authored the anticigarette law, and at one time offered $150 in prizes to clubs
that made the best fight against the use of these "coffin nails."
Edwards' family had migrated to Emporia from the Denver area, where
they had gone with a group of Welch people who were involved with mining.
His father eventually became interested in banking and cattle, and at one time
sent several shiploads of live cattle to England because American prices were
too low. The higher prices he received, however, failed to cover the added
expense of getting them there.
John A. Edwards, first with his father then on his own, began in the
cattle business after completing his work, or possibly play, at the university.
He acquired two large ranches in southwest Kansas where wheat and cattle
were produced, and eventually married the daughter of C. D. Perry, whose
large Claremont Ranch in Clark County was mentioned earlier. Edwards
and his new bride, in fact, were with Perry when he was killed in an automobile accident.
Edwards owned a share of the First National Bank in Eure.ka, as well
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as four rather substantial ranches in this bluestem area of the Flint Hills
where he raised cattle, grain, and hogs. For fun he kept about a dozen elk
and bred fine horses. Edwards made good money during World War I, and
some of his expansion, including oil prospecting, occurred during or soon after
the war. He was a plunger, and, unfortunately, many of his interests were
built unsoundly on borrowed money. The postwar depression drove this
robust cattleman out of ranching, much to the loss of his fellow producers.
Neither KLA conventions nor the attacks on big packers were quite the same
after Edwards retired from the arena. But this part of his story will be told
later. 24
In 1918 Edwards spoke to the KLA convention in Wichita on the value
of the bluestem that he loved. With provincial and chauvinistic overtonesgenerated by the course of world events at the time-and to some extent with
tongue in cheek, Edwards told the convention that bluestem "seems to grow
and thrive over an area that is underlaid with oil." He continued with this
statement:
This Blue Stem of Eastern Kansas and Oklahoma is a wonderful grass. It is a flesh builder and a muscle maker and a nerve tonic.
It is a fattener that has no equal. It needs to bow to no elixir of earth
or heaven. It has grazed and raised and fattened and made sleek,
not only our steers but the five greatest and most enormous and most
corpulent bodies in America; and these fat bodies are the five great
American packers and they got fat on our grass. And that's the kind
of grass it is.
Over in Kentucky they have grass, Blue Grass; a grass without
a stem, and that character of vegetation only grows distilleries and
Colonels; and they are lean. While our grass produces packers, and
they are fat; and that's the difference financially and botanically between Blue Grass and Blue Stem.
Over in Germany a hardy perennial grows which they call Neder
Grasse. This grass makes soldiers and barbarians. Ours makes Citizens. There is a scanty, sickly grass which grows in Russia and Old
Mexico. It is a hybrid . A cross between Wire, Sandburr and Buffalo
grass. It is not a luxuriant herb like ours. It 's the kind of grass which
raises revolutions and repudiation . Ours is a peace producer and a
debt payer.
I have compared our grass with the Marsh grass and Bermuda
of the South, and the Mountain grasses of the West and the Moss of
North. I have found no grass, no fruit or vegetable, that produces
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fat horses and cattle and fat contented people, like our Blue Stem.
It makes a people so healthy and so hearty and so peaceful that they
are willing to be robbed in daylight.~~
Edwards' audience was enthralled, but if they accepted the gist of these
remarks as well as that of the rest of the tribute they would surely have been
encouraged toward greater conservation.
A bit later in time, but still illustrative of this increased awareness of grass,
was a statement in the last will and testament of W. J. Tod, written sometime
before his death in 1929. Tod said, in part: "It is furthermore my special wish
and request that care should be taken to preserve the natural prairie grasses
and that none of the natural grasslands should be plowed or broken up during
the lifetime of my wife, Margaret, and that great care shall be taken to avoid
their being overstocked at any time."~ 6
Some of the techniques suggested to preserve or replenish the native grass
were used during subsequent droughts and are popular even today. Reseeding
with Kentucky bluegrass was suggested, but the adaptability of this and other
eastern grasses was continually being questioned in many parts of the state.
The practice of harrowing pastures, as well as repeated mowings to kill the
encroaching weeds, was also advised. But the most frequently suggested technique-and probably the most effective-was some form of deferred grazing
that allowed the grasses to replenish themselves. Delayed spring entry of
cattle, alternate grazing areas, or complete removal of stock permitted grass
a growing period free from the cropping of meandering cattle. The grass
itself had remarkable recuperative powers if left undisturbed.~ 7
The alarm over grass conditions in Kansas during the second decade of
the twentieth century was, of course, not as great as that which would be
experienced in the devastating 1930s. But the increased concern and growing
respect for much of the natural covering of the state that resulted from the
alarm was a far cry from the attitude of those nineteenth-century prognosticators who believed that all grass would eventually give way to other crops
that were more productive. Those early views had been conditioned by experiences that their purveyors had had in the humid and timbered East that did
not apply in the West.
The rising concern with grass during the war years reflected the progress
of the state's cattlemen in adapting to the natural conditions of the environment and in learning to appreciate the value of the native vegetation. Unfortunately, sod was still being broken. Lessons learned during the war years
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had to be re-learned and more widely promulgated during the 1930s, when
many "experts" riveted the blame for the dust storms wholly upon the plow
and the abundance of cattle rather than the periodic droughts that were common to the grassland environment? 8

By 1920 cattlemen could look back at two decades that, despite the sharp
fluctuations in cattle prices and numbers and in the purchasing power of beef,
had been relatively prosperous. Augmented demands for grain and meat as a
result of the war and a growing population had also been characteristic. These
developments, in turn, had helped cause the expansion of grain crops, more
intensified land usage by ranchers, and their increased awareness of the need
to protect the native grass. As the quantity of land available for cattle diminished, several expediencies were employed to help improve beef production. New feeds and better combinations of old feeds were used to produce
faster gains, and some cattle were marketed at a younger age. But basic in
enabling cattlemen to produce more and better meat, in spite of reduced land
resources and sometimes fewer cattle, was the improvement of stock. More
than any other factor, it was the upgraded animals that provided greater quantity and quality for the urban housewife. Herefords, already plentiful before
1900, became even more popular and highly developed during the opening
decades of the twentieth century. In large part, this development was the work
of several master breeders.
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Throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century, Robert H. Hazlett of El Dorado was the best-known breeder of purebred cattle in the state,
if not the nation. This Flint Hills stockman, who died in 1936, left behind
a legacy that included international fame as a breeder of excellent Herefords
as well as established lines of cattle that were popular for another two decades.
Hazlett's efforts illustrated the methods used by many producers of purebreds, the care they took in matching sires with dams, the culling they found
necessary to improve their herds, and the traveling they did in order to show
and advertise the results of breeding programs. In a larger sense, the work of
this Hereford breeder epitomized the tendency for wealthy individuals to
develop model farms for purebreds with money they had made in nonagricultural businesses. This coincidence of wealth and fine cattle, rooted in the
nineteenth century and even in Old World traditions, continues to the present
time.
While rarely if ever stated, the motives of these suitcase breeders for
entering this particular business were varied. Today, tax advantages m ay
encourage, in part, investment in purebreds; but such was not the case during
the nineteenth century or during much of Hazlett's career. Nor was the desire
for profit the overpowering force, as profits frequently did not result. Usually,
these men could have made more money in some other business. In some
cases purebred breeding was a hobby, a mere diversion from regular chores,
but it required a large infusion of capital. For many, the appeal of the competition inherent in building and showing a fine string of cattle, as well as
pride in accomplishment, made the large investment worthwhile.
On another level, raising purebreds was often a nostalgic link with a youth
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spent on a farm-the fulfillment, as it were, of a longing to return. It was
almost as if some accomplishment in agriculture was needed to crown an
otherwise success£ ul career. The legacy of an improved breed of cattle was a
compelling force. While the rich competed with the many poorer cattlemen
who used purebreds as their only source of income, the development of several
breeds owes much to the willingness of moneyed investors to take up the
trade. For many, like Hazlett, raising purebreds was the most exciting facet
of the beef industry.
Far more important than excitement, however, or even the profits that
some individual breeders made, was the help this improved blood gave cattlemen in coping with rising costs of production. Improving the country's stock
had an added significance after 1900 because the demand for beef increased,
the acreage allotted to the industry continued to decline, and the profit margin
became narrower as production costs went up. Upgrading stock was the only
way to boost production without enlarging landholdings. It became increasingly important that as much beef as possible be acquired from each
animal, and that the cattle produce this beef with a minimum of feed. The
eye appeal that enhanced sale prices and the ability to make better gains and
to mature in less time were characteristics that could be bred into a herd of
commercial cattle by careful selection of upbred or purebred stock. Not only
were these qualities of great value to stockmen in terms of higher returns,
they were also important in producing a better retail product, a higher quality
meat that consumers were demanding more and more. Upbred stock paid
dividends at market time, giving the owner some relief from the cost-price
squeeze.
Purebred production and the upgrading of range stock after 1900 were
based firmly on the work already accomplished in the previous century. By
1900 a number of producers were well along in their upgrading programs,
but there was still much to be done. In this work, Herefords played the lead
role; Shorthorn and Angus cattle were understudies. By 1920 the American
Hereford fourna! reported that 41 percent of the cattle in the West were
whitefaces, while a decade later the same journal boasted that the "great
range sections of our country are now at least 90 percent Hereford-using
districts." Another claimed only 75 percent for the Hereford during the 1930s,
but either figure represented a considerable change in the complexion of range
cattle during the preceding few decades. 1
Kansas continued to be very significant in the production of purebred and
upgraded stock for the range country throughout the twentieth century. In

98

Herefords Triumph: Upbreeding, 1900-1940

1920 Kansas had a greater number of purebred Herefords than any of the
states that touched her borders, and it ranked third in the nation behind Texas
and Iowa. The Kansas lead over contiguous states increased by 1930, and the
state had moved to second for the nation as a whole. Kansas also led surrounding states in Shorthorn numbers in 1920, but fell behind Nebraska and Missouri ten years later. Kansas never led in purebred Angus production, although
there were a few black cattle scattered across the state.2
Much the same position for the state becomes apparent from listings in
the American Hereford 1ournal of breeders who registered the largest number of cattle in any given year. During the early 1920s, at least three Kansas
firms or breeders were usually among the top ten, including the Miltonvale
Cattle Company of Miltonvale, Jesse W. Greenleaf of Greensburg, and C. G.
Cochran of Hays. In 1923 John A. Edwards of Eureka topped the entire list
by registering 670 head. After the middle twenties, however, Kansas began
to move down the register, not so much because production in the state declined but due rather to the increased numbers being raised in Texas and the
Southwest. Clearly, the quantity, if not the quality, of Hereford production
had shifted toward the Southwest by 1930. In 1936 Robert H. Hazlett was
the only Kansan appearing on the list of thirty breeders, and he was twentysixth.3
Upbreeding and purebred production were stimulated most by high beef
prices. The price levels during World War I had this effect, with the numbers of large and small producers expanding rapidly. Towards the end of the
war, the first issue of the Kansas Cattleman expected the state soon to have
700 breeders of purebred Herefords. Then came the postwar depression and
the disastrous declines during the 1920s. With their relatively large investments in highly bred cattle and with the prices not much higher than those
for common grade animals, hundreds of producers of purebreds were eliminated from the field. Much the same thing occurred during the thirties. For
comparison with the World War I period, the Stockman listed 450 breeders
of purebred Herefords throughout the state in 1954.4
Those who used purebred stock or in some manner upgraded their commercial herds could do so in a variety of ways, using either registered purebreds, unregistered purebreds, or grade animals that carried improved blood.
A producer might buy a whole herd of well-bred cattle at one time, but this
was expensive and usually beyond the means of most stockmen. Instead, most
took a more gradual approach. A few upgraded cows were purchased, or the
poorer animals gradually were eliminated from the herd. Most often, herd
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sires figured prominently in the upbreeding process, as the prepotent blood of
one bull could be spread to the offspring of more than a score of cows in a
single breeding season. This was much the cheapest route, although quality
sires were often expensive.
Some cattlemen tried to reduce the expense of buying good bulls by
establishing their own purebred herds to produce sires for their commercial
cows. These herds were usually small, although some grew to provide breeding stock for neighbors. This method was intended to be cheaper than continually purchasing large numbers of expensive bulls from those who specialized in purebred production, but it was also more trouble because the purebreds usually required better treatment than the commercial herd. Special care
during the winter was often provided, and the purebred cows had to be
protected from the overtures of poor-quality bulls. Many of the purebred sires
from these herds were never registered, but it made little difference to the
cows they serviced or to the stockman who dealt in commercial cattle.
In selecting males for upgrading, Hereford bulls stood at the fore. Their
willingness to breed under adverse conditions and the potency of their seed
in spreading desirable characteristics were unsurpassed. Dan D. Casement, a
Kansas Hereford breeder who became one of the most renowned feeders
in the nation, was only one of many to urge producers to be more concerned
with their herd's display quality, character, size, scale, and uniformity. The
right bull, Casement urged, was all-important, and this often meant a purebred Hereford sire from one of the many producers who specialized in this
phase of the cattle industry. 5

Robert H. Hazlett first began raising cattle at the turn of the century. Shortly,
he improved his foundation stock, expanded the herd, and then rose rapidly
to prominence. By 1920 the Stockman called him the "premier exhibiter and
breeder in the state," and only a decade later he was equated with such master
breeders as Robert Bakewell and Amos Cruickshank of Great Britain, and
Gudgell & Simpson of the United States. Donald Ornduff, historian of
American Herefords, may have said it best when he wrote: "It is not given
to many men to achieve such success in breeding Herefords, or any kind of
cattle, that the product of their herds becomes identified by the owner's name
rather than that of the bovine family from which it sprang. Two such herds
in the Hereford field come readily to mind, those of Gudgell & Simpson and
Robert H. Hazlett." 6
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Hazlett had come to Kansas in 1885 from Illinois by way of Nebraska.
Some said a fear of being persuaded to enter Illinois politics had prompted
the move, while others claimed that he left to find cheaper land. He had also
spent time in Leadville, Colorado, where he successfully engaged in mining.
No one knew how much money he made; but, it was said, the El Dorado
man never wanted for wealth after his mining venture. In El Dorado,
Hazlett practiced law and sold real estate, and then when oil was discovered
on some of his property he became active in oil and banking. In short, by the
time he entered the Hereford business, capital was not a limiting factor. 7
Hazlett's first acquaintance with Herefords came in Illinois as a young
lad on his father's farm. Later, while in college, he helped champion the
Hereford's admittance to the various state and county fairs when the Illinois
State Board of Agriculture, dominated by owners of other breeds, refused to
allow the whitefaces to compete as a beef breed. Hazlett continued to admire
the breed, although he did not own any cattle until he bought a small herd
of well-bred Herefords in 1898.
This first herd was strongly influenced by Gudgell & Simpson's Anxiety
4th breeding, but Hazlett had little thought of improving it at the time. Not
until 1903, shortly after Will Condell began over three decades of work in
managing the breeding program, did Hazlett become interested in improving
his stock. He began with an outcross on the Anxiety 4th blood, but he soon
gave this up when the issue proved unsatisfactory. He then decided to concentrate on the lines of Anxiety 4th. This decision set the stage for his greatest
contributions. Next to Gudgell & Simpson, Hazlett's herd became more
heavily concentrated with Anxiety 4th blood than any herd in the world.
About the time of World War I, the herd had improved so much that,
at the strong urging of Condell, Hazlett entered the show ring, initiating
over twenty years of unparalleled success. His herd was honored with 208
championships, 757 firsts, and about 1,000 other ribbons in almost all the major
stock shows of the country. 8
At his model breeding farm northeast of El Dorado, known as Hazford
Place, Hazlett continued not only the principal bloodline developed by Gudgell & Simpson but also their method of linebreeding. He carried this method
of closely mating those animals with a common heritage much further than
did Gudgell & Simpson. And, as in the case of the Independence masters
whom he had studied, the skepticism and advice from experienced breeders
that met Hazlett's first attempts at linebreeding soon turned to amazement
and imitation when the results became generally known.
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Zato Rupert and Iza Rupert, full brother and sister, were the grand champion
bull and cow at the American Royal and the Chicago International shows in
1933. These purebreds were developed, owned, and exhibited by Robert H.
Hazlett, El Dorado, Kansas. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.
Beginning with four sons of Beau Brummel-a grandson of Anxiety 4th,
through Don Carlos-Hazlett managed to concentrate the most desirable
qualities of Anxiety 4th blood through carefully programmed breeding and
rigid selection of calves to be retained in his herd. Some have said that Hazlett's selection policy could best be described as ruthless. Many calves that
might have developed into excellent breeding stock were castrated and sold
for slaughter, because, Hazlett believed, rigid selection was as important to
the development of his herd as the concentration of blood through Ii nebreeding. He felt that if a potential breeding animal showed the slightest deficiency
it was not in the best interests of Herefords to perpetuate this fault by continued use. Hazlett's wealth enabled him to carry this ruthless selection much
further than breeders who depended upon their cattle for their livelihood and
often were compelled to sell cattle for breeding purposes that might have a
slight imperfection. In a broader sense, independent wealth and the rigid
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selection that it allowed may be necessary ingredients to the final development
of blood lines. For these reasons, wealthy individuals have frequently made
the most significant contributions in the area of improved livestock.
The Bocaldo 6th and the Hazford Rupert lines developed by Hazlett
exerted great influence in Hereford circles. Late in life, Hazlett believed that
the greatest thrill he experienced during his many years in the purebred business was the production of the bull Bocaldo 6th, as he had also raised Bocaldo
6th's sire and grandsire as well as his dam. This famous bull was calved in
1914 and won his first major championship the fo llowing year. In 1916 Bocaldo
6th won seven grand championships in seven consecutive major stock shows,
including those in Kansas City and Chicago, before he was retired from the
ring undefeated. Because Hazlett had other bulls he wanted to use at this
time, Bocaldo 6th was used sparingly at first. Then, unfortunately, the bull
met an untimely death in 1922 as a result of swa llowing a piece of baling wire
which punctured his stomach and led to infection of his lungs and liver.
There were descendants enough at the time of his death to perpetuate the
line, however, although Bocaldo 6th failed to reach his full potential for improving the breed. It was the development of the Bocaldos and Ruperts that
contributed more than any other factor to Hazlett's lofty reputation.
Hazlett cattle, according to Donald Ornduff, displayed excellent "fleshing
qualities, smoothness, depth, and symmetry of form." Anothe r observer referred to the type as the "stretcher," a large big-boned Hereford as opposed
to the "short chunky dumpling type." Early maturity and a remarkable
uniformity were also characteristics.n These cattle contributed more desirable
qualities to the nation's Herefords than almost any cattle of their day.
Although Hazlett was sometimes criticized for his ruthless cu lling practices and for his reluctance to se ll breeding stock to other purebred breeders,
his restrictive selling policy was less the case with bulls for commercial herds.
From Hazlett and from those herds owned by breeders who managed to purchase some of his stock, hundreds of bulls that carried the Hazford Place
stamp found a home in leading commercial herds, includi ng those of Walter
Jones of Lebo, who ran cows on his ranch in Texas, and the Matador Land
& Cattle Company. His influence also spread eastward. At his first public
auction, residents of Missouri bought more cattle than breeders from any
other state. Georgia, Virginia, Indiana, Kentucky, and Vermont were also
represented .10
The kindly gentleman from E l Dorado even saved a few purebred sires
from anonymity by rescuing them from range herds. Early in hi s career
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Hazlett was impressed with the progeny of a Gudgell & Simpson-bred bull
named Publican. Learning of Publican through the work of his son, Bonnie
Brae 8th, Hazlett unsuccessfully tried to buy the son. Failing this, he eventually located Publican contentedly working the ranges of the Matador in Texas.
A trade was negotiated with Murdo Mackenzie, the Matador manager, about
1911, which brought the bull, now over seven years old, to Hazford Place.
The El Dorado master figured that Publican had already given his best to
the Matador herd, but still felt that his Anxiety 4th heritage should be preserved. In this Hazlett was correct. Publican's few years of service at Hazford
Place resulted in several notable females for his owner's herd, as well as a number of bulls. Before his sale by Gudgell & Simpson to the Matador, Publican
had sired the bull Domino, sire of Prince Domino 499611. It was through
Prince Domino's many descendants that Publican made his most valuable
contribution to the Hereford breed. Later, Hazlett also rescued Beau Santos,
a son of Beau Brummel, from the John Adair ranch in Texas.11
At the ripe age of 90, after nearly four decades of Hereford breeding,
Hazlett's health began to fail. He had remained physically active, though, up
to near the very end. He had been honored by several agricultural societies,
Kansas State University, and by a number of other organizations. While Hazlett's personal triumph was the production of Bocaldo 6th, his crowning success in the show ring was at the 1936 Chicago International. Unable to leave
his wheelchair, he watched a bull and a heifer from his herd win the top two
championships of the show. Then, a month later, the master breeder died.
At this time his land holdings had grown to about 10,000 acres and his cattle
herd to over 1,000 head, 600 of which were part of the purebred herd .
Hazlett's estate was the largest for which a will was ever probated in
Butler County, up to that time. The bulk of his property-which included oil
and bank stock as well as cash, land, and cattle-was willed to a nephew,
while other relatives were granted large sums of money. The Condell family,
Will and his son Frank, were rewarded for their many years of service with
land, stocks, and cash. According to the will, the entire purebred herd was
to be sold at public auction. Hazlett apparently wanted his improved cattle
spread across the land, a step that he was reluctant to take while living.
The dispersion sale of the purebred stock in June, 1937, ranked as one of
the all-time great sales of Herefords. It was even more spectacular than the
sale of Sunny Slope cattle a few decades earlier. A crowd that at times numbered over 8,000 gathered for the three-day spectacular, although the circus
tent erected at Hazford Place had a capacity of less than a third that number.
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The high prices paid for the animals, at a time when prices were generally
low due to the depression, marked the esteem in which Hazlett's herd was
held. Ten show animals were sold as a group to F. E. Harper and Ray J.
Turner for $18,800. Having failed to persuade the trustees to sell the whole
herd to them before the scheduled auction, these two Oklahoma oil and realestate magnates bought a total of fifty-six cattle for $56,530, easily the largest
single purchase. Gross receipts for the 604 purebreds that were sold climbed
to $305,250. This sum was paid by 133 buyers representing twenty-six states and
three Canadian provincesY
After buying Harper's interest, Ray J. Turner, later governor of Oklahoma, developed the Hazlett cattle for many years, combining the Hazford
Ruperts and Tones with Prince Domino blood to produce the TR Zato Heir
family. These cattle contributed much to the upgrading of Texas and southwestern stock. 13 In Kansas the Condell family kept one of the larger herds
of Hazlett cattle. Will Condell had begun to develop his own herd of purebreds a few years before Hazlett's death. He bought a number of cattle at
Hazlett's sale, which were mixed with stock acquired from the Wyoming
Hereford Ranch. Eventually, the Hazlett lines lost their separate identity.
Frank Condell, who returned to El Dorado from Kansas City after
Hazlett's death and established Dellford Ranch, started with Hazlett cattle
and kept the lines mostly intact for two decades. Numerous sales were held
to disperse the surplus stock from his herd. Then in 1958, pleading the absence of adequate help, Frank Condell decided to disperse the last of his
Hazlett cattle and develop a commercial herd. It is an interesting commentary
on the advance of purebred prices to note that this sale of only 349 head, about
half the number Hazlett had sold two decades before, grossed $460,570, or
about $160,000 more than Hazlett's original herd. Condell's dispersal ended,
for the most part, more than a half century of Hazlett Hereford influence in
the El Dorado area. 14
For a decade or so after Hazlett's death the bloodlines he developed
continued to be in demand. There were numerous advertisements by breeders
of purebreds all over the country offering to sell Hazlett-bred stock. But with
the development of new lines, the cattle lost favor by failing to keep up with
the new trends. Compared to the Herefords in the 1960s, Hazlett cattle were
finer boned. Inevitably, popular lines fade unless a skilled and dedicated
breeder anticipates future demands and develops new qualities in his cattle.
A few years ago an Iowa breeder dispersed a herd that had been kept close to
Hazlett lines; but, for the most part, the Hazford Place contributions are
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Hazlett's herd of show animals, sold in 1937 as a group to F. E. Harper and
Ray J. Turner, both from Oklahoma, for $18,800. Courtesy of the Kansas State
Board of Agriculture.

today hidden in the conformation of the new Hereford. The impact of
Hazlett-bred stock on the development of the Hereford is preserved in the
voluminous records that breeders keep on their sires and dams.15
Hazlett, of course, was assisted in producing improved stock for range
upbreeding by many other Kansans who had either large, well-known herds,
or small and relatively unnoticed collections of cattle. Not far from El Dorado,
near the small Flint Hills town of Matfield Green, for example, lived the
Crocker family. They had come to Kansas shortly after the Civil War; but
it was not until later that two brothers, Edward and Arthur, began to build
the family ranching enterprise into one of the largest in the state. With
profits from grazing thousands of transient cattle, the brothers expanded their
land and livestock holdings until they controlled some 40,000 acres in Chase
County, the Riverview Ranch north of Hays, seasonal grazing in Greenwood
County and the Osage Hills of Oklahoma, and an interest in the Double
Circle Ranch in Arizona. The last leased nearly a million acres of Indian
reservation land and supported some 25,000 cattle. Many of the stockers from
the Double Circle were matured on the Crackers' Kansas grass. A 1920 visit
by the editor of the Stocf(man led him to conclude that he had been shown
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"what is probably the greatest ranch and the largest herd of pure bred breeding cattle to be found in Kansas."
The Crockers started their purebred herd around 1900 with Gudgell &
Simpson sires, expanded it when beef prices were high, and disposed of their
surplus stock with annual October sales. Sometimes buyers were offered as
many as a thousand blooded animals at a single auction. Literally thousands
of Crocker cattle helped upgrade western range herds.
The depression after World War I and the erratic swings of beef prices
were unkind to Crocker interests, however, just as they were to many others.
When the possibility of becoming "oil magnates as well as cattle 'Barons'"
failed to materialize, their empire collapsed. The large purebred herd was
dispersed, as was much of their land, including their interest in the Double
Circle. Arthur Crocker had managed this ranch for many years and was
largely responsible for its success. Some of their Flint Hills property was
saved, and the family eventually reestablished their cattle trade, but not on
the scale that it had reached during the early twenties. 16
The Crockers certainly had a large herd during the heyday of purebred
production that was stimulated by good prices during World War I, but it
was not the largest in the state. That distinction belonged to C. G. Cochran
of the Hays area. His herd included over 1,500 purebred Herefords when
it was dispersed shortly after his death in 1926. Most of these cattle were
registered. Cochran consistently filed papers on several hundred cattle each
year during the middle twenties, which easily put him among the nation's
top ten recorders, one year as high as fourth.
Cochran's breeding establishment, besides being large, was also unusual
because it survived the postwar depression when others were having so much
trouble. His other enterprises may account for this, as one of his principal
interests from the time he migrated to Kansas during the 1880s was banking.
By 1920 he was involved in several banks in western Kansas. His death
prompted a large sale, but it was not the spectacular event occasioned by the
dispersal of Hazlett cattle over a decade later. Prices for stock were low at
the time, and many of the cows were sold in carload lots for $65 to $85 per
head. 17
About a hundred miles south of Hays was another large producer of
purebreds during the golden twenties, Jesse W. Greenleaf. Located in the
drainage basin of the upper Medicine Lodge River, Greenleaf lived in one
of the best grazing areas of south-central Kansas. Rolling hills, excellent
short grass, and dependable creeks characterized the region. Jesse and his
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brother Fred had come to Kiowa County with their father during the big
cattle boom of the 1880s. They worked for stockmen in the area for a while,
then began their own grazing operation for Texas steers with a large pasturemaybe as large as a hundred sections-north of Greensburg. Land was purchased from settlers who could not survive the dry years of the early 1890s
for as little as $25 to $50 a quarter section. Other land was leased, and some
land that was neither rented nor owned ended up behind the fence that
surrounded the whole pasture. Toward the end of the 1890s, the Greenleafs
sold their large pasture and invested in several thousand acres south of Greensburg. Today this beautiful ranch, nestled in a timbered creek valley, is still
operated by Greenleaf's son, James 0., and his two sons.
Jesse Greenleaf began raising purebred Herefords well before World War
I. By the time the boom arrived, he was ready and anxious to capture his
share of the market. His herd of up to 500 cows was of Gudgell & Simpson
breeding as well as Hazlett, when the latter was available. The business was
typically prosperous during the war. Carload lots of yearling bulls were
shipped to Texas in addition to those that were sold locally. For a couple of
years, Jesse sold bulls to the United States Department of the Interior for use
by the Apache Indians around Flagstaff, Arizona. These bulls soon dispelled
the government's reluctance to use purebreds in dry range country. The Fort
Hays Agricultural Experiment Station also bought foundation stock from
Greenleaf's herd.
Greenleaf had been one of the nation's top ten recorders of purebreds
during the boom years of the late teens, but a sad day arrived in 1924. Faced
with a declining market for bulls and low cattle prices generally, Greenleaf
sold his whole herd. His 300 cows and calves, as well as a few herd bulls,
were carried by special train to Wood Lake, Nebraska, where the Woods
brothers were putting together one of the largest herds in that state.
The depression of the twenties also forced Greenleaf to give up ownership of the ranch, which passed to his wife's family. Since that time, the
Greenleafs have leased the ranch. Jesse returned to raising commercial cattlesteers for summer grazing and a herd of cows. He had to ship the latter all
the way to Atchison in 1934 to save them from the drought.
Jesse Greenleaf was not only a producer but also an active guardian and
promoter of the beef industry. Most Kansas cattlemen knew the name Jesse
Greenleaf. He spent fourteen years as a member of the State Corporation
Commission, and after many years of serving KLA was honored with its
presidency in 1938. His term on the State Corporation Commission was one
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of the longest ever served by one member. Because of his work in Topeka
during the twenties and thirties and the desire for their children to have a
college education, the Greenleafs gave up the ranch during the winter months
for a home in Lawrence.
James 0. Greenleaf began to assume the duties of managing the ranch
during the early 1940s. He had graduated from the University of Kansas
with a law degree in 1933, which was not a promising time to be looking
for work. James returned to his first love after working for a while in the
Kansas City stockyards and as an attorney in McPherson. He has been on
the ranch ever since, following in his father's footsteps in more ways than
one. Governor Avery, a classmate of James while both were at the university,
appointed him during the 1960s to the State Corporation Commission.
After more than half a century of riding the crests of prosperity and the
depths of depression in Kansas ranching, Jesse Greenleaf retired to Florida
for a well-deserved rest soon after his son took over the ranch during World
War II. But retire he could not, and he began to build a ranch outside of
Sarasota not far from the winter quarters of the Ringling Brothers Circus.
But land values were rising around Sarasota; and after a decade or so, he
sold the 1,200 acres for five times what he had paid. Little did he know that
in the next half dozen years the land would appreciate by ten times what he
had sold it for. 18
Greenleaf's career, like those of several others, illustrated the perils of
raising fine stock. These breeders were subject to the same erratic cycles in
beef prices as the rest of the industry, only more so because of the size of their
investments. When depressions occurred, the fall was farther and harder.
Many, who jumped in to take advantage of the boom prices during and
shortly after World War I, failed to survive. Depressions, however, rarely
discriminate, and some who had been in business for several years also went
broke. A few years later the 1930s put more purebred breeders out of business, although the poor years the previous decade had not encouraged a
large number of new entries.
Like the depressed years of the 1890s, those between the two wars changed
the complexion of the state's entourage of purebred breeders. Gone were the
Crackers and Greenleafs, and in their place came a few new breeders or
expanded activities by those who managed to continue. And some, like
Hazlett, did survive both depressions of the interwar period, but these successful breeders were often anchored with outside capital.
The bonanza farm and purebred herd of Benjamin B. Foster were among
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those that continued throughout the depressions between the wars. Foster
Farms' Herefords had a staying power found in few Kansas herds, though
the farm was not as well known in the state's agricultural history as a number of other establishments. They continued for almost fifty years, and at
times were among the nation's most distinguished cattle.
While most businessmen-stockmen made their money in oil, real estate,
or banking, Foster chose lumber. Foster's family had moved to Leavenworth
from Kansas City during the 1850s, where his father freighted military supplies from Ft. Leavenworth to Colorado. In 1879, hoping to find other
business opportunities, the elder Foster took young Benjamin with him on a
trip in a covered wagon to find a place to establish a lumberyard. They
selected Randolph, Kansas, a small town about twenty-five miles north of
Manhattan and close to the Central Branch railroad that ran west from
Atchison. Thus began a chain of retail lumberyards that was eventually
spread throughout Kansas and a half-dozen neighboring states.
Benjamin Foster was only seventeen years old when he began managing
one of the family's yards. He was a good businessman, neat and accurate in
his bookkeeping, and scrupulously honest. By the early 1900s he was president of the family corporation, which by this time had over twenty yards.
Not much later, the Fosters had accumulated more than seventy yards from
which to retail the yellow pine lumber that was cut from thousands of acres
of timberland they owned in Texas.
Foster grew to be a large, broad-shouldered man who dedicated himself
to the family business. The retail headquarters were in Kansas City, where
Foster spent most of his life. After marrying well, he and his family lived
for twenty years in the Muehlebach Hotel in downtown Kansas City before
moving to a suburban farm that his wife had inherited. Vivion Farm was a
country estate, meticulously kept by numerous groundsmen. Today, it is the
site of the Midwest Baptist Theological Seminary. 19
Benjamin Foster, though a conservative businessman, was not averse to
investments outside the lumber industry. During the few years prior to World
War I, Foster speculated on western Kansas land. This led to the acquisition
of a huge block of land near Rexford, a few miles northeast of Colby in
Thomas County. Foster bought the land after droughts had turned the soil
to dust and few people wanted it. He acquired about 16,000 acres in one
contiguous plot near Rexford, 5,000 acres in Sherman County to the west, and
over 9,000 acres just across the line in Colorado. The combined operation
became known as Foster Farms, with its headquarters near Rexford. The
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Elevator for storing grain and truck for transporting Foster
Farms' show herd, Thomas County. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.
farms were Benjamin's personal enterprise, not that of the family-owned
corporation.
Wheat and corn were the main products, with cattle grazing land that
could not be farmed and consuming the forage catch-crops. Foster was a
successful farm proprietor, applying many of the organizational techniques
he had learned in business to his agricultural pursuits. The farm manager was
required to keep detailed financial records and send daily reports to Foster's
Kansas City office, as well as to report personally in Kansas City several times
each year. Foster made infrequent inspection trips to western Kansas, but
he knew well what was happening on his farms.
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Foster's shrewdest move during the early years of his farming operation
was to hire E. D. "Doc" Mustoe as manager. Mustoe, who loved to plant
trees in that part of the state where few grew, was extremely capable. He was
a good organizer, a fine public-relations person in the community, and a
keen judge of livestock. The nickname derived from his esteemed ability to
treat sick animals, although he had no formal veterinary training. Mustoe
began with Foster in 1918 and continued with the firm until replaced by his
son, E. D. (Dale) Mustoe, Jr., many years later. Dale was raised on the farms
before attending college and serving in the United States Navy during World
War II. After the war Dale returned to assist his father, then took his place
when the older Mustoe retired. The two Mustoes were the only managers
Foster Farms had prior to its sale in 1965, although there were superintendents
over various parts of the operation before Doc Mustoe took over.
Thousands of bushels of wheat and corn were produced during most
years, much of which was stored in Foster's elevators that towered above the
land. Just after the First World War, some claimed that Foster was the
largest independent wheat producer in the world. The farms were for many
years a showplace in western Kansas for mechanized agriculture. Beginning
during World War I, headers, binders, steam engines, and gasoline tractors
were used for much of the work. One report noted that a steam engine pulled
six binders that cut a 96-foot swath. More than a score of familes and the
282 men on the payroll for the harvest in 1919 were housed in the numerous
buildings on the farm. 20
Foster Farms had cattle almost from the beginning. A commercial herd
of Shorthorns first populated the farm, until a gradual switch to Herefords
occurred by using whiteface bulls on Shorthorn cows. Just after W arid War I
a small herd of purebred Herefords was established to produce herd bulls for
the commercial cattle. The collection of improved breeding cattle grew in
size and quality as the outside demand for bulls accelerated. A few hundred
cows, a top-notch show herd of ten to fifteen animals, and a total of about
a thousand purebred cattle slowly developed.
A fortuitous event, not uncommon in purebred breeding, propelled the
herd into the national limelight. Early in the purebred herd's history, Foster
Farms purchased two expensive cows from Mousel Brothers, purebred breeders
near Cambridge, Nebraska, with the understanding that the cows be with
calf by the service of a promising bull named Young Anxiety 4th. One of
the cows, Creamette 12th, had a bull calf that in a couple of years was responsible for introducing the quality needed for national fame. This bull,
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Foster Anxiety, was the first in a long line of superb males in the Foster herd
that included Promino, Beau Promino 25th, Valiant Stanway, and Beau
Beauty. The last was the most successful show bull the farms ever had,
dominating the circut during the early thirties.
Foster Farms began more than thirty years of show success during the
early twenties after Foster Anxiety had bred quality into the herd. From ,he
Cow Palace in San Francisco to the Bluegrass Show in Kentucky, as well as
all the major shows in between, Foster Farms' Herefords won more than their
share of top prizes. When in 1955 the purebred herd gave way to commercial
cattle, Foster Farms had shown for twenty-six consecutive years at the National Western in Denver, one of the longest continuous showings on record
for one herd under the same name.
The cattle business was complemented with other livestock. Beginning
in 1931, several hundred horses and mules were raised and trained for farm
work each year. Most of these animals were sold to farmers, but some were
kept at Foster Farms to complement the other sources of power. The gasoline
tractor eventually curtailed this segment of Foster's enterprise. Purebred
Clydesdales were also acquired during the depressed 1930s. These large beasts
were registered and shown well into the 1940s in some of the largest stock
expositions in the nation. The Budweiser beer people bought Foster's lead
team one year to add to their St. Louis stable of fine Clydesdales.
Foster Farms sold hundreds of purebred bulls to commercial cattlemen
in more than a dozen states. A few large auction sales were held at the farms,
but in most years return customers absorbed the surplus in private treaty
purchases. While the farming and cattle operation was never strapped for
money, as were many other operations that existed without outside help,
Foster never lavished capital on the farm. Each division was supposed to
show a profit each year, and usually did. Foster Farms' success during
depressions, and even its expansion during the 1930s into the horse business,
illustrated that the operation was economically sound. Excellent management
by the Mustoes and their dedication over a long period to Foster's interests
account in large part for the success. Foster Farms was a notable example
of the combination of mechanized farming and fine livestock on a huge scale.
It was a successful, diversified operation.
Today, Foster Farms is divided into a number of smaller operations,
many of which are irrigated. While some of the land that was separate from
the main plot had been sold earlier, the large farm near Rexford was not put
on the market until 1965, several years after Foster's death. A consortium of
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loca l business men and fa rmers pa id almost $2 millio n do llars fo r thi s large
plot and several sets of im provements. The group bega n almost immedi ately
to resell in smaller plots, retaining what they wanted fo r themselves fro m the
ori gin al purchase. By 1970 most of the la nd was in the h ands of sm aller
fa rmers.2 1

The H ereford s discussed above had horns, but this is not true of all Herefor ds. Begi nning aro und 1900 so me breeders bega n to establi sh the P olled
line, arg uing th at horn less cattle reduced productio n costs. They also pointed
out that more cattle could be shi pped in a single railroad car, that less space
was req uired in the feedlot, and that inju ries to both stock and owners were
reduced. A lthough cattle were usuall y dehorned, the breeders of P olled
H ereford s arg ued that ge netic elim ination reduced considerably the work,
cruelty, a nd expense.
W ar ren Ga mmon, an Iowa breede r, is usually g iven credit fo r in iti ating
the organized development of Polled H erefords. A bout the turn of the century, Gammon collected a group of what was generally thought to be freak
cattle. T o thi s he rd of horn less cows he added a po lled bull, also a so-ca lled
freak, and began establi shing the hornless trait in hi s whole herd. 22
Breeders of horned H erefords h ave bee n slow to accept the polled cattle,
especially in the West. There was a surge of popu la ri ty d u ring the late 1940s
and 1950s among smaller produce rs in states east of K ansas, but even today
there are few polled commercial herds of much size . But their popularity
g rew as polled cattle improved . T oday, Polled H erefords acco unt fo r about
half the whiteface cattle that are recorded, and m any bel ieve th at their future
is exceedingly bright.
The tradition and early accepta nce of H erefo rds wi th horns red uced the
appea l of the Polled H erefords, as did the di ffic ulty of eliminating all horns
by using a polled bull. M any cattlemen beli eved that, if they had to gear up
to dehorn some cattle, a few more we re li ttle additional work . The principal
obj ection, however, related to q uality. "When yo u breed the ho rn s off yo u
breed the hind-e nd off," cattlemen charged , and it was true. In order to
establi sh po lledness fi rmly, quality was sacrificed . The surge in popularity in
polled cattle fo llowed hard upon the eq uali zati on of qu ality bet wee n the two
H ereford choices that occurred dur ing the fo rties and fi fties. 23
Kansas breeders were deep ly involved in de veloping P olled H erefords.
Paw nee Co unty, aro und the small town of L arned, easily becam e the state's
11 4
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Polled Hereford capital shortly after World War I. Almost a score of breeders
were responsible, but most involved were John M. Lewis and his sons, Walter
and Joseph, proprietors of Alfalfa Lawn Farms.
John M. Lewis wandered the country a bit before settling in Kansas.
Returning to his home in Illinois after the Spanish-American War, the restless Lewis traveled to Colorado, where he fell in love with alfalfa. He returned
to Illinois but could never forget the luxuriant forage crop he had seen growing in the West. When he arrived in the Larned area in 1908 and again found
alfalfa growing abundantly, he bought a quarter section of land and stayed
for the rest of his life. Alfalfa and Polled Herefords became his stock-in-trade.
Just before the outbreak of World War I, Lewis married the daughter of
Wallace Libbey, a charter member of the American Hereford Association.
Libbey gave the young couple a choice of $1,000 or ten registered cows as a
wedding present. The couple wisely chose the latter, bought a bull named
Polled Rollo, and began to develop a polled herd with their Anxiety-bred
cows.
Progress was slow during the twenties, but by the thirties the Lewis
herd was beginning to draw national attention. Walter and Joe, who were
both educated at Kansas State Agricultural College, became more active in
managing and running the farm, and the herd grew to several hundred head.
Joe began a successful show career in 1939 that has been continued up to the
present day and has brought Lewis cattle much publicity. Polled Rollo and
his progeny were the early sires; then Victor Dominos became the Lewis
hallmark. Walter barely saved this famous bull from passing unnoticed when
he rescued him from a carload of young bulls his father was sending to a
commercial herd in California. The Victor Dominos are today one of the
most popular Polled Hereford families in the nation.
Today, Alfalfa Lawn Farms is a thriving enterprise. During the summer
months, green fields of alfalfa surround the neat, stuccoed buildings. Not a
blade of grass is out of place on this farm, one of the best-kept in the state.
Polled Herefords graze nearby, awaiting buyers that arrive almost daily to
select and carry away breeding stock. Most bulls are sold to producers in
central and eastern Kansas, but a dotted map in Walter's office reveals that
some have gone to almost every part of the United States, as well as to several
South American countries and to Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand. The
Lewis family is easily the top producer of Polled Herefords in the state and
ranks high among the premier breeders of the nation. Joe continues the show
herd, while Walter is sometimes called to judge international shows. Walter
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was also the first breeder of the polled line honored with the presidency of
the American Hereford Association. The second generation of the family
still controls the Lewis operation, but a third is waiting in the wings.2 4
More recent in gaining a reputation as noted purebred breeders in the
state are J. J. Moxley and John Vanier. These two breeders began in the
1930s to fill the gap left by the decline or dispersion of other herds due to
the depression. They continue today to fill orders for fine breeding stock.
Interests outside the production of beef, especially in the case of Vanier,
account in large part for their being able to move successfully into the purebred business during the 1930s.
J. J. Moxley, a beef cattle specialist at Kansas State Agricultural College
during the early 1930s where he was involved in the government purchase of
drought-stricken cattle, bought in 1935 a small Flint Hills ranch near
Council Grove and began to raise cattle. Ten years later, Moxley retired from
Kansas State and became more active in developing a herd of purebred Herefords that grew to around 200 head of registered cattle. Moxley is now retired,
and his herd is being continued by the family. Many bulls from the herd
thus continue to find homes in commercial herds across the state.2 5
John Vanier had a more varied career than did Moxley before he settled
into the production of purebred stock. Born and raised in Nebraska, Vanier
moved as a young man to Kansas City, where he became a stenographer at
the Board of Trade. Thereafter, Vanier advanced himself carefully from flour
salesman to the ownership of several flour mills in Kansas, and a meat
packing plant.
Vanier's prosperity by the early 1930s enabled him to move easily into
ranching and eventually into the production of purebreds. When he began,
Vanier claimed that his purebred herd was not a hobby, but was intended to
be a solid business in its own right, and in this he has not been disappointed.
During the early thirties Vanier purchased over 5,000 acres near Brookville, Kansas, southwest of Salina, which he called the CK Ranch in honor
of central Kansas. In 1936, with cattle prices low and producers of purebreds
falling by the wayside, Vanier started his purebred herd. The following year
he added over fifty of the best breeding matrons that he could find from the
Troublesome Valley herd owned by Fred Grimes in Colorado. This purchase
catapulted him into the forefront of Hereford breeding, and in a year he was
ready for his first public auction. A new sales pavilion at the CK Ranch was
the site of the first auction, and many others followed in quick succession.
The bull Onward Domino Jr., who descended from Publican, the bull that
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Hazlett had rescued from the Matador, was an early herd sire. He in turn
sired CK Onward Domino, a bull that became the fountainhead of several
highly advertised Hereford families that were popularized by the CK Ranch.
In 1952, for example, a descendant, CK Crusty 46th, topped the National
Western sale in Denver at $41,500.
Vanier's herd grew rapidly. Over a thousand registered cattle were reported by 1943, while over a decade later the Stockman praised Vanier as the
owner of the largest herd of purebred, registered Herefords in the nation. Up
to 500 bulls were dispersed annually to cattlemen in Kansas and many other
states. Vanier also encouraged many younger breeders by arranging special
sales of fine calves to 4-H Club members. Throughout this period Vanier's
wife played an active role in making their Herefords prominent, often buying
and selling many of the purebred cattle. More recently, their son, Jack, has
assumed managerial responsibilities for the family's wide interests. Presently,
the family has numerous farming and ranching interests in a half-dozen areas
of the state in addition to a large commercial cattle ranch . in Wyoming. The
headquarters for these far-flung interests, however, remains at the CK Ranch,
where the production of some of the best Herefords in the country continues. 26
Hazlett, Foster, and Vanier represented the large, successful Hereford
breeders in the state who were able to survive depressions in order to reap
profits when prices improved. And prices were sometimes high. Just after
World War I the average individual price for purebred stock sold at auction
was close to $500, which was an all-time high until World War II stimulated
another boom and average prices rose to over $850 per head by 1951. 27
But the large, rich breeders of purebred cattle, who could afford to buy
the best cattle, to participate repeatedly in the large livestock shows, and to
advertise heavily the results of their breeding programs, were responsible for
only part of the fine blood that upgraded western cattle. Hundreds of other
stockmen who raised only a few purebreds, or perhaps only upgraded common
stock, also did much to improve the size, maturing time, and eye appeal of
range cattle. These smaller operators raised their own herd bulls or traded
with a neighbor who was also upgrading. The lesser-known breeders, who
continually emphasized the need for good bulls, were scattered through many
states, and Kansas was no exception.
Muriel and Ch arles Gregg of Coldwater, Kansas, for example, began a
purebred herd of about twenty-five cattle in the early 1930s that produced
herd bulls for their commercial stock. Fancy cattle for show was not their
objective; so the purebreds received little special attention. The Domino line
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and then bulls from J. J. Moxley's herd and the CK Ranch supplied the outside
blood for the purebred herd. The Greggs saved a good deal of money by
producing their own herd bulls, and still received the benefits from the best
Hereford blood available. A dozen or so of the fine bulls they had used for a
couple of years in their commerci al herd were sold each year to other cattlemen,
reducing still further their expense for sires. 28
One of the Greggs' neighbors, Clair Parcel, was another example of a
small breeder of purebreds, only Parcel eventually became more interested in
showing stock than were the Greggs. Beginning with an orphaned purebred
heifer in 1937 as a 4-H project, Parcel and his father built a herd of well over
a hundred Hereford cows by the early 1950s.
They began with Hazlett bloodlines and kept the herd relatively small
during World War II. Much of the surplus was sold in the fine cattle country
of southwest Kansas. The severe drought of the early 1950s had a disastrous
effect on the Parcels' operation, forcing the sale of all but forty of their finest.
When the rain and grass returned , however, so did the Parcels' fine Herefords.
Today, using largely Line 1 bulls that were originally developed in Montana
from the Advance Domino strain, Parcel has about 300 cows. He became
more interested in showing and in a wider market as his herd grew, but still
supplies many bulls for the local area.2°

Though Herefords had no equal in upbreeding cattle in Kansas, as well as
in other states west of the Mississippi River, they did have some competition
from Angus and Shorthorn cattle. The latter had made their strongest bid
for the range country during the nineteenth century, but a few Shorthorns
are still used on the grasslands and on the small, diversified farms in eastern
Kansas and the Midwest.
While a number of Kansans produced purebred Shorthorns, the Tomson
herd southwest of Topeka became the most prominent during the twentieth
century. It was during World War I and the postwar boom that James G.
Tomson, the genius of the family as far as cattle were concerned, pushed the
Shorthorn herd to national stature. Sometimes referred to as "the Hazlett
of Shorthorn breeders," Tomson had a herd of well over a hundred cows
and supplied many cattlemen with blooded sires. Although Tomson's Shorthorns were never popular in the large range herds of the state, they never
lacked buyers. A few were sold as for afield as Australia and South America.
Tomson cattle were most popular during the 1930s and 1940s when they
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tended to dominate several of the large stock shows, including the American
Royal. The Marygolds, Augustas, and Mayflowers, all originally from Scotland, were families of Shorthorns that were especially profitable for the
Tomsons. These Shorthorn lines easily made the Tomson herd the best in
Kansas as well as one of the finest in the nation during the period between
the wars, although the Tomsons were never very aggressive in promoting
their herd. As long as the cattle were medium-sized, uniform, quickly fattened, and easy to breed and calve, buyers were plentiful.
The head of the family was joined in the business during the busy 1930s
by his son, James G. Thomson, Jr., who still is associated with the herd.
James, Jr., was never as interested as his father in the purebred cattle, but was
responsible for directing more of the Tomsons' energy into commercial Shorthorns, full and partial feeding of stock, and the production of hybrid seed
corn.
A few years before the death of James G. Tomson, Sr., in 1964, the herd
that he had worked so diligently to improve began to lose popularity. The
fashion among breeders of Shorthorns had changed to a larger type, and the
Tomsons were slow to adjust. Through private contracts and a large sale
during the early 1970s, most of the herd was dispersed. At the time of the
sale, it may have been the oldest herd in continuous ownership in the nation.
Today, the Tomsons are not the premier Shorthorn breeders that they once
were, but a fourth generation, sons of James G. Tomson, Jr., is still interested
in cattle. Someday the present herd of seventy-five cows may produce the
wonder bull that will drive the herd back to its former glory. 30
Although George Grant had brought to Kansas during the 1870s the
first black bulls known in the United States, Angus cattle were never as
popular in the larger range herds as were the Herefords. Angus bulls were
less available, which accounted in part for their being less popular, but the
main reason was the overwhelming popularity of the whitefaces. Angus
cattle were used some, however, usually in smaller herds in the central and
eastern parts of the state.
There were also a few purebred Angus breeders in the state. Most began
after 1900, although one of the earliest, T. J. McCreary of Highland, began
late in the nineteenth century. McCreary imported his foundation stock from
Great Britain, built a fine herd, and then became the source of stock for other
herds that were established. Johnson Workman, from around Chapman, an
astute Angus breed er, got his foundation stock from McCreary just before
World War I. He continued to breed fine Angus stock for several decades
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and won the grand championship at the American Royal with a carload of
his feeder steers in 1927. The Hollinger family of Chapman, the Laflins from
Olsburg, and the Ljungdahl family from around Menlo were also prominent
in the state's Angus circle, but their herds were usually small when compared
to those of the large Hereford breeders.
Some believe that the greatest popularity of the Angus in range production is yet to come. Much improvement in the breed's size and ability to gain
rapidly in feedlots has occurred since 1960. Crossbreeding Angus cattle with
Herefords or some other breed has helped increase the popularity of the
blacks. A few Angus bulls with a herd of Hereford cows is a relatively easy
and rapid route to the hybrid vigor that many producers now insist upon. 31

When many young people abandoned Kansas farms and ranches for service
in World War II, they left behind herds of cattle that were often models of
upbreeding. Their grandparents would have been amazed at the progress
that had been made since the 1890s. Purebred producers were largely responsible for this by making fine herd sires readily available to range producers.
By the late twenties and early thirties the dominance of the east-to-west
movement of fine cattle had passed into history, although some stock still
moves in this direction. After the boom that was stimulated by World War I,
fine cattle tended to move in all directions. Purebreds from Texas and Montana, for example, were sold in Illinois and Kentucky. The Wyoming
Hereford Ranch dispersed cattle in all directions, as did many breeders in
Kansas and other states. The movement of purebreds had gone full circle.
Kansas was a key state in the upbreeding process. Located at the crossroads of stock movements to and from the West, the state first transferred
improved cattle from the Midwest to the range country, then joined in with
its own good breeding stock. Some breeders became nationally and internationally famous for their work; but, most important, their improved cattle
began to work their magic in the country's large commercial herds. This
resulted in more and better beef, and helped keep production costs more in
line with market prices.
But upbreeding was not the end of the struggle to reduce production costs
and raise profits. During the early twentieth century, among other things,
the loss from livestock diseases was reduced, and the state's cattlemen reorganized the association that expressed their collective voice on the economic
issues of the day.
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Although Joseph H. Mercer owned relatively little livestock he was the most
important single cattleman in Kansas for nearly three decades. His dual posts
as livestock sanitary commissioner and as executive secretary of KLA were
the principal avenues through which this dedicated stockman exerted a major
influence on the beef industry in Kansas and throughout much of the West.
Mercer was born on a farm near what is today Batesville, Ohio, on
September 7, 1864, the youngest of several children. His father was a farmer
who served four years in the Union Army before deserting the family soon
after the war. His mother's death left Mercer orphaned at the age of two. He
lived the next decade with his maternal grandparents in Ohio before moving
to West Virginia to live with Charles F. Mercer, an older brother.
After his own education in a small business college, Mercer taught school
in Virginia and then moved to the Sunflower State in 1887, where he took
up the grocery business in Cottonwood Falls. This small Flint Hills town
and the surrounding area remained his home until duties with the Sanitary
Commission and KLA forced a move to the capital. Mercer, when he came
to Kansas, had little knowledge of the livestock industry, but friends like the
Crocker brothers soon taught him the necessary fundamentals. Groceries then
gave way to cattle and a little farming. Mercer retained a financial interest in
cattle for most of his life, first operating a small leased ranch near Cottonwood
Falls which he managed himself, then, after he moved to Topeka, simply by
investing in livestock. Cal Floyd, one of the state's largest feeders and pasturemen, became not only a close personal friend but also an occasional partner
with Mercer in investments. As it turned out, however, Mercer's enduring
financial interest in cattle was more for love than profit.
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Mercer was a little over five and a half feet tall, but his short-legged
frame carried well over two hundred pounds. His broad, thick-set shoulders
made him appear to be bigger than he really was. A friend once remarked
that, when sitting down, . Mercer was one of the largest men he had ever
seen. His round, kindly face, adorned with glasses in later years, hid a determination that made him a fearless negotiator around a conference table or
through his heavy correspondence. Contemporaries said that he was a sympathetic man who was honest, sincere, and tender; but he was a dedicated
fighter for any cause that he adopted. As a result, railroad and meat-packing
officials often saw him as bull-headed, and not without some justification.
Mercer first gained state recognition in 1906 when he was elected Chase
County representative to the Kansas legislature. He served three terms in
this position, throwing his influence into the camp of W. R. Stubbs, a progressive politician from Lawrence. Stubbs and Mercer formed a close friendship during these turbulent years in Kansas politics. When Stubbs plodded
his way to the governorship in 1909, he appointed Mercer livestock sanitary
commissioner. Mercer's influence, moreover, went beyond the area of livestock. A Topeka paper once reported that Stubbs ran his independent administration with the aid of the "Three-Joes'-Kitchen-Cabinet." Joe Mercer
was one of the influential three. 1
Mercer continued to have political ambitions throughout his life, but his
seat in the house was the highest elected office he ever held. The gossip around
the statehouse during the twenties indicated that Mercer was interested in
the gubernatorial race at least twice, and he failed in a serious attempt at a
United States senatorial seat in 1932. But it was not for want of ability that
Mercer failed to rise in political circles. He would have made an excellent
governor or senator, but he had little time to do the necessary spade work
for political success. His duties with KLA and the Sanitary Commission
kept him on the run continually. Overall, his extended service to the state
through these organizations was probably greater than if he had been a higher
official. Mercer's name became a household word with Kansas farmers and
ranchers and was known in marketplaces throughout the West and Midwest.
He was so important to the state's livestock producers that they persuaded
him to refuse a presidential appointment to the United States Tariff Commission in 1926.
More than any other individual, Mercer built KLA into an effective
sta•e organization. He was the originator and implementor of most KLA
activities between 1910 and 1937, and it was to his credit that the association
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grew to be one of the strongest in the West. He traveled repeatedly across
the nation in the interests of the association, consulted personally with presidents and other high federal officials, frequently testified before House and
Senate committees, and prepared evidence-which he usually presented himself-for Interstate Commerce Commission investigations. On the state level,
Mercer performed many of the same tasks. He was the confidant of governors,
occasionally their ambassador, and a persistent lobbyist at legislative sessions,
always working through KLA in the interests of the livestock producer.
As sanitary commissioner, Mercer directed the machinery that monitored
and protected the state's livestock, and lobbied for disaster payments when
cattle disease did strike in the state through no fault of the producers. He
directed livestock sanitary affairs for over a quarter of a century and, in so
doing, made the Kansas commission one of the most effective in the nation.
At his death in 1937, Mercer probably held the record for continuous service
in a major appointive state position.
His work load was often overwhelming. Acording to the Stockman
during the frustrating 1930s, it was more than a mere human "could bear-up
under." Mercer's efforts were well spent, though, as the same journal claimed
at the time of his death that his actions may have saved Kansas shippers $2
million a year in marketing expenses.
Mercer's ideas on problems associated with production, transportation,
and marketing of stock, as well as his philosophy on the relationship of government to individuals and business, became the official position of KLA and
of many of the state's producers. He was a loyal Republican in most of his
principles, but never failed to support the small producer in his marketing
battles with big business. His actions, but not always his words, supported
an organized response from farmers and ranchers rather than the hallowed
rugged individualism that some spoke of. He belonged to more than a halfdozen organizations that guarded the producer in his dealings with railroads,
stockyards, packers, and the public. Mercer, along with many others, believed that a healthy agriculture was absolutely essential for a prosperous
national economy. He was not so tradition bound, however, that he could not
adjust to the idea of government aid to agriculture. Like many of the Democrats that he worked with, Mercer moved generally from advocating government price supports in the twenties to controlled production in the thirties.
In short, he spoke frequently in favor of government support for agriculture
so that it might compete better with other sectors of the nation's economy.
In much of his thinking, Joe Mercer was ahead of most other agricultural
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Joseph H. Mercer in his office in the state capitol, 1930s. As executive secretary of
KLA and as the Kansas State Livestock Sanitary Commissioner, Mercer was one
of the most important stockmen in Kansas and the Southwest for over three decades.
Courtesy of Bess Mercer Conley.

producers in the state; but the majority, more often than not, fell into line
behind him once he had explained his position.~

The first step in making KLA more effective was its reorganization, the
stimulus for which came from a dispute in 1912 over the Kansas City Connecting Railroad? While most stockmen favored the railroad's position in
this dispute when they were compelled to testify before the Kansas Public
Utilities Commission, there was enough division in their ranks to suggest
that the small KLA needed to be revitalized. Reorganization, they hoped,
might empower the association to speak with a unanimous voice for a larger
number of the state's 40,000 major cattle shippers. Satisfactory funding of
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the organization was also a prime consideration in the efforts to reorganize.
With reorganization in mind, T. M. Potter, a charter member and president of KLA at the time, appointed a committee of five active producersClyde Miller, Arnold Burns, John Hudelson, John A. Edwards, and Mercerto formulate a constitution and draft by-laws. Balie P. Waggener, the cattlemen's old adversary in their disputes with the railroads, provided legal advice
for this endeavor. After several meetings the group announced that the 1913
meeting of the state's stockmen would be for the purpose of ratifying or
rejecting their recommendations. At this meeting, which was held in the
legislative hall of the state capitol in Topeka, the modern KLA was born.
The old, crisis-oriented association was discarded in favor of a more permanent
organization which, it was hoped, would speak for a greater number of stockmen. The association claimed to represent all livestock producers in the state,
but for the most part it supported sheep and hog men only when their interests coincided with those of the cattle producer. One of the committee's more
important suggestions was that KLA hire a permanent, full-time secretary.
The 200 shippers in attendance agreed, and Mercer, having served part-time
since 1910, accepted the position at an annual salary that fell between $2,000
and $3,000, depending on how much money the association had. Offices for
Mercer's work were established in Topeka, Wichita, and Kansas City. Thus
began the longest term of any officer in the history of KLA, and the organization never regretted this decision.
Before the Topeka meeting to discuss reorganization began, however,
stockmen were promised an exciting fight over the presidency of the association. The incumbent, state legislator T. M. Potter, was opposed by stockyard interests because of his support for the rail lines in the Connecting
Railroad dispute. "They wanted Potter's scalp and would be satisfied with
nothing less," the Topeka State fournal reported. This drew a number of
stockmen to Topeka to witness the blood-letting, but the confrontation failed
to develop. W. L. "Ironjaw" Brown, a cattleman, legislator, and newspaper
editor who three years later disrupted the 1916 KLA convention in his eagerness to declare war on the packers, tried his best to provoke a showdown
but to no avail. He nominated Potter for another term in spite of the stockyards people, but the convention chose not to follow Brown's lead. Instead,
they settled on William J. Tod- a compromise candidate who was less controversial-and the promised fun was not forthcoming. 4
Tod, noted earlier for his interest in purebred Herefords, was a wise
choice at this time for the presidency. Few in the state were more respected
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than Tod, and few took a more profound interest in the affairs of the industry. Tod was a frugal, business-minded Scot, who never failed to cut expenses
whenever possible. In this connection, his wife was fond of telling how joyfully Tod announced to her one day that the price of gasoline had dropped
by a cent a gallon. "Why Willie, what difference does it make to you," she
asked, "you've no gasoline buggy?" "Ah, but Margaret," Tod quickly replied,
"I've a cigarette lighter." 5
Tod had begun in the cattle business by managing the large Prairie Land
and Cattle Company during the heyday of open-range ranching in the 1880s.
He did well in this position and eventually purchased 5,000 acres near Maple
Hill in partnership with George Fowler, the son of a meat packer. When
the Prairie Land and Cattle Company dissolved, the partners acquired the
56,000-acre Crosselle Ranch near Folsom, New Mexico, a part of the land
formerly controlled by the large company. Tod and Fowler insisted on Hereford bulls, some of which were produced at Maple Hill, and their New
Mexico ranch became one of the first large spreads in the area to turn out
high-grade, uniform calves in large numbers. Many of the steers were shipped
to Maple Hill, where they were wintered, grazed on the early bluestem, then
shoved into feedlots along Mill Creek for corn finishing.
The Tod-Fowler association continued for more than a decade, being
dissolved before World War I, with Fowler keeping the Crosselle and Tod
the Flint Hills property. Some believed that Tod's astute management turned
his share into the finest small ranch in the state. He continued to buy and
finish Crosselle stock for many years, much as his neighbors, the Adams
family, were doing with their young cattle. Then, just before his sudden
death, Tod purchased the Crosselle Ranch a second time. His son, James,
was left with the responsibility after 1928.
Tod was a tall, handsome man who never dressed like a cowboy except
for finely tailored boots, one of the few luxuries that he allowed himself. He
had a natural dignity, and no one ever questioned his integrity. Fairness and
honesty were his hallmarks. In 1913 he was the ideal person to team with
Mercer at the head of a reorganized KLA. With Tod at the reins and
Mercer in the harness, KLA was well equipped to lead stockmen into the
era of the First World War. 6
KLA's growth in power and influence over the state's cattle industry
dates largely from the time it was reorganized. Its growth was reflected by
an increase in membership during the first decade of Mercer's tenure as secretary. From the handful of stockmen who had constituted KLA from its
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origin in 1897 until its reorganization in 1913, the number grew to almost
1,500 in 1917, and to over 4,000 by 1918. The association failed to attain its
objective of 10,000 members by the end of World War I but almost reached
the coveted goal by the early 1920s. Tod's presidential address to the 1917
KLA convention noted in this relation that KLA was "now recognized as
a power in this country, second only to the American National and Texas
Association ... [and] the greatest part of this Association's growth in numbers and in power, is due to the untiring energy, ability and unswerving loyalty
of your secretary, Joe Mercer."
Membership, however, was not necessarily indicative of KLA's influence,
for almost all the state's producers as well as many others throughout the
West were affected by the association's work whether or not they participated
in the decision making. Annual meetings were not limited to dues-paying
members of the association, and attendance usually exceeded memberships
by a large number. This was understandable, as the annual meetings filled
several of the industry's needs. Meetings were an important part of the
producer's continuing education, providing a relatively rare opportunity for
stockmen and their wives to socialize with others in the industry, and serving
as a clearing house for the many transactions necessary in the cattle business.
Many cattlemen from Kansas and neighboring states left their homes for the
mid- or late-winter meetings without a single steer or an acre of grass for
their pasturing operation, yet returned having arranged for cattle and grass
enough to satisfy their every need. 7
In addition to hiring Mercer as secretary, one of KLA's more important
accomplishments during this decade was the acquisition of an effective means
of communication. This, too, was in large part Mercer's idea. After the
tumultuous KLA meeting in Wichita in 1916, which gave approval to the
scheme, Mercer began negotiations with a Manhattan publisher named Curtis
L. Daughters for the publication of association news and general information
of interest to stock producers. KLA paid twenty-five cents a year per subscription to have its news printed and sent to each member. The publisher
was also obligated to keep one man in the field soliciting KLA members .
The first issue of the bimonthly Kansas Cattleman was dated November
1, 1916. In it the publisher noted that the Cattleman was to be strictly a
livestock paper, a "valuable medium to the breeders," and of "great service
to all stockmen." The journal was published in Manhattan under this heading
for about a year, then the name was changed to Kansas Stockman with the
May 20, 1918, issue when a number of sheep and hog producers complained
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that the paper appeared to be exclusively for the cattle interests. The first
name, however, continued to be more descriptive of the paper's contents. Also
in 1918 the publishing headquarters were moved to Topeka in order to be
closer to KLA offices.
The increased cost for labor and materials as a result of the war proved
to be as burdensome for the Stockman as it was for the state's producers.
When the postwar depression settled down on the country, Daughters was
faced with bankruptcy. KLA then purchased the paper and, although Daughters was retained for several years as the Stockman' s editor, the responsibility
for continuing the paper was added to those duties already resting on Mercer's
shoulders. 8
KLA had to its credit by 1920 a dedicated secretary, an expanded membership, and a bimonthly publication. It saved stockmen money by adjusting
shipping claims, appearing at rate hearings and market investigations, and
negotiating reduced rates for disease serums. It was a clearing house for many
pasture contracts and cattle sales, an information bureau for general industry
news, and a vehicle through which a large number of the state's leading cattlemen expressed their views. It also lobbied for favorable legislation on both
the state and national levels. A 1918 issue of the Stockman claimed, "The
Kansas Live Stock Association is the second largest state livestock association
in the United States. It is the third largest livestock association in America.
The Kansas Association has doubled its membership within the last year and
with a little more effort on the part of its members it may easily become the
most powerful in America within this year."
While a bit exaggerated, these claims were based on more than booming
desires and local pride. Of the state stock associations in the West that have
been written about by historians, only the Cattle Raisers Association of Texas
appeared to have a larger membership. The associations in Nebraska, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, and Colorado apparently experienced declines
in membership and influence during the war years while KLA was making
significant gains. Declining membership and influence were often the result
of crisis-oriented associations, as the few solid members of KLA remembered
well. With the higher prices that cattlemen received during the war, many
saw little need to absorb the added expense of a livestock organization. KLA
might have suffered the same fate had members not reorganized and hired
Joe Mercer. Finally, only the Texas-based association and the American
National exercised more influence on the national level than did KLA, and
this continued to be true throughout most of the Mercer era.9
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Always on the minds of cattlemen to a greater or lesser degree is the problem
of stock diseases. While disease was potentially the most costly factor in production, control and eradication of many diseases were often beyond the
capabilities of individual stockmen. Consequently, federal and state agencies
were created to act in the stockmen's interests. Texas fever, scabies or cattle
mange, the dread foot-and-mouth disease, and blackleg-probably the most
costly of all-were the ailments of most concern to cattlemen before 1920.
There was also some interest in tuberculosis and brucellosis, but the major
efforts at eradicating these two came after the First World War.
Mercer's second large responsibility was his position as livestock sanitary
commissioner in Kansas. This state-financed agency promoted scientific research, issued quarantines, made regular inspections, and performed many
other duties that were necessary for the health of livestock in the state. The
work was critical in reducing the cost of production and in raising profits.
While the commission had been in existence for some time, it often suffered
from inept political appointees, controversies over its authority, and a lack of
confidence in its decisions. Mercer soon corrected these faults.
Kansas, being the crossroads of much stock travel between the West and
the midwestern feeding and marketing centers, was intensely interested in
controlling livestock diseases. This interest had led the state to participate
in some of the earliest quarantines against Texas fever, and also to the
comparatively early formation of a State Sanitary Commission, now known
as the Animal Health Department.
The Sanitary Commission had sprung from events that occurred during
the 1880s. After increasing amounts of Texas fever and scabies appeared in
the state-there was also a mistaken belief that foot-and-mouth was presenta few prominent stockmen in 1884 pressured Governor G. W. Glick into
calling a special session of the legislature. Glick, the state's first Democratic
governor and also a noted Shorthorn breeder in the Atchison area, was quite
sympathetic to livestock interests. The special session created a joint committee to investigate conditions and recommend legislation. After a summer
of hearings by the group in 1884, the regular meeting of the legislature in
1885 created the Sanitary Commission, which consisted of a three-member
advisory board and a state veterinarian secretary. The legislature charged the
new commission with establishing quarantines, examining cattle and issuing
certificates of health to imported or exported stock, and diagnosing diseased
animals. The three commissioners were required to be active producers
engaged in farming or ranching. Later, it was learned that the members'
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private interests encroached too severely on their public duties. Thus, in
1905, the commission of three men was abolished in favor of a permanent
livestock sanitary commissioner, a post that is still part of the state's administrative machinery. 10
The Sanitary Commission achieved only moderate success in stopping
the spread of disease into the state during the nineteenth century, as might
have been expected, because the three commissioners served only part-time
and governors sometimes used the agency to repay political debts. After 1915,
Mercer was regularly reappointed as director, and his steady tenure was of
great value to the commission and the state's cattlemen. Try as it might,
however, the commission was unable to prevent periodic outbreaks of disease
and severe losses to stockmen. 11
Besides recommending a Sanitary Commission, the 1884 legislative committee also suggested that Kansas State Agricultural College could help livestock interests in the state. "We recommend," the group said, "that a chair
of veterinary science be established in the State Agricultural College." The
college's compliance with this recommendation proved to be of immeasurable
benefit to producers in Kansas and throughout the West, although the graduation of veterinarians was delayed until the twentieth century.
The value of a department of veterinary science became most evident to
stockmen when a preventive for blackleg was developed. Blackleg is an
infectious disease, usually fatal, to which young cattle are especially susceptible
if not vaccinated. A plague for cattlemen, blackleg was one of the most
costly of diseases because it could sweep through a whole herd in a short
period of time. Some estimates suggested that 10 to 20 percent of the yearly
calf crop was lost to the disease in areas where it was prevalent. There was
no cure and prevention was the only safeguard. Once infection began in an
area, preventing its spread was virtually impossible. The blackleg-causing
organism attacked animals during a vegetative stage, and when this form was
exposed to air it produced tiny spores that lived in the ground for years. Animals in a pasture or feedlot might ingest the spores with their feed and
contract the disease years after an earlier siege in the same area.
Many attempts at curing and preventing the disease had been made before
an effective vaccine was developed at the Kansas college. Some of these supposed cures were folk medicine of the poorest sort, a few bordered on witchcraft, and a number were extremely cruel. All were ineffective. One cure
during the 1890s that was advised for Kansas stock involved sewing "red
precipitate and lard-soaked muslin strips" into the calf's hide until the disease
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passed or the calf died. In this case the cure was probably more deadly than
the disease. Other cures involved the use of pellets or powders made from
the processed meat of victims of the disease. Many of these attempts to
produce vaccine derived from one that had developed in France about 1883.
By 1905 Kansas State Agricultural College was sending to western
stockmen each year several hundred thousand doses of a serum made from
the tissue of blackleg victims. The Bureau of Animal Industry even became
involved in financing these early serums, but all proved ineffective. Some
calves lived while others died, and cautious cattlemen often vaccinated several
times and still lost stock. In processing the dead tissue, too much heat killed
the disease-causing germs and rendered the serum impotent, while too little
heat left a serum that killed the animals that were inoculated. A serum that
was consistently strong enough to immunize yet weak enough not to cause
the full effects of the illness remained undeveloped until the second decade
of the twentieth century.
Oliver M. Franklin, a gangling, reticent Oklahoma farm boy who grew
to maturity in Kansas, is usually given credit for developing an effective vaccine. Today his name is used as a hallmark of quality on many veterinary
supplies. First educated at, then employed by, the Kansas college, Franklin
was a young veterinarian when the serum was developed. Credit for this
discovery, however, is due others as well as Franklin. As with most scientific
developments, Franklin 's remarkable breakthrough was based on much work
that had gone before.
Dr. Francis S. Schoenleber, a man of brilliant intellect who came to the
college from Chicago in 1905, established a veterinary curriculum and then
began work to improve the serum that the college was already producing.
Research progressed slowly until 1912 when Schoenleber managed to raise
enough funds, some from other departments, to begin elaborate testing. He
developed what was called a hyperimmune serum. Calves were injected with
virulent blackleg germs; after the calves had produced antibodies, they were
bled. The clear serum was filtered from the blood, and then used to vaccinate
other cattle. The serum was more effective than earlier ones but still provided
only temporary protection. What cattlemen really needed was a single dose
vaccine to give lifetime immunity, or at least one that lasted until young
cattle had passed the most susceptible age.
Thomas P. Haslam also shared in the development of medicines to protect
against blackleg. He and Franklin were among the first veterinarians trained
by Schoenleber at the Kansas school, and both were employed as researchers
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after completing their studies. Haslam worked principally on hog cholera, but
he helped perfect filtering techniques in this country that were being developed
simultaneously by scientists in Europe as well as researchers in Japan.
By the time of World War I the stage was set for Franklin's momentous
breakthrough. Applying the fruits of research by others and discoveries
already made at the college, Franklin perfected and standardized a pure
vaccine that answered the cattlemen's prayers. Fortunately, the expensive
filtering equipment that allowed the immunization properties of the blood
from diseased animals to become part of the vaccine, yet excluded the living
blackleg germ, was imported from Germany shortly before the war. At last,
a one-dose, lifetime-immunity vaccine was available. The serum, which became known as the Kansas Germ-Free Vaccine, spread throughout the nation
once its effectiveness was demonstrated.
Franklin continued to work with blackleg serums, acquiring new information and perfecting the original discoveries. In 1945, the Stockman claimed,
a bit too exclusively for Franklin, that he had developed the "germ-free" liquid
vaccine in 1916, as well as a "blackleg bacterin" in 1923. The journal claimed
further, "History, verified by the U.S. Patent Office and the United States
Courts, allocates to Dr. 0. M. Franklin the distinction of contributing to
mankind the two basic steps that led to the present control of Blackleg in
cattle." 12
Little excitement accompanied the first announcements of Franklin's new
vaccine, but this was understandable. Cattlemen had heard of blackleg cures
before. But with continued testing and Franklin's willingness to treat some
well-known herds, acceptance was hastened. Soon after Franklin perfected
his vaccine he received a frantic call from the Crocker brothers, whose large
purebred herd was losing calves at an unprecedented rate. The herd had been
reasonably clean of blackleg for many years, but somehow the disease had
gotten started and the Crackers were threatened with fin ancial disaster.
Franklin had enough vaccine from a new batch when the plea for help
came, but he had not had time to test its safeness. Undaunted, Franklin
treated 600 of the calves with the untested vaccine. Some anxious moments
followed but none of the calves died, and his success was noted far and wide.
A year or so later, Franklin had the opportunity to break a siege of
blackleg in an Abilene feedlot owned by a Colorado banker-cattleman, Charles
Collins. This time he used safety-tested vaccine. With demonstrations such
as these, along with hundreds of other uses that resulted in no death, or very
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few, orders began to pour into the college so rapidly it was impossible to
fill them.
Companies sprang up in Kansas, first in Wichita and then in a number
of other cities, to produce the long-sought medicine. Franklin immediately
moved into the commercial manufacture and sale of the vaccine, along with
his continued research. He was involved in the Wichita venture, and when
he saved much of the Charles Collins herd, he was able to entice the banker
into the business. Collins invested heavily, building at once a large new plant
in Amarillo, Texas.
Kansas cattlemen were aided by KLA in getting the new vaccine. Within
a year or so of Franklin's disovery, Mercer negotiated a contract for the production and sale of the new vaccine to association members at a figure slightly
above cost. The usual expense of fifty cents a head for immunization was
reasonable for the time, considering the options, but even this price was
reduced later as production techniques grew more efficient.
Before long the amount of blackleg vaccine used exceeded all other cattle
medicines. The federal government helped some individual producers by providing free vaccine, but it was not until the twenties that most cattlemen
accepted the necessity of vaccinating all calves. Widespread use of the serum
helped to eliminate the cattleman's fear that he might "buy a disease" when
he brought in new livestock. Thousands of cattle escaped the scourge, eventually providing more meat for the American table. 13
While scientists at Kansas State worked on a blackleg preventive, Mercer
was confronted with other disease problems. During the fall of 1912 Kansans
experienced, for instance, what was probably the worst epidemic ever to affect
the horse population. It certainly was the most serious situation that Mercer
faced during his first term as sanitary commissioner.
About half the counties in western Kansas were struck at this time by
what was commonly called "horse plague." It was, according to newspaper
accounts, caused by a parasite that invaded the horses digestive system, then
formed "palisade worms" in the animal's artery system. Death usually resulted. The only known cure at the time was the removal of horses from
pastures that were infected and the application of a "laxative of some kind,
say a quart of [ raw linseed] oil and two ounces of turpentine to the dose,
for a few days." Dead horses were burned in an attempt to destroy the
parasite. These fires were so extensive, one paper reported, "the skies of
western Kansas glow at night with the funeral fires of plague-stricken horses."
Towards the end of the plague's visitation, Mercer reported that it had already
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killed over 4,000 horses, valued at close to half a million dollars. Mercer
believed that it was the "most serious situation Kansas had ever faced" up to
that time in the area of livestock diseases. With the onset of cold weather,
the disease subsided and Mercer turned to other problems, although not as
sanitary commissioner. A change in governors brought Sam S. Graybill and
then Taylor Riddle to the post for two years before Mercer returned for his
extended stay in office. 14
Two years after the siege of horse plague, Kansas stockmen were alerted
to another danger. In 1914 the worst outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in
United States history occurred in the Midwest. This scourge, endemic to
Europe and the Orient, was extremely contagious; invariably killed the cattle,
hogs, or sheep that it struck; and had no cure. Preventive measures were
limited to quarantines and the destruction of infected animals. Foot-andmouth had been known in the United States since the 1870s. There had been
small periodic outbreaks, or the mistaken diagnosis of such, several times in
the late nineteenth century. In 1902 and 1908 the disease appeared again, but
in each case it was stamped out with vigorous slaughter campaigns costing
thousands of dollars.
None of these outbreaks in the early 1900s apparently affected Kansas,
but subsequent developments were another story. An epidemic in 1914
started from unknown origins in Michigan, where veterinarians first identified
it as vesicular stomatitis before its true identity became evident. The latter
was a less serious affliction that superficially resembled foot-and-mouth. Hogs
shipped from Michigan apparently carried the infection to the Chicago stockyards, and from there it easily spread to some twenty-two states. About
200,000 animals with a value estimated at $7 million were infected and eventually destroyed. Stockmen, who had to bear most of the cost, were understandably reluctant at times to follow the destruction orders of federal agents.
Before the disease was brought under control, most stock movements in the
Midwest and East had been suspended, and the stockyards in St. Louis and
Chicago were temporarily closed. 15 This foot-:md-mouth epidemic did not
reach Kansas until early the following year, as prompt quarantines by the
sanitary commissioner against inshipped stock from the infected areas delayed
its spread into the state.
On January 27, 1915, the Wichita Eagle carried a warning from Riddle
to the state's stockmen and to the state veterinarian of Missouri that the Kansas
quarantine was being circumvented. Cattle from states that had been infected
the previous year were being sent to market in St. Joseph and Kansas City,
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then reshipped into K ansas as Missouri cattle. Three d ays after Riddle's
warning, his worst fears were confirmed when foot-and-mouth was diagnosed
in Cowley and Sedgwick counties among h igh-g rade dairy cattle that h ad
been imported from Wisconsin, apparently contrary to reg ulations. The
disease was also discovered in Sumner County and among feeder stock in
Butler County, but this appeared to be its limit within the state .
The K ansas legislature immediately appropri ated $10,000 for eradication
work, then later m ade as much as $300,000 ava ilable if it was needed. All
stock movement within the state was suspended except for horses and mules,
which were never affected, and other stock that was moving to m a rket for
immediate slaughter. By Jul y the disease had been eliminated a nd the stock
industry was slowly returning to normal. Over $76,000 was paid in equal parts
by the state and federal governments for the stock that was destroyed, with the
largest single payment of over $32,000 going to Jam es W. T eter, an oilman
and cattle producer from aro und El Dorado. The payments were not full
compensation for econom ic losses but did m ake it possi ble for most of the
affected producers to survive . A few stockmen lost severa l thousand dollars
worth of feed, fo r whi ch there was no compensation, an d m ost incurred
losses from delays in marketing and the temporar y price slumps. 16
This episode in 1915 ended foot-and- mouth in K a nsas, although periodic
threats occurred with a degree of freq uency. One such sca re mate ri alized
near Salina in 1916 when a federal veterinarian erroneously diagnosed footand-mouth among several cars of cattle shipped in from Nebraska. Confusion
abounded, quarantines were issued, and about a hundred cattle were destroyed before the disease was co rrectly identified as vesicular sto matitis. 17
But for the most part, the san itary co mmissioner was spa red the press of
emergencies like the foot-and-mouth alarms. Instead, he spent his time with
more ro utine administrative tasks and the careful scrutiny of less contagious
diseases. An exception was hi s continuous struggle with hog cholera.
The foot-a nd-mouth episode in 1914 and 1915 contributed to the appointment of Mercer as sanitary commi ssioner a second time to replace the ha rassed
T ay lor Riddle. Mercer had served a fo ur-year term earlier during the administrations of Rep ublican Governor Stubbs, but when the D emocrats won the
statehouse with H odges in 1913 Mercer was replaced. Arthur Capper's g ubernatorial success in 1915, as well as the foo t-and-mouth debacle, brought Mercer
back into the commissioner's office, although Governor Cappe r noted that
Riddle had done an adeq uate job. Mercer was reluctant to add any public
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duties to those he was already performing for KLA, but finally accepted at
the insistence of the governor and the state's leading cattlemen.
Mercer remained the commissioner until his death in 1937. This long
tenure, in place of short appointments that tended to change each time a new
governor took office, marked the most significant development in the commissioner's office in over three decades. For several years leading stockmen
in the state had urged acceptance of the idea that livestock health was not a
matter that should be subject to the whims of political appointees. Instead,
they believed, the office should be taken "out of politics," and KLA should
have the responsibility of nominating the person to be appointed by the governor. This plan came to fruition in 1915, when Governor Capper appointed
Mercer, and became state law in 1919, when the legislature required that to
qualify for his appointment the commissioner must have KLA endorsement
and at least ten years of experience producing livestock. 18 As a result, the
state's livestock producers had effective control of this important agency. The
arrangement has continued up to the present day, although the posts of
sanitary commissioner and KLA executive secretary were separated during
the 1960s.

After World War I Mercer directed the Sanitary Commission increasingly
toward the solving of other problems. The depressions and the narrowed
profit margins, if profits existed at all, added urgency to the need to reduce
the cost of disease. The nature of the Kansas industry, with its large inshipment of out-of-state cattle each year, also added burdens to Mercer's willing
shoulders. Interstate movement of stock always increased the chances of
spreading disease, especially if the state and federal agencies were not constantly alert.
Tuberculosis was a killer, as was brucellosis-sometimes called bangs
disease or contagious abortion-and blackleg continued to kill for a few years
after the war. The dreaded foot-and-mouth made no appearance in the state
after the epidemic in 1915, due to the continued vigilance of Mercer and his
immediate embargoes against Texas cattle when the disease appeared there
in 1924 and 1925. 19 Embargoes against other states were never popular but
were necessary for the state's livestock industry.
Blackleg and Texas fever continued to decline after the war; the former
because of the greater acceptance and use of the Kansas blackleg vaccine, and
the latter because the war on the tick was being won. By 1920 stockmen, gov-
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ernment agencies, and several stock associations had exerted efforts that
spanned more than three decades in their attempts to control the tick-induced
Texas fever. Scientific developments spearheaded by the Bureau of Animal
Industry, especially in discovering the cause and method of transmission, as
well as the application of preventive dips, had reduced enormously the losses
due to this disease. Constant vigilance and the various quarantine restrictions
had also helped curtail the tick's movement throughout the West. 20
In addition to improved livestock health and more meat for the consumer,
the scientific work that was done to eradicate stock diseases had other implications for society as well. Some diseases were communicable to humans, and
research on animal diseases sometimes led to breakthroughs in discovering
preventives for diseases that affected people. Work on the tick is a good
example. One historian has even claimed that in some ways the research on
the tick was a great boon to humans. "Teddy Roosevelt," he said, "couldn't
have completed the Panama Canal without it." Apparently, Texas fever was
the first disease caused by a microparasite that was discovered to attack its
victim after being carried by an intermediate host, namely the tick. Scientists
later discovered that ticks and mosquitoes provided the same service to small
organisms, and applied this knowledge toward conquering tropical fevers,
an accomplishment that might have been delayed without the earlier work
of the Bureau of Animal Industry. 21
Although Texas fever was not a serious disease problem in Kansas between
the wars, it did provide KLA and Joe Mercer with one of their proudest
moments and, in the end, one of their best-advertised successes. During the
late summer of 1919 several carloads of Texas cattle had been shipped into
Wabaunsee County after they had been declared free of ticks by federal inspectors at Ft. Worth. In due course, several of the cattle sickened and died
from Texas fever. The disease then spread to other fields. Almost immediately
more than thirty cattlemen demanded nearly $270,000 in federal compensation
on the basis of employee negligence. Mercer, ably assisted at times by John
Hudleston, a member of a long-time ranching family in Pomona, Kansas,
represented in Washington KLA's claim for over a quarter of a million dollars.
Mercer was most effective through the pressure he was able to exert on the
Kansas congressional delegation, and through his repeated testimony before
several committees and the briefs and affidavits he prepared. Finally, after
extensive maneuvering, Congress approved a bill in 1925 which allowed the
claimants to bring suit against the government for negligence. A few months
later a federal court in Kansas City found the claim justified and suggested the
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amount of compensation. The following year, almost seven years after the
cattle were stricken, Congress awarded the thirty-three different claimants a
total of $251,703. The Stockman joyfully announced that it was a "red letter
day for the Kansas Livestock Association."
For its services, KLA received a percent of the claim-reported to be
enough to hnance its activities for 1927-as did a Wichita law hrm, yet enough
money remained to compensate adequately the claimants. After the local
press reported that Mercer had returned from Washington with a quarter of
a million dollars, his Topeka home was burglarized. The family guessed that
the thief believed the payment had been made in cash. 22
Because the tick was now under control, cattlemen became more concerned with other diseases. A relatively new disease, anaplasmosis, became
clinically distinguishable from Texas fever, and it caused some problems in
western states. Kansas had an outbreak of anaplasmosis in 1926, but it was
soon brought under control. Cattle mange was a problem in the state during
the early 1920s, especially in the western part, where quarantines and much
dipping were necessary. Efforts of the sanitary commissioner and the local
stockmen eventually curtailed the disease, but it was never completedly eliminated.23
The most costly diseases for cattlemen after Texas fever and blackleg
declined, however, were tuberculosis and brucellosis. Eradication of both of
these began with dairy stockmen, then spread slowly to purebred and range
producers. Tuberculosis received attention fost because of its greater incidence and the potential for humans to contract this cattle malady, although
the human and bovine strains are different. Serious tuberculosis eradication
efforts began with a joint federal-state program in 1917, but it was not until
the 1920s that Kansas and many other states began extensive efforts. Once
testing and slaughter had established that less than half of 1 percent of its
stock were infected, a county was given a "modifled free" rating. Early in the
twenties Kansas efforts were hampered by small appropriations to match the
available federal funds, as well as by the complicated and troublesome testing
procedures.
Many range producers resisted testing efforts until they realized that
cattle from modified free areas tended to sell better than those from unaccredited counties. By 1930 about half the counties in the state had been declared
free of tuberculosis; then, with the slaughter of many diseased animals in
1934, the whole state was listed as free in 1935. Kansas was the nineteenth
state, Mercer proudly announced, to be so honored. By 1940 the whole nation
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as well as Puerto Rico was declared to have less than half of 1 percent of
its cattle infected with tuberculosis, down from a figure of over 4 percent
in 1922. Federal and state governments had spent over $310 million in this
cooperative effort, while cattlemen, it was estimated, saved over $150 million
a year as a result. 24
Serious efforts at controlling brucellosis were not begun until the 1930s.
Then, with a more effective vaccine that was developed by USDA scientists
and with the opportunity to slaughter large numbers of diseased stock because of the drought, dedicated attention was given to this costly disease,
especially in dairy herds. In 1934 it was estimated that 11.5 percent of all
the cattle in the country were infected, but after a decade of eradication work
the figure was reduced to 2.4 percent. By this time, most of the diseased stock
were range cattle; thus these stockmen became more concerned with vaccinations . Brucellosis was not completely eliminated, however. Even on the basis
of the relatively low percentage of cases that existed during the middle 1950s
it was estimated that the disease still cost producers $45 million annually. 25

By World War II notable progress had been made in the area of cattle health.
Texas fever, blackleg, tuberculosis, scabies, and foot-and-mouth, for example,
had all been eliminated or drastically curtailed. Despite the notable efforts of
this period, however, various parasites, brucellosis, anthrax, and shipping fever
still affiicted cattle; but even in these areas progress was being made. How
much money disease control saved cattlemen or returned to them in augmented
profits is impossible to determine, but it certainly amounted to many millions
of dollars. This was an important consideration when market prices were
usually low. The health of humans was also improved. In Kansas the movements to improve and protect animal health were led by Mercer and the
commission that he headed. This agency was effective and surprisingly free
of controversy. Much of the commission's work frequently was done in conj unction with federal money and personnel, and this assistance represented
no small contribution to the state's livestock industry. 26
Mercer, the orphaned schoolteacher from Virginia, was the engine in the
machine that made things happen in the Kansas beef industry. His work
with KLA and with the Sanitary Commission was significant and fruitful,
but controlling diseases and cutting losses from them were not the only areas
to attract his attention or that of the state's cattlemen as a whole. Once producers had cut to the quick their home production costs, the only other way to
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raise profits was to reduce marketing expenses. This they attempted to do
by working for better rates from the railroads.
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David and Goliath in Kansas:
Cattlemen and Railroads, 1900-1920

Cattlemen, when their stock was ready for market, encountered large corporate interests-first the railroads, then the stockyards and packers. Cattlemen
in the early part of the twentieth century were necessarily dependent on the
rail lines, just as they had been during the nineteenth. Driving their cattle
to market, of course, was no longer possible, and only during the war years
did trucks begin to provide an alternative to rail transport. Even then, only
a few stockmen chose this method. Consequently, most producers found the
railroads essential, and their only recourse was to change or modify those
railroad policies that they disapproved of.
Most of the disputes between shippers and transportation lines that had
surfaced during the closing years of the nineteenth century continued into
the early twentieth. As far as cattlemen were concerned, forestalling higher
shipping rates was by far the most important concern in their dealings with
rail lines. After an increase in rates during the early years of the new century,
stockmen were genera lly successful in maintaining stable tariffs until the
government took over the lines toward the end of the war.
Kansas cattlemen continued to employ several techniques in their dealings
with rail lines. Approaches by individuals and small groups were made, the
young KLA became active at times, and the established state agencies that
were charged with regulating the carriers were frequently ca lled upon to
represent the shipping interests. Regulatory measures at both the national
and state levels, which were in part stimulated by the Progressive movement,
also affected the relationship of cattlemen and railroads during this period.
The new regulations, much to the cattlemen's delight, were all designed to
limit what stockmen believed to be the arbitrary power of the carriers. Several
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of the state's cattlemen fig ured prominently in getting legislation th at was
designed to curtail rail road power.

As the Populist element in K ansas politics faded during the early twenti eth
century, a new progressive g roup took up the banner of reform. Operating
within the Republ ican P arty-a party that had been domin ated by co nservative
fac tions that fed, to some extent, on slush fund s provided by the offices of
the state's treasurer and printer- the refo rm politicians were led by such men
as W alter R. Stubbs, Victor Murdock, Edwa rd W . H och, a nd William Allen
White. These reformers engaged in " boss-busting," fo rced several realig nments in political circles, controlled the legislature and the gove rnorship at
times, and were responsible fo r some sig nificant legislation affecting the shippers' continuing fight with the railro::ids.1
W alter R. Stubbs, the fightin g Qu::iker contractor fro m L awrence, was
p::i rti cul arl y sig nificant in this progress ive m ovem ent. After almost a decade
of lead ing the refo rm group in the K ansas ho use, where he demon strated
repeatedl y that he was skilled in po litical m aneuvering, Stubbs won the
g ubernatori al race in 1908. H e se rved two co nsec utive terms as governor, then
lost his bid fo r ::i Un ited States Se nate seat in 1912. A nother d rive fo r the
same office was turned back in 1920, as we re g ubernatori::i l attempts a few
years late r. Stubbs was ::ilso a stock man, acti ve in KLA ::i nd other stock
associations fo r m any years, but he is m ost remembered fo r his political
acti vities.
Stubbs was one of th e most colorful politician-cattlem en the state h as
ever had. Bo rn in 1858, the second son in a brood of twelve ch ildren, Stubbs
moved with his fa mil y to ::i small Quak er communi ty near L awre nce shortly
after the Civil Wa r. There the yo u ng, frec kle-faced Stubbs, not "a bit handsome" by some accou nts, bega n hi s m eteoric rise to fort une. Displaying g reat
energy and enthusi::is m, he ::idvanced fro m selling hedge plants to tr::i ding
horses and eve ntuall y to fa rm ing. H e was not yet twenty years old w hen he
bought a grai n binde r a nd bega n custom harvesting, so m etimes working fa r
into the night with another person carr ying a lantern ahead of his rig .
During the 1890s, Stubbs developed a commi ssa ry ca r business to service
co nstruction workers who labored on ca nals and rai lroads. Fro m thi s he
moved easily into railroad co nstr uct ion. H e also wo n con tracts to build canals
and to construct the Republic Steel and Iro n mills in Chi cago and two additional stories to the M arsh::ill Field & Co. w holesale house in the sam e city.
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By the time he entered Kansas politics and turned his financial interests more
toward farming and ranching, he was already a rich man. That fortune,
incidentally, was wiped out in the postwar depression.
Stubbs was an imposing figure, six feet tall and two hundred pounds of
dynamic energy, with a mop of unkempt reddish-blond hair that looked as if
it was seldom touched by a barber. His speeches were often as entertaining
as they were informative. Beginning with the unfashionable broad-brimmed
hat of Quaker tradition, Stubbs discarded articles of clothing as fast as he sent
barbs toward his political opponents. Continually speaking on the evils of
big business and political influence, he sometimes punctuated his addresses by
dispensing with his handkerchief, peeling off his coat, and throwing away
his shirt cuffs and vest, all timed and calculated to emphasize a particular
point. Finally, amid shouts of approval from his audience, Stubbs rolled up
his sleeves and revealed a red woolen undershirt, a mark of his humble
beginnings. The crowd loved the speaker's showmanship, if not always the
substance of the speech.
Like many progressives of his day, Stubbs was not an advocate of equal
rights for women. "No women stenographers for Governor-Elect Stubbs," a
Topeka paper reported. "Their place is at home making salt-rising bread."
The governor, it was said, "won't have 'em." Although women were the
foundation of the family and the country, Stubbs believed, their support should
be rooted in the home.~
Stubbs and his progressive associates committed their maximum effort
to reducing the influence of railroads on Kansas politics, which would be to
the advantage, they felt, of the state's shippers. During the nineteenth century,
declared the anti-Populist William Allen White, the railroads had meddled in
the state's political affairs in order to "defend their own interests against
unscrupulous demagogues." White generally blessed the railroads' efforts at
this time, although not all agreed with his analysis. It was true, however,
that the railroads' interest in politics was visible well before 1900. When the
influence persisted into the next century, a reconstructed White and a number
of other state leaders who had opposed populism found the situation intolerable.
The Union Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and Rock Island railroads were most
active in political circles, according to White, while the Santa Fe was usually
exonerated of any serious transgressions. Free passes were considered the
railroads' major source of influence, a favor that was used to pressure both
the delegates to conventions and the members of the state legislature. Influence
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over legislators, it was said, enabled the railroads to "steal taxes [and] continue the inequalities and injustices of rates." Railroads also attempted to
influence the choice of judges, United States senators, and members of state
regulatory agencies. In short, railway lobbyists were a dominant force at this
time in the Grand Old Party in Kansas.3
Cattlemen, like the railroads, also worked to influence the state legislature, but their power was small compared to that of the roads. As a result,
stockmen wanted stronger railroad laws and a direct primary in order to
reduce the power the roads had in state nominating conventions. Two Flint
Hills cattlemen, along with Stubbs, were as effective as any in pushing the
legislature along these lines. George Plumb and C. A. Stannard, respectively
the secretary of KLA and the owner of Sunny Slope farm, were both elected
to the legislature in 1904 and continued to represent the stock interests in one
capacity or another for several years. Joe Mercer and John A. Edwards, both
of whom served about the same time, were also influential stockmen-legislators.4
State railroad legislation in Kansas during the early 1900s roughly paralleled the Elkins, Hepburn, and Mann-Elkins Acts at the federal level, all of
which were designed to end rebates, regulate freight and passenger rates, and
increase the powers of the regulatory agencies. The first Kansas legislature
of the new century faced immediately the task of establishing a new regulatory
agency, since the state supreme court had declared the Court of Visitation
unconstitutional the previous year. They responded by recreating the old
Kansas Board of Railroad Commissioners with powers to supervise service
and to investigate and fix rates subject to judicial review. The new law provided that an executive council of the legislature, rather than the governor,
should designate the three commissioners. In general, the board was somewhat stronger than its nineteenth-century counterpart, but it still remained
inadequate from the shippers' point of view. They wanted the board to have
enforceable rate-making powers, and they demanded the right to elect the
commissioners at large. 5
In 1903 the legislature again attacked unsuccessfully the rate-making
powers of the board, but did establish the popular election of the commissioners. The latter provision was important to stockmen. It led to the election
of James W. Robison, president of KLA, to the board in 1905, establishing
a precedent regarding representation that cattlemen were inclined to press in
subsequent years. 6
The progressive 1907 legislature, dominated in large part by Stubbs,
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accomplished more toward diminishing railroad influence in the state than
did any other session during the early years of the twentieth century. Among
other things, the legislature provided a fine of $100 a day for any railroad in
violation of maximum rates set by the board. More importantly, it established
a bill to limit passes and set in motion the move toward two cents per mile
passenger fares. George Plumb, along with Stubbs, deserved much credit
for the lower fares. 7
Though rate setting by the board remained a nebulous power, the antipass
bill was a major step toward reducing the railroads' use of passes for political
purposes. When the prohibition against passes was linked to the law requiring
a general primary in Kansas, which Stubbs and the progressives forced through
a 1908 special session, White commented, a bit prematurely, that "the oligarchy
of politics-like the lords and nobles of feudal times-is passing away under
the enlightenment of the people." He also noted that "with the passing of
the primary law the title to the governor, to the congressmen and to the two
United States senators, passed from the railroads to the people of Kansas
forever." 8 The state legislature in enacting these laws had, in effect, legislated
practically the whole Populist program that was so much scorned during the
1890s.
Despite White's early optimism, opinion was divided on the effectiveness
of the new regulations. When George Plumb ran successfully for a place on
the Kansas Board of Railroad Commissioners, the Emporia editor noted that
this agency, "if a good one, can perhaps do more for Kansas than any member
of congress or the governor. If a bad board, it can certainly do more harm."
A letter to the Gazette and several complaints by shippers to Stubbs while he
was governor indicated that supervision of the railroads left much to be
desired. 9
Most difficult was the setting of freight rates, because there was no basis
from which to work. In the case of litigation over rates, the courts generally
sided with the roads. Shippers agreed that rates should provide a fair return
on the actual investment of the railroads, but no one knew exactly how much
capital investment was involved. Just prior to World War I the Interstate
Commerce Commission was directed to assess the true value of railroad
property, but due to the war and the complicated nature of the question, no
system of equitable rates based on capital investment resulted from the work
of the ICC. 10
Federal and state legislation by World War I had made some progress in
regulating the carriers, but problems remained. The railways' political in-
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fluence in Kansas had been curtailed somewhat. General fregiht rates had not
advanced significantly but neither had they been reduced, as most shippers
demanded. It may be that added expenses for the railroads justified their
refusal to reduce rates. State taxes across the nation per mile of rail line,
for example, increased 140 percent between 1900 and 1916, and the total number of workers went up by 50 percent. On the other hand, increased expenses
did not mean that the railroads were going broke. The Santa Fe claimed in
its annual reports that total taxes advanced roughly parallel to net income
during the period and that total expenses, including taxes, rose only from
63 to 66 percent of revenue. Net corporate income for the period more than
tripled from $11.0 million in 1900 to $38.1 million in 1916.11
The state regulatory agency had also been strengthened during this
period. In fact, when the Public Utilities Commission was created in 1911
to replace the old Board of Railroad Commissioners, state supervision was
extended to include stockyards and commission merchants. Rapidly, and
often at the urging of railroads, however, the ICC was usurping many of the
activities of state agencies that related to freight tariffs, even in relation to
intrastate rates. This tendency became more pronounced after World War I. 12

In addition to the general leglislation affecting railroads that cattlemen and
most other shippers called for during the early 1900s, cattlemen continued to
battle the roads on other levels. They occasionally used KLA as a tool for
prying concessions from the lines, but for the most part the association remained relatively inactive until a real or supposed crisis sparked new interest.
This was true until its reorganization in 1913. No record, for example, was
discovered of any KLA gathering for the period between the third meeting
in 1899 and a Wichita convention of stockmen in September, 1903. But a
crisis that developed in 1903 brought the association to life temporarily and
sent stockmen scurrying across the state.
Under the sensational headline "Raise in Tariff Means Ruin of Cattle
Business," the Topeka Daily Capital for August 26, 1903, announced new
rates that were scheduled to take effect September 1, and reported that many
cattlemen were in the capital to protest them. Among those present were
sixty members of KLA, with more expected momentarily. George Plumb,
still secretary of the association, had initiated a hearing before the railroad
commissioners by filing a complaint against the railroads operating in Kansas.
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Plumb's action was necessary because the commissioners could act only after
there were formal complaints. 13
Balie Waggener, a Missouri Pacilc attorney, took the lead in presenting
the railroads' case. He first argued that the board had no jurisdiction because
it had been constituted to review existing rates, not those merely proposed.
In addition, he suggested that there was a critical question of whether interstate or intrastate commerce was involved because the Kansas City stockyards
and the railroads' business offices were on both sides of the Kansas-Missouri
line. After the board rejected Waggener's jurisdictional argument, the railroads' attorneys attempted to justify the rate increase on the basis of the roads'
failure to show a profit on stock shipments. The greater chances for costly
injuries, the fact that stock cars deadheaded 60 percent of the time, and the
increased cost of labor were cited as reasons why stock shipments were not
profitable when compared to other freight.
There may have been some justification in the position that stock shipments failed to show as much profit as other freight. Three years after this
particular struggle, the Gazette, praising the effectiveness of KLA but without
providing statistical support, noted that "to this association the shippers of the
state are indebted for the rates on live stock. They are much lower than on
any other commodity in the state and are due to the work of the Live Stock
Association." 14 The railroads claimed that the rates proposed for 1903 tended
to equalize the freight charges on cattle with those on lumber and wheat
and, in a larger sense, that the new schedule put Kansas rates on a par with
those in surrounding states. In retrospect the latter of the dual claims was
hardest for the rail lines to justify. Tariff schedules were infrequently published in the board's reports, even though a provision by the 1905 legislature
required the roads to submit them; but a study published in 1906 placed
Kansas rates consistently above the average tariffs in surrounding states, and
Texas, Iowa, and Illinois. Kansas rates beat the average somewhere between
.03 cents per hundredweight for a 350-mile haul and 3.12 cents on a 200-mile
carry. 15
Cattlemen, on the other hand, argued that they could not afford to pay
higher rates and that the poor service did not merit an increase. A decline of
$2 per hundredweight in cattle prices and rising feed costs were cited in support of the cattlemen's claim of impoverishment. They also pointed out that
a raise was unwarranted in view of the added efficiency and the larger carrying
trade of the lines. Some purebred stock breeders were also upset with the new
rate schedules. They often shipped in small quantities; but due to the rail147
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roads' determination of what constituted a full or partial load, they had to
pay what they felt were exceedingly high tariffs. One said that rates were
the largest obstacle in his fine stock business.
Cattlemen talked of several alternatives during the several days that the
Topeka meeting continued. Some suggested driving cattle to market, while
others favored a cooperatively financed packing house that would raise cattle
prices to a point where the producer could afford higher rates. There were
for the cattleman, however, few alternatives. He could either win the rate
case, or, losing this, adjust his operation, possibly by going out of business. 16
The hearing was continuing into its second day when suddenly the railroads withdrew their proposed increase. "The giant Goliath on one side,"
the September 11, 1903, Topeka Daily Capital noted, "and the youthful David
with his sling shot on the other" had fought each other and David had
won again .
Various explanations were given for the railroads' abrupt decision to
withdraw their proposed schedule. Balie Waggener boasted that he had
persuaded the lines to withdraw in order to preserve the Kansas cattle industry.
The board suggested that the railroads' realization that they had provided
poor service, due to the heavy rains and floods during the spring of 1903, was
the reason. The Topeka paper implied that the threatened enactment of a
Kansas law, similar to the Texas requirement that the roads pay $500 for each
day they were in violation of a directive from the railroad commissioner,
encouraged the lines to stop their attempt to raise rates. Mercer was probably
closest to the truth, however, when he suggested that "David's victory" was
something less than the honored Biblical triumph. Writing some ten years
after the 1903 dispute, Mercer noted that the cattlemen and the railroads had
struck a bargain. The lines would maintain the 1903 level of rates, according
to the agreement, if cattlemen ceased agitation to return to the old carload
system of charging freight rates that had been eliminated a couple of years
before.
Several references were made to a contract that was negotiated between
cattlemen and railroads about this time-probably the result of the bargain
that Mercer noted-but an extensive search of available records failed to
produce a copy. The casual references that were encountered implied that
shipping rates, the permanent abandonment of the carload system, and several
other requirements affecting railway service to stockmen were part of the
contractual obligations. This agreement lasted, according to Mercer, well into
the second decade of the twentieth century. 17
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The struggle in 1903 over rates was larger than the borders of Kansas,
encompassing the whole range country and several stock associations in Texas
and the Southwest. The incident was also a factor in coalescing several dissident elements into a stronger national association. "Judge" Sam H. Cowan,
long-time legal representative of the Cattle Raisers Association of Texas, the
national associations, and sometimes KLA, led the cattle interests in this
instance on the national level. He was ably assisted by such men as the
Scottish manager of the Matador Land and Cattle Company, Murdo Mackenzie, who was later instrumental in turning control of the national association
back to the producers. These two men, along with Mercer and several others,
trekked to Washington to petition lawmakers for federal relief from the
dominance of railroads. Cowan, it was said, eventually helped write the main
provisions of the 1906 Hepburn Act, which grew, in part, from the attempt of
the roads to raise livestock shipping rates in 1903.
The Hepburn Act, with its provisions that allowed the ICC to set "just
and reasonable maximum rates," upon the complaint of a shipper, was a mild
victory for stockmen. The American National and the Texas associations
filed more than a dozen complaints with ICC within a decade after the passage of the Hepburn Act. However, a provision for broad judicial review of
ICC actions, the requirement that complaints had to be originated by shippers,
and the failure of the law to modify the railways' power to classify freight
modified the stockmen's victory. The triumph in 1903 over increased rates
may have been greater than the Hepburn victory, as it demonstrated again
that cooperation on the state and national levels in organized protests was
one of the cattlemen's most effective weapons. 18
After 1903, Kansas cattlemen were not generally aroused over rail tariffs
until the roads proposed a general increase of both inter- and intrastate rates
in 1910. This stability in tariffs was one reason that KLA was largely inactive
during the 1903 to 1910 period. During that time only one meeting of KLAan Emporia gathering in 1906 devoted to recommending "reasonable, equitable
and non-discriminatory freight rates"-was held. In 1910 another KLA convention was held in the same town. By 1910, Robison had died and Plumb
had resigned in hopes of obtaining a seat on the Board of Railroad Commissioners. An Osage City stockman, H. B. Miller, became the second
president of the organization, and Mercer began his twenty-seven years as
secretary.
The real purpose of the Emporia meeting in 1910 was to prepare for a
conference of shipping and commercial interests called by Governor Stubbs.
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Over 150 delegates representing states from the Great Lakes to the Rocky
Mountains were invited to Topeka for the purpose of petitioning ICC to
refuse the advance in rates proposed by the railroads. Addresses by the
Kansas governor and by Murdo Mackenzie outlined the shippers' favorite
arguments. Their lengthy speeches said, in effect, that railroads, in view of
their present high profits, did not deserve higher rates, and that about 30
percent of a steer's value was already invested in transportation costs by the
time it was carried from the Southwest to Kansas, then to a midwestern
feedlot, and eventually to market. Legislation requiring a physical evaluation
of railroad property was also urged. After extensive hearings and innumerable
petitions from groups like the one Governor Stubbs had organized, ICC
refused most of the railroads' requests, keeping the record of success for western cattlemen in this area almost unblemished for the early years of the new
century .19
According to some railroad historians, the roads by 1910 deserved higher
tariffs. In the face of numerous shippers' associations, like KLA, general
frei g ht rates had remained essentially at the seventy-five cents per ton mile
level since 1897. Not until 1913 did the ICC allow a "modest 5 percent advance" in all freight rates. This record of stability in rates prior to 1918
compared quite favorably, from the shippers' standpoint, with the massive
28 percent increase that William G. McAdoo instituted in 1918 while the
government controlled the roads.~ 0
On the other side, there was also merit in the argument of cattlemen and
other shippers that greater efficiency and a rise in business guaranteed railroads a reasonable profit even though operating costs had increased and rates
had remained the same. An investigation of western railroads in 1914, for
example, revealed that the returns on the "book cost" of the roads-which
no one outside the industry knew for sure-fell somewhere between 4.9 and
5.6 percent. Net returns, according to the study, were sufficient to cover
interest charges and operating expenses and still pay dividends on capital
stock ranging from 10.4 percent in 1911 to 7.0 percent in 1914.21 Nor did
the stability of rates as a whole necessarily compensate shippers for short-haul
and freight classification inequities that were continued by the lines. An
adequate physical evaluation of the railroads and more restriction on classification practices may have helped the contending interests decide the rate
issues fairly, but this was not available at the time.
Cattlemen had other complaints during the early years of the twentieth
century. Some objected to dirty stock cars, inadequate loading facilities, and
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a shortage of cars. The Gazette, ironically at the same time that there were
complaints of high freight rates, noted that stockmen "will 'tip' the trainmen
as high as $10 a car for unordered stock cars" when there was a pressing
need. Cattlemen were also critical of delays in service, and some advocated
repeal of the federal law that required detraining for feed and rest after
twenty-eight hours. 22 Although there were other complaints, nothing equaled
the cattlemen's concern over stock tariffs; and, to their credit, they had much
success during the years before the First World War in blocking higher rates.
Freight rates and the general relationship of the cattle industry to transportation continued to be important for stockmen and the activities of KLA
throughout World War I. Tariffs by 1914 had remained at much the same
level for over a decade, except for the modest 5 percent increase in 1913. The
lines, of course, continued to be interested in changing this situation. In
1914 cattle-shipping rates in Kansas varied from 24.5 cents per hundred pounds
for 450 miles to 7.5 cents for a 50-mile trip. This represented an average of
$58.80 per car for the longer and $18.00 for the shorter haul. Rates for shipping hogs from various points in Kansas were consistently 2 to 4.5 cents per
hundred pounds higher than cattle rates, and sometimes amounted to as
much as $10.00 a car more. The additional charges for hogs resulted not
from any additional weight but rather from the larger amount of work
required for handling more animals per carload of stock, and because the
traffic would bear additional charges. Hog producers were never as well
organized as cattlemen. 23
On at least two occasions between 1914 and 1917-when the government
assumed control of the nation's rail lines-the roads attempted to raise the
published tariffs on livestock. Partly as a result of organized lobbying before
the Kansas Public Utilities Commission and ICC, stockmen defeated these
increases. Despite this, railroads continued to show large profits even though
expenses had gone up. Cattlemen claimed repeatedly throughout the war
and during the early 1920s, with little dissent from the rail lines, that the
period before the war was one of the most profitable in railroad history. Santa
Fe, for instance, reported a $15.8 million increase in net corporate income
between 1914 and 1917, or a rise of 71 percent. During the same period,
however, the carrying trade for all the western lines rose by only 41 percent.
The Santa Fe example may not be typical of all western railroads, but it does
suggest that roads did not suffer a decline in profits at least for the first few
years of the war. 24
There was, then, some justification for the cattlemen's insistence that
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tariffs remam unchanged, and for the most part they were successful until
after the government assumed control of the lines. There were significant
increases after that.
Railroads, however, could raise charges for shipping stock without changing the published schedules, if they chose to do so. Livestock tariffs were
based to a slight extent on the estimated value of the stock that was carried.
By enhancing the estimated value of stock, rates were automatically increased.
Cattlemen agreed to this sliding scale for tariffs-actually they probably demanded it-and it became a provision of the elusive uniform contract. Cattlemen agreed to this provision because their reimbursement for stock that died
in transit was also based on the estimated value. While a higher evaluation
raised rates, it also increased the amount that the lines paid for dead stock.
Before the general rise in cattle prices at the beginning of the war, each head
of mature cattle was valued at $50.00. With the rise in prices, this figure rose
to $75.00. At the time, Mercer told Kansas cattlemen that "under present
conditions, a steer valued at $75.00 is shipped under the uniform freight rate
now in existence, but if valued over $75.00, the carriers have a right, under
the Interstate Commerce order [ of August, 1915], to increase their rate 2
per cent on each 50 per cent increase in valuation, or fraction thereof."
Mercer claimed that the sliding scale was costing some cattlemen as much
as $8.00 a car more than the published rates, but it is doubtful that many
shippers were actually affected. Most apparently allowed their stock to be
moved at the estimated value of $75.00 rather than increase it to a level more
representative of actual value. Shippers then enjoyed the standard rate but
suffered a loss above $75.00 on any dead stock. The gamble usually paid.
After experiencing this sliding tariff in conj unction with rather sharp
fluctuations in cattle prices, stockmen began advocating that the estimated
value clause be eliminated from the contract, a provision they were successful
in getting in 1917. From then on shippers paid only the published rates,
and payments for dead stock were related more to the actual rather than the
estimated value. These new provisions probably did not apply to purebred
cattle, which were usually shipped under special conditions. 25
Another way that railroads might increase shipping charges was through
the mutually beneficial practice of disinfecting stock cars after each use. This
practice was required by a new federal regulation that came about the time
the European war began, and was, no doubt, caused in part by the foot-andmouth epidemics that had occurred. The lines asked the shippers to pay disinfecting charges of $2.50 a car and $4.00 for double-decked cars, in addition
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to the regular tariffs. When the announcement was made, Mercer asked the
Public Utilities Commission to stay this railroad order on intrastate shipments,
and he urged the American National to petition ICC for the same privilege
on interstate traffic. Cattlemen were not so much opposed to helping defray
the cost of disinfecting-they realized that it was primarily for their benefitas they were to the level of the charges. They felt that disinfecting could be
done more cheaply, and wanted a delay to allow time for an investigation.
The railroads finally agreed to a six-month trial period so that actual costs
might be assessed, but there was no evidence that Kansas cattlemen were ever
successful in getting the charges reduced or that they continued their fight
for very long. After Mercer's brief encounter with the roads in 1915, the
state's stockmen were content to allow the American National to continue
the battle on the disinfecting issue. 26
The question of free transportation for shippers who accompanied their
stock to market was also an issue at this time, and had been a periodic source
of disagreement for a long time. Cattlemen claimed that it was not only a
well-established tradition but also a requirement of state law that the lines
provide free transport for the owner of stock or for his representative. Large
shippers rarely had any problems in extracting transportation from the lines,
but the various state agencies charged with regulating lines were continually
besieged with complaints from small shippers who felt that they were not
receiving adequate service. The issue became more complex in 1907, when
the legislature enacted an antipass law. Cattlemen favored the antipass restriction, and had helped get it established, but they were careful to see that
the provision did not exclude their right to free transportation. The accommodations for these free rides were also subject to regulation. Each caboose
attached to a stock train, for example, was "to be equipped with seats and
water-closets, and suitable drinking water necessary to accommodate the
number of stockmen properly on such train." Noncompliance with these
stipulations was to result in a $20 per day fine for the road. Cattlemen viewed
any refusal by the rail lines to provide attendants with transport or adequate
facilities as a mere subterfuge for increasing profits.
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the railroads usually
accommodated shippers accompanying their cattle, although small shippers
still occasionally found it difficult to obtain free transport both to and from
the destination of their stock. Generally the lines did not balk at carrying one
attendant for each two to five cars of stock or up to three men as the number
of carloads for one shipper increased. What the railroads did justifiably object
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to was the inordinately large number of "floaters" who inhabited the cabooses,
claiming to be caretakers but actually having little or no official relationship
to any stock being carried. A representative of the railroads told the 1916
KLA convention that cattlemen were largely responsible for the floaters and
that some drastic action might soon be taken. The situation was especially
taxing on the lines' facilities during the busy shipping seasons.
The dispute was finally settled towards the end of the war, at least for
a time, by including in the uniform shippers' contract guaranteed transit privileges that were acceptable to both the shippers and the carriers. A limited
number of attendants were assured of transport, but only bona fide owners
of stock and their employees qualified. 27
Mercer and KLA again represented Kansas stockmen in this negotiated
settlement with the railroads, but KLA was not the only organization that
the state's stockmen depended upon during this period. In 1915 a group of
Kansas cattlemen met in Chicago with other stockmen from across the nation
to form the National Livestock Shippers' Protective League. The purpose of
this new organization was to coordinate and extend the activities of state and
local associations in the area of freight rates, or, in short, to frustrate any
increase in interstate livestock tariffs. The league obtained the necessary
finances for its operation by assessing each carload of stock five cents, a fee
that was collected by the commission firms at the central markets. It was a
voluntary payment, however; and, though local associations urged shippers
to contribute, there was often a deficiency of funds.
The league functioned for over seven years, but its success is difficult to
assess. There were several notable rate increases after 1918; yet, Mercer-the
league's president for a few years-wrote in the late twenties that it had been
notably successful. 28 In any event, the league offered stockmen another avenue
for organized response to real or imagined injustices on the part of railroads.
To some degree it also overshadowed for a time KLA's work in rate disputes,
especially in the area of interstate rates.

The more or less unblemished record of western stockmen in preventing
major increases in livestock tariffs was spoiled soon after the federal government assumed control of the rail lines in December, 1917. There had been
much speculation early in the war as to what would happen to the railroads
in the event that the United States became more actively involved. Even
before President Woodrow Wilson sent his war message to Congress, the
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increased traffic was becoming difficult for the roads to handle. The lines
had tried voluntary cooperation; but with the large increase in freight and
a degree of labor unrest, it became impossible to coordinate the schedules of
the many individual lines. Delays and monumental traffic jams resulted,
while snow and freezing weather towards the end of 1917 aggravated the
difficulties.
Wilson's solution was probably necessary and inevitable in view of the
circumstances. Under the provisions of the Federal Railroad Control Act,
the president established the United States Railway Administration for the
purpose of assuming control of the nation's rail lines. The administration
was also given absolute rate-making powers. William G. McAdoo, Wilson's
overworked and much-harassed secretary of the Treasury Department, was
appointed director general of the new government agency. These new duties,
not slight by any means, were in addition to those McAdoo continued for a
time to have in the Treasury Department. Under the provisions of the government takeover, all antitrust and pooling restrictions were suspended, and
the lines were guaranteed an annual profit equal to an average of what they
had earned between 1915 and 1917, plus government-financed repairs and
improvements. The railroads preferred to eliminate 1915 from consideration
of average income, as it was a relatively unprofitable year, but there were no
complaints about the last two years, as they had been very rewarding.
One of the first actions taken by McAdoo that affected the vital interests
of stockmen was a 25 percent across-the-board increase in freight rates, something the rail lines had been attempting-with only limited success-for almost
two decades. All special tariffs, such as the feed-in-transit rates, were eliminated, and passenger fares were returned to 3 cents a mile. On stock shipments the increase was 25 percent on all existing rates below 28 cents per
hundred pounds-this included most points in Kansas, Colorado, and Oklahoma-and a flat 7 cent increase on all rates that were at the time above 28
cents a hundred. In Kansas this amounted to a raise from 24.5 to 30.5 cents
per hundred-or from $58.80 to $73.20 per carload-for a 450-mile haul, and
from 7.5 to 9.5 cents per hundred-$18.00 to $22.00 per car-for a 50-mile run.
Tariffs for hog shipments also went up and were usually $8.00 to $12.00 per
car more than those on cattle.
The government apparently felt that the war-induced inflation and the
generally increased operating costs justified the new schedules. The most
convincing argument, however, was the rise in the cost of labor. The Adamson Act had already pushed up labor costs, then the railway administration
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increased wages again shortly after the takeover. By 1918 total wages for
railway employees were more than 40 percent above what they had been only
a few years before.
KLA and the American National, as well as several other associations,
protested the new tariffs, maintaining that the railroads were already producing a fair return on the invested capital and that a 5 percent raise would
have been adequate for the additional labor expenses. Some stockmen even
advocated government subsidies for the lines rather than higher rates. But,
in all, there was surprisingly little objection to the government's action either
in assuming control of the lines or setting the new rates. There was probably
more protest in Kansas over a proposal that former governor Stubbs had
made only three years before in an article published in the Saturday Evening
Post than there was over Wilson's action. Stubbs had proposed that the government take over the railroads and operate them as a public utility-in short,
much the same thing that happened in 1917.
Comparatively little opposition from stockmen resulted from Wilson's
action, and, indeed, circumstances had changed considerably between the time
of the Stubbs proposal and that of the Wilson takeover. The declaration of
war was, of course, the major difference; and this was bolstered by an unprecedented propaganda campaign to persuade Americans to support the war
effort. Stock prices were also up, which made it at least appear that cattlemen
could afford higher rates; and, most importantly, stockmen knew that they
had little recourse but to accept the governmental fiat. Many cattlemen were
also ready for government control of the industry that they had been confronting for several decades; at least this seemed to be the implication of the Stubbs
article. Only after a couple of years of experimenting did the cattlemen decide
that they preferred private control of the railroads.
Government involvement with the rail lines during World War I ultimately resulted in more centralization of regulatory powers in the federal
government in this area as well as in most other sectors of the economy. State
agencies were not as yet ready to admit this, but it became increasingly clear
during the early 1920s. Government control, according to the Kansas Public
Utilities Commission, lost sight of the agricultural shipper; rates were up and
service was down. This no doubt contributed much to the tendency of stockmen to become very critical of government-controlled railroads during the
postwar depression. For the nation as a whole, however, many felt that the
takeover was successful. It ended car shortages for the most part, and suplied much of the coordination that was necessary in a time of crisis.20
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While cattlemen continued to combat the railroads during the war, the amount
of energy they expended was decidedly on the wane. Regulation, from the
ICC down to the various state agencies, had become more effective, but more
important in the cattlemen's case was the fact that livestock rates did not
change significantly for more than a decade. Stability of rates induced a
calmer relationship between stockmen and railroad men. When stockmen
were hit with a substantial rise in rates toward the end of the war, the circumstances that usually stimulated shipper opposition to rising tariffs had
changed, and there was little they could have done to prevent the advance
in any event. Some unrest among shippers reappeared around 1920, but even
then it was not as intense as it had been in earlier decades. The tendency to
get along with transportation lines during these first two decades of the new
century did not mean, however, that producers were becoming more satisfied
with the big businesses with which they came into contact. Much of the
antagonism that cattlemen had formerly reserved for rail lines was transferred
to the large meat-packers. While processors had never been exempt from
producer criticism, they began to feel its full force during the early decades
of the twentieth century, especially after the beginning of the war in Europe.
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8
Monopoly and Confusion:
Stockyards and Packers, 1900-1920

Farmers and ranchers spent the years prior to 1914 ra1s111g production to fill
the demands of consumers. But thereafter, production generally moved
ahead of the growth in urbanization and total population, and only the accelerated demands of the First World War prevented the build-up of surpluses
and a drastic downturn in agricultural prices. Instead, prices moved upward
and production was stimulated to even greater heights. The scarcity of shipping facilities and the relatively short trip across the Atlantic favored the
United States, which, for example, temporarily displaced Argentina as the
principal supplier of British beef.
Agricultural producers were generally satisfied with their economic situation throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century. There were,
of course, short periods of unrest, but it was not until around 1916 that large
numbers of producers became unhappy. This disaffection grew as the war
came to a close, and took a sharp upturn during the immediate postwar years .
Basic to the discontent among farmers and ranchers after 1916 were a
number of factors beyond anyone's control. Drought and black rust invaded
the wheat fields. More importantly, production and living costs rose even
faster than the prices ranchers and farmers received for what they so ld, a
situation which was at least partly caused by the European conflict. But
agricultural producers often did not blame the abnormal conditions of the
war, the droughts, or the diseased crops and stock, but rather the marketing
system. The increasing complexity of the general economy, the impact of
droughts and disease, and the effects of the war on production costs and
market prices were not fully understood by farmers and ranchers, while
marketing, they felt, was something they did understand. Because farmers
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and ranchers frequently used marketing agencies, they believed that profits
would be enhanced if inequities perpetrated by the businessmen engaged in
the marketing process were corrected. Many of their complaints about marketing practices were well founded.
Dissatisfaction with an inadequate marketing system, which had been
part of the agrarian scene for several decades, reached a climax about the time
the United States declared war on Germany. Increasing demand and rising
prices for livestock-prerequisites that would guarantee larger profits, stockmen believed-failed to deliver what cattlemen expected. Something must be
out-of-joint, producers reasoned. Adjustments were needed somewhere, and
the marketing process seemed the best place to begin. Stockmen had support
from other quarters, too. Arthur Capper, for instance, as governor and then
as United States senator, crisscrossed the state deploring what he considered
to be an antiquated and unfair system for the marketing of livestock. This
unrest among producers and their representatives brought several investigations of both the stockyard and packing interests, culminating toward the
end of the war with an extensive probe by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) into the operations of the packing industry. Packers were most frequently held responsible for marketing problems and generally received the
brunt of the stockmen's disaffection; but other middlemen, such as stockyard
operators and commission men, were also held accountable. Government
regulation, first at the state and then at the national level, proved the most
effective means of improving the situation, but stockmen experimented with
other options before demanding government help. In general, the lion's share
of the ill will that farmers and ranchers had formerly rese rved for railroads
gradually shifted to packing houses and stockyards.

Kansas City, the western stockman's gateway to the East, continued to develop as an important central market, receiving far more than half of its
receipts from points west of the yards. The number of cattle and calves
marketed in Kansas City, though reflecting the cyclic fluctuations described
earlier, varied for most of the period between two and three million head.
The yards' specialization in the stocker and feeder trade continued, with
almost half of the cattle received leaving the market for additional growing.
The physical facilities of the Kansas City yards were expanded and improved during the early 1900s. Hampered somewhat by the great flood in
1903 and a smaller one five years later, the Kansas City yards acquired more
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land and built additional pens and a new Exchange Building, which served
as the nerve center for all business transacted in the yards as well as for
many of the affairs conducted in relation to the whole western industry. The
new structure, as it was slowly pushed some eleven stories above the surrounding yards, became the source of much pride. When it was completed
in 1911 it was advertised as the largest livestock exchange building in the
world. By 1920 the yards covered an area of over two hundred acres. 1
Kansas stockmen, particularly cattlemen, were not completely happy
with the Kansas City yards, however, and demanded that the state's lawmakers correct some of the inequities that they experienced. In 1907 the
Kansas legislature bowed to the cattle interests by initiating the first investigation of the yards in over a decade. The 1907 inquiry, moreover, had the
advantages of precedents set during the nineteenth century, when stockmen
had also turned to the government for help in redressing their grievances
against stockyards, just as they had done in their battles with railroads.
In an investigation in 1895, for example, the "bewhiskered Kansas Legislature" had been concerned with what cattlemen considered to be excessive
yardage fees. As a result, Kansas lawmakers forced a reduction in maximum
charges for cattle from twenty-five to fifteen cents per head. The reduced
rate, however, proved worthless to shippers, as the stockyards company merely
built quarantine quarters for the inspection of cattle suspected of having or
carrying Texas fever and required that most cattle be inspected, adding for
this service a charge of ten cents a head to the maximum allowed by the
Kansas law. Two years later another investigation resulted in a Kansas
statute-comparable to one passed by the Missouri legislature-allowing the
owner to sell dead stock to whichever rendering company he chose, and
providing for a 30 percent reduction in feed and yardage charges.
Stockmen calculated that reduced feed charges would save Kansas shippers $350,000 a year, but their hopes were thwarted again. A year after
passage of the 1897 law the Emporia Gazette reported that "the farmers of
Kansas haven't got a dollar out of the stock yards legislation, and what's more
they never will get a dollar." The stockyards company contested the law in
the courts for several years and, in the meantime, operated outside its requirements. Eventually, the state tired of the legal battle and the yards continued
to operate virtually unrestricted.2
Prompted by generally depressed cattle prices-much like the condition
that had existed during the middle 1890s-and by continued protests from
stockmen, the Kansas legislature looked into the Kansas City yards again in
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Kansas City stockyards. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.

1907. This time, one of the state's leading cattlemen, John A. Edwards,
was in charge of the investigative team. George Plumb and state senator
H. B. Miller, the second president of KLA, were also members of the fiveman group that again cooperated with a similar Missouri committee.
The final report to the Kansas legislature by the Edwards committee
failed to reveal the sources for the information it contained, but it was
apparent that both stockyards personnel and commission men had testified
and that there must have been some access to the company's records. If accurate, the report revealed several interesting facets of the Kansas City business.
In 1898, according to Edwards' report, the stockyards company had escaped
the full weight of the 1897 regulation by reorganizing as a Missouri company.
This maneuver placed the company outside Kansas jurisdiction, or at least
made the state's power questionable. In addition, the newly organized Missouri company removed itself further from Kansas' scrutiny by not obtaining
a license to do business in the state and by neglecting to file annual reports
with the attorney general. Edwards strongly recommended that the Kansas
attorney general continue the investigation that his committee had initiated,
with forced licensing in view.
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The investigative team also disapproved of what they considered high
yardage charges-as high as $8 for some carloads of stock-and the inadequacy
of weighing facilities. The principal complaint, however, dealt with the
prices that shippers paid for the feed their stock consumed in the yards.
"Millions of dollars have been stolen-literally stolen from the farmers of
Kansas, and have gone into this corporation whose stockholders and managers are doubtless church-going Christians," according to the Emporia Gazette,
and the Edwards report substantiated much of the claim. It noted that
shippers were habitually given short weight and charged high prices for feed.
Since 1900, for example, shippers had paid $175,000 for 10,000 tons of hay
that they never received, and the company sold about 7,000 tons more than
they purchased from their suppliers. To correct this situation, the report
suggested fines be levied for not delivering full weight when selling feed.
The stockyards company defended its various price levels on the basis
that they were necessary to guarantee a reasonable profit on the capital
invested; but Edwards' report also disputed this claim, especially for the period
of the yard's existence prior to 1900. For the twenty-six years before 1900,
according to the study, the company paid an "average of 32½ per cent annually
in cash dividends to stockholders and 34½ per cent in stock and real estate
dividends to stockholders" each year. For the period between 1904 and 1907
a comparatively slight 9 percent a year was cited as the dividend on the
companys $9 million capitalization. The committee failed to account for the
wide divergence in profits between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Increased operating costs as well as the inadequacy of the records supplied
by the company were possible explanations. The company was also accused
of avoiding legitimate taxation by paying property taxes on only about 16
percent of its valuation. Neither the high profits nor the avoidance of taxes,
however, encouraged the committee to recommend any specific measures to
correct the abuses. It could have been argued that licensing the company
might be expected to correct the tax situation, and that the comparatively low
profits during the few years prior to the investigation suggested that the fees
of the yards were appropriate. 3
The only tangible result of Edwards' investigation was a resolution by
the Kansas lawmakers to the effect that "the legislature of the state of Missouri
be requested to unite with the legislature of the state of Kansas in the passage
of a uniform law governing stock-yards." However, no progress was made
in this area throughout the next decade, although an open letter to both the
Kansas and Missouri legislatures in 1909 called again for regulation that might
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"bring to justice that corporation which has practiced extortion and robbed
the livestock shippers and dealers of the West for the past thirty years." The
author of the letter had been the company's "Feed Master" for several years
but had lost his position, he claimed, because he had "made an honest effort
to give full weight, and measure . .. and had not been a party to the crime
of stealing nearly $30,000 from the patrons of the yards." The legislatures,
though, were unmoved by either this letter-which appeared to be largely a
personal vendetta against the president of the stockyards company, G. F. Morse
-or the complaints of shippers. The jurisdictional problem and the difficulty
of coordinating the laws of two states were major obstacles to regulation.
Around 1911, the stockyards company did admit that it was subject in some
instances to the regulations of the Kansas Public Utilities Commission; but
only generalities and vague references to "reasonable and just rates" emanated
from the commission. Stricter regulations of stockyards had to await the
federal regulation that came after World War 1.4
Kansas cattlemen and the state regulatory commission did, however, get
involved in a struggle between the yards and the railroads that began around
1912. As the confrontation also involved the packing interests, a discussion
of this industry is in order before treating the three-cornered dispute of 1912.

Between 1880 and 1920 the large packing companies acquired heavy financial
interests in the stockyards at most central markets. Cattlemen, for the most
part, only guessed at this relationship until the FTC investigation in 1917
made it abundantly clear. Had the cattlemen been certain that the buyers of
their stock also controlled most of the yards and that this relationship led to
collusion on prices, their interest in legislation to control the consolidations
in the meat trade would have become acute much sooner.
The packers' principal entree into stockyard ownership before 1900 had come
from being offered a financial interest in yards as an incentive for locating a
meat-processing plant in the vicinity. The original developers of the yardsoften the railroads-gradually gave way and the packers became the dominant
influence. This occurred in Kansas City to a slight extent during the early
1890s, when Armour was given a half-million-dollar stock bonus for locating
a plant there. After 1900, however, several new yards were begun in or
around the beef-producing area almost wholly with packer money. 5
The effects on producers of packer-controlled stockyards, according to
the FTC study, were entirely bad. Though facilities were sometimes ex164
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panded, they were usually inadequate for the natural growth in receipts and
were habitually understaffed. Exorbitant charges for yardage and feed resulted, and deficient weighing facilities abounded. Most harmful to the
producers, however, was probably the "extreme and unwarranted fluctuation
in the daily prices paid for live stock," a condition that was attributed to the
packing interests. A commission man from the Wichita market revealed to ,
FTC one method that he believed packers used to force prices down. Cudahy
and the much smaller Dold concern divided most of the receipts, and they
might refuse to buy anything if not given first choice. 6 Commission men
felt that competition was subtly being eliminated and prices lowered by such
threats.
In Wichita it was about 1906 before a major packing concern gained an
interest in the yards. At this time a contract was negotiated between the
Wichita Stock Yards Company and Cudahy that gave the latter a sixth of
the $700,000 worth of capital stock in exchange for a guarantee that the plant
would continue to operate in Wichita for at least ten years and continue to
buy all the livestock necessary for the local plant from the Wichita yards.
Over the next few years the capitalization of the yards was increased, and
each time Cudahy's portion was augmented. By 1917 the packing company
admitted ownership of over a third of the $1.4 million worth of stock. Cudahy
did not, however, use its interest to drive out all the small, independent
packers from the Wichita area. Jacob Dold continued to operate under a
contract with the yards similar to that of Cudahy. This became the basis for
the FTC assertion that these two packers· agreed to divide most of the receipts,
with the subsequent possibility of the price fixing that was described above. 7
In Kansas City control of 67 percent of the Boston-owned stockyards plant
passed to Edward Morris around 1912. This large packer gained control of
the $8.2 million company through a complicated plan that involved reincorporating the firm in the state of Maine, a $2 million increase in capitalization,
and his purchase of much of the company's voting stock. The remaining four
large packers in the Kansas City area owned a total of only 5.6 percent of the
voting stock in the reorganized company. 8
Complaints of stockmen over the charges and service of the Kansas City
yards increased about the time Morris initiated his move to take control of
the yards, but so did efforts to improve facilities. Better weighing, yarding,
and unloading equipment, however, precipitated the involved dispute between
the stockyards company and the rail lines that was noted earlier.
In its simplest form the dispute centered on the yards' desire to construct
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a few miles of what they called a terminal or connecting rail line in addition
to new unloading docks. The railroads opposed entry of the yards into what
they considered to be "their business," while the yards refused to allow the
rail lines to construct facilities on stockyards' property. After much debate,
the Kansas Public Utilities Commission landed in the middle of the controversy, as did several of the state's cattlemen. The fact that the allegiance of
stockmen was divided on this issue was instrumental in developing a stronger
livestock association that could speak with a unanimous voice on issues such
as this. The fact that the Kansas City yards were spread over an area served
by two different state governments and the fact that the Missouri Public
Service Commission had fewer qualms than its Kansas counterpart about issuing
a charter for a terminal rail line allowed the stockyards company to maneuver
a victory. After obtaining permission in 1915, the stockyards company purchased more land in Missouri and built a connecting line wholly within that
state.
By 1917, the yards claimed, all the improvements demanded by cattlemen
had been completed without additional freight rates or handling charges to
antagonize the shippers. And this claim was generally true; most shippers,
though they continued to complain about high yardage fees, found that the
new facilities did provide better service. After the war the state of Kansas
again attempted to regulate the Kansas City yards, but this effort failed too.
The yards came under effective regulation only when the federal government
took up the task in the Packers and Stockyards Act. 9

Monopoly and meat packing, in the minds of many producers, were hand
and glove, and this belief helped stimulate inquiries into the packing industry
much like those related to stockyards. By the time of the First World War,
when the FTC conducted its extensive and significant investigation, there had
already been two federal examinations, several more by individual states, and
a judicial ruling that had exonerated the packers of any wrongdoing. Ironically, while Kansas cattlemen expressed much concern over the prices that
packers paid for stock, they apparently concerned themselves little, if at all,
with working conditions and wages in the large packing plants. By the early
1900s the deplorable conditions had been well advertised in such books as
Tlie f ungle, but Kansas stock men failed to admit publicly that they were
aware of the situation.
The first public investigation of the packing industry had occurred during
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the late 1880s when five United States senators-from Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, and Illinois-spent two years scrutinizing the activities of
Swift, Armour, Morris, and Hammond. Their report, published in 1890 and
called the Vest Committee Report after the Missouri senator who chaired the
inquiry, concluded that there was "collusion with regard to the fixing of prices
and the division of territory and business." The packers, however, admitted
to no price fixing, claiming that they set only the wholesale price of dressed
beef. Depressed prices for livestock, they said, were the result of overproduction. Though producers were not convinced by the claims of unrestricted
competition in the marketplace, the committee's work resulted in no corrective
legislation except insofar as it contributed to the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 10
Neither this investigation, the Sherman Act, nor the possibility of other ·
federal legislation retarded the packers' tendency to combine their operations.
Three years after these four large companies were investigated, they joined
with Cudahy to form what came to be known as the Veeder Pool. It took ,
its name from Swift attorney Henry Veeder, who functioned as secretary and
statistician at regular Tuesday afternoon meetings of the members. Representatives at these weekly meetings apparently assigned beef-purchasing territories and apportioned to each participant quotas for the movement of dressed
meat into consumer channels. The pool operated from 1893 until 1902, except
for a couple of years, enlarging its membership in 1897 by adding the firm of
Schwarzchild & Sulzberger. Producers only guessed at the pool's existence,
and even a federal grand jury that was convened in 1895 failed to bring any
indictments against the large packers for violations of the Sherman Act.
Later, when the activities of the pool became generally known, the packers
claimed that its effects had not been harmful to the producer but rather beneficial in that the demand for beef at the central markets had been greatly
stabilized.11
The Veeder Pool was abandoned in 1902 when the Department of Justice
asked for an injunction against the large packers for violating the Sherman
Act. Armour, Swift, and Morris then attempted a gigantic merger, before
forming a holding company known as the National Packing Company. Proportionate to their assets, the parent companies purchased stock in the holding
company and divided the cost of absorbing smaller independent packers. At
weekly board meetings, consisting of representatives of only the three large
companies, officials decided upon the prices to be paid in the central markets
and established buying and distributing quotas. This holding company, which
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proved to be a highly effective and profitable arrangement, was terminated
in 1912 only in the face of a government threat to initiate a civil suit.
Relatively low prices were the producers' lot when most of the receipts
at the central markets were divided according to a prearranged plan among
two or more large packers. With this situation in mind, the FTC Report
concluded that market prices tended to be "the lowest price which will keep
the producers raising cattle, hogs, and sheep and sending them to the stockyard."12
The discontent among producers during the early 1900s was often reflected, and at times even stimulated, by journals and newspapers. The
Topeka Daily Capital, for instance, charged in 1903 that the high price of
dressed beef showed "how well in hand the beef trust has the market and
incidentally how remorseless this trust is in squeezing both consumer and
producer." The stockyards and packing house combination, the paper said,
"gets its rake-off at both ends and has pretty well milked the cattle industry
dry .. . . That it fixes prices now and holds the market in the hollow of its
hand nobody will dispute."
In western Kansas some of the newspapers were singing much the same
song. "What has happened to the price of meat under the manipulation of
the Chicago combine?" one small community paper asked. The price of meat,
it responded to its own question, has doubled and "cattle on the western
plains must sell at starvation prices, and every eater of meat must pay
monopoly prices to enable the few men who make up these six companies to
pile up money by the billion." While assessing the conditions of the beef
industry at this time, the Gazette added that the Kansas farmer was "on the
grouch" and that it was up to packers and railroads to "jolly him into a cattle
growing humor."
Efforts to eliminate the controlled prices in the central markets stimulated
talk of a cattlemen-owned packing plant. On the whole, however, this proposal was na"ive, failing to account for most of the intricacies of the packing
industry, especially the necessity of an efficient system of national distribution.
Slaughter of the animals by packing plants was only the first step in putting
large quantities of meat into consumer channels. Many cattlemen must have
also understood this, as little more than talk ever came from the proposals
to establish a packing house. Instead, the producer and consumer combined
to demand another government investigation of the industry, a demand that
was met in 1904.13
Encouraged by protests over livestock and dressed-meat prices and by
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some early muckraking attacks on the industry, President Theodore Roosevelt
ordered James R. Garfield, commissioner of corporations and son of the
former president, to investigate the meat trust to see if it was the cause of
the violent price fluctuations. Garfield's 1905 report astounded cattlemen,
angered consumers, and confused the muckraking press. The six largest
packers, the report said, accounted for 97.7 percent of the beef cattle killed
at the principal western slaughtering points but only about 45 percent of the
total number of cattle butchered. This, it implied, was not nearly enough to
establish a monopoly. In addition, the high beef prices were caused by the ·
short supply, as the packers' average price for dressed beef was lower than
what they paid for livestock. Their small profit margin-amounting to an
average of eighty-two cents per head or a mere 2 percent on sales-came from
by-products. This report, according to Rudolph A. Clemen, an employee of
the packing industry, produced facts that were of "such comprehensive and
voluminous form that any intelligent person who examined the material could
not question their authenticity or their representative character." 14
Many, however, did question the report, and Garfield was roundly criticized in beef-raising areas. One local newspaper in Kansas was astonished to
learn that "the beef trust is a benevolent sort of thing and for years has been
buying steers and slaughtering them at a profit of less than 2 per cent ...
and part of the time at a loss." The Kansas City (Mo.) / ournal published
several long articles based on research by Cuthbert Powell, its commerce
editor. Powell claimed that he had made as detailed an investigation of the
local situation as was possible without complete access to the packers' booksa deficiency, he suggested, that also existed for Garfield.
The large meat-packers, Powell claimed, controlled the industry through
a "community of interests system" that included their control of all leading
stockyards in the West, except those in Kansas City and Chicago; their
controlling influence in many of the stockmen's banking facilities; their
control of refrigerated cars and distribution systems; and, finally, their collusion through holding companies and pooling agreements. Powell did not
necessarily dispute the packers' claim of making only 2 percent on their
dressed-meat sales but claimed that this was an inappropriate figure to consider. Compared to the eighty-two cents per head profit claimed in the
Garfield document, Powell found a net gain that approached twelve dollars
per head when by-products were included, and a profit of 43 percent on
capitalization when refrigerated car and stockyard profits were considered.
Garfield had been "humbugged," and his report was being "laughed at [and]
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ridiculed," Powell believed, as the packers could shift money around in various
departments and grow rich while showing a loss on butchering. 15
Although they did not accept the Garfield report, cattlemen were hesitant to call for any federal legislation. Many did, however, call for yet another
investigation. The Kansas legislature, with a number of cattlemen-legislators
participating, urged the president to throw the Garfield statement away and
begin a real investigation. Although this was not to be for over a decade,
federal action against the packing industry did not terminate with Garfield's
work. The government brought suit against Swift and ten other packers in
1911 for alleged antitrust violations. A jury trial exonerated the accused. The
action did, however, appear to initiate the demise of the National Packing
Company, whose combined assets, including the several small packing concerns that had been absorbed, were now sold to Swift, Armour, and Morris.
The "real" investigation and the meaningful legislation, which cattlemen
failed to call for at this time, did not come until after 1917.
Thus, during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century the
large packing interests continued the concerted actions that they had begun
during the previous century. These moves toward association within the
packing industry had much in common with those occurring in other industries except for one significant difference. In many industries, such as the
railroads, consolidation and the subsequent elimination of much competition
was motivated by defensive considerations-the industry was not able to
cope with severe competition. In the packing industry, consolidation was not
so much a defensive as an offensive action, a means of increasing already
substantial profits. Largely as a result, the few large packing families built
in a short period of time an amazing system for processing and distributing
the nation's meat supply. The extensive reinvestment of what cattlemen considered to be excessive profits accounted for much of this expansion. Growth
occurred, however, at the expense of many small packers, who were not privy
to the councils of the large packers, and at the expense of the nation's
livestock producers, who believed that they received lower prices and poorer
service when the small packers were driven out of the field. By the early
years of the twentieth century, packers were so entrenched that they could
demand special favors from railways, stockyards, and sometime even the
cities in which they operated. Cattlemen and other livestock producers often
suffered from these special privileges. They had little voice in the deals made
among cities, stockyards, and packers; yet they received lower prices and
poorer service as a result. Producers might have spared themselves some
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anguish had they demanded and received more government intervention at
an earlier date, but nineteenth-century myths about the nature of the cattlemen and the prevailing convictions on the role of government forestalled
the demand for legislation until after the war.

Farmers and ranchers reacted to the large packers as well as to the marketing
process as a whole in a variety of ways during the first two decades of the
new century, but most frequently they opted for joint efforts through an
organization. The relatively slow growth in Kansas of the new agrarian
organizations-the American Society of Equity, the Nonpartisan League, and
the Farmer's Union, for example-and the dearth of cattlemen in the ranks
of those organizations that did exist left many of the state's stockmen little
recourse but to rely upon the older organizations for any collective action
that they might desire. 16 For cattlemen this meant that KLA remained the
principal instrument for attempting changes in the marketing situation. After
steady growth since its reorganization, KLA was in a position to help improve conditions. Its efforts during the war years became increasingly significant.
Displeasure with marketing conditions, for example, dominated the 1916
KLA convention almost to the exclusion of other considerations. This particular meeting also provided a good example of the cattlemen's temper after
the prosperity of the early war years began to wear thin. At the time, though,
other factors were also affecting stockmen, making the time ripe for "war
on the packers," as it was called.
The American National's meeting in El Paso a few weeks earlier had
initiated this recent explosion of discontent with the marketing system by
venting many of the stockmen's complaints. The American National appointed a committee to investigate marketing conditions and called on Congress to remedy all abuses. Then, just a few days before KLA's meeting,
Congressman Borland of Missouri introduced into Congress a strong resolution designed to force the FTC and the Justice Department to move against
the packing industry.
With these previous developments in mind, Kansas stockmen journeyed
to their annual meeting. As a result, the 1916 convention in Wichita was
more turbulent than any other gathering of the state's stockmen. The convention was described at the time as one of the largest meetings of cattlemen
ever held in the United States-larger, it was said, than the American Na171
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tional's gathering the month before. It was estimated that almost four
thousand "rank and file" cattlemen attended the three-day affair held in the
spacious Eaton Hotel.
The convention began on a relatively calm note with an address by H. J.
Waters, president of Kansas State Agricultural College, in which he expressed his ideas about the benefits of eating meat. The college president
deplored the government's campaign to cut high food costs during the war
by decreasing meat consumption. "Meat makes brawn, a healthy body and
a fertile mind," he told the convention. Americans eat more meat than any
people in the world, Waters continued, and it "makes a dominant race ...
[ and] when we advocate economy on the meat bill, we are striking at the
very thing that makes American people the greatest dominant race in the
World." Cattlemen applauded the allusions to the "barbaric Hun" and the
concept of the superiority of the American people. Similar sentiments later
became popular themes in efforts to increase meat consumption.
Governor Capper followed Waters to the stand, presenting the convention
with more germane issues. His speech directed attention toward the packing
industry for the remainder of the meeting. "There is not the slightest doubt
in my mind," Capper announced in an often repeated speech, "that the live
stock markets are systematically controlled by factors other than supply and
demand .... When the profit in feeding steers is so painfully absent, as it
has been in the last year, when we have raids on the hog market as we had
last fall, it is plain ... that there are abnormal forces controlling the price
of farm products, and I believe that powerful interest to be the big packing
houses." The governor urged, among other things, expansion of cooperative
marketing and a thorough investigation of marketing conditions by the federal government.
Cattlemen awoke the next morning to read in the Wichita Eagle that
"Kansas feeders, breeders, ranchers ... say packing houses are cornering all
the profits," and that there was a "conspiracy" of middlemen to rob the
producer. Several of the speakers for the second day continued to heap abuse
upon the packers, one claiming that profits had doubled for the meat processors
the last few years while feeders were losing money. George E. Tucker, KLA
vice-president and editor of the Eureka Herald, added to the general accusations by charging that the Kansas City packers controlled the market newspapers to the disadvantage of the producer and suggested that KLA establish
its own market information service.
Not all the sentiment, however, was antipacker; a couple of speakers
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defended the industry. The president of the 'Wichita Cattle Loan Company,
for example, cautiously suggested that it was not the railroads, banks, or
packers that were adversely affecting the beef industry but rather the practice
of keeping cattle too long before marketing them, thus increasing the cost
of production. J. C. Swift, commission man with the Kansas City Live Stock
Exchange, also defended the meat processors and the independence of the
market news agencies in Kansas City. What the Kansas association needed
more than its own newspaper, he said cryptically, was "a Moses to lay down
new laws, a Jefferson to write a new declaration of independence, and an
Abraham Lincoln to write a new emancipation proclamation." While cattlemen scratched their heads at this puzzling statement, Swift continued that it
was extremely unfair to criticize the packers without giving them an opportunity to speak.
The prevailing sentiment, however, was against the packers. As the
Eagle reported the next day, "cattlemen were standing up in the aisles ...
cheering themselves hoarse over speeches denouncing the [ marketing] system."
Willis L. "Iron Jaw" Brown, a stockman and former Populist editor from
Kingman, brought the row with the meat processors to a climax by demanding in no uncertain terms that federal authorities investigate the industry
immediately. Brown, also a progressive legislator, introduced a resolution that
strongly supported Congressman Borland's attempts to force action against
the packers for alleged antitrust violations. Brown's resolution received much
vocal support, but before a vote could be taken another faction introduced a
resolution that simply called on the packers to divest themselves of ownership
and management of the central stockyards.
The debate over the two resolutions was loud and disorganized. Finally,
President Tod suggested that both resolutions be sent to a committee for
further study. Brown, who insisted on "action not words," was persuaded
to accept this compromise, but shouted that if the "resolution don't come out
of that committee room by noon tomorrow, the hair is going to fly in this
convention." At this point Edwin Morris- grandson of the late Nelson
Morris, the packer-brought the delegates to their feet by racing down the
aisle of the hall demanding to be heard. By this time, however, it was late
in the afternoon, and the packers' side of the dispute was delayed until the
following day. Cattlemen imbibed satisfaction with their steak and ale that
night, confident that they had won the day.
J. A. McNaughton, a representative of Cudahy, was the principal spokesman for the packers the next day. Somewhat illogically and apologetically,
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he arg ued that the packers had m ade thei r fo rtu nes during the "good old
days." N ow, because of growing specializatio n, the ri sing cost of li ve ani mals,
and shorte r hours and higher labor expe nses, packers we re m aking little
profit o n dressed meat, and were able to stay in bu siness o nly because they
had a fa ir margin on by-products.
McN aughton used the exa m ple of a thousa nd-pound steer, shipped three
hundred miles to a central market, to illustrate his point. In this case, he
said, the rail line received over $2.50 for transporting the anim al, the speculato r
who fin anced the buying and selli ng 25 ce nts, and the commi ssion fir m about
60 cents . The poor packer, mea nwhile, w ho did all the processing a nd distributing, received less tha n a dollar.
The packers also invited a rep resentative gro up of stockmen to examine
their books in an effort to qui et charges of excessive profits. A n investigatio n
of the books of K ansas City packers by the state's cattlemen was planned and
possibly even attempted, but no report of their findings ever surfaced. But
even if an investigation did occur, the time and the acco unting expertise that
wo uld have been necessa ry fo r an accurate evalu ation were probabl y beyond
the capabili ties of most cattlemen .17
H ow influen tial K ansas cattlemen at the exciting W ichita convention were
in persuadi ng President Wi lso n to order the FTC investiga tion of packers is
difficu lt to assess . They claimed to have had a g reat deal of influence and even
in sisted that it was KLA officers who ini tiated the ca ll fo r fed eral acti on
within the American N ational. On the other hand, anti packer sentiment was
common th ro ughout the beef states, and a large number of p roduce rs were
dem anding some kind of government action. The packers' opposition to an
in vestigation by either the F T C or the Justice D ep artment indicated their fea r
of resolutions like that of KLA . Preside nt Wilson, with all the publicity on
the subj ect th at was avai lable, must have been aw are of the unrest that ex isted
in stock-prod ucing circles, but it is do ubtful whether he reali zed th at som e
stock inte rests were in favo r not onl y of raising their profi ts by red ucing those
of the packers but also of forc ing federa l regulation of the w hole m arketing
system . Stockmen's com plain ts, incl ud ing the emotional outbursts of the
K ansas p roducers in 1916, probably did h ave an effect o n the pres ident, but
the fin al decision fo r a thoro ugh in vesti gati o n ca me out of circumstances that
were much broader tha n th e unrest among stockmen. P roducers of almost a ll
foo d prod ucts we re dema nd ing a hearing, a nd co nsumers-sp ur red by a 46
percent increase in food prices between Jul y, 1916, and April, 1917-were also
cl amoring fo r the president's ea r. Something must be done, these groups
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claimed, about the atrocious actions of the "food gamblers," who were causing
high prices and reaping all the profits from food production.
Wilson found himself on the horns of a dilemma. He sympathized with
producers and consumers, as well as with the charge that food speculators,
including packers, caused much unrest. On the other hand, he hesitated to
take any action that might impair food production and shipment to the Allies
or thrust the government into the position of setting food prices. The importance of the 1916 presidential election was also on his mind.
In the end, Wilson delayed action until after the election and then ordered
an investigation. The Borland resolution was still alive throughout most of
1916, but it was eventually killed when Congress refused to appropriate adequate funds. The way was thus cleared for new action. In December, 1916,
the president announced that the Justice Department would begin an investigation of the food trades, but before any of the work began Congress passed
a bill that transferred the investigation from the Justice Department to FTC.
The food processors actually favored the transfer to FTC-and were instrumental in getting it-but had the packers been given a choice, they would
rather have had the USDA in charge, as the latter did not have the authority
to subpoena certain records. Wilson ref used to support the transfer until
convinced that it would not impair food production or shipment overseas.
On February 7, 1917-four days after the United States severed diplomatic
relations with Germany, and a full year after the tumultuous KLA convention
in Whicita-Wilson approved th e transfer. Five months later, funds were
appropriated and FTC began its work, the results of which were published
in five parts from 1918 to 1920. 18
The FTC Report on the packing industry provided a more complete body
of information on profits and the various other activities of the large packers
than had any of the previous inquiries. Three commissioners-including the
former progressive congressman and Wichita newspaperman Victor Murdock
-and a host of field representatives launched an extensive investigation of
Armour, Swift, Morris, Wilson, and Cudahy. These men analyzed hundreds
of documents from packer files, over nine thousand pages of sworn testimony,
and thousands of pages of field reports before compiling their final report.
Many obstacles were encountered. The packers had business interests in fields
where the commission's "inquisitorial powers" were limited and some preliminary evidence was unreliable due to deceptive methods of bookkeeping.
The packers, according to the report, also falsified records and coached employees in the proper responses to the investigators' questions. But even with

175

The Kansas Beef Industry

these handicaps, the commission claimed that the extensiveness of the investigation and the careful sifting and piecing together of the available evidence
rendered an accurate report, marred only by its tendency to understate the
actual situation. 19
Most producers agreed wholeheartedly with the findings of the commission, as it confirmed many things they already believed. The packers, on the
other hand, denied not so much the raw data but rather the conclusions that
FTC deduced from the vast number of facts. Historians seem to be in general
agreement that most of the factual information was accurate, although Rudolf A. Clemen, who published a major work on the meat-packing industry
a few years after the conclusion of the FTC investigation, defended the packers. But Clemen's research, and possibly even his manuscript, was well under
way before FTC began its work. Clemen has taught economics and history
at Northwestern University and, at the time his book was published, was on
the editorial staff of The National Provisioner, the trade journal of the packing
industry. 20
The Big Five, according to the FTC, held such a dominant place in the
meat industry "that they control at will the market in which they buy their
supplies, the market in which they sell their products, and hold the fortunes
of their competitors in their hands." In the dressed-meat business alone the
five large packers killed "70 per cent of the live stock slaughtered by alt
packers and butchers engaged in interstate commerce." By way of comparison,
only one independent packer in the United States slaughtered over 1 percent
of the beef, and only nine independents slaughterd as much as 1 percent of
the pork that moved into interstate commerce. The Big Five's control of
by-products was even greater than that of fresh and preserved meats, as many
of the smaller packers were unable to utilize the by-products from slaughter
and thus destroyed or sold them to the larger packing interests.
The packers in question denied that they controlled the dressed-beef
trade to the extent that was implied by the FTC. Instead, they made a concerted attempt to convince the public that their portion of slaughter did not
"exceed one-third of the total meat production of the United States." This
was pretty much the same argument that big packers had used during the
Garfield investigation in the early 1900s. According to the method they used
to compile their figures, it may have been true. The Big Five omitted from
their slaughter figures all the animals killed by their affiliated companies, yet
they included all the stock still butchered on farms for home consumption
in their tabulation of the nation's total slaughter. By figuring one-third of
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the total slaughter on this basis, the FTC countered, "monopoly could not be
considered to exist in the meat industry, even if every pound of meat consumed
in towns and cities were handled by a single company, so long as farmers
continued to kill their own hogs and cows." 21 The FTC might also have
pointed out that the relatively large percentage of stock still slaughtered on
the farm did little to change the situation of the commercial stock producer,
who still had to sell on the market to relatively few buyers.
Nor was the Big Five influence limited to the domestic stock trade or
just to meat processing and distribution; according to FTC, they also had
large interests in foreign slaughtering plants and in the distribution of almost
all foods. The large American packers, for instance, owned or controlled
more than half of the meat exported from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay,
and also had large investments in other countries having surplus meat. "Under
present shipping conditions," FTC noted, "the big American packers control
more than half of the meat upon which the allies are dependent." The Big
Five also handled more than half of all the interstate commerce in cheese,
poultry, and eggs, and about a third of all cottonseed oil. In addition they
had rapidly growing interests in the distribution of canned fruits and vegetables.22
The principal method, according to FTC, by which this small group of
packers gained and increased their monopolistic domination of the food business was through their control of the distribution system. The instruments of
control in this area included ownership of 91 percent of the refrigerated cars
in use, as well as immense holdings of cold storage plants and branch houses
used in wholesale distribution.
In addition the Big Five had interests in several central stockyards. FTC
established to its satisfaction that of the twenty-eight central markets in which
the large packers had financial interests an average of over 80 percent of the
stock in each yard was controlled by one or more of the Big Five. The percentages ranged from control of about 23 percent of the stock in the west
Philadelphia yards to total ownership of the yards in Denver. In Kansas one
or more of the Big Five controlled almost 60 percent of the Wichita yards, 68
percent of those in Kansas City, and 85 percent of the St. Joseph yards.
In addition to controlling the yards per se, the major packers had large
interests in collateral institutions including terminal rail lines, market newspapers (though packers did not appear to be financially involved with the
market paper in Kansas City), and banks for stockmen . Strength in the
financial area was based not so much on actual ownership as it was upon the

177

The Kansas Beef Industry

influence that the Big Five exerted by reason of their large patronage of the
banks and the large number of their representatives who sat on the boards of
directors. In Kansas the Big Five had members on the boards of five banks
in St. Joseph, three in Wichita, and three in Kansas City. Finally, the above
interests led to a large amount of packer influence in "live-stock exchange
buildings where commission men have their offices; control of assignment of
pens to commission firms ... control of yardage services and charges; control of weighing facilities; control of the disposition of dead animals and other
profitable yard monopolies; and in most cases control of all packing-house
and other business sites." 23
The packers' influence at central markets was more threatening to stockmen than any other of their activities. Not only did it give packers the
opportunity to fix prices, it also allowed them to cheat the producer in a
multitude of exchanges, not least of which were short weights and excessive
charges for feed and yardage.
The multiple and diverse interests of the large packers outlined above
had been developing for over a generation. By 1917 the FTC believed that
the existence of a conspiracy was abundantly clear. The Big Five, they said,
intended to "monopolize and divide among the several interests the distribution of the food supply not only of the United States but of all countries
which produce a food surplus, and, as a result of this monopolistic position,
to extort excessive profits from the people not only of the United States but of
a large part of the world." 24
While President Wilson was especially interested in the Big Five's possible
impairment of the flow of food to the Allies, the stock producer was more
concerned with price fixing, excessive profits, and other unfair practices in
the central markets that FTC attributed to the large packers. This, too,
harmed the war effort, many cattlemen said, by discouraging production.
One of the most annoying and costly difficulties faced by producers was
the violent fluctuations in prices at the central markets, which were caused,
cattlemen believed, by the Big Five's dominant influence. A letter from a
Kansas banker to Joe Mercer in 1918 illustrated how price fluctuations
hampered producers and robbed them of just returns. The banker was financially involved with the large Kansas feeding firm of McCready & Shroyer,
near Miltonvale. One day, according to the letter, the feeders responded to a
call from the St. Joseph yards to ship fat cattle, as the receipts were expected
to be light. The feeders responded immediately by shipping four carloads,
but, due to the difficulties of sorting and loading, the remaining thirty-three
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loads were delayed in reaching the yards by twenty-four hours. They received $14.85 a hundredweight for the first four cars and $13.00 for the
remainder, for exactly the same quality of cattle. The fluctuation represented
a difference of over $20.00 a head, which caused the banker to question the
advisability of continuing his support for so risky a business. 25
The FTC investigation supported the belief that packers were manipulating stock prices. The Big Five employed "a vicious system of ... price
cutting," FTC said, to keep small competitors out of the market. In addition,
FTC found evidence that stock prices sometimes depended upon whether the
large packers were "overstocked with fresh and cured meats and want[ ed] to
sell in a high market or ... understocked and want[ ed] to buy m a low
market."
Another practice that affected the producer was "wiring on, as it was
called, which amounted to a packer informing a second stockyard of the
price offered at the first yard if a shipper decided to take his stock beyond the
initial point. Not only did the practice eliminate competition, it deprived the
shipper of the chance to find higher prices at another central market. Also,
the shipper had the added freight cost and loss from shrinkage if he decided
to try another market. John A. Edwards reported a classic example of this
practice. He said that he had sent a "train load" of fat cattle to Kansas City
where he was offered $1.50 a hundredweight below what he thought he
should have. He decided not to sell and went on to St. Louis where he was
offered 75 cents below the Kansas City price by a representative of the same
large packer, after, Edwards claimed, the buyer had checked with Kansas
City. From St. Louis, Edwards went on to Chicago-usually the top market
for fat stock-and was offered the same price that he had been offered in
Kansas City. Edwards was also advised that he should have sold in Kansas
City and saved himself all the additional trouble and expense. In this case,
Edwards claimed, he eventually sold to an independent packer for the price
he had expected in Kansas City, but most shippers, especially the many small
stockmen, were unable or unwilling to go to this much work or expense to
market their stock. 26
The section on profits probably contained the most disputed conclusions
of the FTC Report. The veracity of this section-in the minds of FTC,
producers, and packers-was critical in establishing motives for the numerous
unfair practices of which the packers were accused, as well as a basis for a j udgment on "excessive profits." Basic to the dispute were two different methods
of figuring profits. The large packers referred to profits in terms of a per179
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centage of sales dollars or a certain amount per head of stock slaughtered,
while the FTC and the producers cited profits in terms of a percentage of
net worth. The packers' point of view, for example, was illustrated in advertisements in livestock papers and journals claiming that they were operating
at a margin of $1.22 per head for cattle, and only 66½ and 15 cents for hogs
and sheep, respectively. "How many local butchers," the advertisements
asked, "would be content with less than fifteen cents profit upon a sheep
which he has slaughtered?" Throughout much of the time that the investigation was in progress Swift sponsored advertisements that claimed profits
of only 3 cents on each dollar of sales. By 1919, when producers and consumers were even more upset with high food prices, advertisements claimed
that profits were down to 2 cents per dollar. 27
FTC's report, which was as comprehensive as available records allowed,
cast doubt on the accuracy of the packers' method of figuring profits and
questioned the veracity of their advertisements. The report dealt with several
areas related to financial operations, including a survey of the Big Five's
development, a comparison of the large packers' earnings before and during
the war, a study of their accounting systems, and a comparison of the profits
of the big packers with those of several independent packers. An added
concern of the investigators was to discover whether the controls established
on profits by the Food Administration were effective.2 8
After showing that the remarkable growth of the large packers had
come largely from reinvested surpluses, the report turned to the question of
net profits during the second decade of the twentieth century. According
to FTC, they totaled $251.7 million for the six years between 1912 and 1917$59.5 before the war, and $192.2 million after the war began. In terms of
a percentage of capital invested-defined as the net worth of capital stock
and surplus-this represented an average of 13.6 percent profit, 7.8 percent
for the prewar years, and 19.4 percent after the war started. In summary,
the report noted that there was no doubt
that the packers' profits, particularly since the beginning of the European war, have been enormous, both in the United States and in the
foreign countries. Measured by prewar profits, the 1917 profits were
350 per cent greater than in the average of the three years before the
European war; measured by the amount of sales, they averaged, in
1917, 4.6 cents on the dollar, which was sufficient to produce for the
five companies a total profit of $96,182,000; measured by the net worth
of the combined corporations ( capital stock plus surplus), they aver180
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aged, in 1917, 21.6 per cent; measured by the capital stock outstanding,
as an indication of the dividend possibilities, they averaged, in 1917,
39.5 per cent; and measured by the packers' actual investment of new
capital, they amount to several times even this last figure. 29
The implication of this conclusion was not lost on stockmen. Considerably higher prices could have been paid for livestock without endangering a
reasonable profit even though the packers may have made only a few cents
on each dollar of sales. Profits subsequent to the 9 percent restriction ordered
by the Food Administration were especially difficult to ascertain, but the
commission believed that they approached 15 percent in 1918. The figures
cited by the report, however, were admittedly incomplete; but, in the opinion
of the commissioners, they had erred on the side of conservatism in their
estimates. Yet, the commission realized that the failure of the packers to
follow "well-recognized and fundamental principles of accounting" rendered
it impossible for the FTC to "ascertain accurate! y either the total profits of
the great companies or the profits per head or per pound for the principal
meat products." The report implied that the packers' profits were considerably higher than they reported.
It was unfortunate that the financial records kept by the industry, especially cost accounting, were inadequate for a definite appraisal of the profits
made in meat slaughter. The FTC might have put the dispute over profits
to rest had they been able to establish beyond any doubt a definite profit
level. The commission, however, was certain that packer profits per pound of
meat did not exceed a few cents and sometimes may have been even less than
a cent. But the commission was equally certain that the advertised claim
that profits were only a few cents per unit-a small amount in the public
mind-was wholly misleading and tended to obscure the real facts. "As a
matter of fact," FTC concluded, "a profit of a cent per unit far from being
a small profit, may be an exorbitant profit measured in terms of return upon
capital invested." For example, the Big Five reported to the Food Administration a figure of 2.2 cents for each dollar of sales as their profit in 1918, a
figure equivalent to 15 percent on capital stock and surplus. "Thus while
the packers' profits per pound may appear to the public to be small," FTC
noted, "they are in reality large, due to the enormous tonnage produced on
the basis of a relatively moderate investment."30
The FTC also reported that the big packers had invested money in other
businesses related to meat slaughtering as well as some completely unrelated
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to food processing. Cattlemen saw these investments as an outlet for excessively large profits and another example of the packers' growing influence. In
Kansas City the large packers were reported to own all of the stock of the
Fowler Packing Company, the Fowler Serum Company, and the Standard
Rendering Company. The last company was used by the large packers, along
with the Fowler Desiccating and Rendering Works, to dominate the collection
of waste material from the city's retail meat markets. In addition the packers
owned 50 percent of the Aaron Poultry and Egg Company. In businesses
unassociated with food processing, FTC reported that Swift and Armour
either owned outright or controlled a majority of the voting stock in the
North Kansas City Land and Improvement Association and the North
Kansas City Development Company. The latter, in turn, owned the North
Kansas City Light, Heat, and Power Company, as well as a company concerned with the area's water supply. Armour also controlled 30 percent of
the National Bank of North Kansas City.3 1
The FTC failed to make much of their discovery that independent packers were also making large profits, possibly because the commission questioned
the implications of their own findings. After analyzing the earnings of 117
large independent packers for 1918, FTC concluded that they had earned
18.1 percent on net worth-"a manifestly high return"-compared to the Big
Five's 15 percent, and that there were similar profits for every year since 1914.
There were, the commission hastened to add, other circumstances to
consider before any conclusions could be drawn. The independent packers
that were studied, for instance, were a "selected group" that kept clear and
reliable tabulations of their business activities. It was apparent that the large
independent packers were more profitable than the smaller ones, and that
the business activities of the independents and the Big Five were not strictly
comparable. The latter had wide-ranging business interests, some of which
were far removed from meat slaughter, while the independents were almost
exclusively meat packers. In fact, the lower total return of the large packers
might have indicated that they were actually making considerably more on
the meat part of their businesses than the independents were, as there were
indications that some of their investments outside of meat slaughtering were
disastrous. The commission concluded:

If it can be assumed that the great packers made as much on the
meat-end of their busin ess as do the independents, it would follow that
they must make considerably less on the nonlive-stock end, in order
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to get a lower average rate on the whole
words high profits on meat may be used to
pending the establishment of the latter on a
keeping down the average return on the total
than that shown for the larger independents. 32

business . . . . In other
finance new activities
firm basis, meanwhile
business to a level less

FTC noted that if the Big Five were actually earning less, then their asserted
operating efficiency and the practicality of large industrial conglomerates
should be seriously questioned. One might also note that if the disparity of
earnings discovered by FTC actually existed, then the larger earnings of the
smaller plants help explain the eventual breakup of the larger packers, and,
to some extent, the decentralization of the whole packing industry.
During the early period of FTC's investigation, a few Kansas cattlemen
expressed little faith in the agency's work. Results were not published for
almost a year, and some stockmen grew impatient. The timing of the investigation was poor, cattlemen said, as rising stock prices tended to take the
sting out of the stockmen's discomfiture.
Other cattlemen, however, worked to keep the stockmen's attention
focused on the supposed evils of the packing industry. Walter R. Stubbs,
for instance, scolded cattlemen at the time the investigation began for losing
the fervor for reform that had been expressed at the 1916 KLA convention .
He said that only the power of the federal government could correct the abuses
and that the cattlemen themselves were responsible for the lack of government
action. The large packers, Stubbs believed, "were poor as Job's turkey thirty
or forty years ago and all the money they have got, they have gotten from
the producer. ... When you ship your hogs and cattle down there to the
stock yards, you have to pen them in a packer's yard; you have got to send
them right to his home to get them penned up. . . . [ you pay] two or three
times the right price for feed .... [and] that is your fault. I am not blaming
the packer a bit." When FTC issued a preliminary report in 1918, however,
the cattlemen returned to their antipacker stance. Many of their charges
were supported, and it appeared that the investigation, if followed by appropriate legislation, might well eliminate many abuses experienced by the
producer. 33
The FTC had little doubt after completing its study that legislation was
needed. The large packers had grown to immense proportions since their
origins in the nineteenth century, primarily through reinvesting profits from
the industry. About the only change that FTC noted in large packer opera183
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tions since the 1890s was that the monopoly had become broader and more
inclusive. Their "monopolistic control of the distributive machinery" had
enabled them to move almost at will into the whole food and by-product
business. There was no possibility, the commission said, of effecting fundamental improvements "short of the acquisition by the Federal government of
the distributive utilities now controlled by the Big Five." With this in mind,
FTC recommended that the government acquire through the railroad administration ownership of all rolling stock used for transporting livestock
and all refrigerated cars. In addition the commission suggested that the
government buy enough branch houses, cold storage plants, and warehouses
to ensure competitive distribution. To ensure fair marketing, the commission
recommended that the government take over all the principal stockyards of
the country, as well as other facilities located in the yards that were necessary
for marketing operations. In short, FTC suggested a large step toward
nationalizing the nation's marketing system for livestock, a step that many
cattlemen were hesitant to take.34

So cattlemen obtained the extensive investigation that they had been urging
for over a generation, but some were unwilling to approve the resulting
suggestions. Throughout the postwar depression, no action was taken to put
the full package of FTC recommendations into effect. Most cattlemen were
convinced by this time, though, that federal action was necessary. Only the
type of action or role that the government should assume was a matter for
debate. The FTC recommendations, although reminiscent of some proposals
made by the Populists during the 1890s, went beyond what most congressmen
considered to be a proper relationship between government and private business. Congress eventually responded with a considerably milder form of
government involvement than was urged by FTC. Its recommendations
were, in large part, in line with the desires of producers.
It would be a mistake to leave the impression that the Kansas stockman
was a chip-on-the-shoulder sort of fellow who did little during this period
but criticize the various elements of the marketing system. He was, in fact,
often very happy with the railroads and stockyards, and sometimes sent a few
congenial sentiments toward the large packers. And he always recognized
the importance of these businesses to the beef industry. One issue of the
Stockman, for example, noted how fortunate Kansas producers were to have
the "great Kansas City yards" close at hand, yards that many stockmen in
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Texas, Oklahoma, and the Southwest paid higher freight rates and endured
larger stock shrinkages in order to patronize. The fact that Kansas City had
the largest stocker and feeder market in the world was also appreciated.
Many cattlemen also realized that the packers' extensive storage facilities and
national and international systems of distribution were of great benefit to
the stock industry. Others believed that the storage facilities of the large
packers tended to equalize the supply of animals in the central market and,
to some extent, modify price fluctuations. 3 "
Not all of the producers' responses, then, were as negative as the literature
sometimes implied, because grievances were probably given more coverage
in newspapers and journals than expressions of satisfaction. But there were
significant grievances and negative responses among stockmen, and these
were destined to increase before they declined. Ultimately, federal legislation
laid to rest some of the producers' complaints against stockyards and packers,
but Congress was not prodded into action until FTC's findings were joined
to the unrest of the 1920s.
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Depressions and Low Prices:
Beef Production between the Wars

Producing agricultural products after World War I was a different proposition
than it had been earlier in the century; frustration, failure, and depression
were the common fare. There were a few good years, enough to generate
hope and keep many producers in business; but on the whole it was an era
that was prosperous for only a few, a continual struggle for most, and a
period of failure for many. Although beef producers generally fared better
than dirt farmers, especially those wedded to a single crop, they too suffered
many of the same depressed conditions. A severe decline, followed by a
slight recovery during the middle twenties, confronted the beef business even
before the combined impact of drought and d epression sent agriculture reeling
in the following decade. Recovery began only in the late thirties when the
cycle of drought was broken; then World War II finally brought some prosperity back to the stricken industry.
The unexpected depression after World War I affected most of the
nation's industries, but its effects were most severely felt for the longest period
of time by the agricultural sector. Although stock prices had not yet declined
nearly as much as they would, Joseph H. Mercer was one of the first Kansans
to describe the depressed conditions when he announced early in 1920 that
the previous year had been the most abnormal one ever chronicled in the
history of KLA. He cited as causes of the abnormality the extreme winter of
1918-19 and the late spring that followed, the high cost of feed, and the unsettled marketing conditions. While 1919 had been a banner year for KLA
growth, he said, "its members have probably suffered greater financial losses
throughout the year than have ever before been recorded in the history of
the live stock industry in this state." He estimated that Kansas cattlemen
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had lost an aggregate of over $75 million in depreciated herd value. Thousands
of stockmen, he said, "have had their all swept away-savings of a lifetime
scattered to the four winds-and will never again have sufficient credit to
again enter the business."
No one in 1920 expected the economic plight of farmers and ranchers
to deteriorate still further, but it did. In 1922 Mercer made observations
similar to those he had made earlier, only this time he crowned 1921 with
the dubious honor of being the worst in agricultural history, with scores of
Kansas farmers "hopelessly bankrupt." Conditions began to improve slightly
after 1922, but the whole period between 1919 and 1926 was depressed. Then
about three years of relative prosperity followed, sandwiched neatly between
the postwar depression and the general economic collapse that hit at the close
of the decade. 1
Even the Stockman had its problems during the depressed twenties with
unpaid subscriptions and advertising bills. Then, as reported in the May 15,
1921, issue, an internal problem arose: "The Honorable printers, the Reverend
pressmen and the Estimable binders," were on strike, the paper noted, "they
seek to labor but 44 hours per week, whereas they have been working 8 hours
per day."
Surviving the twenties did little to prepare farmers and ranchers for the
disaster that confronted them and the nation during the thirties. All sectors
of the economy suffered, but the persistence of the postwar agricultural depression rendered the agricultural sector even less able to cope with the new
calamity. Agriculture's plight was reflected in net farm income figures, which
declined from $10 billion in 1919 to only $2.5 billion in 1932 (Table 1). By
1936 national farm income was back up, but it was still low and did not
reflect conditions in parts of the Great Plains. Annual cash receipts from
the marketing of Kansas farm products, for example, declined from an
average of $476.6 million during the last half of the 1920s to $271.3 million
during the 1930s, a reduction of over 43 percent. Kansas farm income did
not again approach the average of the late twenties until 1941.2
The general economic depression of the 1930s was complicated by droughts,
especially on the Great Plains. In Kansas rainfall had not always been adequate in every part of the state during the twenties, but there was an annual
average of at least twenty-eight inches before the decline in the thirties. The
state's average, for instance, was only twenty inches in 1934 and just slightly
over eighteen inches in 1936, one of the driest years on record. Although the
greater amounts of rainfall in eastern Kansas kept the state average relatively
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high, the central and western sections were consistently dry, receiving only
ten to twelve inches of moisture in 1934 and not much more than that in
1936. Then, though spring and summer rains-when the grass and crops
needed it the most-were scant, nature ordained that the parched and hot
summers of 1934 and 1936 be followed by winters with almost no snowfall.
The legendary dust storms followed hard on the heels of the drought,
to the dismay of housewives. The blinding dirt of the 1930s generated considerable literature-some from the USDA-which tended to blame the plow
that broke the plains and the irresponsible overgrazing allowed by cattlemen
for the dust as well as the soil erosion that resulted. Some of the literature
even predicted complete loss of productivity on much of the Great Plains as
some areas became a man-made "Great American Desert." This view, however, should be seriously questioned. The dust storms were obviously related
to vegetation cover, which in turn was related to the quantity of rainfall. Not
the plow, some historians suggest, but the periodic droughts endemic to the
Plains caused the dust storms, and not even the native grass would have
prevented the blowing dirt. Breaking the sod may have even increased the
ground cover, and thus the much-maligned plow may have reduced the
destructiveness of the storms. When rainfall increased during the 1940s,
bumper wheat crops and native grasses returned to the same Kansas lands
that had eroded so severely during the 1930s, supporting the view that dust
storms did not seriously harm productivity, exonerating farmers and ranchers,
and disproving the predictions of prophets who foresaw only deserts and
doom for the Great Plains.3
While dust and drought prevailed, however, reports from Kansas understandably became increasingly pessimistic as the 1930s wore on. According
to Mercer, 1930 was a catastrophic year due to financial deflation and dry
weather. The following year was worse. Then, he wrote, 1932 brought "even
greater disaster to the livestock industry than the preceding year." Each year
thereafter, until the late thirties, was reported as being worse than the preceding one. The Stockman noted in 1934 that "there is not an old-timer in the
cattle country whose memory runs back far enough that he can relate any
early day experience which in any way compares with the hopeless conditions
that face the cowman today." Hot temperatures and scant rainfall forced
many stockmen to operate trucks around the clock hauling water and feed,
if available, to their famished stock. Many springs, creeks, and wells that
had never in anyone's memory failed before dried up during the early thirties.
In 1934 a report from southwestern Kansas noted that "the highways and
189

Table I. Farm Cash Receipts and Income, and Indexes of Prices Received
and Paid by Farmers, and Parity Ratio ; 1919-1940
Indexes of prices received and paid by farmers (1 910-14

= I 00)

Prices received
by farmers 2

Year

Net income
to perso ns
on farm s
from
farming1

;:,...

"::,:::

Crops

Livestock
and
products

Living

Production

taxes, and
wage rates

217

230

206

202

195

197

110

211

235

190

228

195

214

99

"
---"
..,~

1919 ···························· 10,061
1920 ···························· 9,009

\0

0

>-..J

Prices paid
including
All farm
products

......

Prices paid
by farmers

interest,

Parity
ratio3

1921 ............................ 4,131

124

121

127

164

128

155

80

1922 •··························· 5,081

131

136

126

153

127

151

87

1923 ............................ 5,895

142

156

128

156

138

159

89

1924 ............................ 5,681

143

159

128

156

140

160

89

1925 ····························

7,575

156

164

149

161

145

164

95

1926 ····························

6,810

145

139

151

158

141

160

91

1927 ............................

6,569

140

134

146

155

141

159

88

..,"';::;

..,"'
t:l::l

;::;

.:...

J

\D

1928 ·······•············•······· 6,844

148

142

155

156

148

162

91

1929 ···························· 7,024

148

135

159

154

146

160

92

1930 ·······················•···· 5,060

125

115

134

144

135

151

83

1931 ···························· 3,981

87

75

98

124

113

130

67

1932 ···························· 2,510

65

57

72

106

99

112

58

1933 ···························· 3,012

70

71

70

108

99

109

64

1934 ···························· 3,428

90

98

81

122

114

120

75

1935 . ·····················•···· 5,858

109

103

114

124

122

124

88

"'...,

1936 ............................ 4,954

114

108

119

124

122

124

92

1937 ·······················•···· 6,754

122

118

126

128

132

131

93

1938 ····•··············•········ 5,101

97

80

112

122

122

124

78

-.,_

1939 ···························· 5,189

95

82

107

120

121

123

77

"'....
c·
;;

1940 ···························· 5,299

100

90

109

121

123

124

81

1

Realized net income of farm operators plu s value of inventory change plu s wages paid to farm laborers living on farms, in $1,000,000.
Base, Augu st, 1909-Jul y, 1914
100
3
Ratio of prices received by farmer s to prices paid, including interest, taxes, and wage rates.
SOURCE: Adapted from information in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Hist orical Statistics of tlze United State.<, Colonial Times to 1957, p. 283.
2

=

i:::,

...."'

~

...,...,"'

c·

;;
...,

t,

;;
.,_

r--,
0

~

"tl
....

;:;·

tx:l

"'"'

" tl

cl

;:

~

"'....
~
"'"'
;;
....
;:,..

"'
~
;:;

The Kansas Beef Industry

canyons are lined with weary famishing herds, including every age and size,
and not a cow, steer or calf has a value except that put on by the government
appraiser." Conditions worsened in this area before they improved. Two years
later it was estimated that 12 percent of the state's cattlemen were out of
water, while 13 percent were out of feed. A letter to Senator Capper in 1937
lamented that most of the livestock in the western part of the state was gone,
that 90 percent of the farmers were bankrupt, and that dust storms occurred
three to five times a week. The following year a traveler through western
Kansas saw as many tractors as cattle and not "enough native grass to fill an
overcoat pocket." 4
Government purchases of cattle in 1934 helped conserve feed supplies,
but cattlemen were forced to try everything to save their remaining stock.
Anything available with nutritional value was used for feed. James Tod,
president of KLA and the only son of former KLA president William J. Tod,
experimented with burning the thorns off the "tree cactus" that grew on
his New Mexico ranch as feed for 1,700 starving cows. It worked well, he
said, as long as the cactus held out. Tod used kerosene burners for this work
and noted that a man working ten hours could burn enough to satisfy 110
cows and calves for a day . It took calves only a few days, and cows a little
longer, to acquire a taste for the cactus, which, according to Tod, reminded
one of the avocado pear.
Eventually, Tod was forced to move his herd to Mississippi, but this
provided no salvation either. Unaccustomed to the climate and the diseases
in the area, many of Tod's weakened cattle soon died. In the end, Tod's
losses forced him to sell the model ranch near Maple Hill that he and his
father had so carefully built." The buyer was his brother-in-law, Horace G .
Adams, Jr., who already owned a large ranch near Maple Hill.
Many cattlemen had to sell or move stock during the thirties. Some took
a leaf from Tod's notebook and sent cattle to southern states where moisture
and feed were more plentiful, while others moved cattle to the Flint Hills or
eastern parts of the state. Wherever there was a little extra feed, cows from
the dry West soon appeared. Jesse Greenleaf saved much of his stock-by
this time only a commercial herd, because the postwar depression had forced
him to dispose of his purebreds-by shipping them to the Atchison area to
graze the marshy flats along the Missouri River, where they often kept company with bootleggers tending hidden stills, as well as hobos who were also
trying to survive. Feed was also shipped into the state when it was available,
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with KLA serving as a clearing house to coordinate the distribution of surplus
feed to needy cattle. 6

The causes of the depressed state of American agriculture between the wars
were many and varied. In the 1930s the economy was genera lly depressed,
and agriculture had the drought to contend with besides. But in the 1920s
the long depression in agriculture was due in part to the producers themselves. Writing in the New York Times, William Allen White noted fairly
accurately that the farm problem during the twenties was not the result of
any organized or insidious plot by other economic groups, but rather the
consequence of agriculture's relatively slow adaptation to changing times.
The slowness, White added, was partially due to the nature of the industry
and the extended period of time that was required to change basic operations.7
The inability of producers to adapt rapidly to changing conditions was
illustrated well by the agricultural surpluses that existed after World War I.
The war had stimulated a large demand for foodstuffs, and farmers and
ranchers had happily responded. They gave little thought to the prospect
of decreasing demands with Europe's recovery after the war, or to the time
it would take to adjust their farming and ranching operations to lower demands. Yet, while producers can be criticized for lack of foresight, they were ,
often following during the war the best advice of Food Administrator Herbert
Hoover, who cajoled, pressured, and praised the willing farmers and ranchers
to greater heights of production. Even after the war, Hoover believed, a
devastated Europe would continue to demand American farm products in
increasing quantities. He was wrong, and slow to correct his error. Europe
failed to maintain its demands, let alone increase them. With the reestablishment of prewar shipping patterns, other nations cut into the outlets
recently acquired by the United States. Europe's recovery after the war was
relatively rapid, which again defied Hoover's predictions.8
Some American producers even contributed to Europe's rapid recovery
and thus, indirectly, to reduced markets. J. 0. "Jake" Southard, a Kansas
raiser of purebreds, exemplified not only America's contribution to postwar
Europe's beef production but also the fate of some who expanded their
beef cattle production during the wartime boom. Southard, known as the
"Comiskey Hereford King," was a former employee of Swift & Company
who had entered the cattle business just before the war began. The Monarch
family of purebred Herefords became his trademark. Thousands of dollars
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were made during the war, Southard noted later, and were as easily spent.
After the conflict, Southard became the first American to earn a contract
with the Belgian and French governments to assist in restocking cattle lost
or butchered during the war. More than 15,000 milk and beef cattle were
called for, which were reported to have grossed Southard over a million dollars. But the flush times this Kansas cattleman enjoyed changed late in 1921.
When the full force of the deflation hit the industry, Southard nearly went
broke. He soon announced that he was retiring from ranching in order to
promote community sales, where he would "turn anything from a ratskin
to a ranch into money on a few days notice." His sons continued in ranching,
but even this enterprise ended two years later with a complete dispersion sale.
The relatively profitable years of the middle twenties brought Southard back
into ranching again, but this time he wisely retained his interest in the
Southard Sales System to supplement his income. 9
As a result of Europe's recovery, small quantities of agricultural produce
were marketed overseas during the twenties and thirties. At the same time,
developments on the domestic scene, such as unemployment and altered buying patterns, militated against using as much as could be produced. Per
capita beef consumption, for instance, declined from 75.8 pounds in 1918 to
an average of 65.2 pounds during the 1920s. This level remained fairly constant between the wars except when government relief agencies provided
large quantities to the unemployed in 1934.
Wheat and corn producers also faced a declining demand for cereals.
Early in the twenties, government attacks on the high cost of living and the
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continued practice of "Hooverizing" the food budget that had been patnotically adopted during the war reduced demands for food, as did the changing
patterns of consumption that resulted from new dress fashions and health
fads. The slim-look of the twenties, however, was not as detrimental to the
beef producer as it was to those who raised grain. Unemployment, especially
during the early twenties and thirties, and the increased number of manufactured goods that consumers needed, or at least thought that they needed, also
cut into food budgets. 10
More specific information demonstrates that the general rural depression
discussed above was much more than a figment of farmers' and ranchers'
imaginations. The rising number of beef cattle in Kansas, for instance,
reflected more than the character of agricultural production during the war.
Over 2.7 million cattle and calves were reported in 1919, representing a 47
percent rise since 1914, or more than double the increase of cattle in the
nation as a whole ( see Figure 1, p. 21). One expected, however, the cattle
in a western beef state to increase more than the national average. The distribution of these cattle remained much the same, although a slight shift
toward the western and southwestern part of the state had occurred by 1920
before the drought of the thirties pushed cattle back into the Flint Hills ( see
Maps 2 and 3, pp. 71 and 72) .11
The high number of beef cattle in 1919 declined to an average of about
2.2 million head during the 1920s. The following decade the average was
almost 2.6 million head, until 1935. The combined forces of depression and
drought, as well as a greater realization that overproduction depressed prices,
drove the cattle population below 2 million by 1937. Because there was enough
feed available, except during droughts, there were generally more cattle than
the markets were able to absorb.
The easy credit that was available had encouraged the growth in cattle
numbers during the war, and there was a similar situation during the late
1920s. John Clay, long-time ranch manager, commission man, and cattle
financier, blamed packer money for much of the boom in cattle financing. It
began with P. D. Armour, Clay said, and "his example was followed till every
big packer, his associate banks, his imitators in the search for wealth, promoted loan companies that sold their securities freely in every part of the
country." Cattle financing became, according to Clay, a race for "greed,
glory, and power." But the packers were not alone in lending capital. Most
banks, especially those near producing areas, urged their customers to claim
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a slice of the war bonanza. Almost anyone with cattle for collateral could
get money, contributing further to the oversupply.
The speculative boom was not limited to cattle; investment in land also
occurred at inflated rates, and eventually made the postwar depression more
severe than it might otherwise have been. In some cases, land values rose by
70 percent during the war, and much of the land that changed hands at these
inflated values did so with a down payment of as little as 5 to 19 percent.
Farmers and ranchers also bought other goods-radios, bathtubs, and even
more costly items like trucks, automobiles, and tractors. Some of these articles
were, of course, necessary for efficient operation, but they were also expensive
and added much to the agricultural debt. The general absence of rural
prosperity during the 1920s had a redeeming feature, however, as it kept
overspeculation in agriculture at a minimum. 12
As production remained high and other conditions depressed the nation's
economy, prices of farm commodities and the purchasing power of farmers
and ranchers plunged downward and remained low for most of the interwar
period. While general price levels remained adequate on most farm products
throughout 1919, they had declined 43 percent by 1921 ( see Table 1). Prices
that farmers paid, for the most part, showed no such decline. The purchasing
power of corn was a graphic example of this relationship of prices. In 1919
about a fifth of a bushel of corn bought a gallon of gas, while six bushels c,f
corn purchased a ton of coal. Two years later the ratios had increased to two
bushels for the gas and sixty bushels for the coal. Some farmers wisely substituted corn for coal. Cattlemen had similar experiences with their products.
In 1913 the USDA claimed that seven cattle were worth a wagon, grain
binder, or gang plow. By 1921, seventeen cattle were required for the same
purchases.
Farm parity figures, reflecting the uneven correlation in prices farmers
and ranchers paid and received, declined from 110 in 1919 to 80 in 1921. Farm
parity averaged just over 90 for the remainder of the decade; but grain prices
remained low, and the rise was due largely to products like cotton and meat.
The price situation for agriculture deteriorated further in the 1930s as the
nation's economy became depressed, and farm prices fell more than did those
of nonfarm goods and services. The parity ratio in 1932, for example, was
down to 58, a decline of 34 points from 1929. Wheat was thirty-two cents
a bushel in 1932, and fifteen-cent corn was again used for fuel. 13
Low profits and high costs during the twenties spelled high debts for
many farmers and ranchers. Those on the Great Plains had the most severe
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problem; 9 percent of all Kansas farmers and 28 percent of those in Montana
reported losing their farms or other property. Mortgaged indebtedness for
Kansas farmers and ranchers reached an all-time high for the interwar period
in 1924, when the figure was reported to have reached $535 million. Not even
during the depressed thirties-when Kansas farm mortgages amounted to
$411.7 and $429.2 million in 1930 and 1932, respectively-was the figure as
high as the 1924 figure, but it probably would have been higher had other
factors been comparable to the twenties. By the thirties many marginal
operators had already been forced out of business, there had been no war
boom to encourage investment, and the financial institutions were increasingly
unable to loan more money to farmers and ranchers.
Although the raw totals do not necessarily reveal the fact, farm and ranch
indebtedness was probably a more serious problem for those still in business
during the 1930s than it had been the previous decade, and credit amelioration
was one of agriculture's most pressing needs. During the early thirties one
estimate reported that 50 percent of the nation's farm and ranch owners were
debt free, 33 percent would have no serious debt problems if prosperity was
restored, and 17 percent were confronting a hopeless situation. Almost a
million ranchers and farmers lost their land during the four years following
1930, and some were Kansans. According to Roy S. Johnson, a Federal Land
Bank official, the number of mortgaged farms and ranches in the state decreased between 1930 and 1935 from 78,496 to 69,939, or from 47 to 40.1
percent of the total number. But one must approach this decline cautiously.
As foreclosures reduced the number and percentage of mortgaged farms
and ranches, they also made the situation appear better than it actually was.14
The market levels for cattle also revealed the depressed state of American
agriculture, although beef prices made a better recovery during the 1920s than
did grain prices. In 1919 Kansas beef cattle were selling for $10.40 to $11.25 a
hundredweight and sometimes higher. Two years later prices had been cut
by half. Once under way, the drop was exceedingly steep. The experience
of E. T. Anderson towards the end of 1920 illustrated the rapidity. Anderson
sold forty carloads of cattle in November, 1920, for an average of $13.00 a
hundred. Three months later he sold the same quality of cattle for $7.75;
and while Anderson was upset with the low price, he had actually received
about $2.00 a hundred more than beef prices averaged for the whole year of
1921. The rapidity of the decline in prices, as well as the extent, put a number
of cattlemen out of business.
After reaching bottom in 1921, beef prices began a tortuously slow advance
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of a few cents a hundredweight each year until 1925, when the average price
jumped about a dollar. From $7.00 a hundred in 1925 the average price moved
up to $10.00 by 1928, then turned downward again. By the time they reached
bottom during the early 1930s, stockmen had had a real education in low
prices. From an average of around $10.00 per hundred during the late twenties, Kansas beef prices fell more than 50 percent by 1932 and to the phenomenally low average price of $3.95 in 1933. Not since the first decade of the
twentieth century had beef prices dipped so low, and then they were part of a
considerably lower structure for all prices. After the bottom was sounded
in 1933, yearly average prices for Kansas fluctuated some but generally moved
upward along a course between $4.30 in 1934 to $7.60 in 1939. It was 1942
before beef prices again reached the 1919 and 1928 levels. 15
The deflated prices, especially the sharp declines during the early twenties
and thirties, were especially hard on feeders. Many of them were confident
as World War I ended that the market would maintain some stability; thus,
they purchased relatively high-priced feeder cattle. By 1921 they found themselves with large investments in stock and high-priced feed, and extremely
low market prices. Some claimed losses as high as $60.00 a head, but most
were probably not as high as this. Many feeders were, however, forced to
get out of the business or sharply curtail their operations. A 1921 study of
twenty-two widely scattered counties in Kansas revealed that investments
in feeding cattle had been reduced by 65 percent from the 1920 level, and it
estimated that investment was down at least 50 percent throughout the whole
state. There was little profit in feeding cattle at current prices.
Feeders experienced a similar situation, only worse, during the thirties
when they were caught with relatively high-priced stock that had been bought
in 1929. Meanwhile, during the early part of this decade, the drought-induced
feed shortages were added to the feeders' woes; and in Kansas the number of
cattle that were full-fed during the early 1930s was negligible. Mercer noted,
for example, that the number being fed in 1934 alone was close to 80 percent
less than the preceding year. 16
Yet the agricultural producers, despite their plight, were better off than
many city folk. Most were employed, had places to live, and could raise some
of their basic food needs. And the price situation did improve after 1932,
apparently more as a result of the drought and short crop situtaion than
anything else. The parity ratio of 58 in 1932 improved slightly to 64 the
following year, then climbed more rapidly to 93 by 1937, the high for the
decade, before another decline in the late thirties. 17
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The economic plight of cattlemen between the wars naturally took its toll of
individuals. Out in western Kansas the severe winter of 1918-19 combined
with the early stages of the depression to strike a death blow to one of the
state's most enduring ranches. Peter Robidoux, an adventuresome French
Canadian, had worked his way to Wallace County on the railroad shortly
after the Civil War. Searching for greener pastures, Robidoux gave up railroad work, bought a barrel of whisky and a box of cigars, and launched a
merchandising career. He prospered for twenty years in the small town of
Wallace, especially during the boom years of the 1880s. His initial commercial
venture, housed in a small tent, grew to be the largest general merchandise
store between Kansas City and Denver. Goods were high-priced at Robidoux's
place, but they continued to sell until the decline of the 1890s, when his competitors began to cut prices. More obstinate than wise, Robidoux refused to
cut his prices during the depression, and eventually closed his doors after
spending a whole day without a single customer. He never returned to the
store, some said, allowing more than $20,000 worth of inventory to rot on
the shelves.
Merchandising, however, was not Robidoux's only calling. As profits had
accumulated, he gradually purchased 32,000 acres of real estate, much of it
good bottom land along the Smoky Hill River, and became a rancher. After
the severe winter following World War I killed thousands of his cattle,
Robidoux subdivided his land and sold parcels to eager buyers during the early
summer of 1919. The Stockman reported that several hundred prospective
buyers-who had arrived in over a hundred automobiles-followed the auctioneer and a spirited band from plot to plot as the land was auctioned.
Unmindful of the faint glimmer of depression that clouded the horizon, buyers
paid $30 to $42 an acre for the bottom land, while the upland pasture sold
for $15 to $20. The exaggerated demand for land, as well as Robidoux's
advancing age, no doubt influenced him to sell, and the serious deflation that
followed proved the wisdom of his decision. 18
John A. Edwards, mentioned earlier for his work as a progressive legislator and stockman in western Kansas and the Flint Hills, lasted a little
longer than Robidoux, but his end as a rancher was much the same. Edwards
had plunged deeply into cattle and land investments during the flush war
years before the low cattle prices of the early twenties left him unable to meet
his payments. When oil speculation failed to make up the difference, the
bank foreclosed the mortgage on his ranches. One misfortune followed another
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in the Edwards household; their home was partially destroyed by fire just as
the other disasters became apparent.
Near desperation as his fortune continued to decline, Edwards scraped
together a paltry $50 in 1927, split it with his wife, and set out to find work,
leaving his family behind in the half-burned house. He finally landed in the
small town of Paola and, with the help of friends, began a second career
as a supplier of natural gas. Here he remained until his death in 1958, regaining part of the prosperity that had accompanied his cattle operations up to
1920. The postwar depression, coupled with his overexpansion, had ended
his sparkling career as legislator, stockman, and prominent representative of
livestock groups in their disputes with railroads and packers. The cattle
business in Kansas was never the same without Edwards. He had been a
popular speaker at KLA conventions and other gatherings on special hoildays,
where he critized the cattlemen's adversaries as forcefully as possible. All this
ended, too, when the depression drove one of the state's most popular cattlemen from his favorite endeavor. 19
One of the largest cattle operations and fortunes to disintegrate during
the twenties, however, was that of former Kansas governor Walter R. Stubbs,
the fighting Quaker from Lawrence. As Stubbs disengaged himself from
contracting during the early 1900s to allow a free hand for politics, he also
invested in land. A few years later, after his two terms as governor had ended
in 1913, Stubbs turned most of his attention toward his rural properties.
Stubbs bought and sold several large ranches in the West. By 1920 he
was reported to have the largest dairy in Kansas, near Mulvane, in addition
to large ranches in Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. He initiated
his Texas interests by purchasing the right to lease sixty sections of XIT land
from the father of 0. C. Hicks. The Hicks family eventually moved to
Kansas after the depression of the twenties, and ranched near Garden City
for more than forty years. Stubbs, meanwhile, was a great favorite in Texas
for a few years, overcoming disastrous cattle losses during the severe winter
of 1918-19 and dazzling the locals with his prohibition speeches.
Stubbs' ranching interests in Kansas included 3,200 acres near Plainville,
as well as thousands of acres of leased grassland farther west in the state.
Most of his 15,000 cattle were at first Angus, but he gradually shifted to
Herefords. At the time of his last senatorial race, a newspaper said of the
former governor that "his ranch and ranch land holdings are among the
largest in the West and Southwest and are probably as well managed as any
in the United States."
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Despite his astute management and large fortune, however, the postwar
depression struck down Stubbs' empire just as it did many smaller operators,
and he ended his ranching days as the manager of a large ranch and irrigation
project in Colorado. This prominent cattleman died in Topeka in 1929, only
a few months before the stock-market crash ushered in a depression even
more severe than the one that the governor had struggled with. 20
The newspapers and journals of the 1920s identified only a few of the
large operators who failed during the postwar depression. But there were
others, as well as many small operators-some of whose operations were
marginal to begin with-who were also forced out of business. A few failures
during the twenties were caused in part by overexpansion during the war,
when it was hard not to be optimistic, because cattle prices were high and
the government was demanding more and more goods from agricultural
producers. In contrast, the depression of the thirties was not preceded by a
flush period that had encouraged overinvestment. Fewer producers had overexpanded, but many still suffered ruin because of other conditions.

Depressions like those in the twenties and thirties naturally spurred producers
to attempt to raise profits, but the avenues through which they could act
unilaterally were limited. They sought higher prices for farm produce and
lobbied for government subsidides. They examined the retailing end of the food
industry to see if there were excess profits that might be directed back to the
producer. Improved merchandising techniques were sought by producers, as
well as expanded capital. These and other avenues were explored, but none
bore much fruit. Writing in 1929, William Allen White said that the farmer
"turns to the government, and gets only more taxes ... to the banker ...
and finds his interest rates soaring ... to the industrial worker and finds
him pounding farm prices down that he may have cheaper food." In general,
White was accurate. The agricultural producer, for example, never received
the prices for his products that he needed or desired. On the other hand,
new developments in agriculture helped to reduce production and marketing
costs. Progress was not, however, in proportion to the effort expended by
farmers and ranchers. 21
In the realm of procuction, forces beyond the producers' control determined many fixed costs, but there were others that could be affected. For the
rancher, land continued to be his largest investment, followed by his foundation stock. After that there were numerous additional items-feed, labor,
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fences, buildings, maintenance, taxes, death losses, and interest on a cattle
loan, probably. With all of these expenses in mind, the USDA and the Kansas
Agricultural Experiment Station reported in a joint study in the early 1920s
that a cow-calf operator had an average of almost $28 annual carrying costs
per cow, and that the gross cost of a weaned calf was over $33. Though these
figures applied to the Flint Hills, they were no doubt representative of most
Kansas production. 22
Pasturing calves into grass-fat beef was also expensive. In the Flint Hills
grazing aged steers and cows cost $17 per head per season in 1919, almost
triple the expense for the same services before the war. The figure declined
to around $8 or $9 for most of the twenties, but even this level was higher
than it had been before the European conflict. By 1931 lease prices had declined to $7 or $8 for aged cattle and went as low as $3 to $6 a head in 1933.
After this, the drought and shortages of grass tended to push rates up, as the
bluestem region provided better grazing than other areas of the West even
though conditions were far from normal. Grazing rates for the last half of
the thirties averaged around $7 to $8, and this included allowances for more
acreage per animal than was required during a period with average rainfall.
Young cattle were pastured more cheaply and the rents outside the Flint
Hills were usually lower. These rates often seemed exaggerated during the
whole period when compared with prewar years or the market price of cattle. 23
There were other expenses in addition to grazing fees in preparing cattle
for market, so many that most of the cattle studied by the USDA during the
early twenties lost money for their owners. The period of the study, of course,
encompassed the worst years of the postwar depression, but during the late
twenties a report by Mercer also demonstrated that production costs remained
high. After several of the state's ranchers had provided him with figures that
included all expenses for beef animals from birth to delivery at the market,
Mercer reported that it cost between $11.75 and $12.25 per hundred to produce marketable beef. Cattlemen, in short, made little money between the
two wars except for the latter years of each decade. Survival, not profits, was
the goal for most. 24
Yet the Flint Hills continued to accommodate large numbers of cattle
throughout most of this period, as did the state as a whole. According to
reports in the Stockman, the number of cattle shipped in between January
and June averaged 250,000 each year between 1922 and 1927, and 233,000
between 1928 and 1937. Texas, Oklahoma, and the other sections of Kansas
still furnished the bulk of these cattle. Additionally, there were considerably
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more cattle grazing the Flint Hills' bluestem each year than appeared on 111shipped records. Some of these were locally owned cow herds, some were
feeder stock, while others were cattle shipped in at times other than the
January to June period. Railroad shipping records provided some evidence
of this additional stock when 100,000 more cattle were shipped out of the
Flint Hills in the fall of some years than were brought in during the spring.
Some estimates placed the total number of cattle in the area at close to a
million each year.
Depressed conditions during this period encouraged an interest in changing the traditional practice of basing pasture rents in the Flint Hills on a
fixed fee per head. Some Texas cattlemen suggested that pasturemen install
scales, then charge according to the gain made by the cattle. This, they
believed, would force landowners to "take a little more interest in seeing that
pastures are not overstocked and that the cattle receive proper attention."
Others proposed various profit-sharing plans between the owner of the cattle
and the pasturemen that tied rents directly to market prices or to the net profit
for the whole operation. Owners of stock were especially prone to seek new
bases for payments during hard times to reduce some of their risks as well as
their investment, if the pasturemen could be persuaded to help finance the
herd. But changes in the methods of contracting Flint Hills grass were not
extensive. The old methods of charging by the head or acre remained dominant, and there was usually no problem in finding customers for the superb
grass. 25
Labor and taxes were also expenses that appeared high for much of the
interwar period. In 1919, largely as a result of the war, Kansas farm wages
were 253 percent above 1913 levels. Labor costs, however, did not involve
large cash outlays for many ranchers. Their profits, if any, were frequently
derived from the exploitation of their own and their families' labor.
Taxes were a different story. Farmers and ranchers complained throughout this period, with much justification, that their land taxes provided a disproportionate amount of the state's revenue. While Kansas taxes were lower
than the national average, they were still high for a depressed sector of the
economy. Between 1910 and 1925 state taxes rose 159 percent, with most of
the increase occurring before 1921. By 1929 Kansans were paying fifty-eight
cents per acre in land taxes, with 75 percent of this revenue going toward
education and roads.
Rural residents protested this inequitable taxing system, but with little
success during the twenties. Some proposed reduced spending on roads, or a
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high tourist license to pay for it, while others suggested less money for education, especially teachers' salaries, which were "far in excess of real worth."
Some also suggested reducing real estate taxes by initiating a tax on state
income, sales, or intangibles. A number of Kansas cattlemen favored sales
taxes, while dirt farmers tended to oppose them, apparently because they
believed a sales tax added to the cost of machinery and repairs would be an
unfair burden. At least one cattleman believed that schools should be financed
by a luxury tax rather than local property taxes; then the state, he believed,
could "tax hell" out of luxuries like silk stockings and hotel rooms that cost
more than $1.50. Many others also favored heavier taxes on luxury items.
But all of these proposals fell on deaf ears during the twenties, and owners
of land and cattle continued to carry more than their share of the tax load,
along with all their other expenses. In view of their power in the state legislature, however, most farmers and ranchers were apparently unwilling to
reduce property taxes if it meant sacrificing the additional services to which
they had grown accustomed or initiating new taxes to fund the services.
Property taxes per acre were lowered during the depressed 1930s, but
new taxes were added. From a high of fifty-eight cents in 1929, tax levies
in Kansas declined to thirty-six cents per acre in 1933 and 1934, and to an
average of a little over forty-one cents an acre during the whole decade. But
lower property taxes did little to lighten the tax load carried by rural residents,
and tax delinquency increased at an "alarming rate." By the early thirties
many farmers and ranchers had reconsidered their opposition to a state income
tax, and the farm lobby became an important factor in persuading the Kansas
legislature to initiate such a tax. The new law also taxed a number of intangibles, but the increased revenue did not alleviate the landowners' tax
burden as much as they had expected. 26
Of special interest to a number of stockmen was the tax on inshipped
cattle. By 1930 this assessment had been on the books for over thirty years,
but had always been erratically collected, if at all. Cattlemen who happened
to use pastures in counties where officials conscientiously collected the tax
became disgruntled, and shortly after World War I several Texans contested
its constitutionality, though unsuccessfully.
Towards the end of the twenties the tax was more generally collected in
an attempt to find added revenue, and out-of-state cattlemen joined some of
the state's own in calling for repeal. Pasturemen in the Flint Hills, convinced
that the tax decreased their business, were especially vocal in repeal efforts.
In 1929 they formed the Bluestem Pasturemen's Association for the purpose
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of promoting their business interests, notably the repeal of the tax on foreign
cattle. Late the same year their efforts were successful when the state legislature provided that cattle shipped into the state between March and September
required no Kansas assessment if taxed in another state. Judging from the
available records, however, there was no noticeable rise in the number of inshipped cattle as a result of the amended law, although out-of-state cattlemen
did profit from the change. 27
Cattle mortality was another factor on the cattleman's expense account,
an item that could sometimes be reduced with better management practices.
Annual death losses during this period were irregularly reported, but appeared
to range from around 1 to slightly over 2 percent of all the state's beef cattle
during those years that might be considered normal. Deaths from severe
winter storms were least avoidable, although increased winter feeding and
better care of cattle in general helped reduce these losses. With the advent of
the radio, stockmen were better informed on weather conditions and could
often take precautionary measures.
Cattlemen had more control over losses from disease, especially after cures
and preventives like the blackleg serum were developed at Kansas State Agricultural College. Thousands of dollars were saved by spending only a few
cents a head for treatment, and this was important for producers who were
living with marginal profits.
In addition to reducing the cost of disease, cattlemen could sometimes
enhance their income by improving other production methods. Better care
and more winter feeding-which decreased deaths, improved calf crops, and
reduced winter weight losses-were basic improvements. Feed for fattening
stock could also be improved, and experiments were carried on at Kansas
State Agricultural College along this line. In 1913 the college inaugurated an
annual Feeders' Day for stockmen of Kansas and surrounding states in order
to facilitate the dissemination of the latest scientific findings. Feeders' Day
is still part of many cattlemen's yearly agenda. By the late thirties Kansas
State College-called such after 1931 in recognition of the fact that the institution was "not only to make men better farmers but also to make farmers
better men"-had provided much information on such things as the relative
values of roughages, the fattening qualities of various grains, and the proper
mixtures to use. The contribution of various protein supplements to feeding
diets was also studied, as was the proper method of caring for grass.
Well before the end of the interwar period experts at the college had
reported a number of times on what they believed to be two of the "soundest
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Baling alfalfa, Finney County. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.
and most practical methods of handling beef cattle in Kansas." One of these,
known as the Kansas deferred full-feeding plan, consisted of purchasing yearlings in the fall, wintering them well enough to produce two hundred or more
pounds, then summer grazing without grain until the first of August. After
this, the plan called for 100 to 120 days of full-feeding in a dry lot before
marketing as finished beef. The whole process involved ownership of the
cattle for thirteen to fifteen months .
The second method recommended by the college experts involved ownership for three months longer. Sometimes referred to as "growing, grazing,
wintering, and selling as fleshy feeders," this plan consisted of purchasing steer
calves in the fall, wintering for a hundred pounds of gain, summer grazing
without grain supplement, and, finally, a second wintering to produce two
hundred pounds more. The cattle were sold in the spring as "fleshy feeders,"
after the rush of slaughter stock and before the large movement of stockers
and feeders in the fall. Many Kansas producers who were not wholly committed to the production of calves used these methods, exactly as suggested or
with slight variations.
C. W. McCampbell, a teacher in the animal husbandry department between
1910 and 1945, was instrumental in advertising these methods as well as many
of the other conclusions of the college research staff. McCampbell was ably
assisted by others, one of the most widely known in relation to beef production being A . D. "Dad" Weber, an expert livestock judge, who spent some
thirty years at the college working to improve agriculture. 28
The Adams family of Maple Hill had one of the better-known operations
that used the Kansas plans for feeding stock. With one of the largest ranch
enterprises in the state, Horace G. Adams started feeding cattle during the
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Baling alfalfa, about 1926. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.

1920s, about the same time that Kansas State began to test and advertise the
new plans. Several thousand acres of Adams' bottom land near Maple Hill
were devoted to corn and forage crops, which eventually filled the battery of
silos that towered above the ranch headquarters. The Adams family fed
annually for many years as many as 5,000 of their own cattle.
Besides feeding, the Adamses participated in several other aspects of the
beef industry. The large operation was begun shortly after Horace G. Adams
came to Kansas with his father in 1881. The father was a banker, but Horace
bought bluestem pasture and began to ranch. He bought over 10,000 ac res
around Maple Hill, then acquired an interest in over 60,000 acres along the
Cimarron River in Meade County. Some of the ranch spilled over into Oklahoma. The combined acreage became known as the XI Ranch. When
Horace Adams died in 1933, he left his seven children around 85,000 acres,
said by some to be the largest quantity of land owned by any one person in
the state. Only the Robbins family of Belvidere, who owned nearly as much
land and leased considerably more, had an operation comparable to Adams'
111 size.
Two of the sons, Horace G., Jr., and Raymond E. Adams, managed the
ranching empire after the father's death. Raymond was especially active,
buying shares from his brothers and sisters and expanding the original holdings. Horace G., Jr., retained part of the XI Ranch, while Raymond bought
most of the family's remaining land. Today the fourth generation of the
Adams family operates the large spread.
The Adams operation always included some of the best Herefords raised
in the West. Upbreeding bega n early with Gudgell & Simpson stock, followed
by Hazlett bulls and those from the Turner ranch in Oklahoma. The Adams
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Filling pit silo with winter feed. Courtesy of the Kansas State Board of
Agriculture.
family was among those ranchers who had their own purebred cattle for
raising breeding stock for the range herd. When the purebreds were finally
dispersed in 1940, they numbered well over a thousand head. Raymond Adams
also kept highly bred quarter horses for many years, dispersing them finally
during the early 1950s.29
The Adams cattle-feeding operation during the twenties, as well as the
operations of other producers, revealed a trend to marketing younger stock .
This was an attempt to cut costs by reducing the time that cattle spent maturing and fattening. "The day of the four-year-old steer is almost past," James
Tod noted about 1920. He and his father had a similar cattle-feeding operation next door to the Adamses. Along the same line, McCampbell reported
as early as 1922 that only 20 percent of the butcher stock purchased by packers
weighed over 1,300 pounds, whereas this class had dominated the slaughter
market before the war. Packers now preferred, he said, finished stock at 800
to 1,100 pounds. Many of these lighter cattle were around two years of age
when butchered. A year after McCampbell's observations, the Stockman noted
that 44 percent of the cattle on feed in Kansas were under 700 pounds and
only 1 percent were above 1,300 pounds. Although there was much variance
in the use of the term, the younger stock were often referred to as baby beef
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Filling a "corn crib" silo, Greeley County. Courtesy of the Kansas State
Board of Agriculture.

and, with growing frequency, were being creep-fed a grain supplement while
still running with their mothers. 30
The emphasis on younger stock developed in response to a number of
factors, but chief among them were the need to cut production costs through
feed and grain savings and the evolving consumer demand for smaller cuts
of meat. The war had contributed to the changing consumer preference,
because much of the large, aged beef-considered most desirable at the timewas shipped abroad for military consumption or for the Allies. The smaller
animals were relegated to the domestic table, and American consumers began
to develop a preference for them.
Cattlemen also learned that the four-year-old steer not only used more feed
but also wasted time in the fattening process. During the first two or three
years, much of the summer gain was lost during the winter months unless
a grain supplement was added to the roughage diet. Then, if too much gain
occurred during the winter, it might be lost the first part of the grazing
season. Stockmen were happy to adapt to a trend in the consumer market
which resulted in lower production costs, as most were convinced by this
time that, in the words of one cattleman, "it takes two pounds of gain to
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replace one pound of shrink." By the thirties some Kansas cattlemen kept
their older stock no more than two years, marketing it at 800 to 1,200 pounds,
while others, especially those in the Flint Hills, continued with their threeyear-old steers.31 Upbreeding, as noted earlier, was essential to the trend of
marketing younger beef, because the ability to finish quicker was to a large
degree bred into cattle.
While cattlemen adopted many of the practices that promised to reduce
costs, there were always risks involved. Improved methods that reduced
operating expenses were welcomed, but those that increased numbers of cattle
contributed as well to lower prices by creating surpluses. This enigma was
not uncommon for agricultural producers.
Certain costs were also reduced through cooperative action. KLA was
increasingly called upon during this period to assist with problems that
related more specifically to the production phase of the industry. KLA
proved to be a handy outlet for the stockmen's frustrations, an avenue through
which stockmen could conduct some of their business, and a source for much
of the advanced scientific thinking on production techniques.
Kansas cattlemen reacted differently toward their organization during
this depressed period than did stockmen in other parts of the West, as KLA
grew in strength while other associations declined. To the north, the associations in Nebraska, Wyoming, and South Dakota struggled to survive, especially during the 1920s. The Nebraska association may not have even met
during the early twenties; the South Dakota organization almost died; and
in Wyoming the cattlemen's group reported only 262 members in 1930. The
state associations in Colorado and Texas were somewhat stronger, but the one
in Colorado was preoccupied for much of the period with internal problems.
The Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association, created in 1921 by
the consolidation of two smaller organizations, was the only state association
in the West that rivaled KLA in strength.
The American National was active during this period, although there
was some indication that its policies tended to favor cow producers over
feeders and that it was not as concerned with marketing problems as some
cattlemen believed it should have been. In 1933, for example, a new organization known as the United States Livestock Association was founded. It was
almost exclusively concerned with marketing problems and appeared to be
primarily representative of midwestern stockmen, especially feeders. This
association claimed 15,000 members by 1934. Mercer and James Tod repre210
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sented Kansas cattlemen, and had advisory positions in the new organization.32
Kansas cattlemen, then, had the help of one of the strongest stock associations in America during the interwar period. Mercer was still "the engine
in the machine" that kept KLA going and its membership expanding. About
the time the postwar depression was being generally felt, KLA claimed that
with 10,000 members on the rolls "the Association is now the strongest live
stock organization in the United States, and we think we say without being
boastful that it is most effective." The Texas group, by comparison, reported
4,766 members at this time.
Membership, however, was not necessarily the most significant barometer
of strength. More important was the claim made midway through the interwar period that KLA represented some 85 percent of the Kansas beef industry.
And there is no reason to question this claim. Mercer himself referred to
KLA in 1920 as "one of the few really effective producers' organizations in
our country," well recognized in other states. A few years later he gave
much the same evaluation of KLA, but added that it "is representative not
only of Kansas livestock interests, but those of all mid-western and cornbelt
states." 33
Many of the same sentiments were aimed toward KLA during the 1930s.
An official of a Kansas City commission firm noted, for example, that "the
Kansas Live Stock Association has probably done as much or more than any
other association for the live stock interests not only of Kansas but of the
entire Southwest." Judging by the many activities of the organizationespecially in the marketing area and in the stockmen's relations with the
government-this claim was well founded, although the association did suffer
a severe loss in 1937 with the death of Mercer.34
William G. West, long-time friend and associate of Alf L andon and
Mercer, became the new executive secretary of KLA, a critical position if the
organization was to continue to be effective. But his tenure was cut short
by death less than a year after he had assumed the post. William J. Miller,
who served KLA as secretary for the next ten years, followed West.
Miller, who was also a close friend of Mercer, represented a family that
had long been active in Kansas politics and business, as well as farming and
ranching. Two brothers, William W . and Hiram B. Miller, had migrated
to Kansas after the Civil War and had gone into the mercantile business in
Osage City. As the business prospered, they purchased land. Hiram B.
eventually became active in cattle politics. He was a charter member of KLA
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and in 1910 was instrumental in its reorganization. By the time William J.
Miller, son of William W., became KLA executive secretary, descendants of
the two brothers controlled an insurance agency, a farm and grassland near
Osage City, a ranch and feeding plant near Miller, a farm near Topeka
where hogs were fattened on city garbage, and a hog serum plant in the
same city-all of which, acording to the Stockman, were minor businesses
compared to large ranch holdings in Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas.
Neither of the secretaries to follow Mercer, however, made any significant
changes in the work of KLA. The hard-working former schoolteacher had
established the pattern, and the organization carried on in much the same
way for many years. 35
In addition to educating readers through its journal; providing cattlemen
an annual opportunity to meet, learn, and negotiate business; and serving as
a continuous broker to match cattle with feed, KLA made a concerted effort
to stop cattle thefts, which increased during this period. Thefts increased during the interwar period for a variety of reasons, the most important of which
were the general economic slump, unemployment, and the availability of the
truck. The last had the most significant impact. With a truck for transportation, or even the back seat and trunk of a car, "backseat butchers" could
easily slaughter several animals and spirit them away under cover of darkness
to an unscrupulous meat dealer, butcher, or community sale, sometimes
located in another state.36
The economic cost of rustling for some producers was serious. A few
Kansas cattlemen reported losing more than fifty head in a single year, and it
was estimated that the state as a whole lost over $100,000 worth of cattle in
1937. Most years, however, losses were not as severe as this, but they were
still significant when profit margins were small. Preventive measures supported by KLA included offering rewards for the arrest and conviction of
thieves, support for the McCarran Bill, and brand inspection at the central
markets. The McCarran Bill, which proposed to make interstate transportation of stolen cattle a federal crime-was first vetoed by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, then finally passed in 1941.
Mercer also attempted to prevent any pardons being given to imprisoned
cattle thieves. Stockmen as a whole supported legislation to establish a statewide brand registration statute, a relatively late move to acquire such a law.
The legislature finally complied with their wishes in 1939, requiring that
brands be registered by the state rather than the county. The sanitary commissioner was charged with administration of the law until a state brand
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commissioner was created during the late 1940s. Cattle thefts had declined by
World War II, but they did not stop.
The new brand law had not required branding, only state registration
of brands if they were used. Nor did the law compel sellers of cattle to prove
ownership with a brand registration or bill of sale. Small sale rings across
the state opposed the latter requirements because of the added paper work.
About two hundred people were convicted of rustling during the first decade
of the law's operation, but stockmen again experienced a rash of rustling
during the early 1950s, perhaps because of poor economic conditions. The
KLA and the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) were both responsible
for reducing this profit-robbing activity, even though it was never eliminated.
The KBI, in fact, was organized largely because of agitation by stockmen
during the thirties for more state aid in preventing stock thefts.37
KLA also performed a valuable service for producers during the interwar
period by helping to establish the National Live Stock and Meat Board,
the first significant entry of the association into the retail dimension of the
meat industry. This unique organization-one of the first joint efforts by
producers, commission men, packers, and retailers, who were often considered
rivals in the meat trade-popularized meat-centered diets and expanded
markets through new merchandising techniques.
The idea that eventually led to the establishment of the Meat Board was
first presented at the 1919 KLA convention in Hutchinson by Thomas E.
Wilson, then president of Wilson & Company. He suggested that producers
cooperate with packers in organizing a committee to study marketing conditions. If successful, the cooperative group was to become permanent. KLA,
especially Mercer, was largely responsible for forming the Producers' Committee of 15, and for urging it to accomplish its work. But the committee, now
supported by several other stock associations in the West and Midwest, found
many disagreements between range men of the West and feeders of the
Midwest. For almost three years the group languished in uncertainty as to
the direction it should take. Henry C. Wallace, the secretary of agriculture
and chairman of the committee, preferred to concentrate on marketing ills
rather than those in retailing, and was largely responsible for blocking any
action until the present Meat Board was finally decided upon in 1922.
Extremes in the literature published by those who either opposed or
advocated meat diets did much to encourage action by the Meat Board. Some
writers of the time denounced meat because of the ill effects it supposedly
had on the public's health, while others made ridiculous claims in their
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defense of meat. One Kansas producer, obviously prejudiced, insisted that
every "great man we ever produced was a great meat eater or consumer,
from George Washington down to Joe Mercer." His enthusiasm grew as he
warmed to his subject: "If you want to look like real men and women," he
said, "eat meat. But if you want to look like a pig-tailed Chinaman, just live
like one, don't eat any meat; eat rice. Show me a nation on the face of the
earth that amounts to anything that doesn't eat meat." Frank W. Atkinson,
KLA president at the time, expressed similar sentiments a few years later.
After reminding his listeners that the strong ate meat and not "prunes, sardines and grapes," Atkinson suggested that "if the hard boiled Irish could only
have been taught to raise more beef and less hell and potatoes, the British
Empire today would be calling their Prince of Wales, Mike, and their King,
Patrick the 27th."38
The new board immediately launched a number of research and education programs in an attempt to protect meat from adverse publicity. Financial
support came from a voluntary five-cent contribution from producers for each
car of stock sold along with the same amount from the buyer of each car. The
assessment was later advanced to twenty-five cents a car, and eventually to
a few cents per head when railroads were no longer the principal carriers of
livestock.
It is impossible to evaluate precisely the contributions of the Meat Board,
as no one knows what meat consumption would have been without its services. Almost certainly, though, consumption of meat was increased by the
board's efforts. Serious research projects, educational endeavors, and other
promotional activities have characterized the board's work for over half a
century. Mercer, who was chairman of the board for several years, Dan Casement, John A. Edwards, W. R. Stubbs, Will Miller, and A. G. Pickett are
only a few of the Kansans who served the board that KLA had such a large
part in founding. 39

The individual cattleman, then, could lessen a few of his production costs,
but not many to any significant degree. Most remote from his influence were
such factors as the total number of stock on the market, feed costs, market
prices, and land values. Those factors that were generally beyond the influence
of producers were frequently the most important. Prices, for example, both
those paid and received, always remained beyond the producers' influence. Yet
cattlemen came through the two severe depressions of this period as well as
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any other agricultural producers, and maybe better than most. Times were
hard and some producers were forced out of business, but the price of cattle
always seemed to rally before that of many other agricultural products. The
consumer's preference for meat, and his inability to find an acceptable substitute, played a large part in this. When he could afford it, he ate meat,
especially beef.
Some of the state's cattlemen who had reasonably stable operations even
used this generally depressed period to expand their holdings. If his ranching
enterprise did not have large debts held over from World War I, a cattleman
was in a good position to seek new capital from outside the cattle industry.
The Robbins family, for example, had neither large debts nor a shortage of
capital when the beef industry turned sour between the wars. They expanded
their operations and by the 1940s had become the largest cattlemen in the
state. The Robbinses were certainly some of the best managers of ranching
property in Kansas.
William Webster Robbins, a Connecticut Yankee from near Wethersfield,
had migrated to Kansas in 1883 to help establish the small town of Norwich,
southwest of Wichita in Kingman County. The family was already prominent
in Connecticut, having migrated to America in the 1680s, and had money
for investment. Robbins used his capital first for a bank in Norwich, then a
small ranch near the old English settlement of Runnymede. Edward Denmore Robbins, a brother of William Webster and chief counsel for the New
York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, sent additional capital for buying
land. When William Webster, the youngest of the Robbins brothers, died in
1916, the partnership had some 20,000 acres of good range land around Norwich and near Belvidere in Kiowa County. The expansion that was to follow,
however, dwarfed these already significant holdings.
Edward Chester Robbins, son of William, returned from World War I
in 1919 to manage the property for his uncle. Here was the ranching genius
of the family, the man most responsible for expanding the 20,000 acres into
a ranching domain that came to be owned by a half-dozen sons and daughters
of the original two brothers. Although most of the other Robbins men were
Yale graduates, Edward did not graduate from the university. He did have
two years at the revered institution and often prided himself on having several
Yale graduates on his payroll. No dilettante rancher was he, however. Edward
Robbins was a practical man with good sense about cattle and land, popular
in cattle circles, and patient enough not to expand more rapidly than the family's fortunes allowed.
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Edward Robbins was joined in the ranching business by two brothers,
Martin H., during the early thirties, and Richard W., a few years later. The
latter had recently retired from the presidency of Transcontinental and Western
Airline, now TWA. Richard was also a long-time director of the Santa Fe
Railroad, as well as of several other large companies. When Richard became
actively involved with ranching, he purchased for his headquarters the beautiful Rockefeller ranch near Belvidere, which had been established by the industrial family several decades before. The Rockefeller ranch was only a few
miles from Edward's home.
By World War II, after two decades under Edward's guiding hand, more
than 70,000 acres of grass were owned by the Robbinses in the Belvidere area
and in the Flint Hills to the east, much of which was purchased when small
ranchers were forced out of business by the depression. They also rented some
land in the state, and had a long-term lease on 75,000 acres of the Anchor D
Ranch in the Oklahoma Panhandle.
The Robbinses had begun ranching with grade cattle mixed with fine
Shorthorns, but turned to Herefords during the twenties. By using the best
purebred bulls available, the family was soon producing some of the best
commercial whitefaces in the state, cattle that were eagerly sought by feeders
in the area and in the Midwest. Herefords remained the hallmark of the
ranch until Robbins initiated crossbreeding with Angus cattle during the
1940s, but a large number of straight-bred Herefords still remain on the
ranch today.
The normal procedure while Edward managed the property was to keep
most of the cow herd in Oklahoma, carry yearlings for a year on the grass
near Belvidere, then send two-year-old stock to the Flint Hills for a few
months of additional maturing. From the last area the cattle were shipped
to market for slaughter or for additional fattening in a feedlot. For a long
time a few carloads of Robbins cattle were shipped each year to Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, where one or two at a time were bought and carefully fattened
under the watchful eyes of Amish farmers.
A maximum of 6,000 cows and a total cattle population of over 15,000
grazed the short grass of the Robbins spread during the late forties, although
fewer cattle were usually kept, especially during times of drought. Grass in
the Flint Hills, however, enabled the Robbinses to survive the dry 1930s and
1950s in reasonably good shape. Before the hard times of the thirties forced
Edward to devote all his energy to saving the cow herd, he also had other
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livestock interests-he had kept three large flocks of sheep in addition to raising several thousand turkeys and several hundred hogs.
In 1958 the Robbinses' operation experienced a significant change when a
natural gas field, eventually consisting of over thirty wells was developed on
their Kansas land. The family then consolidated its land interests, dropped
their lease on the Oklahoma property, and reduced their cow herd considerably. With income from sources other than cattle, their Kansas grass was
carefully protected from overgrazing.
A number of ranchers would probably have expanded still further with
the added wealth of gas production, but not the Robbinses. Edward and
Richard were both getting older and beginning to disengage themselves from
managerial duties. Edward died in 1967, Richard a few years later. Today
many of the family's interests are managed by Evan Koger, a grandson of
the founder of the Kansas ranch and nephew of Edward and Richard. Koger,
a Yale graduate with a passion for scuba diving, grew up on the ranch,
learning the finer points of the business from Edward. All of the Kansas
land that was acquired by the Robbinses is still in their possession. The
outside capital that was available at critical periods and the superb management of Edward Robbins were indispensable for the rapid expansion that
occurred during the abnormally depressed period between the wars. 40

Although few ranchers were as successful as the Robbinses, the growth that
did occur helped to make beef the single most important agricultural product
in the state by 1940. An examination of the cash receipts for Kansas farmers
and ranchers from the marketing of major farm commodities during this
period supports the increasing importance of cattle to the Kansas economy,
as well as the stockman's advantage over the grain farmer (Figures 9-12) .41
During the period 1920 to 1940, cash receipts from all livestock and its products
averaged over 61 percent of total farm income for Kansans, compared to only
about 32 percent for all field crops. Government payments made up the remainder, averaging a little over 12 percent of the total in 1935 and 1940. Cash
receipts from marketing cattle and calves alone averaged almost 29 percent
of the total income, while that from wheat was about 23 percent. The percentage of income from beef actually increased during the depression and
drought of the 1930s, while that from wheat and crops as a whole declined
significantly. Moreover, income from beef cattle became even more dominant in the Kansas farm economy after 1940. 42
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Figure 9. Percentage of Farm Cash Receipts from the Marketing of Major
Kansas Commodities, Plus Government Payments, 1925
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The acreage devoted to wheat expanded somewhat between the wars;
but when the whole period is considered, the state's cattlemen lost relatively
few acres of grass to expanding crop lands. The grass lost in the twenties was
partially regained in the thirties. During the whole period, grazing land totaled
between eighteen and twenty million acres, or roughly 40 percent of the state's
fifty-two million acres. The expansion of wheat during the 1930s came mostly
as a result of decreases in other crops; corn acreage, for instance, declined
over four million acres. 43
Nor was the expansion of wheat necessarily detrimental to the beef industry, which actually expanded along with wheat during much of the time.
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Figure 10. Percentage of Farm Cash Receipts from the Marketing of Major
Kansas Commodities, Plus Government Payments, 1930
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When prices were low, wheat was sometimes fed to stock; but more important
was the growing practice of grazing cattle on fall wheat. Large numbers of
cattle were actually shipped into the state for this purpose, then sent on to
grass during the early spring. Other crops were also grazed, and an increasing
number of acres were devoted to forage crops for livestock. The increased
grass and feed that became available as the tractor replaced the horse also
aided the cattlemen. The number of tractors in the state shot up from 17,177
to 95,139 between 1920 and 1940, helping to produce enough additional feed
for a million head of cattle or more. 44
The lessons of the drought and depressions of the 1920s and 1930s were
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Figure 1 I. Percentage of Farm Cash Receipts from the Marketing of Major
Kansas Commodities, Plus Government Payments, 1935
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taught in a hard school, but they were important. Improved tillage and soil
conservation practices were encouraged, corn tended to give way to wheat in
parts of the state, and stockmen became more concerned with conserving feed
and building reserve supplies. The government was instrumental in some of
these developments. There was also more diversification in Kansas agriculture
as a result of the drought, and many farmers who had depended almost exclusively on crops began to keep a few beef cattle. Although the lessons were
hard, most farmers and ranchers learned them well. When the time came
for high-geared production during the 1940s, Kansans were ready to meet the
challenge. 45
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Figure 12. Percentage of Farm Cash Receipts from the Marketing of Major
Kansas Commodities, Plus Government Payments, 1940
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10
Outside Help: Cattlemen
Look to Washington, 1920-1940

Some historians see the depression after World War I as a watershed in the
history of American agriculture. During that time, technology, among other
factors, enabled producers to supply far more than could be consumed, but
the cost of production was much greater. Society began to question more than
it ever had before whether rural life was actually superior to an urban existence, as many people had thought it to be. But most important in making this
depressed period a landmark was the increased willingness of farmers and
ranchers to seek government relief. The war had taught agricultura l producers
that government action could change economic conditions during an emergency in wartime, and many producers came to believe that the government
might also deal with economic emergencies in a time of peace as well. As a
result, rural folk spent more time and energy attempting to persuade the government to abandon its laissez-faire attitude toward agriculture .1
Kansas cattlemen were among the first organized rural groups to seek
government help during the postwar period. As early as the fall of 1919
a group gathered at the Muehlebach Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, to
plan strategy for a Chicago meeting with the Big Five Packers and for
a visit with government officia ls in Washington. Walter R. Stubbs was elected
chairman of the group, which also included Joseph H. Mercer, George Donaldson, Dan D. Casement, John A. Edwards, and some forty others, all prominent
in the Kansas beef industry.
In Chicago the delegation questioned the meat processors about declining
livestock prices. To account for the decline, the packers cited the FTC investigation, the government-encou raged unrest over food prices, and the fear
of restrictive legislation . They finally passed the buck on to Washington.
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The cattlemen, although not necessarily convinced of the packers' innocence, departed the following day for Washington, where they eventually met
with Kansas legislators, USDA officials, and Attorney General Palmer. Stubbs,
with obvious contradiction, criticized the secretary of agriculture for failing
to obtain both higher meat tariffs and more foreign markets, while KLA
President George Donaldson berated Palmer for his stand against the packers'
supposed hoarding of meat. After some debate, the attorney general promised
that there would be no prosecution for the alleged hoarding; thus, the packers
should not fear government intervention in slaughtering for storage. But, he
added, his office would continue to urge regulation of the large meat processors.
Before returning to Kansas the disparity between livestock and retail
meat prices was graphically demonstrated to the disgruntled cattlemen at a
local eating establishment. "Thin slices of roast beef cost more in Washington
for the delegation than a cow would cost in Kansas," Edwards snorted, and
many of the Kansas cattlemen protested by eating a fish supper. "They
couldn't afford beef. Stubbs took soup," Edwards added. Then Edwards
turned his wrath toward retailers, claiming that they added 100 percent to
the carcass price of meat as their gross profit. "It is disheartening to realize,"
Edwards continued, "that the charge from the butchers' block to the consumers' kitchen is as much per animal as the cost of raising, grazing, feeding,
fattening, and marketing the animal, plus the freight, the commission, the
packing house expense and profit, plus freight to the retail shop." 2
After returning to Chicago to report that the packers were safe from
prosecution for hoarding, the Kansas delegation returned home. Nothing
significant resulted from the expedition, but the protesting delegation from
Kansas was part of the larger movement that worked for the adoption of the
Packer Consent Decree and eventually the Packers and Stockyard Act. The
trip to Washington illustrated the growing recognition by Kansas cattlemen
that government action was an essential part of the solution to their difficulties.

After their success in getting the Packer Consent Decree and the Packers
and Stockyards Act, stockmen turned to other areas in which they believed
government action could aid the industry, concentrating first on higher tariffs,
then on agricultural credit.3 Most farm representatives were convinced that
high protective tariffs were necessary for agriculture to prosper. Industry,
they reasoned, prospered behind tariff walls; why not agriculture? The
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Democrats' Underwood Tariff, they believed, was based on the folly of free
trade.
Likening agriculture to industry was a delusion, however. The two
sectiors of the economy were not comparable in all respects, agriculture's
inability to control production being the most notable difference. What United
States agriculture really needed at the time was not the reduced foreign
markets that resulted from higher tariffs, but rather low tariffs to encourage
larger exports. The simple fact that before foreign countries bought they
must first sell was passed over in favor of the clearer lesson-at least in the
minds of producers-that was gleaned from the growth of manufacturing as
a result of high duties. The delusion, of course, was understandable; yet, the
success of agricultural interests in getting higher tariffs probably worked to
their ultimate disadvantage.
In 1921 Congress passed the Emergency Tariff Act, which, at the urging
of the farm bloc, included prohibitive duties on twenty-eight agricultural
commodities, including wheat, corn, meat, sugar, and wool. This temporary
protectionist measure was made permanent by the Fordney-McCumber Act
the following year. Both tariffs included duties on manufactured goods,
which farmers and ranchers increasingly realized caused them higher production costs; but they were willing to trade rising tariffs on manufactured goods
for the right to set those on farm products about as high as they wanted them.
Imported beef was taxed at three cents a pound and lamb at four cents, compared to one and a half cents and two cents in 1909, a relatively high tariff
year itself. Live cattle were taxed at an ascending rate, depending upon their
weight, ranging from $1.50 to $2.50 per hundred.
Kansas cattlemen applauded these duties, as did most other stockmen,
.1 \though some mid western feeders complained about the high tariffs on imported stockers and feeders when the domestic supply began to appear inadequate. Kansas stockmen, however, were unsympathetic toward lower tariffs
on live cattle. When fifty-four carloads of Canadian feeders arrived in the
state during a single week in 1927, Mercer fired off letters to Senators Arthur
Capper and Charles Curtis demanding much higher duties.4
Agriculture did not respond to the high tariff rates as well as producers
had hoped, and shortly after the Fordney-McCumber Tariff became law, they
began advocating additional rates. Imported hides were an article of special
concern, as the tariffs of the early twenties had left hides on the free list.
Duties were added later, but many cattlemen believed that they were too low.
Over 35 percent of the hides used in the United States, Mercer claimed in

225

The Kansas Beef Industry

1925, came from Mexico and South American countries. This was an outrage
to the domestic cattle producers, he felt, and it had caused cattlemen to lose
$225 million over the previous five years.
Nor did the high tariffs exclude all canned meats. A 1926 issue of the
Kansas Stockman reported that Rodney Edward, a Kansas stockman-farmer,
was recovering "from the shock of learning that for some time he had been
eating Argentina and Uruguay canned beef." Fresh meat and livestock from
South American countries were excluded, due to the fear of importing hoofand-mouth disease, but canned meats and cured hides were allowed to enter.
The low South American production costs, cattlemen believed, were unfair
competition. They were especially outraged when some of them discovered
that they were eating the lower-priced, imported product without knowing it.
"Here am I," Edward grumbled, "a cattleman in the heart of the cattle country, buying and eating South American beef."
The effect of imports on domestic prices, however, was not nearly as great
as cattlemen generally believed. According to one study, the quantity of
imports was so small compared to domestic production, and the amount of
beef consumed was so elastic, that tariffs could not be blamed for declining
prices. It also revealed that complete exclusion of foreign beef would have
done little to raise prices. 5
Despite this study on the effects of the tariff, however, most stockmen
demanded higher and higher tariffs. Mercer made several trips to Washington
during the second half of the decade to spur Congress toward that goal. In
1928 he advocated tariffs levels three times higher than the existing duties;
a year later he testified that over 206 million pounds of meat and meat products
were being imported each year, to the decided detriment of American cattlemen. Congress failed to act, however, until the 1930 passage of the HawleySmoot Tariff. This pushed protection to an all-time high with ad valorem
rates estimated to be up 30 to 40 percent. Over seventy farm products were
included among the protected items, including a 10 percent ad valorem rate
on hides and shoes.
Mercer proudly remarked that it was "the best tariff agricultural and
livestock interests have ever had," and that stockmen finally had what they
wanted with this new tariff-except, one might add, higher stock prices. But
by this time their problems were more serious than the threat from imported
meat, and the long-sought tariffs did nothing to improve the declining state
of agriculture.
Mercer had worked hard to sell Congress on higher duties but, curiously,
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had passed up a Coolidge appointment to the Tariff Commission, where he
might have been influential in effecting higher rates sooner than 1930. Mercer's refusal-at the urging of the KLA executive committee-illustrated the
value they placed on his services to the industry as a whole in many areas
besides tariffs. Mercer and a number of other agricultural leaders continued
to work for still higher duties, even after the Hawley-Smoot Tariff helped
set off a wave of increased duties throughout the world. In the end, agricultural prices remained low, and United States exports declined over 75 percent
between 1929 and 1933. 6
When the Trade Agreements Act was considered in 1934, cattlemen and
most other agrarians labored diligently to defeat the new thinking on import/
export trade. They were unsuccessful, however, and a tradition of almost forty
years of rising tariffs was reversed when Congress authorized the executive
branch to raise or lower duties through reciprocal trade agreements. Tariffs,
of course, could be raised, but many farmers and ranchers knew that the
trend would be toward lower duties. The most-favored nation principle of
the new agreements was also anathema to many rural groups.
By 1939 some twenty-two reciprocal agreements were in force. Average
duties had declined from 46.7 to 40.7 percent, and the quantity of United
States imports and exports had gone up. The value of United States crop
exports, however, remained about the same throughout the whole period from
1932 to 1938, although quantities increased when conditions allowed surpluses.
Low prices kept the total value stable. Beef exports remained essentially the
same throughout the whole decade of the thirties, never exceeding 1 percent
of domestic production and usually staying closer to 0.5 percent.7
Cattle and beef imports were slightly higher than exports, amounting to
2.8 percent of home production in 1930. They declined from that the next
few years, but then climbed to 3.3 percent in 1935 and 4.8 percent by 1939.
Rising imports were triggered by lowered tariffs, by decreased domestic supplies, and by rising cattle prices toward the end of the decade. Much of the
canned meat reportedly came from American-owned packing companies in
South America. The live imports were principally the stocker-feeder class
from Mexico and Canada, after both countries had negotiated reciprocal
treaties with the United States. Combined imports from these neighboring
countries amounted to over 744,000 live cattle in 1939.
Most cattlemen were enraged over the imports, and had few kind words
for Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his reciprocity schemes. "The cattlemen and sheepmen have been sold down the river by a bunch of brain trust-
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ers," one Kansan remarked; but, in fact, the imports had little effect on the
industry. Midwestern feeders were usually happy that the foreign cattle were
available, and it is doubtful that enough stock or meat was imported to affect
market prices seriously. In addition, a meat embargo continued to protect
cattlemen against large shipments from Argentina, one of the world's leading
beef-producing countries. World . War II and disruptions in world trade
occurred, however, before any accurate measure of the effects of these increased
imports was determined. 8

Throughout the decades following World War I farmers and ranchers sought
additional government programs to assist agriculture. Marketing was their
principal area of concern during the twenties, but there was much demand
for programs that would aid them in production as well. The McNary-Haugen
proposal, which resulted in a long and sometimes bitter fight, is a good
example of the kind of aid they sought. Originated in large part by George
N. Peek and espoused by the "red-headed, pipe smoking Secretary of Agriculture" Henry C. Wallace, the McNary-Haugen proposal called for a twoprice system for basic agricultural commodities, including cattle, sheep, and
swine. Cattle, however, were dropped as a basic commodity after a temporary
rise in prices around 1926. Behind protective tariff walls, high prices were
to be set for domestic agricultural products, while surpluses were to be purchased by the government and dumped on the international market at whatever price they might bring. The proposal, however, was never given a trial.
It was defeated in Congress during the early twenties, then failed twice to get
President Coolidge's approval during the last years of the decade.9
Coolidge, of course, held the trump card on the McNary-Haugen proposal and used it, but dissension within agriculture's ranks also contributed
to its defeat. While the Plains cattlemen generally favored the bill as long as
beef was considered a basic commodity, there were some who advocated its
defeat. William J. Tod, former president of KLA, and Dan D. Casement
were two Kansas cattlemen who were much opposed to this particular type
of government intervention. Most cattlemen in the state, however, appeared
to favor the McNary-Haugen idea, especially before cattle were excluded as a
basic commodity. Mercer repeatedly argued for direct government support. To
critics who cried "socialism" and "class legislation," he replied, "Why not?"
Other sectors of the economy, he said, profited from government help. Now
it was agriculture's turn for aid in its time of crisis. McNary-Haugenites even
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received support from the bastion of republicanism at Emporia headed by
William Allen White. He had made a study of local indebtedness early in
1922 and concluded that "the mortgage records in Lyon County indicate that
in a few years we shall have a peasantry instead of an independent manhood
upon the western farms" unless the government became more involved with
agriculture. But support from Kansas was insufficient to carry the day. 10
While the McNary-Haugen Bill was being debated, Mercer and others
advocated an agricultural commission with power to balance production and
consumption as well as to make desirable changes in marketing and distribution. Organizations like the trade associations and large business combinations
of urban industries served as the pattern. The consolidation in nonagricultural
sectors of the economy resulted in less competition, Mercer and others pointed
out, and had a large effect on their successful existence. In a letter to President
Coolidge in 1924, Mercer noted that the country had sufficiently catalogued and
discussed the needs of agriculture. "Hence our conclusion," he continued,
"that a permanent federal agricultural commission with authority of law
would be of far greater consequence in solving the perplexing and difficult
problems of agriculture than continued investigations." Marketing problems,
Mercer believed, were the key to most of agriculture's difficulties. He also
proposed that the commission be empowered to establish what he referred to
as systematic production. Few details of what systematic production meant
were supplied to the press, but Mercer appeared to have m mind a vague
notion of production controls.
Once Mercer's letter to the president was published m the Stockman,
there was much response from cattlemen in the area. Judging from letters
that were published, Mercer's idea was favored by about eight to one. Some
of the letters suggested various modifications, but essentially they all favored
some type of government control of production, price fixing, or systematic
marketing. One perceptive writer even suggested that a producer's attitude
toward government aid was based not so much on philosophy as it was on
his degree of financial solvency. "The greatest foe of agriculture," wrote John
S. Hill, a Kansas hog producer, "is in the ranks of the farmers themselves,
and consists of the man who has made his, while land was cheap and easy
to get, and refuses to see [that] the younger man [is hampered] by reason of
modern conditions."
A few letters in opposition to Mercer's proposal were also published, and,
in accordance with Hill's reasoning, several of them were from well-established producers. Tod, for instance, wrote Mercer, "I dread to think that you
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have inhaled some of the dust from such a deadly fungus as the McNaryHaugen bill." Another view illustrated that some stockmen had already
despaired of ever getting any government aid and questioned its effectiveness
even if it should materialize. Charles E. Collins-Kansas farmer-stockman,
Colorado banker, and manufacturer of veterinary supplies-who had supported
earlier efforts for government aid, now wrote to Mercer that he had "about
reached the conclusion that the thing for the producers to do is to just stay
at home and work like hell and not know anything, and he will think things
are alright." Collins continued, all "we know about agriculture, econom:c
questions, agronomy, astronomy, astrology, bacteriology, butrology, pessorallgy, plokfhiechanisjehanbosne [sic], and every other damn thing that one
could know [has not been] worth a five cent piece . . . . The less you know,
the less you worry." He failed to explain, however, how ignorance and less
worry might raise prices.
The Manhattan stock feeder and showman Dan D. Casement was also
among those who condemned government-aid proposals at this time. Casement had been educated at Princeton University-he was said to be the only
stockman in the country who recited Browning to his cattle and Horace to
his horses-before he assumed control of a ranch in Colorado, a farm in Ohio,
and a spread a few miles north of Manhattan known as Juniata Farm. It was
reported that he would spend days riding the ranges of the Matador Land
and Cattle Company looking for a "wonder calf" to be fattened and sent to
stock shows. Frequently, Casement's feeder and fat stock won top prizes at
the nation's major stock shows.
Throughout his life Casement was unalterably opposed to what he called
government handouts to agriculture. He opposed the McNary-Haugen Bill,
Mercer's proposal for an agricultural commission, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), and any other plan that appeared to compromise what he
considered to be the traditional values of rural America. In 1926 Casement
wrote that "the farm is the last fortress of individualism in a new social order,
governed by group interests and complicated by the complexities of modern
mass life." Legislation could not reverse the laws of nature that sent or withheld moisture, nor, he believed, could it affect the economic law of supply
and demand. This opposition to government aid during the twenties proved
to be only a warm-up for the vast opportunities that Casement would have
to oppose such aid during the following decade.11
There was, then, some opposition in Kansas to almost all the proposed
aids to agriculture, including Mercer's agricultural comm1ss10n. But Mercer's
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plan generally had wide support within the state, even though it implied
much more control over production than many other proposals did. How
much Mercer's thinking influenced the shaping of the Farm Board, which
was eventually created by the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act, was not completely clear. Most likely it had little more influence than most of the other
proposals that came to Washington during this decade, and the suggestions
for agricultural relief were legion. Will Rogers once remarked during the
twenties that "farmers have had more advice and less relief than a wayward
son. If advice sold for 10 cents a column, farmers would be richer than bootleggers." Rogers was not far off the mark. 12

The postwar financial situation also illustrated that farmers and ranchers
encouraged a larger government role in their industry. As the bottom dropped
from under wartime prices and the easy money for agricultural expansion
began to dry up, many producers believed that the federal government was
obligated to provide credit and debt relief. The government, they noted correctly, had encouraged much of the expanded debt, yet obligations contracted
during the heady days of the war were almost impossible to repay once
deflation began. To make the situation even tighter, there were stepped-up
demands by a number of banks for the repayment of existing loans. Even the
Federal Reserve made credit more difficult to obtain in 1920 by temporarily
imposing progessively higher discount rates for larger loans. Farmers and
ranchers naturally and legitimately began to desire government relief.
Agricultural credit needs varied a great deal. Land purchases, for example, required loans for as long as forty years, while loans on cattle were
needed for from three months to four years. All loans, according to borrowers, should be at low interest rates.
Credit for the beef industry at this time, as in the past, came mostly from
private sources. The Federal Reserve Banks were of little help, as the sixmonth limit on discounted paper helped only feeders. Stockmen complained
that the Federal Reserve kept interest too high-around 6 percent during the
1920s-and was too restrictive in making loans. The Federal Land Banks
were not of much help in the area of long-term credit, as the amount the
banks loaned even to their select clientele was usually quite small. In 1923
the maximum was increased from $10,000 to $25,000-at 5.5 percent-but even
this failed to alleviate the scarcity of credit, as few borrowers qualified for
the maximum amount. In 1924, for instance, the average Federal Land Bank
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loan in Kansas was only $4,198, hardly enough to buy much of a farm or
ranch. Just as important was the absence of intermediate credit, a system that
provided loans for the several years that they were often needed.
The first attempt to correct the credit situation for cattlemen was a
cooperative effort by the Stock Growers' Finance Corporation, which discounted its first cattle paper in 1921. Almost $50 million, including $1.3 million from seventeen institutions in Kansas City and $150,000 from twelve in
Wichita, was pledged to a pool for discounting loans. The rate was 7 percent,
but the loans were renewable for up to thirty months in order to provide
capital for herd owners who were breeding cattle. M. L. McClure, a former
Kansan with Federal Reserve experience, headed the institution. Kansas
cattlemen were optimistic at first, but when they realized that prospective
loans still had to qualify under Federal Reserve standards and that discount
rates were 1 percent higher than those of the Federal Reserve, their optimism
evaporated. And this was the case across the nation, as only about $20 million of the available money was ever loaned.
Stockmen continued to press for government action, and finally in 1921
Congress authorized the War Finance Corporation-replaced by the Agricultural Credit Corporation in 1924-to rediscount the cattle paper of private
lending institutions. This paper was discounted at 5.5 percent for a six-month
loan and at 6 percent for an advance that lasted a year. Most important for
a large number of borrowers were the practices of granting loans that did not
qualify under Federal Reserve standards, of loaning nearly the full value of
a herd, and of accepting feed as part of the collateral.
Over $300 million was pumped into the cattle industry by the War Finance
Corporation by the middle twenties, and this no doubt saved a number of
stockmen from disaster. Some banks and a few cattlemen, according to
Mercer, complained of the red tape-the initial application was thirteen pages
of detailed items-but the major complaint was that these efforts were also
too small for the need that existed. By the end of 1922, for instance, Kansas
stockmen had received $3.5 million from the corporation, or, according to
Mercer, only 20 percent of what was actually needed. But, in view of the
declining market for livestock at this time, additional capital might have resulted in unnecessary expansion and even lower prices.
Congress in 1923 also created twelve Intermediate Credit Banks in an
effort to satisfy long-term capital needs. Loans to cooperative marketing
agencies were also a prime consideration of these institutions. They provided
some relief, but they became of more importance during the next decade.
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When cattle prices improved after the middle twenties, the pressure for
government-secured loans declined as private sources again became willing to
satisfy much of the demand. In the end, the government venture, notably
that of the War Finance Corporation, had been only moderately successful.
Producers suffered at the end of the decade from much the same lack of
long-term, low-interest credit as before. But they did not forget the government's efforts during the early twenties. When the severe depression of the
next decade settled down upon their mortgaged farms and stock, they again
turned to Washington for relief .13
The government's involvement in agricultural credit during the thirties
became increasingly complicated and even more extensive than it had been
before. Most important to the producer was the fact that the involvement became permanent. Credit for farmers and ranchers became critical after the
crash in 1929, although bankers were slow to admit it. Many lending institutions, some capriciously and others to protect their depositors, not only
refused to make loans for agricultural purposes but also called in existing
loans or refused extensions. The Stockman noted in 1931 that the large banks
in Kansas had "their vaults filled with money," yet refused to grant loans
that they would have readily accepted only two years before. During the
early thirties, there was little doubt that immediate and long-term credit was
one of agriculture's greatest needs, but many banks were slow to agree. Mercer
polled most of the state's bankers during 1930 and found that nearly half of
those polled said no to the question asking if there was a need for long-term
agricultural credit, or failed to respond . Freight rates, in the bankers' view,
were the most serious problem confronting producers. 14
Along with calls for general inflation-one stockman-banker, Charles E.
Collins, suggested that the government print and issue $100 milion in greenbacks each month and then recall them at a rate of $50 million per month
after the depression-Kansas producers turned increasingly to governmental
agencies for credit. Until the New Deal period they were continually disappointed. Federal Land Banks did not compensate for the decline in commercial credit, even though Congress during the early thirties tripled the money
available to them. The Intermediate Credit Banks had never been very effective, although some $64 million was dispensed or discounted between 1929
and 1933 in the whole Tenth Federal Reserve District, the unit which includes Kansas. There was some additional help from the Regional Production
Association which was created in 1932. Using funds from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, the Production Credit Association that was located in
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Wichita had loaned about $10 million by April, 1933. A prominent Kansas
banker-cattleman, Cal Floyd, directed the Wichita institution and believed
that it was "one of the greatest movements the government had ever undertaken." There was criticism, however, because many applicants were turned
away. Those who received loans complained of the slowness with which the
paperwork was done. 15
Although inadequate, as far as farmers and ranchers were concerned, all
the government efforts in the field of agricultural credit from the time of
President Wilson were important as a foundation for subsequent programs.
The desperate financial condition of American agriculture compelled President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to take speedy action soon after he took office. Within
a few months of his inauguration the president had created the Farm Credit
Administration (FCA) by executive order, and Congress had passed major
agricultural legislation, including the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act. These measures combined the government
programs providing credit to agricultural producers and placed the various
institutions under the governor of FCA.
The FCA supervised and coordinated several major efforts to supply more
credit. To aid the Federal Land Banks, Land Bank Commissioner Loans
were created, primarily to assist with a second mortgage those farmers and
ranchers who were already obligated. Foreclosure of farms in the Tenth
Federal Reserve District declined from 167 to 94 the first two years the commissioner loans were available. Production and marketing loans were also
made by the Intermediate Credit Banks. By discounting the paper of the
Production Credit Corporation, the ICB supervised local associations of
producers and made loans to local marketing and purchasing cooperative
agencies. Later, they began to discount loans made by the Farm Security
Administration-now called the Farmers Home Administration-which
proved to be especially helpful to small ranchers. 16
Most cattlemen were delighted with New Deal efforts in this area. Among
the advantages in the new system were relatively low interest rates, expanded
rather than reduced credit during emergencies, and local management for the
production and cooperative associations. An indirect benefit was the fact that
ranchers and farmers were forced to keep better records of their operations.
Since the thirties the federal system has generally satisfied a large part of the
credit needs of range stock.men. Feeders, however, have depended more on
commercial institutions; but they, too, have indirectly benefited from the
government's efforts. Several Kansas cattlemen publicly lauded these aids
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to the beef industry, and just a few months before his untimely death Mercer
noted that "probably the greatest aid government has rendered agriculture
as a whole has been in extending financial help to distressed farmers and
stockmen." 17
Despite all the government aid, however, commercial lending institutions
were still the dominant source of agricultural credit in 1941, holding 62 percent of the farm mortgages and 70 percent of the outstanding short-term
credit. More convenient locations, less red tape, and the traditional patterns
of rural borrowing helped account for this. Private institutions obviously
served a vital need, but because of their obligations to depositors and shareholders their effectiveness was limited during the thirties. One historian has
written that commercial banks have tended to be "fair-weather friends, ready
to supply credit when it was easy to get and to people who had little difficulty
getting it anywhere; but were conspicuously absent in times of stress or for
the person who was not the choicest client." The government system created
during the New Deal did much to correct this situation. 18
President Hoover, the last Republican president until after World War II,
made a final attempt to aid the agricultural sector, but those ranchers who
advocated a larger government role were disappointed with his Agricultural
Marketing Act. Although stockmen were better off than dirt farmers during
the late twenties, they still expected help. The act, for the most part, was
designed to assist cattlemen in marketing their stock through cooperatives. A
lot of talk about production controls and price setting emanated from the
Farm Board that was created by the act, but little was accomplished by what
some referred to as the Republican 4-H Club of Hoover, Hyde, Hell, and
High Taxes. 19 Hyde was secretary of agriculture in Hoover's Cabinet.
Mercer and a number of Kansas cattlemen parted company with the
Farm Board over its decision to aid stockmen only through bona fide existing
or newly created cooperative associations rather than established livestock
organizations. The board's proposals for orderly marketing, the expected but
undefined effects that this would have on production, and the establishment
of an agency to provide more marketing information were not foreign to
Mercer's thinking. In fact, he claimed early in 1930 that "the Kansas Livestock Association was destined to take a major part in the new evolution of
the livestock industry which is being sponsored by the government." But
Mercer and KLA, like many other agricultural representatives, wanted more
than the board offered, and at the very least expected KLA to participate on
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an equal basis with cooperative associations in any decisions related to the
state's livestock industry.20

Despite the Farm Board and other government agencies, the economic condition of stockmen declined rapidly during the early thirties. When the new
Democratic administration took over in 1933, demands for government action
increased conspicuously. Washington responded in kind, which led former
United States senator Henry J. Allen of Wichita to compare Roosevelt and
the New Deal to the new preacher that a deacon had just heard. "He is the
most powerful man in prayer I have heard," the deacon reported, "he asked
the Lord for things that the old preacher didn't even know that Lord had." 21
By 1933 few producers were unwilling to "ask the Lord" for help, and
the urgency was illustrated by the frequency with which calls were sent out
from Kansas. At a KLA-sponsored emergency conference in Emporia in
1932, Mercer addressed the group on the causes of the depression. Expressing
a principle of agricultural fundamentalism, Mercer told his listeners that
agriculture's plight was the basic • cause of the depression and that the government must secure a more equitable system of income distribution. Two
months later, Mercer said that the government was "morally obligated to aid
in effecting an economic readjustment in livestock production and farming
generally ." 22
The AAA, created in 1933, provided producers with one of their first real
opportunities for government help from the New Deal. Basically, the AAA
intended to raise farm income through production controls, the nemesis of
agriculture for over a decade. The AAA also had power to purchase surpluses, to withdraw land from production, and to make marketing agreements.
The wheat program, which included payments for diverted acreage, eventually
proved to be one of the most popular AAA practices in the state.
Rural participation in the formulation and administration of AAA programs was also stressed. In the livestock sector, participation first appeared
in the National Corn-Hog Committee of Twenty-Five, a group that represented the producer and advised AAA of aceptable programs. This committee
eventually recommended an emergency program for government purchases
of surplus hogs, then suggested that a permanent system be devised that included reductions in corn-hog production and a two dollar per hundredweight processing tax. The AAA accepted most of the recommendations,
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although it did make the hog reduction program more stringent than had
been recommended.
Mercer represented Kansas corn and hog raisers at several meetings in
Washington and Chicago, but before departing he met with some of the
state's leading producers to discuss possible plans. Those attending meetings
were divided on specific proposals, but all favored a definite program and
expressed their willingness to cooperate. Throughout the discussions of the
National Corn-Hog Committee, Mercer opposed the processing tax, as well
as the particular type of imposed limits on production that most other committee members supported. He believed that the corn-hog problem could
best be solved with price supports, marketing agreements, and higher tariffs.
Kansans were divided on the corn-hog program throughout AAA's few
years of operation. When Mercer polled KLA members on whether the hog
program should be extended into 1935, judgments varied. One thought it
was "the first time . . . an intelligent effort has been made to help agriculture
to be put on a parity with industry," and another said he knew "of no words
to express my contempt for such an idiotic, senseless, unworkable scheme to
usurp the American farmers' freedom." Arnold Berns, past president of KLA,
believed the problem was too technical for the average farmers' consideration.
Berns supported his stand by noting that, if he went to the Mayo Clinic, he
would not solicit the opinion of the whole Rochester population. In the end,
Kansas was the only state to vote negatively on the 1935 program, although
many of the state's producers participated in the program after it had been
ratified by a large margin nationally. 23
The relationship of the AAA to the cattle industry also indicated the
government's desire to please the producers. Throughout the first few months
of Roosevelt's administration and while AAA was being debated, cattlemen
found themselves in the dilemma of wanting aid but opposing production
controls and processing taxes like those being suggested for the corn-hog program. Their failure to appreciate the significance of the 15 percent rise in cattle
population since 1929 and the fact that cattle prices had not yet fallen as low
as other farm commodities accounted for much of the opposition to government production controls. The fear of higher retail prices and reduced consumption kindled their opposition to processing taxes. Additionally, many
cattlemen believed that a government-enforced marketing agreement with
packers was adequate to curtail production, along with government-financed
elimination of diseased animals and selected spaying of females. A Texas
cattleman, according to one historian, even suggested that Secretary Wallace
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equip the hind legs of all bulls with roller skates, rather than subject the
cattle producer to planned production. Beef purchases for relief, higher
tariffs, and public money for financing a campaign for more consumption
were also suggested. 24
As a result of the producers' oppos1t1on, cattle were written out of the
AAA program as a basic commodity, but this was acceptable to cattlemen for
only a short time. As prices continued to fall, as the drought became more
severe, and as they learned that other AAA programs hurt them-cotton,
wheat and corn reduction, for example, raised feed prices-cattlemen began
to agitate for more consideration. During the initial phases of this campaign,
leading Texas cattlemen-notably Dolph Briscoe, who was president of the
Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association-spearheaded the drive
to get cattle accepted as a basic commodity. Though KLA failed to support
the movement until after its southern neighbors had got the ball rolling, it
did throughout this whole period lead the fight against a processing tax.
Although cattlemen were unsuccessful throughout 1933 in restoring cattle
to the basic commodity list, other measures were taken to help them, including
beef purchases by the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (FSRC). Then, at
the Albuquerque convention of the American National in January, 1934, those
who favored cattle as a basic commodity forced a vote on the issue. The
result was indecisive even though about 90 percent of the Texas delegation
favored the proposal. The American National did, however, appoint a committee of five to study and recommend further actions. 25
Shortly after the Albuquerque meeting of the American National, Secretary Wallace called more than a hundred cattlemen to Washington to discuss
proposals for the beef industry. From this number, seventeen were selected
as a manageable working group. They, in turn, recommended that cattle be
made a basic commodity, and that a committee of twenty-five cattlemenlater reduced to five-be appointed to devise a plan for production control,
a requirement before Wallace would approve AAA money for the beef
industry. Mercer was a member of both groups and had by this time accepted
the necessity for production controls, although they were contrary to his preference for limiting production through marketing agreements.
The Jones-Connally Cattle Act of April, 1934, resulted from the long
agitation for government aid. It made cattle a basic commodity, authorized
$200 million as compensation for reduced production, and provided an additional $50 million for the purchase of diseased stock. A definite plan for
production control, however, had to be worked out before any funds were
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Cattle suffering from the drought, Cloud County, 1934. Courtesy
of the Kansas State Historical Society.

allocated. While cattlemen and AAA officials debated a permanent plan, they
realized that the severe drought of 1934 had changed many of -the circumstances. Immediate relief, not long-range planning, became the order of the
day, and all thinking and action turned in this direction. 26
While producers described conditions in the most extreme terms-and
there was, no doubt, some commercial value in this type of rhetoric-the 1934
situation certainly merited immediate governmental consideration. In Kansas
feed was scarce in many sections and water was in even shorter supply. Governor Landon aided the stockmen by persuading some of the state's oilmen
to lend deep-well pumps, pipelines, and tank trucks for use in distressed areas.
This was repeated in 1936, which was as severe a drought year for Kansas
as 1934. Landon and Mercer also labored to find feed that could be shipped
in from other states. Railroads transported the feed at reduced freight rates
and provided reduced tariffs on cattle that were shipped to feed. Still there
were more cattle than there was feed and water, and something had to be done
to reconcile the differences. 27
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On June 19, 1934, President Roosevelt signed an order to create the special
Drought Relief Service, and purchases of drought-stricken cattle began two
weeks later. The Drought Relief Service worked through state and county
representatives in determining drought areas and the cattle to be purchased.
Eventually, every state west of the Mississippi River except Washington was
declared a primary or secondary drought area, as were counties in several other
states east of the Mississippi.
Cattle were usually inspected by local men assisted by Bureau of Animal
Health officials. Inspectors first determined whether the animals were fit to
be shipped to other feeding areas or to slaughter, or whether they had to be
killed in the immediate area due to weakness or disease. After the cattle
were appraised, benefit payments to the owner amounted to $3 to $6 per head
in addition to a purchase payment that ranged from $1 for young calves to
$14 for stock two years or older. If the owner chose to sell, he was required
to share the purchase money with the mortgage holder, if one existed, who
in turn waived any claim to benefit payments. Payments were made, for the
most part, from funds provided by the Jones-Connally Act and other emergency appropriations, and from money available to the FSRC. 28
Many years after purchase of drought-stricken cattle in 1934, a Kansan
told an apocryphal story that he claimed had been popular in the southwest
part of the state. The urgency of the situation, the story went, pressed a young
biologist into service as an appraiser. He did well, it was reported, until he
encountered several goats in the district where he was working. He had
never seen goats before, so he wrote to Secretary Wallace that he had been
"executing your orders here in the Southwest, but I have discovered a new
and unusual animal. I have never seen any thing like it before," the young
man complained. "The animal seems to have a very sad face, has whiskers on
its chin, and its hindend is worn slick. Would you advise I shoot some of
them?" Wallace was greatly disturbed when he received the communication
and immediately wired back: "For God's sake, don't shoot any of the animals
described in your letter, those are ranchmen." 29 Regardless of whether the
story was true or not, it did illustrate the skepticism with which some producers viewed government agents and the new directives from Washington;
but in the end, cattlemen were forced to admit that the program had been
helpful.
Purchases of cattle in Kansas were typical of those in most other states,
although the Kansas Emergency Relief Committee (KERC) provided better
organization than some areas had. The KERC was begun in 1932 to admin-
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ister Reconstruction Finance Corporation funds; but before the emergency
of the thirties was over it directed a multitude of activities, including work
relief projects, service to transients, and food distribution, in addition to operations related to cattle purchases. John G. Stutz directed KERC, but as much
authority as possible was delegated to local officials. In the cattle program
Stutz was assisted by Dean Harry H. Umberger of Kansas State College,
V. L. Morrison, E. M. Evans, and dozens of local officials.30
The month of July, 1934, was the hottest month on record in Kansas.
The average temperature during the whole summer broke a forty-eight-year
record, and this after four successive years with hot temperatures and little
rain. Cattle purchases began in July, the first in Meade County. By the end
of the month so many cattle were pouring into Wichita awaiting reshipment
to southern states, eastern Kansas counties, or slaughtering plants that private
feeders had to be contracted temporarily. Seven months later, 521,164 beef and
dairy cattle had been purchased from every county in the state except Allen.
Heaviest purchases were in counties just west of the Flint Hills in central
Kansas, while the lightest buying occurred in the eastern part of the state.
By January 15, 1935, purchasing was completed.
Kansas producers received payments that totaled over $7.5 million, an
average of $14 .44 a head. Of all the states that supplied cattle to the government, the $14.44 a head was one of the highest payments made, and the 3
percent condemnation rate in Kansas was one of the lowest, a credit to the
efforts of the Sanitary Commission to eliminate diseased stock during the
twenties.
While it was not always possible to do so, the government purchasers
made a concerted effort to eliminate all diseased animals from herds, as well
as to preserve the better breeding stock from slaughter. Some 15,000 registered cattle from several states, for instance, were sent to Indian reservations
as foundation stock, and their owners were compensated by an average of
$45.00 per head . Most producers appreciated the opportunity to eliminate the
poorer quality or diseased stock from their herds, but by the same token
many were also reluctant to sell their better stock. About 10,000 sheep and
a few angora goats were also purchased.3 1
If cattle fit for human consumption were not shipped to other pastures,
they were slaughtered and the meat distributed to the needy by the FSRC
or some other designated agency. Much of the slaughtering was done by
major packers, but many smaller plants were also used. In Kansas the KERC
negotiated contracts with eighteen plants for this work. In addition, it al241
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lowed counties that had adequate local butchering facilities to slaughter a
few of the cattle for the immediate distribution of fresh beef to needy families.
Local butchers in about thirty-five counties in the state slaughtered over 8,000
head, with a considerable savings in transportation and storage.
The KERC also established nine beef-canning plants in the state for the
dual purpose of processing the bee£ purchased and providing work relief.
Existing or remodeled plants were used to process 102,231 cattle into almost
13 million cans of meat. For the short time they were in operation, about
9,000 men and women worked in the plants. Many of them gained experience
that was utilized later in private concerns after the KERC plants had closed. 32

In all, over 8.3 million cattle were purchased, with almost half of these
coming from Texas and the Dakotas. Only about 18 percent of the purchase
was condemned, the remainder being used for food . The belief that many
would not survive shipment to feed or slaughter was the most frequent reason
for condemning cattle. The government purchases, in conjunction with heavy
commercial marketing, reduced the 1934 cattle inventory by 11 percent. Producers were paid a total of $11.7 million by the government, and it was
estimated that they received $120 million more from their commercial marketing than they might have without the government program. The effect of
the government's purchases on cattle prices following 1934 is difficult to
determine, however, as the surplus was reduced by commercial marketing as
well. But it was evident to producers all over the country that prices during
the fall of 1935 were over 50 percent higher than they had been in 1934. For
many, this spoke for itself.
Nevertheless, a number of people complained about the program. Producers wanted higher prices, even though they were paid more than the
stock would have brought on the open market. They also demanded larger
purchases, and called frequently for the abrogation of the promise to participate in future government controls on production. There were also complaints on administrative procedures. The American National once charged
that the program was in the hands of economists and theorists, all "qualified"
by the fact that they knew nothing about the real situation. Some saw the
purchases as the first step in the government's takeover of the industry, which
would lead to the cattlemen's loss of independence, or as an insidious votegetting scheme.33
There were also many who supported the program. On the whole, most
producers were happy with the sale of their cattle. Widespread approval
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Drought cattle purchased by the government and shipped to the Kansas City
stockyards, 1934. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.
encouraged one Texan to report to The Cattleman in 1934 that "President
Roosevelt is much greater than Moses, because he is leading millions of people
out of the depression and Moses only led a relatively small number of people
out of the Wilderness." Others talked of the government "saving" the industry, or preventing a "complete demoralization" in beef-industry circles. But,
in fact, the program neither saved nor destroyed the industry. Rather it protected many cattlemen, bought their stock when there was no other market,
and prevented a great deal of unnecessary suffering on the part of starving,
thirsty cattle. Additionally, it provided work relief for a short period, and
a lot more beef for relief recipients than they would have otherwise received.34
Kansans' reactions to the cattle purchases were similar to their response
to most AAA measures. The corn-hog plan was least popular, while cattle
and wheat plans received the greatest support. Kansas, in fact, led the nation
in the number of wheat producers who participated in diverting acreage and
in the amount of payments received. By the time the Supreme Court dispensed with the AAA, Kansas had received a total of $87.5 million in government payments, third highest behind Iowa with $94.2 and Texas with
$148.2 million. 35
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Stockmen have traditionally had a poor reputation as conservationists, and
drought condition focused much public concern on ecology. Even before
the thirties many accounts of the practices of nineteenth-century cattle and
sheep producers stressed their overgrazing grassland and destruction of vast
areas of public domain. Certainly, some destruction resulted as stock men
hurried to use as much of the public's grass and water as possible before
others did. Not all stockmen failed to conserve the national resources, but
the public generally viewed stockmen as destroyers of the natural environment.
New Deal conservationist efforts, however, helped not only to improve the cattlemen's deplorable reputation but also to change many of their wasteful practices. The government, for instance, established guidelines for more efficient use
of the public grassland, and made payments to help develop water-saving
ponds and to establish grazing practices that preserved the native grass. Although stockmen sometimes resisted governmental guidance, they came to
appreciate the efforts after a while and in the end became known for their
conservationist work.
The Taylor Act of 1934 was the first major thrust of the New Deal into
the area of conservation. Designed to correct past evils, the act withdrew from
possible settlement most of the unappropriated public land in the West and
organized much of it into grazing districts. Kansas stockmen did not profit
directly from the Taylor bill. Rather, they probably suffered some loss in the
marketplace in competing with stockmen who grazed cattle on public land
at low fees, but only on rare occasions did they object to the inequity.
The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 was the
most important piece of New Deal legislation related to conservation. This
act, largely an expedient to circumvent the 1936 Supreme Court ruling that
voided much of the first AAA, kept federal funds flowing into the agricultural sector of the economy by paying farmers and ranchers to shift to soilconserving crops and to adopt other conservationist practices. With the Supreme Court in mind, Congress now provided funds directly from the United
States Treasury rather than from a processing tax. Payments for shifting away
from soil-depleting crops- which were said to be surplus crops like wheataveraged $10 an acre, while cattlemen benefited from the 35 cents per animal
per month payment that was made for allowing range land to reseed itself
through deferred grazing. Cattlemen were also paid $1 per linear foot for
digging additional stock wells, 10 cents for every hundred linear feet of
contour ridging of the range, and 50 percent of the cost of some pond con244
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struction. A number of cattlemen felt that contouring was as advantageous
to landowners as any practice to come out of this period.
In all, Kansas received by far the largest payment made to any state
during the first year that the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act
was in force, but the largest portion of this went toward diverting wheat
acreage. Payments remained high for the rest of the thirties, although a limit
of $10,000 to any one farmer or ranchman was set in 1939.36
In addition to the several federal agencies that were involved in conservation work in the state during the thirties, the KERC sponsored work relief
projects related to conservation. Much of KERC funding eventually came
from the federal agencies created to provide relief, although some early
efforts had been paid for by the state. Some of the CCC camps in the state
exemplified KERC's activities, being administered by the state and paid for
largely with federal money. Towards the middle of the decade KERC's
work was taken over by other agencies, especially the Works Progress Administration.
Practical conservation work that directly affected stockmen related primarily to grass and water. Because it was impossible to reduce herd strength
rapidly without severe economic loss, some of the state's grassland suffered
intensely as rainfall diminished. A few stockmen predicted that much of the
grass was gone forever, but others were more realistic. A. E. Aldous, an
agronomist at Kansas State College, estimated that the grazing capacity of
the Flint Hills had decreased 30 to 40 percent by 1935. Aldous said little
about the short grass in the central and western parts of the state; but in view
of even greater shortages of moisture there, the grazing capacity in these
areas must have declined even more, especially after the 1936 drought.
The grass, though sparse, was not dead. A lack of moisture rather than
deliberate overgrazing was the basic cause of the poor crop. On the other
hand, there were practices that stockmen could readily adopt that would help
them not only to replenish the natural vegetation but also to weather the
periodic scarcity of rainfall in the future. Various methods of deferred grazing that allowed the grass to reseed itself appeared to work best in the shortgrass areas, although there were attempts to seed buffalo grass artificially in
the western part of the state. In this connection and after considerable study,
the Ft. Hays Experiment Station concluded that harvesting short-grass seed
was impractical. But it could be reseeded by scattering hay that had gone to
seed over bare spots. A manure spreader could be used for spreading the
cured hay before pressing it into the prepared soil with a packer. Reseeding
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seemed to prove more successful with the long grasses of eastern Kansas,
however, and here too the hay method was frequently used. By 1938 the
Stockman reported that 7,563 of the state's cattlemen were deliberately applying
a deferred-grazing program; and thousands more, no doubt, were employing
the concept to a greater or lesser degree. Ranges could also be protected by
distributing salt, water, and feed so that stock would not continually gather
in only one area for feeding. Weed and brush control and contour terracing
also improved range land. But, even though all of these practices were beneficial, rainfall was most important. When sufficient rain fell, the grass that
had become largely dormant during the drought began its slow recovery. As
early as 1938 the Stockman noted that the bluestem was coming back in many
Flint Hills areas. In 1946 Kling L. Anderson reported to the Board of Agriculture, "Many [acres] once thought to be destroyed, now have a cover of
grass nearly equal to that before the dry years." Nature and intelligence
had contrived this great change, which disproved many ominous predictions
that had been made along the way. 37
The drought also motivated farmers and ranchers to construct more ponds.
These were intended to conserve available water and store it for future use,
reduce soil erosion, and provide more stock-watering locations. If stock gathered at only one place for water, the grass was destroyed by their frequent
trampling. John R. Brinkley, the colorful doctor who claimed to restore
virility with his goat-gland operation, and a part-time politician, was one of
the first Kansans to suggest wholesale pond building at public expense. But
pond building was not significantly expanded until government agencies
became involved in work relief. 38
Pond building was also encouraged by government officials and various
state and federal conservation agencies. Governor Alf Landon, for example,
was a strong advocate of pond construction and encouraged it at every opportunity. Early in his first term as governor he persuaded the legislature to
grant a tax reduction to those farmers or ranchers who constructed waterconserving dams. Then, motivated by his concern for water conservation and
by the desire to "pry more relief money from the federal government," Landon
held a special conference on Kansas water problems in 1934. Detailed plans
for 50,000 ponds-along with designs for numerous large lakes for storage
and for flood control-were submitted to the federal government. It was soon
announced that Kansas would begin receiving half a million dollars a month
for construction. Some of the larger, more expensive projects were shelved;
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but a year later KERC was supervising the building of 2,391 ponds and 26
lakes. 39
The number of ponds and windmills that were constructed in Kansas
during the thirties is still a matter of speculation. Various agencies sometimes
gave progress reports on their individual efforts; but these were only partial
lists at best, and no one seems to have included the numerous individual efforts
of farmers and ranchers that were unrelated to any of the government relief
projects. One of the best estimates, however, indicated that at least 7,000
dams, pits, and ponds had been constructed by 1940. Conservationist groups
encouraged the erection of additional windmills to provide more water and
help distribute stock more evenly over the range land. Several relief agencies
provided much of the labor and money for many new wells constructed during
the thirties. But the figures for new wells are as speculative as those for
ponds. 40
The Morton County Land Utilization Project was another government
attempt at conservation that affected Kansas cattle producers. Morton County,
located in the far southwest corner of the state, usually has about seventeen
inches of annual precipitation, but during the thirties rainfall dropped to
around eleven inches. Dust storms and soil erosion naturally followed, and
the government acted. Land purchases in Morton County began under the
Resettlement Administration in 1935, at which time 53,590 acres were bought.
Rehabilitation began immediately, principally through efforts to arrest the
blowing sand. In 1938 an additional 42,800 acres were acquired under the
authority of the Bankhead-Jones Act. Other purchases and exchanges followed
until the project included almost 107,000 acres of sandhill land on both sides
of the Cimarron River, or about 23 percent of the county. The project has
remained pretty much the same size up to the present.
Under supervision of the federal Soil Conservation Service-the project
has been administered by the Forest Service as a National Grassland since
1954-the area was reseeded to grass and developed for pasturing. By 1943
some of the land was judged sufficiently recovered to allow grazing, and less
than a decade later the whole area was being utilized as pasture. The land
was leased to the Morton County Grazing Association-formed in 1944
specifically to handle this project-then subleased to members of the association, with some 25 percent of the grazing fees being allocated to the county
in lieu of taxes. The association handled many of the routine administrative
duties, decided on the number of stock each member was allowed to pasture,
and provided range riders, salt, and fences. The Forest Service, however,
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determined the grazing fees, the length of the grazing season, and the total
number of animals allowed on the land.
Under the expert management of George S. Atwood, the Forest Service's
representative for almost twenty-five years, this cooperative effort by the
government and local stockmen was an unqualified success in returning much
of the land to high productivity. More rainfall during the forties, of course,
was also instrumental. Stockmen in the area have generally approved the
project, although they frequently disagreed with what they considered to be
unnecessarily low limits on the numbers of stock allowed to graze, or complained of a short pasturing season. 41
Thus cattlemen have demonstrated their interest in conservationist practices throughout the twentieth century, sometimes reluctantly, and often only
with the encouragement and leadership of government. Yet the controversy
over the cattleman as conservationist continues. The fact that almost all
the land in the state is privately owned accounts in large part for the environmental concerns of Kansas stockmen. This is not to say that Kansans did
not learn and profit from the extensive government efforts at conservation,
especially after the droughts of the thirties focused much attention on the
matter. Most of them did profit, and not a few of the younger stockmen
probably appreciated for the first time the delicate balance that must be struck
between nature and human activity. Many learned the necessity of adapting
to the environment. With nature's cooperation, the government's encouragement, and their own unquenchable optimism, they became not only better
conservationists but better cattlemen as well. 42

Throughout the New Deal period there was always some disagreement among
the state's cattlemen on the methodology of individual projects sponsored by
the government. The same discord was apparent when cattlemen discussed
government aid as a single concept, a practice that became increasingly popular
as the New Deal wore on. Most Kansas cattlemen welcomed the government's
efforts in their behalf, although there were a few who maintained that the
agricultural sector had no room for government subsidies.
Dan Casement, noted earlier for his opposition to government involvement during the twenties, exemplified opposition to New Deal programs
better than anyone else in the state. Sent by his parents to Princeton, where
he learned individualism and self-reliance, Casement then went to western
Colorado to graze cattle and incidentally to illegally fence in some of the
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public domain. Eventually he became the most widely known Kansas cattleman in the nation. More has probably been written by and about Casement
than any other stockman in the state. Unparalleled success in the show ring
with his feeder stock, wide appeal as a public speaker, and his undaunted
willingness to say what was on his mind largely accounted for his popularity.
Casement also had a charismatic personality. Equally at home in the farrowing pen or the lobby of the Waldorf-Astoria, the Manhattan stockman had a
wide circle of friends. Some said he made an art of profanity. He was, for
example, fond of calling a person with whom he disagreed a "prismatic
S.O.B.," which translated into "a son of a bitch from any angle one cared
to look at him." Some of his other well-chosen vocabulary was unprintable.
Casement, with his brightly colored vests, fashionably tailored jackets,
and ever-present pipe, was usually at the major stock shows and other gatherings of stockmen, spewing his feedlot philosophy to all who cared to listen.
He was equally comfortable with Thomas Jefferson's agricultural fundamentalism and Andrew Carnegie's Social Darwinism, changing his message
little throughout his life. Speaking at a meeting of the American National,
for example, Casement told cattlemen, "You do not represent a business
system or a political organization. You are a social class, typifying a way of
life, a fraternity of ideals, that preserve the best in American lore, that unify
in a single code of citizenship the traditions of our forefathers for freedom,
independence, opportunity, resourcefulness, and rugged individuality."
This was the same simplistic message that Casement dispensed for three
decades. Shortly after AAA went into effect, for instance, Casement wired
Secretary Wallace that the new program had caused hog prices to decline
almost a dollar in five days. The program, he said in the wire, "is universally
condemned by leading farmers and supported only by professional farm
leaders in whom real farmers place no trust. It is axiomatic," he continued,
"that neither the laws of nature, economics nor evolution can be repealed by
human agencies. Your program aims at the impossible . . . ." 43 There was
no acceptable method to regulate production, he believed, and to attempt to
do so "spells the suicide of democracy," while "to do so by force would invite
revolution."
Casement believed further that producing food was "the foundation of
our national economy, the base on which the whole structure should rest, the
center from which all of its elements should radiate." In answer to New Deal
plans that attempted to help the poor farmers and stockmen, Casement replied,
in excellent Carnegie fashion, that "poverty and underprivilege are ordained
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by the law of life and vital to its design. No human authority can ever abolish
them." The solution, he said, was not government aid but rather "an unspeakably slow attrition." Depressed farmers and ranchers were happy to
believe that agriculture was the most important sector of the nation's economy, but they were not sure they agreed with the ideas of inevitable poverty
and necessary attrition.44
Casement was not merely an armchair philosopher, content to damn the
New Deal from afar. He also had the courage of his convictions. In 1935
the ultraconservative Farmers Independent Council of America was formed,
ostensibly to disseminate among farmers accurate information concerning
agricultural ills and the true intents of the AAA. Although the council was
established primarily by Stanley F. Morse, Casement became the president
of this agrarian counterpart of the American Liberty League, and he did as
much as anyone to advertise the organization's views. The council thought
even Alf Landon was too liberal for its full support in the 1936 election, and
the Roosevelt landslide dealt the council a mortal blow. While it continued
to exist for a time, it never became the large movement of farmers in revolt
against government aid that its founders had envisioned. Eventually the
council died, "having become little more than it had been in the beginning,
a propaganda organ for industry, the meat packers, and some large cattle
interests." 45
Casement, like most of those he represented, carefully selected the government interventions upon which he heaped abuse. Little if any opposition
from Casement or any others was expressed toward high protective tariffs for
cattlemen, the millions of dollars of public money that the USDA spent to
improve the cattle industry, or the various laws that regulated for the producers' benefit the businesses that were tangential to beef production. Nor did
Casement see any inconsistency in his beliefs and the relatively low fees that
he and others paid to graze cattle on the public lands of the West. 46
Although Casement never altered his views on government aid throughout his long association with the Kansas cattle industry, the views of hundreds
of others were not at all consistent, nor were they in line with those of the
Manhattan feeder. As noted above, government aid did not come to cattlemen against their will; stockmen demanded help and at the time were usually
appreciative of it. The methods and extent of government attempts to aid
agriculture were, however, sometimes criticized. Mercer, for instance, remarked at one time that the New Deal was like the farmer who had "too
much hay down," and the Stockman once published this ditty:
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Little Boy Blue, come blow your horn
There's a government agent counting your corn;
Another one lecturing the old red sow
On the number of pigs she can have and how.
Although some criticized the methods, few were critical of the principle
of aid itself. KLA president W. H. Burke, for instance, noted in 1935 that
one could get few farmers and ranchers in central and western Kansas excited
about opposing government help, as the AAA "has provided a great many
of them with the only incomes they have had in the last three years. Their
bonus checks have been the only money they have had for food and shoes."
Later the same year Burke chided two of the most prominent members
of the Farmers Independent Council by noting that he would shortly visit
Charles Collins, who now opposed government aid in all forms, where he
would price calves at 8 cents a pound, "a similar crop of which he [Collins]
could not sell for half the money before the government, under the AAA,
bought at fair prices, some 8 million surplus cattle." Burke then reported that
he would also stop at Dan Casement's farm to see his large pig crop, "made
possible by his personal sacrifice in refusing to sign a control program, now
selling at 10 cents per pound." Dan was a fine host, Burke said, and he would
"not remind him that a previous crop of pigs, before the government reduced
the surplus was begging for a buyer at 3 cents per pound." R. J. Laubengoyer,
another Kansas stockman, told the KLA convention in 1938, "I practiced
so-called rugged individualism in farming and ranching until I discovered
that it was useless to buck a braced game." Most other business and labor
groups, he said, were being subsidized in one way or another.47
Joe Mercer probably best summarized the thinking of most agricultural
producers in the state during his unsuccessful bid for the United States Senate
in

1932. Mercer traveled the state telling his listeners,
I am not an advocate of government in business, yet as I study the
situation it does appear that the true function of government is in
serving its citizens in acute emergencies by directing its business affairs so as to prevent unnecessary suffering and property loss . . . .
Government alone can direct in controlling production ... control
credits and prevent wild speculation ... stop bank failures . . . .
How unnecessary and ridiculous it is for millions of our citizens to
tramp the streets, hungry, poorly clad and cold, looking for means of
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livelihood, because we have too much food, too much wool and cotton
and too much fuel. 48
Although willing to demand and accept aid during the thirties, a number
of Kansas stockmen soon forgot the position they had taken during the
depressed interwar period. Judging by the popular literature that emanates
from the industry today, many cattlemen talk as if they are opposed to government aid, and some even believe that this sentiment is based on a long
tradition. Well-chosen elements of Casement's philosophy, for example, are
honored today by many as typical of the views cattlemen have always had
toward government support. At a KLA convention in 1950 cattlemen yielded
to the general hysteria that was characteristic of the times and proudly adopted
a "Freedom Resolution" that condemned the "socialized state." In a supporting statement the Stockman waxed eloquent in its description of the
conventioneers, referring to cattlemen who "disdained the dole" as "those
men who take their winnings and their losings in stride [like the] pioneers
who made America great .... They asked no favors ... those cowmen, who
are the bravest, most rugged individualists, the most forthright characters to
band together." 49
Ten years after adopting the Freedom Resolution, the Stockman continued to beat the same drum. Under the heading "Livestock Producers
Don't Like Government Help," the journal intoned again, "Historically the
cattle business has been through repeated experience of boom and bust coinciding with the ups and downs of the cattle cycle. At times it might seem
pleasant for the cattlemen to unload these problems onto the taxpaying public.
But cattlemen have a long and proud history of insisting upon carrying their
own problems of natural and economic hazards." 50
Thus, the myth of complete independence and self-reliance, which had
been generated long before and perpetuated by men like Casement, persisted
beyond the middle of the twentieth century. In reality, as the interwar period
revealed, it was a strange position for the livestock sector in view of its
generally advantageous relationship with government at both the state and
national levels. It is probable that opposition to government aids increased
during the prosperous World War II period, but prior to that many successful-and unsuccessful-attempts were made by the government to assist
producers of beef. And these came, largely, at the request of farmers and
ranchers. Nor was the producer through asking for help when he managed
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to get aid for the production phase of the industry. Petitions for government
regulation of marketing institutions and transportation were also on his
crowded agenda between the wars.
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11
Beginning a Revolution: Markets,
Packers, and Trucks, 1920-1940

After maturing the cattle, producers turned their attention to transporting
the stock to market and processing the beef for consumption. Marketing, the
middle state in the long process that put beef on the American table, was
significant in determining profits. Marketing was of special importance to
producers during the twenties when many believed that improvement in this
area was essential for raising income and thus profits. Then, during the
chaotic thirties, cattlemen returned their attention largely to production and
government aid, as it was hard to work for improvements in marketing when
many catt lemen were simply trying to survive. Ironically, though, it was
during the thirties that the most notable changes in the transporting and
marketing of stock occurred.
The cost of marketing, which had edged upward during the inflated
World W ar I period and had failed to retreat as rapidly as did stock prices
during the postwar deflation, was the fo untainhead of discontent. Many
suggestions for reducing these charges surfaced, but few were actually attempted and fewer still were successful in achieving their objective. First in
time came renewed interest in closer government regulation of transportation
facilities, stockyards, and packers; then more concern for cooperative marketing developed. Still, producers were dissatisfied, and when a combination of
factors-primari ly the increased use of the truck-forced marketing and
packing facilities to begin decentralizing, many producers were happy to
accept the amended system.
Some change in producers' attitude toward big business also became
evident during this period. Cattlemen, for example, had become less critical
of the large packers by the late twenties, and these processors became more
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friend than whipping boy. The intense struggle over railroad freight rates
had also lost much of its fire by 1940, as cattlemen turned more and more to
motor transport. All these developments had great significance for the beef
industry, much of it lasting far beyond World War II.

Almost as soon as the emergency in Europe had passed, shippers began debating whether the railroads should continue under strict government control.
Joseph H. Mercer and a number of Kansas cattlemen, remembering the rise
in rates and what they thought was poor service, believed that the lines should
be returned to private direction as soon as possible. Shippers of agricultural
products as a whole, however, were divided on the issue, and the split contributed to the passage of the Transportation Act of 1920. This piece of legislation returned the lines to private control and, more importantly, ordered
that the Interstate Commerce Commission approve rate increases to the extent
that lines received a "fair return" of about 6 percent on their aggregate value.
State regulatory agencies were instructed not to interfere with any tariffs
that were designed to produce the 6 percent return. This, in effect, reduced
significantly the state's power to regulate the carriers.
In the western district the ICC established an average value of $60,000
per mile of track and, subsequently, allowed a 35 percent rate increase. While
westerners believed unanimously that this advance had been excessive, some
tariffs in the eastern district were raised by 40 percent. As a result of the
substantial advance, Kansas intrastate rates for cattle advanced from 30.5 to
41.0 cents per hundredweight for a 450-mile haul, and 9.5 to 13.0 cents for
a 50-mile journey, representing over $98 and $31 per car, respectively, for
the longer and shorter hauls. Sam H. Cowan., legal representative of several
western livestock associations, estimated that the two substantial advances
since the beginning of the war had increased all rates by 75 percent of their
prewar levels, not too far removed from the 60 to 70 percent actually experienced in Kansas intrastate tariffs.
The disparity that existed between freight rates and livestock prices at
this time was exemplified by the account of a westerner who shipped several
carloads of sheep to the Chicago market. The sheep, supposedly, sold for less
than the freight bill, so the commission company wired the owner for additional money to make up the difference. "Don't have any money," replied
the shipper, "but I'm sending more sheep." 1 Many Kansas cattlemen, faced
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with rising freight rates and declining stock prices, understood well the
sheepman's plight.
The rise in freight tariffs in 1920 was one of the most significant increases
in railroad history. Coming at a time of severe deflation in agricultural prices,
the large advance reversed sharply the tendency for rates to remain somewhat
proportionate to agricultural prices. Furthermore, for the first time an alternate source of transport was becoming available to shippers and would
eventually reduce the gains the railroads made in the Transportation Act
more than any action of shippers or groups that represented them.
Kansas stockmen, and agricultural producers as a whole, wasted little
time in protesting the new 1920 rate schedule. Lengthy ICC hearings follo wed, with Mercer and other KLA members figuring prominently. The
cattlemen argued that the railroads' evaluations had been set too high and
that shippers, faced with the depression, were unable to pay the higher charges.
They had limited success in 1922, when the ICC revaluated some railroad
property and subsequently lowered rates, but the new tariffs hardly approached
the prewar levels that were desired by cattlemen. In general, the rollback in
Kansas intrastate tariffs amounted to only about 10 percent.2
After the decrease in 1922, the rates in Kansas, as well as most of the
western district, remained essentially the same for a decade and a half, except
for emergency reductions in response to the drought of the thirties. But
the stability of rates did not end the controversy between the shippers and
rail lines that had existed sporadically for over two generations. Railroad
petitions for higher tariffs arrived at ICC offices simultaneously with shipper
demands that rates be reduced. The carriers, for instance, petitioned ICC
for a 5 percent increase in 1925 while KLA asked for a 25 percent reduction.
Both were denied. Repeat performances occurred in 1931 and 1932, with
much the same result. Then, much to their credit, the rail lines yielded to
pressures from political leaders and shipping interests for emergency drought
rates. These lower tariffs were a significant factor in adjusting to the drought
and depression as they allowed stockmen some flexibility in deciding upon a
course of action to meet the emergency. Kansas cattlemen could, for example,
ship in hay at half the regular rate. Or they could ship cattle out to available
feed at 85 percent of the fat stock rate, then return them at 15 percent, which
represented only half of the published schedules for the round trip. The lowered rates enabled many cattlemen to cope with the disastrous feed shortages
and to save breeding stock from the government-sponsored canning factories.3
Stockmen also objected to other items on the rate schedules. Mercer,
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for example, reported to the annual Feeder's Day Convention in 1927, "our
entire freight rate structure is a most complicated affair, filled with inconsistencies, irregularities and unfair rates." He apparently had in mind rate discrepancies on cattle shipped into Kansas from the Southwest, all with similar
origins but some with unloading points some fifteen miles beyond the point
where rail lines were competitive. The absence of competition, Mercer
claimed, allowed railroads to raise shipping charges by $11 to $35 a car.
Although cattlemen protested some preferential rates, they strongly defended others that were to their benefit. Reduced tariffs on purbred stock,
feed-in-transit, and sale-in-transit rates, for example, were all matters of
dispute. Cattlemen wanted lower purebred rates and the continued practice
of reducing the charges for cattle sold or fed while in transit to a central
market. The lines, on the other hand, desired to keep purebred tariffs the
same-there was more profit in carrying a telephone pole than a purebred
bull, one railroad official claimed-and to move special tariffs generally toward
a single, uniform charge for all cattle. In the end, purebred rates were reduced to half the regular fare in 1924, sale-in-transit tariffs were continued,
and the interwar period ended with railroads still attempting to modify the
feed-in-transit rates. 4
Just before World War II, cattlemen were again confronted with rising
freight tariffs. The ICC allowed advances on specific commodities in 1937,
but livestock interests avoided this increase. Their success was short-lived,
however, as ICC permitted another advance the following year, subject to
the approval of state regulatory agencies. The Kansas Corporation Commission first refused but then acquiesced to the higher tariffs, both actions at
the request of cattlemen. Livestock interests apparently accepted increased
intrastate rates in 1938, because they feared that continued opposition might
result in higher interstate charges."
By 1939 the Kansas Stockman claimed that average rates for farm products were 163 percent higher than they had been in 1913. Two years later
they were even higher. On the eve of the United States' entry into the war,
Kansas cattlemen were paying over $100 and $40 per car, respectively, for
450- and 50-mile hauls. This represented several dollars a car more than
shippers had ever paid to transport their stock by rail, and about double
what they had paid during World War I. The general success that cattlemen
had had before World War I in keeping rate hikes to a minimum contrasted
sharply with the rising tariffs they experienced between the wars. By then,
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however, higher tariffs were being balanced somewhat by an alternate means
of transport. 6
While rail lines continued to carry the majority of Kansas livestock, a
new development that eventually revolutionized stock transport appeared on
the horizon. Trucks began to make inroads on rail transportation, slowly
during the twenties, then much more rapidly during the following decade.
By the beginning of World War II the revolution in livestock transport was
well on its way. Trucks, or trailers pulled behind the family automobile,
began to interest livestock shippers for the first time during World War I,
but it was a decade later before they carried a significant number of stock
to central markets. Because large numbers of hogs were often raised in the
immediate area of the large markets, this species led others in turning to truck
transport. In 1919, for instance, the Stockman noted that "trucks frequently
bring hogs a distance of from 50 to 75 miles in good condition" to the state's
larger markets. Moreover, some stockmen began suggesting that trucks would
eventually solve the producers' short-haul problems, but it took two decades
to prove these views correct.
In 1920 it was estimated that 10 percent of all farm produce was carried
to market by truck, but still only 3 percent of the hogs and cattle were
carried in this manner. Then, during the twenties, the number of trucks
on Kansas farms increased eightfold, and the construction of hard-surfaced
roads followed in due course. Yet, even with improved roads and the new
trucks, the vast majority of livestock still arrived at the central markets by
rail (Table 2) .7
During the following decade a major shift began to occur. With trucks
in mind, Mercer noted midway through the 1930s that "possibly at no time
in history have shipping conditions changed so rapidly as during the past
recent years." Over 97 percent of the hogs arrived at St. Joseph by truck
in 1936, although the percentages for sheep and cattle were lower. The
shorter distance from shipping point to market apparently meant that hogs
were most easily shipped by motor transport at this time. Many cattle and
sheep, coming from a much wider area, were still shipped by rail. By the
end of the interwar period, however, the Stockman reported that at sixtyseven of the principal markets in the country 66 percent of the cattle, 62
percent of the calves, 69 percent of the hogs, and 22 percent of the sheep
arrived by truck. 8
The figures showing the large increase in truck transportation to central
markets, significant though they were, did not reflect the even greater num259
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REO truck delivering a cow to the Stuart Commission Company, Wichita. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.

bers of stock that were transported to the many local marketing points that
sprang up during this period, especially during the thirties. The truck, in
fact, was a significant factor in the whole decentralization process that occurred in livestock marketing and packing facilities. The figures do show,
however, the reciprocal influence of available railroads and the quantity of
stock brought in by truck. Wichita had the fewest railroads and the largest
percentage of stock delivered by truck, while Kansas City was just the
opposite.
A number of reasons accounted for the growing popularity of truck
transportation, not least of which was the persistent belief that rail tariffs
were too high, especially charges for short hauls. Many argued that additional charges by the railroads only reduced their livestock-carrying trade.
After experiencing less business, many stockmen believed, rail lines attempted
to maintain their profit levels by raising rates for the livestock that was
carried rather than reducing rates and becoming more competitive. This,
stockmen held, only encouraged the vicious circle of more trucks and higher
railroad freight rates.
The Kansas experience during the thirties, however, does not completely
support these judgments, as the large growth in truck use during the early
thirties coincided with a period of stability in published rail tariffs. Railroads
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Table 2. Percentage of Cattle and Calves Trucked to Central Markets,

1925-1936
1925

Year

Kansas City ... .............................................................
St. Joseph ..................................................................
Wichita ................................... ...................................
Averages ....................................................................

1930

1936

3.0
8.8
16.6

11.0

40.8

27.8

74.4

32.5

80.6

9.5

23.8

65.2

SOURCE: Exhibit C-1. Ex Parte No. 123.

would probably have had to reduce their rates in order to maintain their
livestock-carrying trade at its former level, as it remained more costly to ship
by rail than truck on short hauls. Only the large commercial truck lines were
supervised to any degree by state regulatory agencies, and not until after 1933
did the Kansas Corporation Commission make any attempt to establish uniform rates between the two different modes of transportation. Equal rates
did not result, however, as this attempt applied only to commercial trucking
concerns; much of the stock was hauled by owners or by neighbors who were
not subject to state regulation.
Factors other than lower costs contributed as well to the large shift to
truck transport. Trucks were more convenient, as shippers could readily
adjust the shipping schedule to their personal needs, set their own departure
and arrival times, and more effectively select desirable marketing days. Trucks
serviced all areas of the country, and provided direct ranch-to-market transport without any intervening loading and unloading. This factor, along with
the fact that livestock in trucks usually received better care, resulted in fewer
injuries and deaths. Trucks also provided faster service in most instances,
which resulted in less shrinkage. All these factors were significant considerations in the shippers' choice of transportation, as was the fact that once
trucks were purchased they became indispensable machines around farms
and ranches, performing a multitude of chores other than transporting stock
to market. 9
The truck was welcomed first by small shippers, those who usually
marketed less than a railway carload, and especially those who lived within
fifty to a hundred miles of a market. But before the period had ended, large
producers who usually shipped long distances were also turning to motor
transport. Those with good access to rail lines were slowest in converting
to the truck. The Robbins ranch, for example, which was close to the Rock
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Modern truck unloading at the Herrington sale barn, 1977. Courtesy
of the Kansas Stockman.

Island as well as the Santa Fe lines, did not switch to trucks until after a
squabble with the Santa Fe during the middle 1950s over rates and labor.
Stockmen in the Flint Hills turned completely to trucks during the late
1950s and early 1960s. For shippers who always had a carload or more to be
shipped a long distance, railroad freight rates were not much of a factor in
the shift. Most likely, truck transport cost more during the early period, due
to the small vehicles and the poor roads that slowed delivery. 10
Today, trucks have supplanted rail lines almost completely. The long
lines of pungent rail cars that snaked their way across western states have
given way to huge trucks that thunder down the highways night and day,
sometimes decorating the approaching traffic with the shrink that shippers
hoped to avoid. While railroad rates were a compelling reason for small
shippers to ship by truck, there were others that were more important to the
transition. The convenience of having the stock picked up at the farm or at
loading pens in the pastures and the greatly reduced time in transit were,
and are today, the most significant reasons. These advantages continue to keep
stockmen happy with the truck.

Throughout the interwar period Kansas livestock producers, as well as many
others throughout the West, continued to patronize heavily the three terminal
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marketing facilities in or adjacent to the state. About 1930 a report noted that
67 percent of the Kansas cattle marketed at the public terminals went through
the facilities at Kansas City. Wichita and St. Joseph received around 12 percent each, and all other markets accounted for only 9 percent. Receipts at
Kansas City during this period averaged around 5.7 million head annually.
About 2.2 million of these were cattle and calves, and most of the remainder
were hogs. While Chicago continued to be the largest national stock market,
especially significant for fat cattle, Kansas City was in second place in total
receipts and was the largest trader in the country for stockers and feeders.
Early in the twenties Kansas City was receiving almost double the number
of stockers and feeders that were received at Omaha, the second largest market
for this class of stock.
The other terminal markets readily available to Kansas producers, at St.
Joseph and Wichita, received a total annual average of about 3.3 and 1.0
million head of stock, respectively. Of the total, cattle and calf receipts averaged over half a million at St. Joseph and somewhat less than that in Wichita.
Like Kansas City, both were also important hog-marketing centers, especially
St. Joseph. All these markets tended to show their highest receipts during the
early twenties, then experienced steady declines for the remainder of the period.
Decentralization of packing and marketing largely accounted for this. 11
The large companies continued to dominate meat packing throughout
the interwar period, but their relative importance declined in much the same
proportion, and for similar reasons, as that of the terminal stockyards. The
World War I period had been unusually profitable for the large packers because of the immense demand for meat and the disrupted trade patterns that
allowed the United States to satisfy more of Europe's need. But the flush
times turned sour when the kaiser's armies surrendered. The demand for
meat then declined and prewar trade patterns were reestablished. Several
business ventures by large packers that were unrelated to the meat trade also
fell victim to the general depression and affected their overall prosperity.
The large packers blamed much of their misfortune on the government.
The Food Administration, they claimed, had encouraged them to process all
the livestock produced while the European conflict continued. F. Edson
White, a representative of Armour, told Kansas cattlemen that the packers'
cellars were stacked high with meat at the end of the war, and hides were
stacked wherever there was an available spot. While this may have been
an exaggeration in order to account for low stock prices, the big packers did,
apparently, have large inventories of meat in 1918; and production remained
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high while the whole economy slipped into the postwar depression. Some
packers cited the government's restrictions on their auxiliary enterprises as
a reason for their decline. After the early twenties, however, the large packers
recovered along with most other industrial sectors, then continued to prosper
for the rest of the interwar period except for the early thirties.
The dispute over the packers' profits, so volatile during the war, failed
to abate during the twenties but did subside to a large extent during the
following decade. Most of the same offensive and defensive arguments used
during the war were repeated by producers and processors throughout the
postwar period. Cattlemen claimed the packers had excessive profits on their
investment, yet the processors insisted that they made only 1 percent on sales.
Both may have been correct, although the cattlemen's charge appeared less
well founded than it had during the war.
The large packers lost part of the meat slaughter business to smaller
packing plants. Between 1916 and 1929 their percentage of the meat slaughtered for interestate commerce declined from over 70 to about 58 percent. It
was true, however, that some of the smaller plants were owned by the large
packers. While their percentage of the total slaughter was down and they
may have experienced a lower margin of profit, the large packers remained
a dominant influence in the meat industry throughout the whole period. 12
While the packers struggled with the postwar depression, the producers'
agitation for a larger government role in marketing finally came to fruition.
The first in a series of moves was the so-called Packer Consent Decree of
1920. It developed after officials in the Justice Department had studied the
FTC Reports, then initiated a suit to prosecute the Big Five packers for
violations of the Clayton Antitrust Act. In order to escape prosecution and
severely restrictive legislation, to avoid damaging publicity, and, possibly, to
forestall a closer look by the Justice Department into their operations, the Big
Five agreed to relinquish their interests in stockyards, terminal railroads,
market newspapers, and some cold-storage warehouses. Additionally, the
packers promised to dissociate themselves from the wholesaling and retailing
of all groceries except meat and related items and dairy products. Those
producers who were eagerly awaiting startling revelations and vindication of
their many charges from the prosecution were shocked at the agreement and
not a little dismayed. Many of their efforts were then turned to supporting
one or the other of the legislative proposals that were designed to regulate
livestock marketing.13
Even before Attorney General Palmer had negotiated and the Supreme
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Court of the United States had confirmed the Packer Consent Decree, Congress made a number of attempts to regulate the marketing and processing
of livestock. Most of these bills died in committee for lack of support, usually
because packers and many producers considered them too "radical" if they
attempted to implement any of the FTC recommendations for government
ownership. A bill sponsored by Senator William S. Kenyon came closest to
passage. It provided a system of licensing for all interstate slaughterers, stockyards, and commission firms, as well as some other agencies associated with
the meat trade. The Kenyon Bill was debated at length throughout 1919,
but eventually failed.
Nevertheless, almost 80 percent of the producers polled by the Stockman
in 1919 favored some type of federal regulation of stockyards and packers.
The 1920 KLA convention even featured a formal debate on the issue.
"Resolved, that Federal Supervision of Stock Yards and Packing Industries Is
Necessary to Restore Confidence in Live Stock Business" was the topic of
the formal discussion. Mercer and John A. Edwards upheld the affirmative
side, emphasizing the monopolistic practices of the packing industry, the
packers' manipulation of market prices, and their excessive profits. Representatives of Swift and Wilson argued that the evils attributed to the industry
did not exist, that cooperation between packers and producers was essential,
and that curtailment of packer operations with restrictive legislation would
be harmful to the producer. The audience, mostly Kansas producers, enjoyed
the confrontation immensely. While the packers presented the "facts" and
the most logical arguments, the efforts of Edwards and Mercer were more
colorful and emotional. There was little doubt which side won the debate
as far as the audience was concerned.14
While Congress debated regulation of stockyards and packers throughout
1918 and 1919 but produced no bill, the attention of Kansas producers shifted
to the state level, where similar legislation was being considered. Early in
1920 during a special session of the state legislature, Mercer and a few lawmakers wrote a bill designed to regulate the state's livestock trade. Known
as the Burdick Bill after a legislator from Atchison, it provided for a Kansas
Live Stock Bureau with power to establish and put into effect "reasonable
rules, rates and charges" for packers, stockyards, commission men, and rendering plants. Protection of the public's interests was the basis for the proposed legislation, which was to be enforced through licensing and the newly
created Court of Industrial Relations.
The bill received little outside attention until the legislature indicated
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that it might pass a measure that would satisfy KLA demands. Following
this, the Stockman reported, the Kansas City packers came to Topeka with
"blood in their eye." Long-winded opposition followed, Mercer was called
"bull-headed," and KLA was accused of having "conspired to deprive the
packers of their rights and ruin them." Nonetheless, the bill passed and the
packers had to carry their fight into the courts in order to prevent implementation. This they did, and escaped conforming to the new Kansas statute
until federal legilslation finally paralleled the state's effort and rendered it
unnecessary. The Burdick Bill, however, would have been ineffective in
regulating the firms in Kansas City in any event. Many of the operations
were or could easily become Missouri-based and thus outside the jurisdiction
of Kansas statutes. The episode did indicate, however, the strong producer
support for regulation, and this hastened the advent of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. 1 "
This long-awaited regulation of the central markets and meat processors
materialized when packer sentiment for legislation combined with that of
producers and, to a lesser degree, with that of consumers. Not since the
passage of the Meat Inspection Act in 1906 had public sentiment for regulating packers reached such proportions. One of the large packers, Thomas E.
Wilson, expressed the general position of the industry in 1921 when he told
Kansas cattlemen that producers and consumers were so hostile toward the
meat processors that something was needed to restore public confidence. This
the Packers and Stockyards Act was expected to do, and besides it was far
less "radical" than some of the earlier proposals.
In addition to general pressure for legislation KLA had a specific role
in getting Congress to approve the Packers and Stockyards Act. Several years
after passage a representative of Swift & Company listed KLA's pressure on
Senator Arthur Capper as the principal reason the measure was adopted.
It was true that Mercer and other KLA members provided the senator with
much advice concerning the proposed legislation, but Capper was not difficult
to convince.
The act attempted to prevent those packers engaged in interstate commerce from engaging in any unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive practices
such as giving undue preferences, apportioning supplies, dividing territories,
and manipulating prices. Packers were also required to keep uniform accounts
and records that would accurately reflect their business operations. Stockyard
owners and commission merchants were required to publish and charge
reasonable nondiscriminatory rates, as well as to submit their other activities

266

Beginning a Revolution: Markets, Packers, and Trucks, 1920-1940

to scrutiny. The secretary of agriculture was charged with the enforcement
of the Packers and Stockyards Act, subject to review by the courts. And, in
practice, so many precautions to protect packers from arbitrary regulation were
provided that they could, if they chose to do so, keep most rulings tied up in
the courts for several years. 16
As a result of the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Packer Consent
Decree, some of the practices that shippers complained of were eliminated.
Among producers, the decree was the least popular of the two measures,
especially after it had been in force for a decade. Strenuous efforts were made
during the middle of the interwar period to have the decree set aside in order
that the large packers might enter the retail food business. The meat processors led the movement, but it received strong support from many groups
of producers, including KLA. Mercer testified several times before USDA
investigative groups to the effect that packers were regulated sufficiently by
the Packers and Stockyards Act and that packers could be an effective competitor of grocery chains if they were allowed to participate in retail meat
sales. Lowering the price of meat and a subsequent increase in the quantity
consumed were Mercer's primary goals in getting packers into the retail
business. But USDA recommended and the courts confirmed only a partial
nullification of the decree. In 1931 packers were allowed to deal in most foods
at the wholesale level but were generally denied entry into retail sales. 17

While producers were sucessful in obtaining more government regulation, the
cost of marketing remained high and continued to agitate stockmen. There
was no large reduction in the charges of commission merchants or stockyards as a result of the new legislation, although during the early 1930s the
USDA conducted a prolonged investigation of marketing expenses and
reported that charges had been reduced, with an expected savings to shippers
of several hundred thousand dollars annually. Despite these claims, however,
producers felt that marketing costs were high compared to livestock prices. 18
Because they believed that marketing was too expensive, stockmen made
several additional moves in their continuing effort to increase profits. Kansas
cattlemen first encouraged small packers, like the Ruddy Packing Company
in Kansas City, to compete with the large stock buyers. Then, Mercer and
Edwards became deeply involved in a scheme to raise enough money from
Kansas and southwestern cattlemen to purchase the bankrupt Drover's Packing Company, also located in Kansas City. They expected a plant owned by
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cattlemen to allow producers to reap some of the rich rewards that they
claimed were common for the large packers. All of these attempts, however,
either folded as individual enterprises or failed to affect the producers' share
of the meat industry's profits in any significant way. 19
Another proposal for reducing marketing charges and increasing profits
materialized during the early twenties in what was called the conference plan
for selling stock. Cattlemen had been advocating a conference system with
middlemen for several decades. Under Mercer's leadership, KLA repeatedly
called for the establishment of a permanent routine that would enable shippers
to come face-to-face with middlemen to resolve grievances. Finally, in 1922,
the Kansas City Livestock Exchange agreed to a plan proposed by Mercer.
Stockmen first suggested reducing the number of commission firms plying
their trade at the Kansas City yards, believing that with fewer merchants
commission charges that reached $18 to $20 a car for cattle might be reduced.
Mercer claimed that there were twice as many firms on the Kansas City
scene as were needed and that the high commission charges were a direct
result. Cattlemen believed that a larger volume for fewer merchants might
enable the charges to be lowered. After repeated attempts to reduce the number of commission men and to make the conference plan work, cattlemen
had to admit defeat.
Far more effort was devoted to a similar practice that had also been suggested a number of times, usually under the rubric of orderly marketing.
Basically, this concept involved proportioning daily receipts to the expected
packer demand through the cooperation of all the middlemen in the marketing
process: railway officials, commission merchants, stockyard managers, and
packers. It was thought that advance estimates of receipts by the USDA
market news service and the lengthening of the marketing week to five or
six days would be essential for orderly marketing. With supply geared to
demand, Mercer often proclaimed, prices for livestock would be higher and
more stable. But much to Mercer's disappointment, stockmen were unable
to establish a permanent system of orderly marketing during this generally
depressed interwar period. It had worked effectively, many producers believed, not only after a fire at the Kansas City stockyards in 1917 but also when
it was urged by the government towards the end of the war. But too much
cooperation was needed, apparently, for orderly marketing to be achieved
without a central authority to compel it. Mercer, however, was slow to give
up the idea, and it became during the late twenties the cornerstone of his
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proposal for an agricultural commission. It was the basic suggestion that KLA
made to the Farm Board when it became a reality.~ 0
Cooperatives were another attempt to reduce marketing costs that largely
failed to help the state's cattlemen. The number of Kansas cooperatives had increased slowly until the latter part of World War I. By 1917 the state reported
553 cooperative concerns, 59 of which were livestock shipping associations. No
terminal cooperatives were reported at this time, and it is likely that none
existed, although attempts had been made to establish them. Towards
the end of the war the Farmers' Union, after doing business successfully in the Omaha yards, spread its operation to other central markets,
establishing cooperative commission houses at St. Joseph in 1917 and Kansas
City the following year. The yards in Wichita and Parsons acquired Farmers'
Union branches in 1925 and 1935. These terminal cooperatives received stock
from any producer who cared to pay the small membership fee. In 1923 the
American Farm Bureau Federation added a cooperative commission house to
the Kansas City exchange. While this provided stockmen a choice of cooperative firms, it also resulted in more competition for the new, struggling firms. 21
Statistical data, while sparse and inconsistent, indicates that in 1929 there
were cooperative commission houses at twenty-two of the nation's central
markets, handling over twelve million head of stock annually at receipts of
$314.5 million. In Kansas City receipts by cooperatives rose from zero to over
10 percent of the total by 1924. A larger percentage was handled by the
Farmers' Union agency in St. Joseph, where 20 percent of the total receipts
in 1923 and an average of almost 14 percent for the whole decade of the
twenties passed through the cooperative firm. Large hog marketings helped
account for the proportionately larger patronage of the St. Joseph cooperative.
The cooperatives in Kansas City and St. Joseph claimed an annual savings
for producers of almost $40,000 and $78,000, respectively-perhaps an exaggeration-throughout the decade after World War I, in addition to providing
better services.
During the early 1930s the relatively small influence of cooperatives in the
marketing of Kansas stock declined considerably and then recovered slightly
toward the end of the decade. By the middle thirties only fourteen cooperatives were reported to be in the Kansas livestock trade, doing an annual business of $1.2 million. Growth had been hampered by the lack of cooperation
between the Farmers' Union and the Farm Bureau groups, by the large
number of small lots that had to be handled, and by the producers' tendency
to dump their inferior stock on the agencies. As a result, the influence of the
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cooperatives was limited by their inability to control enough of the marketings
to raise prices.2 2
For the most part, the producers' conscious efforts to reduce marketing
expense came to naught, but other developments did reduce somewhat the
cost of marketing stock. One of the most significant was the decentralization
of the nation's marketing points and packing industry. Usually referred to
collectively as direct marketing, decentralization of the traditional marketing
facilities involved both an augmented number of community auctions-often
called sale barns-and a rise in the quantity of stock sold directly to the
packer, either by the producers themselves or by country buyers who represented a particular packer. Consequently, larger numbers of producers sold
their stock without sending them to central stockyards. Decentralization of
the packing industry involved simply an increase in the number of small
packers that operated outside the immediate area of the terminal stockyards.
During the interwar period, marketing decentralization was the most pronounced of the twin developments, and by World War II the facilities that
allowed large numbers of producers to avoid terminal stockyards were in place.
Only the beginning of packer decentralization was accomplished at this time,
however, with the most significant development delayed until after the Second
World War.
Some observers thought that decentralization was a revolutionary development for the livestock industry, something entirely new for the thousands of
livestock producers across the nation. In one sense this was true, but decentralization was also, in part, only a continuation of the movement of packers
and stockyards toward the source of supply that had begun well back in the
nineteenth century. In another sense, although decentralization was revolutionary in the minds of most twentieth-century producers, it was reminiscent
of the relationship that had existed between producer, marketing point, and
processor before the Civil War and the subsequent development of large,
regional marketing and packing centers. The twentieth-century version of
moving meat into consumer channels, however, was done on a much larger
scale and was considerably more sophisticated than its nineteenth-century
counterpart.
Exact figures are unavailable for the percentage of Kansas beef cattle that
was marketed through community sale barns or directly to packers without
passing through central stockyards. Some indication of the growing popularity
of direct marketing in the state, however, can be inferred from the national
trends that developed, from the widespread interest in the new marketing
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practices, and from the increased number of auction houses in the state by 1940.
The Stockman occasionally referred to the growing number of community
auctions in Kansas during the year immediately following World War I, but
there were relatively few of them until the early 1930s. Though the increase
in Kansas was not as large as some midwestern states experienced, a considerable number of new local auctions were established in the state. The number
was estimated to be somewhere between two hundred and three hundred by
the late thirties, enough to provide each county in the state with at least two. 23
Development of community sales presented the beef industry with new
dimensions of the old problem of protecting livestock from diseases and stock
thieves. Central markets had long ago provided for regular sanitary inspections, treatments, vaccinations, and brand inspectors, who determined whether
the consignees actually owned the stock being sold. Most of the same procedures eventually developed at the community level. Regulation along these
lines was begun in Kansas when the legislature passed a KLA-sponsored bill
in 1937 that required the licensing of markets and charged the sanitary commissioner with the responsibility of controlling the spread of diseases. 24
Stock was also sold outside the central markets directly to packer buyers.
This practice avoided the competitive bidding of community auctions and,
more than any other method of direct marketing, incurred the wrath of
cattlemen. With the cooperation of the railroads in permitting the use of
their pens and loading facilities, packers established concentration yards m
some parts of the countryside where stock was collected and sent directly to
the slaughtering plant. This practice was especially popular in marketing
hogs, and thus was more common in the heavier hog-producing areas of the
Midwest, but the Stockman reported that it was also becoming popular in
Kansas. This method was roundly criticized by several Kansas producers,
primarily because it delayed the passage of other stock that was destined for
terminal marketing. Producers also believed the method lowered prices. To
fill these concentration yards, packers sent buyers to the countryside to negotiate private sales-some said with favored producers. A few stockmen even
claimed that the large packers secretly divided the country into territories,
each having an area in which other packers would not compete. 25
Another controversial method of direct marketing involved the establishment of packer-owned yards near those of the central stockyards. Mercer
blamed the Packers Consent Decree, with its prohibition of packer-owned
yards, and the regulations of the Packers and Stockyards Act for this develop271
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ment, but in fact a few of these private yards existed before the postwar
government regulations.
Private yards in Kansas City, called the Mistletoe Yards and owned by
Armour, constituted one of the major burs under the KLA saddle for over
two decades. The Mistletoe Yards had been built during the early 1900s
when the Fowler Packing Company failed to get the Kansas City Stockyards
Company to build runways to its plant, located about a mile from the main
yards. Armour fell heir to the yards when it bought the Fowler plant, and,
according to John A. Edwards, maintained the yards and the older Fowler
processing plant at the expense of the modernized Morris house, which it
absorbed during the early twenties. Throughout this interwar period the
number of livestock sold through these private yards increased rapidly. Although hogs constituted the principal and possibly the exclusive species of
stock passing through the Mistletoe Yards, many Kansas beef producers were
concerned with the precedent that was being set for marketing outside the
terminal centers. Despite repeated attempts by KLA either to close down
the yards or to have them placed under the supervision of the USDA, the
Mistletoe Yards continued to exist. 26
Although it is impossible to determine the exact quantity of Kansas
livestock involved in direct marketing between the wars, the large increase
in community sale barns and the great concern that the Stockman expressed
regarding direct sales indicated that marketing shifts in Kansas were at least
as great as those that occurred nationally. In fact, direct marketing may have
been even more popular in Kansas due to the large number of stockers and
feeders that were produced. Nationally, about 10 percent of the marketed
cattle and 15 percent of the calves were sold by direct marketing methods
throughout the twenties. By 1939 the percentage of cattle and calves passing
to new owners outside the central markets had grown to 23 and 34 percent,
respectively, and by 1956 the percentages had risen to 30 and 63. While this
change in terminal market patronage was quite evident in the stocker and
feeder class, the marketing of fat cattle ready for slaughter continued to
depend heavily on the central markets, even as late as the 1950s. Even though
the movement of cattle outside the terminal marketing centers during this
period was significant, that for hogs was even more startling. By 1940 as
much as 50 to 60 percent of the hogs marketed were sold outside the major
terminals.~ 7
Marketing of livestock outside the terminal exchanges, then, was well
established by 1940 with both the community and direct-selling methods.
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Direct marketing developed because of a variety of factors, not least of which
was the stockmen's persistent desire to reduce marketing expense. To a large
extent direct marketing accomplished this end. Commission charges at local
auctions were, for example, less than those at the large terminal markets. But
a more important advantage enjoyed by patrons of community sales was in
escaping railroad freight rates. Reduced transport charges operated most
effectively in the exchange of stocker and feeder cattle, and the transfer of
this class of stock became one of the more important functions of community
sales, especially if the cattle were destined to be fed in the immediate area.
Cattlemen also saved freight charges by using community sales to market
stock when they finished the fattening process, although this was usually not
what was done. Marketing stockers and feeders through community sales
was one of the few forms of direct marketing that received KLA's unqualified
blessi ng, and savings on freight rates was the principal reason for the association's support.
Low market prices and the consequent decline in the producer's ability to
pay freight rates were also important in encouraging direct marketing. The
developments during the early thirties, when market prices were extremely
low and direct marketing experienced a rapid growth, demonstrated this
relationship. But whether the lower commission charges and the savings on
freight rendered the producer larger profits remained a disputed matter. The
lower prices that were paid for livestock-and prices were usually a dollar
or so a hundredweight lower than at the central markets-prevented higher
profits, according to some, and the absence of a wholesale shift away from
terminal markets supported this view.
Other reasons for the popularity of direct marketing, however, m ay have
been more significant than the real or supposed enhancement of profits.
Technological developments-the radio, telephone, teletype, and especially
the truck-enabled local sales not only to keep abreast of the latest developments in marketing but also to have an hourly account of price fluctuations
at the central markets. It was an advantage for producers to know the price
levels at the terminal markets and an inducement for them to market directly
if the local price was not too much below that at the larger market. The
increased use of trucks, though, was the most significant technological factor
in encouraging direct marketing. Conversely, opportunities to market locally
encouraged the use of the truck. This new mode of transport, along with
the many new and improved roads, not only reduced transportation charges
but greatly facilitated the movement of stock at the community level. In the
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end, the widespread use of trucks served to link the local and terminal marketing centers, to the producers' advantage. They had a choice as to marketing
points, and the competition resulted in better service even if not in higher
profits.
Many producers perferred marketing closer to home because they could
save time, watch their stock weighed and cared for, and often deal with
people in whom they had greater confidence. Local marketing was also an
economic boost to the whole community, as farmers and ranchers who brought
livestock to sales often bought many of their supplies and other necessities
before returning home. Chambers of commerce, however, learned quickly
that a sale barn located in or near a town might prompt unfavorable comments from those who happened to reside downwind from the holding pens.
While most direct marketing was adaptable to all species and lot sizes,
producers with hogs or small lots of cattle most often used the community
sales method. Larger stockmen supported selling direct to a packer representative or feeder. Producers also used local sales for dumping their inferior
animals, while the choice stock was shipped to the larger markets. Although
this was not particularly good for the reputation of the local market, it did
enable producers to market more uniform bunches at the major terminals
and save railway ta riffs on inferior stock. Consequently, the opportunity to
sell the poor stock locally incurred the displeasure of local auction operators,
but it likewise increased the profits of producers. 28
Doubts about the advantages of direct marketing were common during
the early period. KLA, for instance, fought tooth-and-nail against direct
selling and only reluctantly condoned community sales, except for the transfer
of stockers and feeders. M. W. Borders, who was billed as a farmer, believed
that direct marketing was evil and the "gravest question that has ever confronted the livestock industry of this country." His support for this position
was steadfast, if not necessarily justified. Immediately after making the
accusation, he delivered the longest talk ever given at a KLA convention.
His audience, although tired by the long ordeal, was generally sympathetic
to his diatribe against direct marketing.
Heading the list of KLA complaints against marketing direct was the
depressing effect it supposedly had on prices. Mercer reasoned-when he was
not accusing packers of arbitrarily setting prices--that the free and open
competition on the large central markets determined the price that producers
received . It followed then, he believed, that if packers went outside the
central markets for some or most of their supply, prices were forced down.
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Community auction barn, Dodge City. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical Society.

Some producers, including Mercer, believed that packers were engaging m
direct purchasing deliberatdy to lower prices. The KLA secretary also claimed
that direct purchases in the countryside by packer buyers skimmed the choicest
animals from herds, leaving only the poorer stock to depress even further
the price levels on the large public markets.
According to transcripts available in KLA files, direct marketing prompted
the most serious dispute between packers and Kansas producers that occurred
between the wars. Reportedly, charges and countercharges, threats and counterthreats, and much "'offensive language"-not included in the transcriptswere part of confrontations in Kansas City and later in Chicago that had been
arranged by Mercer. At one time, the packers walked out of the meeting in
disgust. Somewhat later, after Mercer had smoothed their ruffled feelings,
Gustavus F. Swift vowed never again to sit down with producers if the
threats and abuse continued. Though stormy and exciting, the meetings
accomplished nothing. KLA's strong opposition to direct marketing continued
for a few years, then declined as it became apparent that the organization was
losing the battle.
Before giving up, however, KLA led a movement for passage of legis275
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Inside the Dodge City auction barn. Courtesy of the Kansas State Historical
Society.

lation that would have authorized the USDA to supervise most livestock
transactions-especially those that were conducted in places like the Kansas
City Mistletoe Yards-just as the government looked after the large public
terminals. But after more than a half-dozen years of periodic debate in Congress on what was usually called the Capper-Hope Bill, the legislation failed.
The opposition from states farther removed from large central markets and
thus more interested in direct marketing was instrumental in defeating Capper's proposal. Packers also opposed the bill, arguing that they preferred to
use the central markets for their necessary supply, as this method burdened
the producer rather than the packer with risks and expense of shipping. They
were forced to buy direct, the packers claimed, because there was not enough
livestock being sent to the central markets to keep their plants in full production. Competitive buying by packing plants on the West Coast and by small
plants in the area served by the terminal markets was cited as the reason
for declining receipts. 29
After a long and sometimes bitter fight, KLA and other producers who
opposed direct marketing were unable to reduce its popularity. Selling hogs
directly was always the most urgent concern, but KLA was also troubled
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about cattle that were exchanged in this manner and even more fearful of
the long-range implications on livestock price-setting policies if the central
markets ceased to exist. As far as the effect of direct marketing on livestock
prices during this period was concerned, however, KLA's strenuous opposition
may have been largely a wasted effort. Direct marketing continued to increase in spite of KLA, and a USDA-sponsored study by the Brookings
Institution concluded that there was no evidence to support the charge that
packers lowered general prices by directly purchasing stock. Producers in
general and KLA in particular, it seemed, were always willing to blame
almost anything but overproduction and the often depressed state of the
whole economy for what seemed to be small returns from their stock.30

During much of the time that direct selling developed, there was a parallel
movement toward establishing small packing plants outside the immediate
area of the large stockyards. Kansas, however, did not respond to this development in the same manner that it had reacted to the decentralization of
marketing points. While some decentralization did occur, the relative importance of the packing industry in the state temporarily declined.
There had always been, of course, some packing outside the large terminal
centers, as well as processing that was divorced from the large packers. The
big packers sometimes established their own small plants or bought those
established by others. Kansas had a few packing plants scattered across the
state, serving mostly the demands of the immediate area. As early as 1868
Edward W. Pattison established a packing plant in Junction City, for instance;
and by the beginning of World War I several towns, including Pittsburg,
Hutchinson, Manhattan, and Topeka, all had plants that were divorced from
the terminal packing centers in Kansas City and Wichita. Most of these
plants were concerned primarily with hog slaughter, but a few cattle were
killed, and the only government-inspected horse-meat packing plant in North
America during the early 1900s was the Hill Packing Company in Topeka. 31
The ownership of the nation's packing businesses and the plants themselves were decentralized to such an extent during the first postwar decade
that the proportion of the meat slaughtered for interstate commerce by the
big packers declined from over 70 percent in 1916 to around 58 percent in
1929. The large packers' response to these decentralized plants was generally
to buy them, or to build plants of their own that were outside terminal markets.
During the two decades following 1927, Swift, Armour, Wilson, and Cudahy

277

The Kansas Beef Industry

absorbed about sixty-fi.ve smaller plants in addition to the new ones they built
for themselves. By the 1940s the percentage of slaughter performed by the
large packers was back up, although the location of the processing plants had
been diffused. 32
The tendency of packers to decentralize during this period had a strange
effect on the packing industry in Kansas. Always among the leading states
in livestock production, Kansas might have been expected to profit from the
movement of packing towards the source of supply, but such was not the
case. Instead, the importance and size of the industry declined throughout
the interwar period. Excluding agriculture, packing was the largest industry
in Kansas during the twenties, and the state as a whole ranked second behind
Illinois. A decade later Kansas was third, and had declined to sixth by 1939.
The value added by Kansas packing revealed much the same pattern. In 1919,
$40 million worth of value was added, $33 million a decade later, and only
$20 million in 1939.
One of the major reasons for the slump in Kansas packing between the
wars was the drought-induced decline in hog production. Hog slaughter, like
the direct marketing of hogs, was often the stimulus for decentralization. The
diffusion of cattle and sheep slaughtering locations was less rapid than that
for hogs. Cattle and sheep came from a wider area, and to be economic the
slaughter of cattle needed to be on a scale sufficiently large enough to utilize
all the by-products. Scale was especially significant for those by-products
used in the manufacture of pharmaceutical supplies. The effects of New Deal
crop-limitation programs, which reduced the amount of corn raised in Kansas
and then encouraged its production in diverted cotton acreage in a few states
like Texas, also affected Kansas packing. Not only was hog production discouraged in the state, but other areas were encouraged to increase their feeding
of livestock and, subsequently, their slaughtering of these animals. 33
In addition to declining hog production and the problem of scale, the
distribution system of the larger plants was also involved in the decline of
Kansas packing. As the distribution system reached almost all areas of the
country, the importance of local slaughtering was reduced accordingly. After
World War II, however, the Kansas packing industry was to regain and even
surpass its former prominence.
Nationally, other factors were important in encouraging packers to decentralize. Shifting and growing population centers, the relatively high costs
from congestion at large terminals, the increased cost and complexity of labor
relations, and the desire to exchange obsolete old plants for more efficient new
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ones, all had some bearing. But the most significant stimulus was related to
transportation. The truck was beginning to reduce the packers' dependence
on railroads, not only for the delivery of livestock but also for the distribution
of meat, especially after the refrigerated truck came into use. The use of
trucks for distribution and also for delivery of livestock to processing plants,
to a large extent, was a development that had a much greater impact after
1940.
Despite the truck, however, railroad transportation remained vital to
packers throughout this interwar period. But here, too, freight tariffs played
a significant role in decentralization. Theoretically, freight rates on live animals were fixed so that they were equalized with rates for shipping meat,
even after the reduction of bulk and the transportation of by-products at a
lower rate were figured in. But this was usually not the case in actual practice.
When all shipping expenses were figured, rates tended to discriminate against
the shipment of live animals from central states eastward. Cattlemen often
opposed rates that favored the shipment of meat because they believed that
eastern buyers might be driven out of the central markets in the Midwest
by these inequitable rates, thus reducing competition. Mercer occasionally
opposed reductions on meat tariffs before the ICC, because, he said, comparable rates on live animals and meat enabled "order-buyers from the East
to liven the Kansas City market." Yet Mercer also favored locating packing
plants as close to the source of supply as feasible in order to reduce shipping
expenses for producers, a stand contradictory to his position on meat tariffs.
While tariff schedules favored the shipment of meat from central states
eastward, they had just the opposite effect on shipments to the West Coast,
where the transporting of live animals was encouraged. The railway tariff
situation, then, tended to influence central states to ship meat to the East
and live animals to packers on the West Coast. Either way, decentralization
of the traditional packing locations was encouraged. 34

Considerable decentralization had occurred by 1940 in both the nation's
marketing and processing facilities for livestock. It was the beginning of a
revolution. Railroads had built the large stockyards during the closing decades
of the nineteenth century, enabling meat processors to centralize and still distribute their products nationally. Now, trucks were tearing the system apart.
As a result, cattlemen were given options in the marketing of their stock.
Stockmen were also successful in getting the government to regulate the
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stockyards and packers during this period, but failed to find the large decline
in marketing costs that they had expected. A variety of interrelated forces
contributed to these movements, forces that continued and multiplied after
World War II, when even larger accomplishments in the same areas were
to occur. Establishing the foundation during the interwar period, however,
was important in its own right.
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During the early 1940s, as many young people in Kansas exchanged their
overalls and blue jeans for the uniforms of the armed forces, they left behind
a mature beef industry. Some of the state's cattlemen marketed calves from
their large and small cow herds, others specialized in producing younger cattle
on grass, and a few fattened the grass-matured stock on grain. Cattlemen had
upbred their herds beyond the wildest dreams of their nineteenth-century
predecessors; science had mitigated the evils of many livestock diseases; and
technology had solved many of the problems involved in producing beef.
Stockmen had responded to the evolving economic situation first by organizing
the Kansas Livestock Association and then by building it into one of the
nation's strongest state organizations. The KLA, in turn, provided cattlemen
with the collective power to deal with big business and to win from government the concessions they needed for improving the industry's health. In
short, the Kansas beef industry was well prepared to make its contribution
to the country's war effort and to develop sti ll further after the conflict ended.
From a national perspective the Kansas industry, like that in states sur- •
rounding it, was transitional in beef-producing techniques. Here, in a state
located strategically at the threshold of the Great Plains, were stockmen
engaged in full-feeding cattle on grain, a practice that dominated the Midwest,
and those involved in more expansive grazing operatio ns that characterized
the cattle industry to the west and south. This transitional character reflected
to a large degree the state's environment and its agricultu re as a whole. As
one moved from east to west, rainfall declined, long grass gave way to short,
and corn yielded to wheat as the basic field crop. Kansas producers, who had
chosen to specailize in calf production, maturing of stocker cattle, or gram
fattening of feeder stock, had adapted well to their environment.
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After almost a decade of drought, adequate rain returned to the Great Plains
during the 1940s. Thirsty pastures again grew green and lush, demand for
beef rose substantially, and cattlemen smiled on their newly found prosperity.
Although troubled somewhat during World War II with ceiling prices, transportation and labor shortages, rustling, blackmarkets, and rationing, cattlemen
adapted to these difficulties along with an increase in number of cattle and
greatly improved prices. In Kansas, the number of beef cattle and calves rose
from 2.0 million in 1940-with an average selling price of $7.95 per hundredweight-to 3.4 million in 1945, bringing $12.41 per hundredweight. Prices had
not been as good since the First World War, nor had cattlemen had as many
cattle to market since 1903. In larger numbers than ever before, cattle moved
away from their traditional marketing locations to help meet the growing
demands of the West Coast, especially California. The higher ceiling prices
there, railroad rates that favored live animals, and the concentration of military
personnel and defense plants, all contributed to the change.
The prosperity and optimism that characterized the beef industry during
the war continued into the postwar period. Although the number of beef
cattle in the state declined-remaining, for the most part, below three million
head until 1951-and despite the fear of many that a repeat of the post-World
War I depression was in store, prices climbed to unparalleled heights. An
average of $23.29 in 1948 was the highest for any year of the decade. The
demise of ceiling prices, full employment with high wages, aid for European
recovery, and the desire of American consumers for more beef contributed
to the higher prices. Cattlemen enjoyed unprecedented prosperity and needed
no direct government subsidies. As a result, they loudly rejected Secretary of
Agriculture Brannan's plans for increased aid. It was time for "rugged individualism" again, although cattlemen still demanded high tariffs and disaster
relief.I
A severe blizzard toward the end of the forties was one of the few things
that dampened the spirits of Kansas cattlemen during this period. Sweeping
in from the northwest during November, 1948, and with a repeat performance
in January, 1949, heavy snows, strong winds, and bitter cold blanketed that
part of Kansas west of Salina. By late January, 1949, the Kansas Stockman
estimated that 50,000 sheep and 10,000 cattle had perished and that hundreds
more were unaccounted for. Losses sometimes reached 40 to 50 percent of
individual herds . Hundreds of young cattle died as the calving season arrived before the snow and cold had passed. It was the worst storm for the
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Great Plains since the legendary winter of 1886--87, with the final count m
April, 1949, approaching 200,000 cattle deaths in the whole region.2
Many of the cattle and sheep that perished in western Kansas were
pasturing on wheat, a growing practice in that part of the state after the
drought of the 1930s. The return of normal rainfall and the advent of the
tractor encouraged raising more winter wheat. As the rains increased during
the forties and fall wheat got a better start, pasturing livestock on wheat had
increased in popularity. Over 300,000 cattle, but occasionally as many as
600,000, and over a million sheep were grazed commercially-about half by
nonresident operators-when moisture and the growth of wheat were favorable. While the practice added a few coins to the pockets of farmers and
ranchers, it proved disastrous for some during an unusual winter like that
of 1948-49, when feed reserves were inadequate and it sometimes was impossible to transport to the fields the feed that did exist.3
Despite some adverse weather, however, the 1940s were good to cattlemen, especially when compared to the difficult struggles of the previous decade.
One observer has noted, "The whole story, briefly told, came to this: Prosperity deadened all pain, and few cattlemen felt any pain anyhow."~
Phenomenal weather patterns and fluctuations of over $10.00 per hundredweight in cattle prices perplexed K ansas stockmen during the 1950s. In 1951,
to begin with, the state experienced the wettest year since records were begun
in 1887, culminating in heavy and severe floods in the eastern part of the state.
With the Korean War in full swing, an all-time high average price of $29.69
per hundredweight for beef cattle accompanied the unusual amount of rainfall.
The next year, beef prices dropped $4.00 a hundredweight and rainfall also
declined to below normal. By August the Topeka Daily Capital reported
that trucks were hauling hay and other cattle feeds into the western section
of the state because of drought. Drivers kept their trucks running twenty-four
hours a day, hauling feed from as far as Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, and Indiana.
At times, water also had to be hauled, but the many farm ponds that had
been constructed since the 1930s helped alleviate this shortage. 5
Beginning in Texas in 1951, the drought hit most of the Great Plains
before it had run its course by the late fifties. Consequently, dust storms that
reminded older residents of the 1930s struck western Kansas in full force.
Herds were reduced but the state's total beef-cattle population was not affected
by the drought nor the decline in demand after the Korean War ended until
1957. Beef cattle, which numbered 3.3 million head in 1951, rose rapidly by
half a million before 1956, then declined to below 3 million by 1957. The
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decline in numbers was brief, however, and by 1960 the state had over 4
million beef cattle and calves. Beef prices fell as a result of the droughtinduced marketings and the end of the war, forcing the government, with
machinery that had been established during the New Deal, and also the
Farmers' Home Administration established in 1946, to enter the marketplace
and credit outlets to help support prices and profits. The lowest price occurred
in 1956 when beef cattle averaged $16.34 per hundredweight before a slow
climb to almost $24.00 in 1959, and to just under $22.00 in 1960. In all, according to John T. Schlebecker, "Times were not bad, but neither were they
good." Some of the prosperity of the forties carried into the early fifties;
then drought, inflation, and rising production costs eroded the profits in
raising beef. Ironically, a severe blizzard struck western Kansas during this
generally dry period. This 1957 storm caused estimated losses of 15,000 cattle,
6,000 sheep, and 2,000 hogs. As was true during the winter of 1948-49, many
of the sheep and cattle that died were grazing winter wheat. 6
Notable progress also occurred after World War II in the area of disease
control, although the large battles against the tick, blackleg, and tuberculosis
had almost been won before the war. Brucellosis control moved forward, but
not until the 1950s were serious measures taken by range producers to eradicate it. Vaccination of calves was the main means, but there were also expanded testing programs and some slaughtering of stock. In 1949 Kansas
restricted sales of cattle without brucellosis tests unless they came from a herd
certified to be free of the disease. A few cases of anthrax appeared in the
state during the fifties, but immediate quarantines effectively stopped its
spread. Vesicular stomatitis and anaplasmosis also appeared in the state on
occasion, but not in epidemic proportions.
One of the major accomplishments of scientists was the elimination of
parasites. The cattle grub, caused by heel flies, was especially troublesome,
affecting a third of the range cattle on the Great Plains in 1945, with millions
of dollars lost as a result of damaged hides and inferior meat. Nor did cattle
that were continually annoyed by heel flies gain as well as they might have.
By 1947 Kansas was in its third year of a DDT-spraying program to rid herds
of the heel fly. Better weight gains followed, but the spraying affected only
indirectly the grub that ruined hides and damaged meat. By the middle
1950s, however, USDA scientists, working with the large chemical companies,
had developed effective chemical treatments that spelled doom for many costly
parasites, including the destructive grub. The new vaccines and chemical
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treatments were expensive and pushed up production costs, but the investment was more than repaid at market time. 7
Many other changes also occurred in the Kansas beef industry during
the dramatic twenty years following World War II. Most of the prewar
concern over packers, stockyards, and railroads disappeared, as more and
more of the stock found markets outside the terminal centers. Trucks and
pickups continued to replace the railroads, who made little effort to retain
their livestock-carrying trade. In their attitude toward the government,
cattlemen, as might have been expected, displayed much inconsistency. While
opposing the likes of social security, and price and production controls, they
demanded at the same time disaster relief, high tariffs, government purchases
of beef, and much aid in the area of disease control.
The most visible changes in producing beef in the state after the war,
however, did not occur in marketing, in the cattlemen's attitude toward
government, or in disease control, but rather in developments related to irrigation and feedlots. To many, the unprecedented rise in irrigation and the
full-feeding of cattle in large commercial lots amounted to a revolution.
As it happened, these spectacular developments also affected most of the other
aspects of the business of raising cattle.
Feeding cattle on grain before slaughtering has been a part of the
American beef business almost from the beginning and has always had some
role in the Kansas industry. With few exceptions, single family operators
before World War II fattened the cattle that were full-fed or partially fed.
Most frequently, a cattleman bought a carload or even several carloads of
older steers and fed them throughout the winter. The work provided the
feeder profitable employment during the slow winter months, kept some of
his equipment in use, and often supplied a better market for his grain. Fattening with grain also occurred in conjunction with the use of forage crops
or the roughage left over from harvesting grain. A few Kansas cattlemen
fed several thousand head a year, but they were exceptional. Before the war,
most of the state's cattle were still marketed as grass fattened and ready for
slaughter, or as "warmed up" feeders destined for cornbelt feedlots. 8
Although most cattle marketed from Kansas before World War II were
not finished on grain, there was a slight increase in feeding toward the end
of the 1930s. After a short burst of feeding during the early forties, however,
the ceiling prices and the rising demand for beef brought many cattle directly
to slaughter from grass, interrupting the trend toward more feeding that
had begun earlier. But after the war Kansas participated in the growth of
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feeding that occurred throughout the Great Plains and the Southwest. The
expansion occurred when more of the state's farmers and stockmen began
feeding, when those who already fed cattle expanded from 50 or 60 head to
150 or even as many as 500, and when the large commercial lots developed.
Large commercial feedlots-usually defined as operations with a thousandhead capacity or more, feeding cattle that are owned by the operator or are
fed on contract for others-were the most visible development in the postwar
revolution but, until after 1960, not necessarily the most important. The
spectacular growth of feeding in Kansas came after the middle 1950s and
was initiated by the smaller feeders, usually one man and his family. Many
of today's urban dwellers, who are struck by the pungent odor emanating
from the large commercial feedlots dotting the highways, sometimes located
just outside a city, may conclude that most of the beef in their supermarkets
comes from the large lots. But this was untrue of Kansas beef as late as 1960.
Although the Board of Agriculture failed to tabulate the number of small
feeders during the fifties, it did report in 1960 that "in spite of the remarkable
development of large commercial feed lots in many areas of the state, it was
significant to note that more than 75 percent of the 1960 Kansas cattle feeding
was still in smaller farm operations." The most remarkable development
before 1960, then, was not the large commercial lots that dealt exclusively
in cattle, but rather the significant rise in the number of smaller lots that
were only a part of the total farm or ranch operation.
The percentage of cattle being fed in large commercial lots, however, rose
dramatically soon after the Board of Agriculture made its report. From 26.7
percent in 1960, the portion of cattle fed in commercial lots with a capacity
of a thousand or more rose to 57.5 percent five years later, and to 87.6 percent
by 1975. The number of commercial lots in the state also increased, but not
as dramatically as did the percentage of cattle fed in them. In 1952, for
instance, there were 7 large feedlots in the state and only 22 by 1960. Five
years later the number had grown to 88 and to 140 by 1974. As the large lots
grew in size, many of the smaller feedyards went out of business, reducing
the total number of lots in the state from 13,500 in 1965 to only 6,300 in 1975.
By the 1970s the number of large commercial lots had stabilized at around
135. The many smaller feeders who responded to market conditions by going
in and out of business, however, caused fluctuations of more than a thousand
a year in the total number of feedlots in the state. As a result of the revolution, Kansans by the 1970s marketed around two million head of grain-fed
cattle each year, up from less than half a million in 1955. 9
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Many reasons account for the rem arkable postwar development of feedlots
m Kansas. Most of the reasons apply to similar developments throughout
much of the Great Plains. The re latively dry climate reduced the diseases
that feedlot operators had to deal with and led to fewer environmental problems; and the area was close to large supplies of feeder cattle and grain, and
near several good markets for fat stock. The postwar period brought a rising
demand for meat, especially the smaller cuts from quality beef that could be
produced efficiently in feedlots. Economic factors, such as the rising cost of
g rass-fattening cattle and the desire of cow herd owners for income at times
other than their traditiona l fall marketing of calves, also encouraged feeding.
Science and technology played a role. Growth hormones, like stilbestrol, in
addition to the many antibiotics that were mixed with feed, not only produced
healthier cattle but also larger gains at a more profitable rate of growth.
Mechanical loading, feeding, and mixing devices saved much labor in the
fattening process and added to profits, once the initi al investment had been
retrieved. 10
The large supplies of grain and forage in the immediate area of the
feedlots, however, encouraged expanded feeding on the Great Plains more
than any other factor. Access to these raw materials eliminated the prohibitive
expense of shipping grain into the feeding area . Irri ga tion , which provided
the increased yields of grain and forage, thus became the second basic element
in the postwar revolution in beef production. Few travelers through the semiarid western part of Kansas today can remain unmoved by the sight of thickly
planted corn towering alongside the highways, the lush fields of green alfalfa,
and the millions of bronze and heavily laden heads of sorghum, waving
gently in the summer breeze. Somewhere, often hidden during the late
summer by the tall corn, is probably an aluminum pipe, almost a quarter of
a mile long, supported and moved along by a half dozen or more giant,
wheeled towers. With a single rotation around a center pivot, at the operator's
command, this amazing device spreads several inches of precious moisture on
thirsty crops that formerly had to beg the heavens, often unsucessfully, for a
taste of rain. Even the Sand Hills aro und Garden City, relatively rough land
for irrigating, now feels the tread of the towering center-pivot systems. The
first settlers in western Kansas learned painfully that corn was not the best
crop for the environmental conditions; now irrigation has circumvented, at
least for a while, the laws of nature that send or withhold rain.
Although irrigation had been a part of Kansas agriculture for a long
time, its growth at first was slow. A little over 50,000 acres were artificially
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watered in 1920, less than 90,000 by 1940, and only 100,000 by the end of
World War II. Then a rapid expansion began. The number of irrigated
acres in 1945 had more than doubled by 1950 and had risen to 900,000 by the
time the drought ended a few years later. By the late fifties over 90 percent
of the irrigated acreage was located within twenty counties in the southwest
corner of the state.
The increase in irrigation during the 1950s, however, proved to be only
a shadow of the explosion that occurred the following decade. From fewer
than a million acres in 1960, the number shot upward to over two million
by the early 1970s. Drought encouraged some of the expansion, as did the
scientific advances that were made in crops, fertilizers, and watering techniques. Extremely important in the growth of irrigation, however, was the
large demand for grain and forage that developed as cattle feeding increased,
a demand that farmers, with the greatly improved irrigation equipment, easily
filled. In all, the rapid and large increase in cattle feeding and irrigation
proved to be concomitant developments with significant reciprocity. Sorghums, especially after hybrids were introduced in the 1950s, rivaled wheat
in importance. The state's cornbelt shifted from the northeast to the southwest, and the yields of the crops under irrigation more than doubled the
dry-land production. Feedlots fostered and then consumed the added production. In many ways feedlots made farmers and ranchers partners in the
beef business rather than adversaries, if, indeed, they had ever been anything
else.11
As a result of the developments in feeding and irrigation, the number
of beef cattle and the amount of red meat packed in the state rose significantly.
The western one-third of the state had more cattle than ever before (see
Map 4, p. 73). The count of beef cattle in Kansas grew from 4 million in
1960 to over 5.8 million by 1970, and to 6.8 million by 1974. Numbers fluctuated with market conditions, but the last figure represented two and three
times the number of beef cattle the state had kept before the feedlot industry
expanded. Between 1.6 and 2.8 million of these cattle came from other states,
some for grazing, but most for the large feedlots that dotted the countryside.
Oklahoma and Texas, as in the period before World War II, provided about
half the inshipped cattle, with the balance coming from more than a dozen
other states. 12 Meat packing also expanded as many packers moved closer
to the supply of butcher cattle. In 1961 Kansas packers slaughtered enough
livestock to produce over a billion pounds of meat with a value of $432.8
million. By 1974, slaughter was up to 2 billion pounds at a value of $1.5
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billion. Beef and veal accounted for 61 percent of the total poundage of red
meat packed in 1961 and over 82 percent in 1974. By the 1970s the packaging
of red meat was one of the state's leading industries, generating six or seven
times its dollar value in other business activities. The growth of feedlots with
their large concentrations of fat cattle had helped make it profitable for the
packing houses to move from the congested cities to the small towns near
where the stock was produced. 13
The extraordinary growth of feedlots and irrigation did not occur without
difficulties, especially in the area of the environment. Despite many unknowns,
such as the rate of recharge and the quantity of available water, for example,
farmers plunged into the irrigation era full force. Slowly, the Water Resources
Division of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture caught up with developments and began to impose more rational planning in the use of water. When
many owners located feedlots near urban areas, citizens complained of the
offensive odor that rose from the lots, especially during wet weather, and the
many flies that were attracted by the manure. The lot operators, on the other
hand, pointed out the numerous economic advantages that cattle feeding provided the communities. Both groups had viable arguments. The most serious
problem for feedlot owners, however, was not the offensive odor but rather
the disposal of waste without polluting surface and underground water supplies. Natural conditions-a lower water table, as well as less surface waterhelped solve most of these problems in western Kansas, but feeders in the
eastern part of the state were not as fortunate. During the late 1960s fish kills
in the Neosho and Cottonwood rivers led to the closing of several feedlots,
including yards that were owned by the Crofoot and Anderson families. Gradually, though, and at the request of government agencies, most yards overcame these difficulties by building large lagoons into which the waste drained.
Sometimes the waste was then used for irrigation, thus providing both moisture
and fertilizer for crops that were later consumed by the cattle in the lots. The
Pratt feedyard became one of the best models in the nation for this type of
efficient disposal and reuse of waste from fattening cattle.H
While hundreds of Kansas farmers and ranchers participated in the revolution in cattle feeding, the names of several families stand out most prominently. Their operations exemplified the new trends in feeding. E. T. Anderson, one of the earliest large feeders, began buying land and feeding cattle
during the early 1900s. He made good money during World War I, then
nearly went broke during the 1930s. He continued to deal in cattle, however,
and in 1940, with his son Kenneth, purchased a decrepit feedyard near
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Modern feedlot near Pratt, Kansas, 1972. The circles of center-pivot 1rngation
systems are visible between the rows of cattle pens and at the bottom, right. Courtesy of the Pratt Feedlot, Inc.

Emporia that eventually became a modern feeding enterprise. They gradually
improved and expanded the lot until by the early 1960s it reached a capacity
of 20,000 cattle. But Anderson's operation closed down a few years later,
when faced with large remodeling expenditures to prevent polluting surface
water in the area.15
The Crofoot family fed cattle along the Cottonwood River near Strong
City and Cedar Point, not far from Anderson's base at Emporia. These men
contributed much to the advent of large commercial feeding in the Flint Hills,
traditionally the summer home of thousands of grazing cattle. In conj unction
with his pasturing operation, J. F. Crofoot began feeding cattle during the
depression of the early 1920s. As his sons, Ray, E. C., and Glen, grew older,
they first became partners with their father and then in the late thirties
developed their own cattle businesses. By the time of World War II the
Crofoots had several feeding establishments. Ray Crofoot, operating near
Cedar Point, even used a water-powered mill for grinding feed. The old mill
continued in operation until the disastrous flood in 1951 destroyed the water
wheel and forced conversion to electric power. As the demand for fed cattle
rose during the early 1950s, the Crofoots expanded, carving large feedlots from
the hills west of Strong City. The hillsides provided shelter for the stock
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during bad weather, and the pens were easily cleaned because of the natural
rock floors. Proper drainage of the lots that lay close to the Cottonwood River,
however, eventually proved an insurmountable obstacle. By the early 1960s
the Crofoots, now aided by a third generation, had expanded their lots in
the Flint Hills to a capacity of over 20,000 head, and were interested in other
feeding enterprises outside the state. But stricter pollution standards during
the late 1960s drove the feedlots along the Cottonwood River out of business.
Girdner, a son of E. C. Crofoot, estimated that to remodel their lots in
accordance with government specifications would require an expenditure of
over a quarter of a million dollars, a sum that the family chose not to spend.
The Crofoots, however, did not give up feeding cattle. E. C. Crofoot and
his son Jay moved to the drier climate of west Texas to operate a large feedlot
near Lubbock. 16
While eastern and central Kansas had always had some cattle feeding
and had witnessed much expansion after World War II, the western part of
the state was more properly the home of the postwar revolution in feeding. It
occurred, naturally, in the twenty counties that were mentioned earlier for
their large growth in irrigation. As a result, one observer was able to note
in 1971 that over half the total cattle feeding in the state was done within
a hundred mile radius of Dodge City. 17
Earl C. Brookover, more than any other individual, led the developments
in the western part of the state, beginning his operation in 1951 at a site
north of Garden City in the fertile valley of the Arkansas River. Ed Robbins,
a rancher from Belvidere, who wanted income from his cattle at times other
than during the fall marketing of calves, supplied Brookover with some of
his first feeder cattle. The Garden City stockman started with 500 steers,
then, using his own and other local capital, gradually increased the capacity
so that today the yard has bunk-line space for 42,000 cattle. The turnover
rate is about two-and-a-half times a year, allowing over 100,000 cattle to pass
through the yards in a single year.
Today, Brookover's feeding enterprise is typical of the many large commercial operations that exist throughout the West. The cattle, most of which
come from within a 300.mile radius of Garden City, are either owned by
Brookover or fed commercially for others. Brookover's own cattle are usually
purchased by order buyers who are stationed throughout the Southeast and
Southwest, receiving twenty-five cents per hundredweight for their part in
buying cattle. Brookover prefers steers for his operation, purchased at 650 to
700 pounds, fed for 120 days or until most grade choice, and then sold at
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Modern feedlot with feed mill in the background . Courtesy
of the Kansas State Board of Ag1-iculture.

around 1,000 pounds. Heifers, young bulls, and thin cows are also fed at
times, but medium-grade steers often make their owner the most profit.
Cattle that are owned by others are fed and cared for by the yards' employees
at a charge of five cents a head per day, plus the cost of feed, medical care,
and branding. Packer buyers come directly to the yards to make their purchases. Trucks bring the light cattle to the feedyards, then haul the finished
stock to packers , Upon first arriving in the yards, cattle are routinely vaccinated for red nose, blackleg, and malignant edema, then dipped and wormed
to kill external and internal parasites. Each pen of cattle receives its own
brand. Cattle are initially fed a diet that contains a high percentage of roughage to gradually "warm them up" for the concentrated ration of grain that
follows. Brookover began his feeding enterprise with a random mixture of
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grain and ensilage that was hand-scooped into bunks from the back of trucks.
Today, an ultra-modern, computerized mill that mixes and processes thirty
tons of feed an hour, all according to a prescribed formula, provides the diet
that is carried to the cattle several times daily. Mechanized feed trucks have
replaced scoop shovels. Depending upon which can be purchased at the most
advantageous price, alfalfa or some other forage crop and steam-rolled wheat,
milo, or corn may make up the basic ration, all mixed according to plan with
molasses, minerals, and other necessary feed additives.
Consistent with the vertical integration that has occurred in many agricultural enterprises, some of the four million bushels of grain that Brookover
uses each year is produced on his own irrigated farms, making him also a
leader in expanding irrigation in southwest Kansas. In 1977, he purchased
a ranch just south of Garden City, which had belonged for many years to
0. C. Hicks, in order to expand his irrigated farming. Preparations were soon
begun for using processed waste from a Garden City packer to supply some
of the water for the sprinkler systems that Brookover erected on the Hicks
ranch. The completed project was expected to work to the advantage of both
the feeder and the packer.
Brookover's feedlot is a clean and efficient operation, with few problems
in disposing of waste. Pens are carefully cleaned after cattle are shipped out,
and the manure is spread over his land or stored for use after the crops have
been removed from the fields. Some manure is also sold to farmers in the
area, who use it to fertilize their irrigated crop land. 18
From the beginning, Brookover has been at the forefront of the changes
that have occurred in cattle feeding and irrigation in southwest Kansas. The
daily operations of most other commercial yards are similar to those at Brookover's modern factory for making beef; but few yards are operated as efficiently
or, most likely, with any more profit. Today, the feedlots operated by Brookover and those run by the many others in western Kansas who have followed
his lead are an important stimulus to the local economy, providing markets
for the ranchers' calves and an outlet for the abundant grain and forage that
is raised in the immediate area. The lots have become the focal points of the
communities' agricultural endeavors. In addition, employment is provided
for numerous people, who either care for the cattle or shuffle the necessary
papers that facilitate the many transactions that must accompany the business.
Packers are supplied with quality beef and truckers are provided cattle to
haul or meat to carry away to distant urban centers. Millions of dollars are
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added to the Kansas economy each year as a result of the recent developments
in the making of fine beef.
In addition to increasing the number of grain-fattened cattle that came
out of Kansas after World War II, the revolution described above affected
other segments of the Kansas beef industry as well. Production in the state's
best-known area for cattle raising, the Flint Hills, did not escape the changes.
During the 1950s and after, the expansion of feeding operations and the
increased use of commercial feed supplements significantly changed cattle
production in the Flint Hills. In the state's most distinctive beef-producing
area, more cow herds began to eat the lush grass that had formerly been
reserved for cattle shipped in from the Southwest. Despite the increased
number of breeding herds, however, cattle were still shipped in for summer
grazing; but even this practice changed as the age of the cattle gradually
declined as a result of commercial feeding and changing consumer demands.
In 1945, for instance, Wayne Rogler, a pastureman from Chase County, grazed
3,100 three-year-old steers for Dolph Briscoe of Uvalde, Texas. The cattle
gained 284 pounds each as a result of their three months on the bluestem.
A few years later, E. T. Anderson still pastured over 3,000 three-year-old
Matador steers, but the practice soon declined. During the 1950s, two-year-old
stock began to dominate. By the late 1960s breeding herds and yearlings
accounted for most of the cattle in the Flint Hills. By 1976 Rogler estimated
that 30 to 40 percent of the bluestem was used by locally owned cow herds,
with the remainder utilized by yearlings.
In addition to the increased consumer demand for grain-fed beef and
the commercial feeds that aided winter use of pastures, the general prosperity
that cattlemen experienced during and after World War II encouraged residents to buy their own cow herds and to cut down on out-of-state cattle.
Stockmen also learned that rising land prices and other production expenses
had raised the cost of fattening cattle on grass. Highly mechanized feedyards, using the large grain supplies that became available, fattened cattle
almost as cheaply, and did so in less time. 19
The origin of and the type of cattle that continued to come into the Flint
Hills after the war also changed a good deal. High-quality Herefords from
the Texas Panhandle and Oklahoma dominated the Flint Hills trade before
the 1930s, then cattle from southern Texas became prominent in the movement. Today, yearling steers move into the Flint Hills from several states
to the south and east of Kansas, together with those from the traditional
sources in the Southwest. Today's cattle are owned mostly by producers in
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Kansas and Oklahoma, are of mixed colors rather than straight-bred Herefords,
and are generally of poorer quality than most of the earlier stock. Pasturemen
refer to them as "#1 and #2 Okies." 20
The drought of the 1930s and the rising costs of grass fattening encouraged more scientific research in grass utilization during the postwar period.
Feeling that research in the use of grassland had fallen behind that in other
areas of agriculture, leading stockmen in the Flint Hills helped persuade the
state to buy a small tract west of Manhattan for the use of Kansas State
College of Agriculture in its research. The benefits from rotating pastures,
weed and brush control, and the use of supplemental feeds were demonstrated,
as were the harmful effects of overgrazing. The advantages and disadvantages
of annual pasture burning also received much study, but as late as 1970 university scientists had not ended completely all of the old arguments. The time
of burning, the moisture content of the soil, and the intended use of the
pasture were discovered to be critical in the decision on whether to burn.
Though some cattlemen have completely dispensed with burning, others still
fire their pastures periodically in hopes of gaining better weed and brush
control and more forage per acre for their cattle.
Today, cattlemen in the Flint Hills continue to experiment. Some, for
instance, are increasing the number of cattle per acre while reducing the
length of the grazing period. Normally, a steer is allowed about four acres
for the summer grazing season. By cutting the acreage in half and by making
sure that all cattle are gone by early July, some cattlemen have found that
they can get more gain and profit per acre and that the grass still has time
to replenish the food supply to its roots before dormancy in the fall. A July
sale to one of the many feedlots and the rising costs of production on grass
contributed to this development. 21
Two decades or so after World War II the Flint Hills exemplified another
postwar development in the western beef industry-cattle of different hues
had replaced many of the straight-bred Angus and Herefords. This change
offended some traditionalists, who argued that the crossbred cattle destroyed
the eye appeal of stock and that it mongrelized the traditional breeds. But the
multicolored steers and heifers, although sometimes offensive to older stockmen, suggested that the traditional British breeds were being crossbred with
each other or mixed with one of the new exotic breeds that had recently been
introduced into the United States.
While there had been much crossbreeding during the nineteenth century,
when British breeds were being used extensively to upgrade the Longhorn,
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most large ranchers had settled on straight-bred herds once the cattle had
been improved. These straight-bred herds generally dominated the range
country until the late 1950s and 1960s. Then, led to a large extent by the
work of USDA scientists at the experiment station near Miles City, Montana,
and by following scientific advances that had already been made in the
development of hybrid seeds, swine, and even chickens, cattlemen also began
to seek hybridization. They desired the earlier maturity and greater milking
ability from mother cows, the heavier weaning weights from calves, and the
better gaining qualities from feeder stock that advocates claimed for crossbred
cattle. In the end, cattlemen hoped for larger profits from more beef production with the same quantity of feed. But the breeding of purebreds continued
because maximum results from crossbreeding were not attainable without
purebreds for use in crossing.
Some ranchers developed sophisticated breeding programs that involved
three-way crosses, but this was often a complicated procedure and required
more pasture space than many had available. Most simply altered the breed
of their bulls, often by running Angus bulls with their Hereford cows or
whiteface bulls with their black cows. Cattlemen also used exotic breedsCharolais, Simmental, Santa Gertrudis, Brahman, Limousin, and others-in
their crossbreeding programs. While the Brahman had been in the country
for a number of years, most of the exotics came only after World War II or,
in the case of the Santa Gertrudis, were developed here through specialized
breeding programs.
Few exotics grazed Kansas grass before 1960. Paul Mannell, who farmed
southwest of Lincoln, brought some of the first Charolais into the state in
1960, while E. Wallace Johnson, near Towanda, registered the same year the
first purebred Santa Gertrudis in the state. Several other exotics were also
represented, including M. A. Bell's herd of Highland cattle from Scotland.
But most crossbreeding in Kansas followed the trend of mixing Hereford
and Angus cattle.
Many of the advantages claimed by advocates of crossbreeding resulted
from mixing the traditional British cattle and by introducing exotic blood
from continental Europe. Due to their hybrid vigor, calves were larger
and better muscled, brood cows matured earlier and gave more milk, and
feeder stock gained weight more efficiently. As a result of the many attempts
at crossbreeding and because the breed itself had been improved, Angus
cattle became more popular in the range country. Shorthorn blood also
became more common in the West, although the breed was hampered by a
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shortage of breeding stock. Conversely, straight-bred commercial Hereford
and Angus herds declined in number. Not all crossbreeding, however, had
the desired effects, as some herds were downgraded by the use of inferior
sires. But cattlemen soon realized that although crossing two animals of poor
quality might produce some hybrid vigor, it also resulted in inferior progeny. 22
While many owners of commercial herds experimented with crossbreeding, producers of purebreds were reluctant at first to endorse crossing, fearing
that the purebred business might be injured. But there was little loss of business, as purebred sires and dams were still necessary for the crosses. Herefords,
traditionally the most favored cattle, continued to be popular, most crossbreeders using the whitefaces someplace in their programs. Cattlemen who
crossbred cattle desired above all the aggressive breeding of the Hereford bull,
as well as his superior ability to transmit his desirable characteristics.
Several other developments appeared after World War II in purebred
Herefords, some detracting from the breed and others adding to its popularity.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example, several prominent stockmen
in the West contributed to a change in the Hereford's conformation as they
bred and selected shorter, more compact animals. The new Herefords had
much eye appeal, style, and heavy muscling; but, after being plied with grain
in modern feedlots, they also had too much fat for the modern consumer.
As a result, the trend turned back to the long-legged, rangier types of Herefords.
Dwarfism, a problem caused by a recessive gene, became a more serious
problem for the breed. Further, most other breeds, especially the Angus,
also were affected by dwarfism at about the same time. One government
expert estimated in 1952 that 15 percent of the calves born that year were
affected by the abnormality. Cattlemen and their breed associations first
tended to ignore the problem, while high-grade sires and dams continued
to spread the genes throughout the country. Numerous avenues looking
toward the detection of the offensive gene, such as insulin injections designed
as a possible means of identifying dwarf carriers, were explored by scientists;
but the ultimate practical solution involved checking of pedigrees for any
known dwarf-carrying ancestry, screening of herd bulls by progeny testing,
and the prompt elimination of all animals which proved to be carriers of the
defective gene. Thus, by the 1970s, dwarfism as a major industry problem
not only had been significantly reduced but for all practical purposes was
virtually eliminated.23
Artificial insemination and performance-testing were new developments
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that aided cattlemen. The first allowed a high-quality bull to spread his
characteristics to literally thousands of calves, to some even after his death.
Performance-testing, which requires the systematic weighing of calves at
various stages of development, added scientific evidence to the judgment of
cattlemen in selecting the most desirable breeding stock. Superior and inferior
sires and dams were more easily identified. Before it had gained popularity,
however, some disagreements developed between the people who showed
their cattle and the advocates of performance-testing; but by the 1960s the
groups worked together to the advantage of both. Most were already convinced by the time the 1976 reserve grand champion Hereford bull at the
Denver stock show demonstrated that the same animal could do well in both
performance-testing and in the show ring. Clair Parcel, one of the state's
early advocates of performance-testing, had raised the bull. 24

Although the state's breef producers confronted many production and marketing problems during the decades following 1890-some resolved, some
not-the cattle industry experienced remarkable growth in its size and in
its contribution to the total agricultural economy of the state. Throughout
most of the twentieth century, between 35 and 40 percent of the state's total
acreage has been used for grazing, which represents more land than that
devoted to any other single use. In addition, part of the millions of acres
planted to field crops produced forage or feed grains that were used as cattle
feed. By 1940 over 64 percent of the cash receipts of Kansas agricultural
producers came from the marketing of livestock and its products; over 31
percent of the total receipts derived from cattle and calves alone. By World
War II, after the depression and government programs of the 1930s had
dealt the hog industry a severe blow, beef cattle were easily the dominant
species of livestock in the state. After 1940 there was a temporary decline in
the importance of the livestock sector as a whole, relative to that of field
crops, but this was not the case with the beef cattle portion of the state's
agricultural economy. In 1950 and 1960, for instance, cattle acounted for
34 and 35.7 percent, respectively, of the total cash receipts from the marketing
of the state's major farm commodities. This was almost the same as for
wheat. Beef gradually increased its share until by 1970 nearly 50 percent
of the total cash receipts came from marketing cattle, while that from
wheat declined to 22.4 percent. Livestock's contribution as a whole had also
risen by this time to almost 64 percent. The land that was used, then, the crops
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that were fed, and the cash receipts all pointed to the tremendous significance
that beef production had attained in the Kansas economy .25
Even though beef production increased its contribution to the state's
economy during the twentieth century, financial returns to individuals from
ranching over an extended period of time were sometimes not large. Considering the capital invested and the amount of work involved, cattle producers
often could have made more money in other endeavors. One study of Flint·'
Hills grazing, for example, estimated that landowners received net profits
of less than 3 percent on capital invested, capital which in "other forms of
investment could readily bring immediate returns of four to six per cent." 26
These figures applied to ranching during the 1960s; but, judging from the
many references to no or low profits, they were representative of returns to
Kansas beef producers throughout much of the twentieth century, especially
the period after the First World War. The profit figures, however, did not
include the gains that accrued to property owners as a result of rising land
values. In fact, the increased value of the land, especially since the 1930s,
may have outstripped the profits from producing cattle. Nor did the study
measure the many intangible attractions of raising cattle, such as pride of
ownership, continuing a family heritage, enjoying the primitive beauty of
the land and the environment as a whole, and the pleasure of improving a
product. These advantages, both tangible and intangible, help explain why
Kansas and other beef-producing states have never suffered a shortage of
cattlemen, and why the nation's consumers have seldom endured a shortage
of meat. Through good times and bad, cattlemen can be expected to continue
to produce an adequate supply of beef for the nation's consumers.
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